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Abstract 
The Mexican Experience with Financial Sector  
Liberalization and Prudential Structural Reform 
After WWII, the Mexican government took increasingly the control over the 
economy including the banking sector in 1982.  By 1985, a worsening economic 
crisis forced the government to begin a process of economic liberalization. The 1994-
1995 financial crisis prompted efforts to develop a sound prudential framework for 
Mexico’s financial system.  Toward this goal, liberalization in financial services is 
vital for developing countries to make their build   financial systems viable and their 
economies stronger. Related economic legal reform scholarship indicates that safe 
and sound financial markets are built upon the effective implementation of key 
“international prudential standards”.  In 1995, Mexico started to work domestically, 
from the “bottom-up”, in financial sector reform, while applying step by step 
international prudential standards and opening unilaterally the sector to foreign 
investment, even ahead of the liberalization agreed in NAFTA.   
 
NAFTA’s and MEFTA’s innovative chapters on financial services, with their 
various dispute resolution mechanisms, are examples of Mexico’s commitment to 
promoting high levels of cooperation at the bilateral, regional and hemispheric levels.  
At the global level, as part of G20, Mexico has promoted a financial system reform 
approach that continues liberalization with financial stability and sustainable 
economic development. This thesis argues that Mexico’s case demonstrates that 
financial liberalization and related structural reform need to be integrated in a 
coherent and coordinated policy manner, and be effected in an enlightened country-
specific (bottom-up) and sequenced manner. This must be applied within a wider 
financial stability framework combined with sustainable, equitable economic policies 
consistent with a country’s particular developmental stage.  
 
Fifteen years after Mexico began its financial liberalization agenda, the Global 
Financial Crisis has demonstrated that such a process can deliver a stronger and more 
stable financial system. Mexico should therefore not backtrack on its commitment to 
the prudential liberalization of its financial sector but use the crisis as a basis for 
further meaningful reform and policy readjustment to create further substantial and 
sustainable liberalization and regeneration longer term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to modern economic development scholarship, liberalization in financial 
services is vital for developing countries, such as Mexico, as it can assist them in 
building viable financial systems and developing stronger economies. Related 
economic legal reform scholarship, indicates further that, to develop robust yet safe 
and sound financial markets, a country should build these markets upon a structural 
foundation rooted in “international prudential financial standards.”  
 
International prudential financial standards have been created over the past two 
decades, during which the international financial community has been devising 
consensus on international standards and codes of conduct to achieve financial 
stability and develop robust financial systems. This consensus has taken the form of 
pronouncements by such bodies as the BCBS, IASC/IASB, IOSCO, IAIS, JF, and 
FSF.
1
 
 
This dissertation centers on Mexico (a leading developing economy and a member 
of the G20) as a country case study in the attempt to create a viable “prudential 
liberalization” framework respecting its domestic financial sector.  It argues that 
Mexico is a case in which law and related institutional framework have been 
fundamental to economic development generally, and in which an effective financial 
sector is essential to economic growth. 
 
The 1994 Mexican crisis caused a fundamental re-evaluation of the role of 
financial law and institutions with the consequent development, for the first time, of 
a comprehensive framework of internationally acceptable “international prudential 
financial standards” delineating minimum requirements for financial stability.2 
                                                 
1
 See BCBS, “Report on the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments – Concordat” (Sep. 1975); 
BCBS, “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards” (Jul. 1998); C. 
Felsenfeld & G. Bilali, The Role of the Bank for International Settlements in Shaping the World 
Financial System, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. (2004) at 945; and D. Alford, Basle Committee 
International Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 
DICK. J. INT’L L. REV. 189 (1992) at Ch. III. 
2
 See Douglas Arner, The Mexican Peso Crisis: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Markets, 
LAW & BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 4 (1996) at 28-69; and See DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW (2007) at 2. 
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Law has a role in both financial stability and financial market development, both 
of which, in turn, are important for economic growth.  The current international 
financial system was developed as a response to the risks inherent in financial 
liberalization, domestic restructuring and globalization of finance.   
 
IFI’s Financial sector legal reform efforts that are part of the so called NIFA,3 
mandated by the G7 (which include the WB and the IMF),
4
 have not formally and 
systematically considered how, within the context of an overall legal infrastructure 
and policy approach and framework, the financial sector reform efforts should fit 
into, and support, the economic and social development.
5
  
 
Thus, in addition to the application of international best practices, the 
improvement of substantial legal and judicial framework, societal cognizance of, and 
adherence to, rules and their enforcement should also be encouraged.
6
  Likewise, 
fundamental legal changes are to be introduced in a measured, sequenced and 
sustainable manner consistent with the country’s particular stage of economic, 
financial, and even political development, including its relative level of market and 
regulatory sophistication.   
 
Such was Mexico’s case, as shown in Chapter I.  As a response to its 1980s and 
(mostly) 1994-95 crises, Mexico has been the leading Latin American country in 
efforts to develop a sound prudential framework for its financial sector, keeping an 
eye toward evolving “international prudential financial standards” yet working 
domestically from the bottom-up.  
                                                 
3
 Beginning in the mid 1990s, G7 (today G8) began to focus on “international financial architecture.” 
The first use of the specific terminology “New International Financial Architecture” is often attribute 
to Michael Camdessus, former managing director of the IMF, who first began regularly to use this 
term in 1998 (e. g., Michael Camdessus, “Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized 
World,” address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, May 8, 1998).   
4
 See George Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability Forum, 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW & ECONOMIC LAW 24 (1999). 
5
 This author is in no way arguing that G7/G8’s efforts and IFI implementation, dissemination and 
assessment over the past decade have been without merit but suggesting that these efforts and 
directions are not sufficient, inasmuch as they deal with an incomplete picture of a developing 
country’s longer-term economic and social developmental requirements, which can be facilitated 
through the financial sector’s legal development.  See J. J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW 
REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (2000). 
6
 See J. J. Norton, “Taking Stock of the “First Generation” of Financial Sector Legal Reform” (WB 
Law & Development Working Paper Series 4, 2007).   
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Simultaneously over the past three decades, the international financial community 
has been in the process of devising a consensus on international standards and codes 
of conduct to achieve financial stability and to develop robust financial systems. This 
consensus takes the form of minimum standards in the form of soft law, with 
compliance being achieved through the force of example.  The pronouncements are 
made by such bodies as the BCBS, IASC/IASB, IOSCO, IAIS, JF, and FSF.
7
 
 
Trade-financial services liberalization agenda and the prudential 
standards-structural reform agenda have largely been driven on separate policy paths 
and by differently motivated sets of diverse domestic, regional and international 
bureaucrats.  It is with much irony that any real policy and practical linkage between 
these two interrelated but most often disconnected agendas has only arisen briefly in 
times of prior financial crises, and perhaps more so now on a sustained basis in light 
of the current GFC (2008-2010). 
 
International agreements on trade-financial services liberalization (WTO/GATS, 
NAFTA, and MEFTA) focus on opening domestic boundaries to allow the provision 
of financial services at both cross-borders and local levels. The financial sector 
reform needed at the domestic level to implement commitments undertaken 
internationally mainly emphasizes competitiveness and greater concern for financial 
stability. In terms of self-fulfilling crises, financial liberalization makes attacks 
possible and exposes underlying financial vulnerabilities to the vagaries of 
international capital markets.
8
   
 
Defining the nexus between trade liberalization and safety and soundness 
concerns for financial markets and institutions is a major cooperative challenge for 
trade and financial authorities at the multilateral, regional and domestic level. 
Moreover, the issue of proper sequencing in financial service liberalization is critical.  
                                                 
7
 For discussion of soft law and its role, see G. Bertezzolo, The European Union Facing the Global 
Arena: Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Regulation,” 34(2) ELR 257 (2009); T. Meyer, Soft 
Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2009) at 888; P. VERDIER, 
Transnational Regulatory Networks and their Limits, 34 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2009) at 113; A. HAMANN & H. FABRI, Transnational Networks and Constitutionalism, 6 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) at 481; S. PICCIOTO, Constitutionalising 
Multilevel Governance?, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) at 457. 
8
 See Norton, “Taking…, op. cit., at 30. 
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It seems to this author that the primary emphasis needs to be placed on the 
“maturing of the internal financial system and market,” which includes broadening 
access to the financial system and linking the prudential and financial sector reform 
side to the IMF and WB reform efforts, and to the above mentioned international 
financial standards-setters such as the BC, before wholesale external liberalization 
takes place.
9
 
 
The sequencing of reforms is not a mechanical process but one that should be 
customized and fine-tuned on a country-by-country basis.  Legal reform should be 
approached from a made-to-order, not a ready-made, perspective. Improper 
sequencing (i.e., liberalization that precedes strengthening of financial reforms) has 
been a critical underlying factor in many financial crises.  
 
Proper sequencing is important as a country tries to broaden its financial system in 
a meaningful, fair and equitable
10
 manner to make it accessible to those who are 
presently excluded from it.
11
 
 
Financial inclusion “is present in the discussions about the future of financial 
regulation, and it is acknowledged as a component of financial and socio-economic 
stability as it provides opportunities for those who are not economically 
privileged.”12   
                                                 
9
 See id., at 30. 
10
 See id.; and CGAP, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR FUNDERS OF MICROFINANCE, 2nd ed.; 
Microfinance Consensus Guidelines (CGAP 2006): “With an estimated three  billion  of  the  world’s  
population  “excluded”  (in  terms  of  practical  effect,  not necessarily by intent) from the financial 
sectors of their respective countries—leaving them without any financial “lifeline” or any effective 
means to access the financial sector, and without the prospects of wealth creation over time—the 
importance of getting this next generation of financial sector reform right cannot be overstressed”. 
11
 See Norton, “Taking...”, op. cit., at 34.  See also GERARD CAPRIO, PATRICK HONOHAN, and 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, eds., FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION: HOW FAR, HOW FAST? (2001). The 
problems that arose from the failure of proper sequencing of reforms in Thailand in the 1990s are 
illustrative here. 
12
 AFI & CNBV, REPORTE DE INCLUSIÓN FINANCIERA 1 [1ST REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION] 
(2010) at 10 [hereinafter 1ST REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO].  Along similar lines, the 
WB has said that, “Recent development theory sees the lack of access to finance as a critical 
mechanism for generating persistent income inequality, as well as slower growth. Without inclusive 
financial systems, poor individuals and small enterprises need to rely on their own limited savings and 
earnings to invest in their education, become entrepreneurs, or take advantage of promising growth 
opportunities.  Financial sector policies that encourage competition, provide the right incentives to 
individuals, and help overcome access barriers are thus central not only to stability but also to growth, 
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Domestic banking sectors and financial systems in some developing countries 
have had a reputation of serving better the government and the upper classes at the 
expense of excluding significant portions of the population and their developmental 
needs.   
 
Studies referred by the WB on financial inclusion would seem to indicate that is 
as true about Mexico as it is about other developing economies in Latin America.
13
  
Nevertheless, a closer analysis of more recent empirical data, in light of a wholesome 
understanding of Mexico’s broader cultural and economic contexts, shows that the 
issue of financial inclusion in Mexico goes beyond what can be accomplished 
through deregulation and competition.
14
   
 
Notwithstanding the above, it is also to be kept in mind that, as the WB itself 
acknowledges, “certain regulatory prudential measures aimed at financial stability 
can restrict the degree to which banks can serve small borrowers.”15 Therefore, “A 
reform approach to financial sector policy that explicitly recognizes the importance 
of access can help ensure that financial development also makes financial systems 
more inclusive.”16   
 
A point of reference for proper sequencing of liberalization of financial services 
could be the one shaped by the EU, which has created an internal market 
characterized by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of the four 
freedoms. The EU has come up with one of the most complex regulatory and 
                                                                                                                                          
poverty reduction, and more equitable distribution of resources and capacities” (WB, FINANCE FOR 
ALL? POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING ACCESS (2008) at ix [hereinafter FINANCE FOR ALL?]. 
13.
 See A. Kumar, T. Beck, C. Campos, and S. Chattapadhyay, “Assessing Financial Access in Brazil” 
(WB Working Paper No. 50, 2005); available at: 
www.wam.umd.edu/~soumya/Docs/Assessing%20Financial%20Access%20in%20Brazil.pdf#search=
'world%20bank%20and%20access%20to%20financial%20services'.  See also T. M. Solo and A. 
Manroth, “Access to Financial Services in Columbia: The Unbanked in Bogotá (WB Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3834, Feb. 2006) at: 
www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/31/000016406_2006013109
0049/Rendered/PDF/wps3834.pdf; and  J. Caskey, C. Ruíz Durán and T. Solo, “The Unbanked in 
Mexico and the USA” (WB Policy research Working Paper 3835, Feb. 2006); available at: 
www.wwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/26/000016406_200601261
62730/Rendered/PDF/wps3835.pdf.  
14
 See infra Chapter 3, 3.2 Financial Inclusion in Mexico. 
15
 FINANCE FOR ALL? at 144. 
16
 Id. 
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supervisory schemes in the world, namely FSAP, and it includes all main domains of 
domestic and sophisticated cross-border financial services.
17
  
 
Although BCBS, IOSCO and other involved IFAs and IFIs have attempted to 
provide generally applicable core prudential standards and principles on various 
aspects of a sound banking and financial system, these standards and principles have 
largely emanated from industrialized countries, such as the EU and the US, and have 
not taken into consideration that the existing financial systems in most developing  
countries and emerging economies have tended to serves better some segment of  
society excluding others.   
 
Further, as previously discussed, the general assumption of liberalization of 
financial services is that this liberalization is, by definition, good for development. 
Again, this assumption is most often shaped by the industrialized countries (e.g., 
through WTO and GATS).
18
 
   
The interaction between international prudential financial standards and 
WTO/GATS has not been sufficiently addressed. Both developed and developing 
countries should consider carefully ex ante the implications of financial crises, as 
well as the efforts of WTO and, more directly, GATS and its component negotiations 
on financial services.  
 
In the present extensive debate on the role of the architecture of the international 
financial system in both preventing and responding to financial crises, as well as 
preserving financial stability, the interplay of the IMF, WB, and WTO/GATS has 
not been properly addressed.
19 
 
Liberalization and competition bring important economic benefits in the context 
of supporting financial development, economic growth and poverty reduction.
20
 
                                                 
17
 Chapter 2 discusses briefly this topic.   
18
 See Norton, “Taking...,” op. cit., at 37. 
19
 Id., at 30.  In the same sense, see ARNER, FINANCIAL..., op. cit., at 13. 
20
 See ARNER, FINANCIAL…, op. cit., at 440: “Competition in financial markets, as in other segments 
of a market economy, is important for proper market functioning and efficiency of resource allocation. 
Unlike many other markets, however, financial markets (especially those related to banking) as noted 
throughout this volume, carry a number of externalities, both positive and negative. Financial markets 
 25 
Research and experience suggest that a liberalized and competitive financial sector 
supports increased economic growth. As said before, at the same time, financial 
liberalization brings with it certain risk that need to be addressed appropriately.   
 
Most importantly, recent research indicates that financial liberalization without 
appropriate sequencing and development of a legal and regulatory framework to 
reduce risks actually can increase the risk of financial crisis.
21
 However, it should be 
considered as well that financial liberalization leads to more stable markets in the 
long term.
22
 
 
While the literature is generally incomplete and inconclusive to date, there is 
some positive effect of capital account liberalization on growth, especially for 
developing countries, though crises seem to be larger in emerging economies if the 
capital market opens first, rather than the domestic financial sector. Further, equity 
market liberalization appears to decrease both output and consumption growth 
volatility, indicating that equity market liberalization is good for both global markets 
and individual markets.
23
 
 
In looking at liberalization, international best practice suggests that in building a 
competitive financial sector, countries like Mexico have used multilateral and 
                                                                                                                                          
generally benefit from foreign participation and competition. At the same time, however, open capital 
markets can also have negative consequences if a proper institutional framework does not exist. 
Nonetheless, one of the best ways to generate competition is to allow foreign participation. Empirical 
research supports the idea that foreign financial intermediaries have a positive role in financial 
stability and development.”  
21
 See id., at 412. See also M. Goldstein and P. Turner, “Banking Crises in Emerging Economies” 
(BIS Economic Paper No. 46, Oct. 1996); and W. White, “What Have We Learned from Recent 
Financial Crises and Policy Responses?” (BIS Working Paper No. 84, Jan., 2000).  A result of the 
research generated by BIS and IMF after the crises has been to link financial liberalization with 
financial crises around the world over the past century.  Another important link is that between 
financial liberalization and especially competition, and financial sector development and economic 
growth, while at the same time reducing risk of financial crisis.  Weak “domestic financial systems” 
have been suggested to be a significant underlying cause of 1990s crisis when coupled with 
liberalizations without appropriate prior and /or concurrent restructuring.  Though according to some 
research financial liberalization is followed by more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the short run, in 
the long run it leads to more stable markets.  
22
 G. Kamisnky and S. Schmuker, “Short-Run Pain Long-Run Gain: The Effects of Financial 
Liberalization” (IMF Working Paper , WP/03/34, Feb., 2003)  
23
 H. Edison, M. Klein, L. Ricci and T. Sloek, “Capital Account Liberalization and Economic 
Performance: Survey and Synthesis” (NBER Working Paper No. 9100, 2002). See also G. Bekaert, C. 
Harvey and C. Lunblad, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” (NBER Working Paper No. 
8245, 2001).   
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regional arrangements such as WTO/GATS, NAFTA and MEFTA to reinforce 
progress and encourage competition and prudential liberalization.  
 
However, in addition to risks, foreign participation often raises also a number of 
difficult internal political issues in many economies, such as the case of Mexico and 
historically, often resulting in efforts to block –at some point- such participation. 
Today, foreign participation in the Mexican case is dealt with largely through 
multilateral (WTO), regional (NAFTA) and bilateral (MEFTA) negotiations. 
 
As said before, Mexico has been domestically proactive and has fostered high 
levels of cooperation on the bilateral, regional, hemispheric and global levels. 
It is worth-noting Mexico’s efforts to coordinate financial sector liberalization with 
prudential supervision enhancement through the common treaty framework of 
NAFTA, particularly through its innovative Chapter 14 on financial services and its 
vanguard dispute resolution mechanisms, which is one of the more advances set of 
rules in financial services liberalization.  
 
Of present and long-term significance are Mexico’s current efforts as part of G20 
Leaders and Finance Ministers groupings to develop a financial system reform 
approach that continue liberalization, while promoting financial stability and 
sustainable economic development.  While the 1982 Mexican Sovereign Debt default 
did not result in any imposed conditionality on financial sector reform but focused on 
macroeconomic reforms, Mexico began to initiate major economic reforms in the late 
1980s.
24
  
 
The tough financial situation resulting from Mexico’s 1994 crisis brought about 
important prudential financial sector reform that linked it to IMF, WB reform efforts, 
and to the aforesaid international financial standards-setters such as the BCBS.   
Even as a pioneer emerging economy,
25
 Mexico became proactive in these processes 
and was innovative in its approaches following a bottom up approach.   
 
                                                 
24
 See NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR …, op. cit., at 265. 
25.  Here “emerging economies” refers, according to “related terminology used by the IMF ,to market-
based economies in the process of moving to “developed” status through integration into the global 
economic and financial system. See ARNER, FINANCIAL..., op. cit., at 17.  
 27 
Simultaneously Mexico executed successfully such prudential financial standards 
into multilateral (WTO/GATS), regional (NAFTA) and bilateral (MEFTA) contexts.   
 
The onset of the 1994 Mexican financial crisis signaled the return of a sort of 
financial crises not seen since before the establishment of the Bretton Woods system. 
The design of the Bretton Woods system was to eliminate the possibility of such 
financial crises in the future.
26
  Financial crises in emerging economies over the past 
fifteen years highlight the dangers inherent in financial liberalization without the 
adequate domestic restructuring in the context of participation in the increasingly 
globalized financial system.
27
 
  
In reviewing case studies of financial crises in the 1990s, one can get a number of 
important lessons, such as the Mexican case has shown. First, becoming full 
participants in the international financial system, while at the same time maintaining 
both domestic and international financial stability, requires careful domestic 
restructuring as part of any process of liberalization. Throughout financial crises, 
liberalization without appropriate restructuring has been followed often by crises, 
which have sometimes had international or even global impact.  
 
Second, the policies and systems advocated by Bretton Woods and other IFI 
during the 1990´s did not adequately take into account the risks inherent in financial 
liberalization and likewise provided insufficient guidance on the necessary 
requirements to be implemented domestically in the context of restructuring.  Third, 
developments in one country are no longer restricted to its own borders in today’s 
increasingly globalized financial system, and consequently there is a need to 
readdress the Bretton Woods system and to have in place a proper NIFA.28  Fourth, 
all these systems, whether domestic or international, need to be based upon 
transparent, rule-based structures.
29
     
 
                                                 
26
 The Bretton Woods system was successful in many ways.  However, following the break-up of the 
fixed exchange rate system in 1973, the gradual return to free movement of capital, and the increasing 
reintegration of financial systems, the stage was set for a return to the sort of crises common during 
the 19th and 20th centuries.  See id., at 16.    
27
 See id., at 6. 
28
 See id.  
29
 Id., at 35. 
 28 
That is why the degree of liberalization of services, and specifically the 
liberalization of financial services, has generated a significant debate among the 
main emerging economies in connection with full liberalization against lesser degree 
of liberalization.  Mexico, in particular, has adopted a liberal approach over the last 
seventeen years, and the financial system has evolved toward almost full financial 
services liberalization. Nevertheless, this faced strong opposition within Mexico and 
generated significant political debates and criticism coming from the major political 
parties (PRD and PAN) and from other political forces in the country. 
 
Mexico started to strengthen its financial system back in the mid 1990´s after the 
Tequila Crisis by linking strongly to international prudential financial standards.  
This author argues that adhering to those international standards, in addition to other 
economic and social reforms, has helped financial stability and financial markets 
development, both of which in turn have been significant for economic growth in the 
country.  
 
From the perspective of this author, each country’s situation is sui generis, and 
international prudential financial standards have not been designed as instruments for 
development and access by themselves.  As Joseph Stiglitz has emphasized, there is a 
need to contemplate various political, economic, social and cultural facets of 
development as well.
30
 Thus, this paper argues that financial sector reform needs to 
be one of many other broader objectives for the sound economic development of a 
particular developing country.  
 
Therefore, this work takes into account the stage in which Mexico became 
innovative in its bottom up approach to linking to international standards.
31
 Mexico 
has enlightened the implementation of those international financial standards at 
                                                 
30
 See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); and Joseph Stiglitz, “Whither 
Reform Ten Years of the Transition” (keynotes address at the WB annual conference, Apr. 28-30, 
1999). 
31
 See Norton, “Taking...,” op. cit., at 33.  Purely top-down legal reform is not viable in the long-term 
much has to come from the bottom up. Active and fully committed country participation is needed 
from the very beginning. Keeping in mind that each country represents an individual case, nations 
may need to adopt solutions that correspond to their different levels of development and their 
different needs, especially in relation to the financial sector. This means that the initiative for 
conducting and construing reform in a broader developmental context should rest primarily with the 
involved country. 
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unilateral level, which have been executed successfully externally into a multilateral 
(WTO/GATS), regional (NAFTA) and bilateral (MEFTA) context. 
 
This work is organized in six chapters.  Chapter 1 gives account of Mexico’s 
gradual economic liberalization over the past three decades, during which it 
transformed its almost fully state-controlled economy into a more free-market 
economy, eventually becoming also an active part of the WTO regime.  It also gives 
account of the liberalization of its financial system over the last two decades, having 
NAFTA as a clear turning point.  In light of its 1994 crisis, Mexico is an example of 
how financial liberalization can be devastating if not accompanied by the 
strengthening of the financial market institutions, especially adequate supervision 
and regulation.  
 
Chapter 2 examines the history and growth of GATS and financial services 
liberalization, the GATT/WTO institution, its development and relationship with 
RTA´s agreements, as well as the liberalization commitments among developing 
countries in GATS, together with an investigation on how trade regulations in 
financial services might affect prudential and other types of regulation in financial 
services.   
 
Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses the worldwide development as assisted by 
universal, rule-based, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading with 
meaningful trade liberalization. In this sense the study shows the benefits of the 
development of multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral liberalization. 
 
Mexico’s accession to multilateral and RTAs (GATT, WTO/GATS), the 
development of the cross border financial services, the multilateral framework and 
the Mexican policy debate surrounding it, are also discussed in Chapter 2. As part of 
the aforesaid, Chapter 2 addresses the specific question of whether the Mexican 
bottom up approach, unilateral framework or autonomous liberalization is more 
important than the multilateral and regional liberalization.  
 
Chapter 2 also takes into account briefly how the EU has been an example of 
proper and interesting sequencing of liberalization of financial services, which has 
 30 
created an internal market characterized by the abolition of obstacles to the free 
movement of the four freedoms.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on Mexico’s domestic efforts to deregulate and its unilateral 
implementation of international principles and standards.  Given the additional 
challenge that developing economies face regarding financial inclusion, and the role 
that deregulation can play in favor of inclusion, this chapter examines and documents 
the legal and institutional framework of Mexico’s ongoing efforts to promote 
financial inclusion.  
 
Chapter 4 evaluates NAFTA.  It documents the political debates that surrounded 
its adoption and existence from the leftist parties in Mexico, and analyzes its 
advantages and disadvantages for Mexico.  It specially analyzes its chapter on 
financial services, as well as the different principles on trade in financial services 
such as NT, MFN treatment, market access, proportionality, harmonization and 
mutual recognition.  It also explores what NAFTA can learn from the EU, and from 
the different FTA that Mexico has signed with other countries such as Japan.  
 
Chapter 4 also analyzes the bilateral framework such as the MEFTA and its 
provisions, as well as the dispute settlement practice relating to those three 
frameworks (GATS/WTO, NAFTA and MEFTA). The principles of interpretation 
are examined including the one financial service case study presented before chapter 
14 of NAFTA. 
 
The manuscript of this work was submitted for supervisory review in early 2008 
and is intended to speak primarily as of June 2008.  In the process of revision, 
however, the major intervention of the GFC occurred and has brought into question 
the efficacy of various perceived “conventional wisdom” on global and domestic 
financial liberalization, on the international financial regulatory/supervisory 
standards
32
 that have evolved over the past two decades, and on the globalization 
processes generally.  Accordingly, a Chapter 5 on “Mexico Two Years after the 
Onset of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis” was added.   
                                                 
32
 See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of 
Governors of the IMF, (IMF Press Release No. 08/240, Oct. 11, 2008). 
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It is noteworthy how, in spite of the negative impact the crisis has have on several 
key elements of the Mexican economy, the Mexican financial system has shown a 
unprecedented strength and solidity.  This whole phenomenon is examined in 
Chapter 5, which concludes that Mexico should not backtrack on its commitment to 
“prudential liberalization” as to its financial sector but should use this crisis as a 
springboard for further meaningful reform and policy readjustments as to meaningful 
and sustainable “prudential liberalization.” 
 
The concluding Chapter 6 draws together Mexico’s three decade journey and in 
connection therewith provides some modest policy reform recommendations.  
 
The methodology used in this work has been the analysis of primary sources, such 
as International Treaties like GATS, GATT, WTO, NAFTA, MEFTA etc., court 
cases, WTO and NAFTA cases as well as Mexican law, reports and other documents 
by Mexican governmental agencies (SHCP, CNBV, BANXICO, CONDUSEF, etc.) 
and secondary sources. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF MEXICO’S RECENT POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 
AND OF ITS PATH TOWARD ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION  
 
AND  FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
 
  (INCLUDING POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS) 
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1.1 RECENT HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF 
MEXICO’S ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION   
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
This section explores the general background and context of the liberalization of 
financial services in Mexico in the 1990s.  Having NAFTA (1994) as a clear 
threshold, it explores the further legislative reforms that allowed for increased 
foreign participation in the Mexican banking sector and the financial system in 
general.  Lastly it reports on the shape of the financial system in the NAFTA era. 
 
1.1.2 General Political Economy Background and Context of Pre-NAFTA 
Mexico 
 
“The Mexican economy lived isolated since the 1930´s decade up to the middle of 
the 1980´s.”33 Throughout all this span of time Mexico was ruled by a single political 
party, PRI, which from the presidency controlled the three branches of the federal 
government, of the local state governments, and even the municipal governments.
34
   
 
Mexico’s path toward economic liberalization in general is very much the history 
of PRI’s positions on these issues up until 2000, when a different political party, 
PAN won the presidential elections and took over the executive branch of the 
Mexican government.  PRI’s position on economic policies and models has swayed 
from left to center-left to center back to left over the past decades and continues to 
have ambiguous positions on matters of political economy.
35
   
                                                 
33
 Edna Jaime Treviño, “La lógica de la reforma económica,” LUIS RUBIO (coord.) POLÍTICAS 
ECONÓMICAS DEL MÉXICO CONTEMPORÁNEO [ECONOMIC POLICIES OF CONTEMPORY MEXICO] (2001) 
at 53.  See also Robert E. Herztein and Joseph P. Whitlock, Regulating Regional Trade Agreements—
a Legal Analysis, PATRICK F. J. MACRORY, ARTHUR EDMOND APPLETON, and MICHAEL G. PLUMMER, 
eds., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS,” Vol. 2 (Feb. 
2005) at 220: “Mexico remained a basically closed economy... up until the mid-1980s.” 
34
 Mexican constitutional scholar Jorge Carpizo used the term “Mexican Presidentialism” to refer to 
the quite unlimited power (both de iure and de facto) that the peculiar kind of presidential system in 
Mexico bestowed to presidents, in spite of the constitution’s formal separation of powers and apparent 
“checks and balances.” See generally JORGE CARPIZO, EL PRESIDENCIALISMO MEXICANO,  
[THE MEXICAN PRESIDENTIALISM] 9
TH
 ed., (1989). 
35
 Some political commentators have referred to this phenomenon as “a wide center”, but except for 
the more centrists Salinas and the Zedillo administrations (1988-2000), PRI has been characterized 
more by center-left and leftist positions. Furthermore, after coming on third place in the 2006 
presidential election, below the leftist coalition lead by PRD, PRI’s new and current leadership (as of 
 34 
 
The roots of Mexican economic Statism are found in the Mexican Revolution and 
the federal constitution it begot in 1917.  Unlike the 1857 federal constitution, which 
was a classical liberal constitution that protected private property and restricted the 
government’s attributions, the 1917 constitution has been dubbed a “social 
constitution.”  What that actually means for all practical purposes is that individual 
rights are restricted in favor of greater attributions for the state (or, more realistically, 
the government) to be able to assist better (allegedly) under-privileged classes.   
 
A comparison of some samples of the most relevant portions of the two articles 
that touch on elements of political economy shows the aforesaid shift and the 
economic doctrine that dominated Mexico during most of the 20
th
 century.
36
   
 
Between 1935 and 1940 (the presidential administration of Lázaro Cárdenas) 
government “took an increasing role as chief factor in the economic dynamic of the 
country.”37  Between 1941 and 1951 Mexico was forced to substitute imports due to 
WWII, which restricted maritime transportation and therefore imports from oversees, 
and which forced the USA to limit its exports.  Although when the war was over the 
reasons that justified the import substitution policy had ceased, Mexico did not 
abandon it.
38
    
 
The accession of Miguel Alemán to the Mexican presidency (1946), right after 
WWII ended, marked the onset of the economic model of import substitution, whose 
first stage lasted up until 1956-1958, when the “stabilizing development” started 
during the second half of the presidential administration of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines.
39
 
                                                                                                                                          
2010) has moved the party’s stand (and voting behavior in the Legislative branch) from center to left, 
consistently opposing any structural reform that would change the status quo constructed by PRI 
during its Statist era. 
36
 See Appendix 2: Excerpts of the 1982 and 1983 Amendments to the Mexican Constitution.  
37
 Roberto E. Blum, “Las políticas económicas y la transformación política de México,” [Economic 
Policies and the Politic Transformation in México] in RUBIO, op. cit., at 32. 
38
 Id. 
39
 See MARTÍN CARLOS RAMALES OSORIO, INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN POR SUSTITUCIÓN DE IMPORTACIONES 
(1940-1982) Y MODELO “SECUNDARIO-EXPORTADOR” (1983-2006) EN PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA 
[Industrialization by Substitution of Imports (1940-1982) and “Secondary-Exporter” Model (1983-
2006) in Comparative Perspective], at Chapter 2 (2.1); available at: 
http://www.eumed.net/libros/2008c/434/Modelo%20primario%20exportador%20e%20inicios%20de
%20la%20industrializacion%20sustitutiva.htm).  The second stage of the “substitution of imports” 
policy took place during the “stabilizing development” era (1956-1970) and was characterized by an 
 35 
 
A significant legislative step increasing governmental control of the economy was 
given with the “Law on Attributions of the Federal Executive in Economic Matters,” 
promulgated in December 30, 1950.  In the 9
th
 edition of EL PRESIDENCIALISMO 
MEXICANO,
40
 Jorge Carpizo explained that the objective of this law was to allow the 
president “to intervene in the different facets of the economic process: production, 
distribution and consumption.”41   
 
This new law that legalized thorough governmental intervention in the economy 
was reckoned positive by Carpizo and other UNAM scholars.  Andrés Serra Rojas 
(professor of Administrative Law) praised the law saying it constituted “the most 
important legislative document on state interventionism in Mexico, aside, of course 
of the corresponding articles of the constitution.”42  Likewise, Antonio Martínez 
Baez (Secretary of Economy when the law was issued) said that “because of its 
purposes of the highest public interest,” the said law should “exist permanently.”43 
 
The most significant legislative step toward taking over full control of the 
economy was the set of constitutional amendments required to furnish, post facto, 
with constitutional grounds López-Portillo’s expropriation of the Mexican private 
banks in September, 1982.  The amendments, promulgated in February 3, 1983, 
moved the contents of Art 25 (inviolability of mail) and Art 26 (inviolability private 
                                                                                                                                          
increase in commercial protectionism, which extended beyond 1970 throughout the whole 1970s.  
Author Martín C. Ramales Osorio quotes Nora Lustig saying: “Industrialization during the fifties and 
sixties occurred within a domestic market overly protected by tax and non-tax barriers.  The 
proportion of the imports that required previous permits increased from 28% in 1956 to more than 
60% in average during the sixties, and around 70% in the seventies.” (RAMALES OSORIO, op. cit., at 
chapter 2 (2.2.); available at: 
http://www.eumed.net/libros/2008c/434/Desarrollo%20estabilizador%20y%20profundizacion%20de
%20la%20industrializacion%20sustitutiva.htm.     
40
 The 9
th
 ed., cited in this work, was printed in Dec. 1989, right before the economic modernization 
process.  However, it seems to be a mere reprint from a much earlier edition since it does not reflect 
any of the debates taking place in the late 1980´s.   
41
 CARPIZO, op. cit., at 135. 
42
 Id.  Citing ANDRÉS SERRA ROJAS, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO [Administrative Law], México 
(1974); Vol. II, at 301. 
43
 Id., at 135-136.  Citing Fernando Zamora, Fundamentos constitucionales de la intervención estatal 
en materia económica [Constitutional Foundations of the State Intervention in Economic Matters], in 
LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1917 Y LA ECONOMÍA MEXICANA [THE 1917 MEXICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE 
MEXICAN ECONOMY] (1958) at 214. 
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homes by the army in times of peace), one small paragraph each, to end of Art 16, in 
order to fill such articles with an entirely new content.
44
   
 
It is worth highlighting that, as Luis Pazos has repeatedly pointed out, most of the 
concepts introduced to the Mexican constitution by the 1983 amendments to Arts 25 
and 26 were taken from the Soviet and Cuban constitutions.
45
   
 
Art 28 was also amended as of February 3, 1983, although it had already been 
amended as of November 17, 1982, shortly after the presidential expropriation of the 
Mexican private banks.  The November 1982 amendment added a fifth paragraph to 
Art 28 (on the prohibition of monopolies) that said: 
 
It is also an exception to what is provided in the first part of the first 
paragraph of this Article the rendering of the public service of banking 
and credit.  This service shall be rendered exclusively by the State 
through institutions, in the terms that the corresponding statute 
establishes, which shall also determine the guarantees that would 
protect the interests of the public and the functioning of those in support 
of the policies of national development.  The public service of banking 
and credit will not be object of concession to particulars.
46
 
 
 
The February 3, 1983, amendment of Art. 28 went far beyond.  The new text 
rearranged what was already contained but also added several new provisions.  Such 
amendments (many of which are still in the Mexican constitution in spite of the 
economic liberalization experienced since 1985) show the profound influence Statist 
ideas have in Mexico and the consequent belief that the government should control 
the economy.   
 
Carpizo wrote that the government-owned sector had “grown in an impressive 
way,” and that there was “intervention in a very ample range of activities that are 
                                                 
44
 See Appendix 2: Excerpts of the 1982 and 1983 Amendments to the Mexican Constitution.  
45
 See, for instance, Luis Pazos, “Las falsas políticas de austeridad del gobierno mexicano” [The False 
Austerity Policies of the Mexican Government] (Jun. 3, 1985).  Originally delivered at the Mexican 
Forum of The Center for Strategic & International Studies of Georgetown University; available at: 
http://www.uaca.ac.cr/actas/1987feb/lpazos.htm. 
46
 DOF (Nov. 17, 1982) at 7-8; available at: 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_097_17nov82_ima.pdf.  
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ultimately controlled by the executive.”47  As of 1970 there were 247 government-
owned entities distributed in five sectors:   a) farming, forest and fishing; b) 
industrial; c) communications and transportation; d) social welfare; and e) financial, 
commercial and other services.  As of 1974 there were 351 government controlled 
entities, and as of June 1976, there were 511.
48
  
 
The industries and economic activities that were under direct control of the 
Mexican president were: social security,
49
 electrical power, railways and various 
train companies, one airline, airports, federal roads and bridges, the Mexico City 
underground transportation, the phone monopoly, port services, oil, housing, forests 
and fertilizers, and the iron and steel industry.
50
    
 
Carpizo’s 1989 edition of his book fails to account for the Mexican president’s 
control over the banking sector that resulted not only from the expropriation of the 
Mexican banks
51
 but also from the amendment of constitutional Art 28.  Therefore, 
the liberalization of the banking sector was going to require amending once again the 
constitution to remove the restriction contained in Art 28, fifth paragraph.
52
   
 
The high point of Statism described above was the prelude of the collapse of the 
Mexican economy in the early 1980s, which eventually forced the Mexican 
government to start, albeit hesitantly, the transition toward liberalization. 
 
1.1.3 Background and Context of Mexico’s Early 1980s Economic Crisis. 
 
The period between 1954 and 1970 is known in Mexican economic history as the 
“stabilizing development” (desarrollo estabilizador), which was characterized by 
significant and steady economic growth, low inflation and steady exchange rate.
53
  
                                                 
47
 CARPIZO, op. cit., at 151. 
48
 Id., at 151-152. 
49
 In Mexican labor law and custom, social security comprehends more than payments after retirement 
and in case of accidents, including also full medical coverage, child-care, vacationing, sports, 
entertainment and shopping facilities.   
50
 CARPIZO, op. cit., at 151-152. 
51
 See infra 2.1. Expropriation of the Mexican Banks.  
52
 See infra 2.3. Commercial Banks Re-privatization.  
53
 See Juan Ramírez Marín, Banco de México (BANXICO) [Bank of Mexico (BANXICO)], 87 
QUORUM LEGISLATIVO (Oct-Dic 2006), at 206.  Luis Pazos highlights the role of Antonio Ortiz Mena 
at SHCP in keeping low inflation during the time he held that office, which covered the better part of 
 38 
However, the economic benefits did not reach all the population but primarily urban 
middle classes.   
 
Such unequal distribution of the benefits of economic growth and stability 
brought about social discontent that included protests from labor unions (railroads, 
telephone, rural teachers, PEMEX, medics, etc.), which were strongly repressed by 
the government.
54
    
 
Upon his accession to the presidency of Mexico in 1970, Luis Echeverría Álvarez 
adopted an economic model that put on the federal government the primary burden 
of providing the growing population with education, health services, housing, and 
employment.  In order to achieve that, public expense was increased, “including the 
social expense, in order to achieve the so much desired Echeverrian ‘shared 
development’; namely, the double Keynesian goal of full-employment and 
distributive fairness.”55 
   
Consequently, in 1972 the Mexican government increased public spending “to 
expand production, decrease unemployment and improve the distribution of 
income”.56  Such public spending was paid by the expansion of the monetary supply 
by BANXICO (which continued through 1975).
57
  In addition to that, in 1973 the 
government’s budged increased taxation on commercial income. 
 
  Furthermore, the government had to resort to borrow money from the domestic 
(59%) and foreign (41%) markets.  In order to finance itself, government also 
                                                                                                                                          
the Stabilizing Development.  Ortiz was in charge of SHCP during the presidential administrations of 
Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) and Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970).  During those 12 years 
between 1958 and 1970, the average GDP was 6.2%, and the average annual inflation was 2.6%, 
which at some points was lower than that of the USA.  This was due, according to Pazos, to fiscal 
discipline, low foreign debt, and free prices.  See Luis Pazos, “Desarrollo estabilizador ¿Secreto de 
Ortiz Mena?” (May 15, 2007); available at: 
http://www.asuntoscapitales.com/default.asp?id=3&ids=2&idss=8&ida=2046.  Also, between 1952 
and 1960, BANXICO was directed by Rodrigo Gómez who “declared himself along his 
administration, as a staunch enemy of inflation, since it not only has negative effects over the 
distribution of the income, but also ends stopping investment and economic growth” (Ramírez Marín, 
op. cit.).  Ramírez Marín highlights the role of BANXICO’s prudent monetary policy in achieving 
economic growth and stability.        
54
 See RAMALES OSORIO, op. cit. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 “The monetary mass grew at an average inter-annual rate of 18.2% during 1971-1975” (id.). 
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resorted to increase in 1% the “encaje legal,” the obligatory reserve that private 
banks had to keep in deposit at BANXICO.
58
 
  
Such measures caused inflation, which turned negative the real interest rates paid 
by banks to the saving public.  Credit for the private sector became unavailable from 
the domestic banking sector, so it had to turn to foreign indebtedness.  Between 1971 
and 1976 the public deficit was multiplied 9.3 times, and the government’s foreign 
indebtedness 4.3 times.   
 
Yet the goals for which all that increase in public spending was made were not 
achieved.  Growth during the same years was 5% in average, “insufficient to solve 
the problems of unemployment and sub-employment…  Rather than coming close to 
the economy of full-employment it moved away from it.”59  Moreover, the 
Echeverría administration ended with a devaluation (August 1976) of the Mexican 
currency of almost 100%, the first devaluation in 22 years (since the onset of the 
“stabilizing development” in 1954).   
 
OPEC’s 1973 oil embargo and the consequent raise in oil prices did not benefit 
Mexico significantly.  Mexico’s oil production that year represented merely 1% of 
the totality of the world’s oil production, and its proven reserves of oil were only 
0.6% of the world’s proven reserves.60   
 
                                                 
58
 See id.  The encaje legal was first used during WWII as an instrument to control the extraordinary 
and significant influx of foreign currency in order to prevent that influx to cause inflation.  Thus, it 
was not originally meant to become a source of financing of public spending.  It started to be used as a 
means of financing public spending with moderation during the “stabilizing development” (when 
there was another extraordinary influx of foreign currency), and started to be abused in the 1970s (see 
Ramírez Marín, op cit., at 205-207).   
59
 See RAMALES OSORIO, op. cit.  
60
 See Lorenzo Meyer Cosío, El auge petrolero y las experiencias mexicanas disponibles.  Los 
problemas del pasado y la visión del futuro [The Oil Boom and the Available Mexican Experiences.  
The Problems of the Past and the Vision of the Future], in FORO INTERNACIONAL [International 
Forum], Vol. XVIII, No. 72 (Apr-Jun, 1978) at 581; available at: 
http://www.lorenzomeyer.org/Articulos-Revistas/27.pdf).   During the 1960s domestic demand of oil 
products increased while oil exploration, exploitation and production activities lagged behind up until 
the early 1970s.  In order to avoid an energy crisis, exploration activities were intensified in the early 
1970s (see CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE LAS FINANZAS PÚBLICAS [Center for Public Finance Studies], 
Cámara de Diputados, H. Congreso de la Unión [Center for Public Finances Studies, Chamber of 
Representatives, H. Congress of the Union] (herein after CEFP), “Evolución y perspective del Sector 
Energéticoen México, 1970-2000” [Evolution and Perspective of the Energy Sector in Mexico, 1970-
200] (Dic. 2001) at 15; available at: 
http://www.cefp.gob.mx/intr/edocumentos/pdf/cefp/cefp0512001.pdf.  
 40 
It was until 1974 (when that embargo ended) that the exploitation of oilfields 
discovered back in 1972 made it possible for Mexico to start exporting oil again that 
year (1974).  Further exploration and discoveries between 1974 and 1978 resulted in 
a significant increase in Mexico’s proven oil reserves in the late 1970s.61 
 
In 1976, José López-Portillo won the presidential election, without having to 
compete against any opposition candidate, and was inaugurated on December of that 
year.  Under his leadership, one of the objectives of PEMEX’s 1977-1983 
administration and its exploration policy was to prove abroad “that Mexico counted 
with reserves and production capacity large enough as to become an important 
exporter of crude oil, while that would facilitate at the same time the firm’s and the 
country’s access to international loans,” having the oil reserves as backup.62   
 
By 1979 it was proven that Mexico possessed 5% of the oil world reserves and 
3% of the gas world reserves.
63
  In light of Mexico’s improved oil reserves and 
production capacity, the 1979 (or second) oil crisis (triggered at the wake of the 
Iranian Revolution) brought unprecedented economic benefits to Mexico as a result 
of a significant growth in export revenues.
64
   
 
It was that 1979, at the wake of the discovery of one of the most important 
oilfields in the world (Cantarell, off the coast of the southeastern State of Campeche), 
that López-Portillo uttered his famous statement: “We have to get used to manage 
abundance.”65  
 
                                                 
61
 See CEFP, op. cit., and ENRIQUE CÁRDENAS, LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA EN MÉXICO, 1950-1994 [The 
Economic Policy in Mexico, 1950-1994] (1996) at 108.   
62
 Id., at 16. 
63
 See GERARDO GIL VALDIVIA & SUSANA CHACÓN DOMÍNGUEZ (COORD.), LA CRISIS DEL PETRÓLEO 
EN MÉXICO [The Oil Crisis in Mexico] (Apr. 2008) at 35; available at: 
http://www.foroconsultivo.org.mx/libros_editados/petroleo.pdf; and CÁRDENAS, op. cit., at 109. 
64
 See CÁRDENAS, op. cit.  “Between 1977 and 1981 the economy grew at an average annual rate of 
7.8%, while inflation grew 24.2% in annual average during that term.  The boom came from two 
fundamental sources: a big expansion of public investment in all areas, especially in those related with 
the export of oil…  Secondly, both the larger availability of international funding and the oil export 
themselves made easier the access to growing amounts of foreign loan, which made it easy the growth 
of both public and private spending” (op. cit.).  
65
 See Rubén Cortés, “Así nació Cantarell, así se está muriendo” [Thus Cantarell was Born, thus It Is 
Dying], in LA RAZÓN [The Reason] (Mar. 10, 2010); available at: 
http://www.razon.com.mx/spip.php?Art.26232.  See also Blum, op. cit., at 35.    
 41 
However, as Norton suggests, “much of the exuberance was rooted in the 
country’s estimation of its national control of petroleum resources in light of 
rocketing prices in 1970’s, and Mexico held to an economic policy of import 
substitution industrialization and severe restrictions on foreign direct investment.”66   
 
The exuberance was mistaken to be permanent or at least steady for the medium 
term.  This incited false feelings of welfare about Mexico both in the Mexican 
government and in international banks (mostly from the USA).  During the second 
half of the 1970s such banks over-lent money to Mexican government-owned 
companies and to the federal government itself.   
 
Mexico borrowed from foreign banks more money than any other developing 
country, and such banks did not count with enough information about their 
economies, balance of payments positions, investment flows, aggregate external debt 
and international reserves.
67  
 
The Mexican Government became extremely dependent on the large revenues 
from oil sales (that resulted from OPEC oil embargo) to cover its increasingly high 
expenditures, which included public health and education programs.  It also adopted 
an overvalued currency policy.  Speculation on the peso’s devaluation spurned 
further cycles of devaluation and massive transfers of money out of the country.
68 
 
 
The Mexican government’s foreign debt had quadrupled between 1976 and 1982.  
Thus, when oil prices fell and international interest rates rose, the downward capital 
market revaluation of Mexico was inevitable, thus putting the country into a serious 
crisis in 1982.  That year the Mexican government declared a suspension of 
payments of its foreign debt, devalued the peso against the USA Dollar, imposed 
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foreign currency exchange control,
69
 and expropriated all the private banks.
70
  These 
acts resulted in the cessation of inflows of foreign private capital.
71
   
 
It has been observed rightly that the “policies followed from early 1970s to early 
1980s were, at beast, contradictory and erratic, plunging the country into economic 
crisis in 1976 and again in 1982.”72  So, after decades of varying degrees of 
protectionism, state-controlled economy, and about a decade of nationalization and 
government control of all kinds of companies of all kinds of sectors, a growing 
bureaucracy, and fiscal indiscipline, Mexico was left in a deep economic crisis with 
uncontrolled inflation, and a big and growing foreign debt.
73
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 Although the state of affairs described was exacerbated during the twelve years between 1970 and 
1982, similar policies were followed by most Mexican presidents during the 20
th
 century.  What Luis 
Pazos (Professor of Political Economy at ELD) wrote in 1991 about the recent economic history of 
Ibero-America was certainly true of Mexico: “Most of the economic policies implemented in the 20th 
century in Ibero-American countries have been inspired in the protectionist and over-regulation that 
Adam Smith condemned and in the Marxist theories that leads also to over-regulation and state 
monopolies” (LUIS PAZOS, DEL SOCIALISMO AL MERCADO [From Socialism to Market], 1st ed., 
(Mexico, 1991), at 155.  Furthermore, he adds a few paragraphs later that: 
Over the last four decades, a large number of intellectuals, progressive priests, 
liberation theologians and third-world politicians, devoted themselves to defend the 
benefits of de centrally planned system or socialism.  Many of them started from 
Marxist theses such as class struggle, income concentration, surplus-value and 
exploitation, to propose solutions the Ibero-America’s social problems.   
Other intellectuals, in a veiled way, under the semantics of structuralism, 
peripheral capitalism, dependency theory, and the deterioration of exchange terms, 
presented solutions in more complete and “scientific” ways, but arrived to the same 
conclusions of the Marxists. 
During the last four decades, that is, after the WWII, those theories were the ones 
that had more influence in Latin American governments (id., at 157).     
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As a result of the grave economic crisis left behind by José López Portillo (1976-
1982), Miguel De la Madrid Hurtado’s presidential administration (1982-1988) faced 
the first package of structural adjustment measures imposed by WB and IMF, which 
marked the onset of so-called “neo-liberalism” in Mexico.74 However, the only 
significant achievement of the De la Madrid administration was Mexico’s accession 
to GATT in 1986. 
 
1.1.4 Political Confrontations Regarding Free Market Policies 
 
The influence and power that the so-called neo-liberals and technocrats gained within 
PRI by the latter part of the De la Madrid administration provoked the creation of a 
dissenting faction within that party, by its leftist members, self-named Corriente 
Democratizadora (Democratizing Bloc).  This faction explicitly opposed free market 
policies and reforms, including economic liberalization. By 1988, the so-called 
Democratizing Bloc seceded from PRI and joined leftist opposition parties to form 
an electoral alliance that eventually became the PRD party. 
 
Ever since, PRD and other smaller leftist parties that have followed or still follow 
PRD’s former presidential candidates (formerly Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and more 
recently Andrés Manuel López Obrador) have presented steadily a strong opposition 
against free market economy and FTAA, NAFTA and WTO,
75
 both in their 
discourse and their voting behaviour in the Legislative branch. 
   
PRI then swung without too much opposition within toward a more market center 
position under the influence of its presidential candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
who held the Secretary of Programming and Budgeting during the De la Madrid 
administration. PRI’s candidate, Salinas, officially won the 1988 presidential 
election, amidst allegations of electoral fraud against PRD, which came second in the 
election’s official results.   
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The Salinas administration (1988-1994) brought about a first generation of free 
market policies and structural reforms. In his First Presidential Report to the 
Legislative branch (September 1989), then President Salinas said: 
 
The crisis showed us that a larger State is not necessarily a more 
capable Estate; a State that owns more is not a fairer Sate. The reality is 
that, in Mexico, more State meant less capacity to respond to the social 
demands of our fellow countrymen and, at the end, more weakness of 
the State itself.  While the public sector’s activity was increasing, the 
attention to problems of potable water, health, rural investment and 
food, housing, environment and justice decreased. The State was 
expanding while the welfare of the people was falling down.
76
     
 
 
Although the process of reducing the number of state-owned companies was started 
back in the De la Madrid Administration, “the larger and most controversial 
privatizations were carried out during the government of president Carlos Salinas...  
It was during this... that the privatization of the commercial banks was carried out 
between 1989 and 1990.”77  Other changes needed to adapt Mexico for NAFTA were 
achieved by the Salinas administration.
78
  A significant one was the autonomy of 
BANXICO, and making its chief mandate to fight inflation.
79
      
 
1.1.5 Mexican Political Parties’ Attitudes Surrounding NAFTA’s Negotiation 
and Approval   
 
A Mexico-US Commercial framework Agreement on Trade and Investment 
(predecessor to NAFTA) was signed in November 1987.
80
  Then, in March 1990, a 
newspaper leaked information about a meeting between USA and Mexico 
government officials to explore the possibility of a bilateral FTA.   
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In June 11, 1990, presidents Carlos Salinas and George Bush announced officially 
in Washington their intention of starting the negotiation process toward a bilateral 
FTA.  Both presidents presented notices to their respective congresses in August of 
that same year.  In February 1991, Canada joined the project, and negotiations 
officially started for a regional trilateral FTA between the nations of the northern part 
of the American continent.
81
   
 
That same 1991, Mexico had an intermediate federal election (to renew the 
Legislative branch) that put the prospects of NAFTA’s approval at the forefront of 
the wider public debate.
82
  Ten political parties took part in that 1991 election.  Four 
small extreme leftist parties, Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción 
Nacional (PFCRN), Partido del Trabajo (PT), Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores (PRT) and Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), questioned the very 
legitimacy of the federal government to negotiate and sign NAFTA.
83
   
 
PAN, PRD and Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM) did not 
question the legitimacy of the negotiations but the way in which NAFTA was 
negotiated.  PAN proposed to get the Legislative branch involved in order to remedy 
the lack of representativeness.  PRD and PARM (both leftist parties) proposed a 
public debate in order to increase citizen participation.
84
  PRI was the ruling party 
and therefore supported the process as was carried out.    
 
In the summer of 1991, three years after the highly contested presidential election 
of 1988 (in which, at best, PRI won by a narrow margin over the leftist PRD), the 
intermediate federal election saw a significant recovery of PRI, who won 61.4% of 
popular the vote.  PAN came second with 17.7%, and PRD third with 8.26%.   
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The  seven small parties (including the leftist PARM, PFCRN, PPS, PRT, and PT) 
got, together, only 13% of the popular vote, although in the 1988 election most of 
them were part of the leftist coalition lead by PRD which came close to winning (or 
arguably won) the presidential election.
85
   
 
PRI’s CTM defined its position until after the election (August 19, 1991), 
endorsing the federal government’s economic policy and economic liberalization, as 
long as workers’ and labor unions’ rights were not compromised nor the standard of 
living of workers. CTM’s position statement on NAFTA also posed “the need to 
provide training programs in order to increase productivity, and proposed a revision 
of the educational system that would make it possible to train young people in 
priority technical areas for the new economic activities.”86 
 
Notwithstanding the above, CTM’s Secretary of Education acknowledged that the 
first stage of the commercial liberalization “had provoked negative experiences that 
was necessary to correct by means of the modernization of the productive plant, the 
introduction of new technologies and new ways of labor organization.”87  Aside from 
this, CTM’s attitude toward NAFTA was generally positive.88   
 
In 1993, NAFTA was ratified by the Mexican Senate with PRI’s and PAN’s 
Senators the vote in favor, while PRD Senators voted against. 
 
1.1.6 Political-Economic Context of the Beginning of NAFTA Era 
 
NAFTA entered into effect on 1
st
 January 1994, but was accompanied by the armed 
uprising the “Zapatista Army” guerrilla in the south-eastern state of Chiapas that 
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very same day.  Zapatistas enjoyed the sympathy of leftist parties (PRD and its 
smaller “satellite” parties), organizations, and intellectuals, as well as the alleged 
(unofficial) support of another PRI faction that, under the leadership of Manuel 
Camacho Solis, later left that party to join PRD.   
 
Noticeably, among the chief issues denounced and opposed by the Zapatistas and 
their supporters were precisely NAFTA and other “neo-liberal” policies and reforms 
carried out by the Salinas administration.  The significance of the date of the uprising 
must not be underestimated.   It was the starting date of NAFTA
89
 and the beginning 
of year of presidential elections (upcoming later in the summer) in which voters were 
going to decide whether Mexico should continue on a path toward free market 
economics or go back to Statism.  
 
Salinas’s first choice for a successor as president (by way of PRI’s candidacy)90 
was Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta, who had been in charge of the Secretary of 
Social Development.  But Colosio was assassinated during the presidential 
campaign, in March 23, 1994.  Among the many theories of why Colosio was 
murdered, a popular one (although as unproved yet as any other thesis advanced so 
far) alleges that he had the intention of departing from “neo-liberalism” (a matter that 
also remains unproved).  
 
Whatever the truth about Colosio’s assassination is, the very existence of such a 
theory confirms the significance and intensity that confrontations about free markets 
have had in recent Mexican political and economic history.        
 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, who had been in charge of SHCP and was 
perceived as committed to continuing the changes toward a free market economy, 
became PRI’s candidate in place of Colosio.  Zedillo won the presidential election, 
amid fears of further violence and turmoil, and thus due in part to the population’s 
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desire for peace and stability, but also thanks to the economic improvement (both 
perceived and real) Mexico had achieved by the end of the Salinas administration. 
 
Not even a month into the Zedillo administration (inaugurated on 1
st
 December, 
1994), the infamous “Tequila Crisis” was unleashed.91  The sudden devaluation of 
the Mexican currency, followed by an overnight exponential increase in interest 
rates, quickly hit large segments of the general population who had various kinds of 
debts (from credit cards to residential mortgages) rendering them unable to pay their 
debts and thus losing their assets and credit eligibility.  Firms with loans in dollars 
struggled to pay and had to lay-off a significant number of employees (at all levels), 
bringing about a sudden and sizeable increase in unemployment.  
 
An imaginable consequence of the economic crisis in the political debate arena 
was to blame it on the so-called “neo-liberal” policies and reforms.  In spite of that, 
the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) upheld the reforms made by his predecessors 
and continued on a path toward free market economy.  Fiscal discipline was 
maintained (although at the expense of an increase in the consumer tax from 10% to 
15%); and BANXICO continued to fight and keep inflation under control.     
 
By 1995, NAFTA started to bear fruits, as the surplus with the USA grew due to 
the rise of Mexican exports to that country (due in part to the devaluation of the 
Mexican Peso).  Maquiladora investments, manufacturing jobs and exports were the 
main source of economic growth.
92
  During the Zedillo administration six more FTA 
were signed.
93
  This was possible because Zedillo still had political control over the 
Legislative branch, as his party (PRI) had the absolute majority in both chambers, 
and “presidentialism” was still the ruling principle in Mexican practical politics.    
 
In spite of the deep and long-felt aftermath of the 1994 crisis, and its being 
blamed on free market policies and reforms (both of which were still very much alive 
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by the time of the 2000 presidential election), the centrist PAN won the presidential 
election with Vicente Fox Quezada as candidate, embracing and giving continuity to 
the market program of his predecessors.  PRI came second in the election, and PRD 
and its satellite allied parties came third.  
 
The cyclic end-of-presidential-term currency devaluation was prevented for the 
first time in 30 years in the 2000 presidential transition, thanks to the preventive line 
of credit to protect the Mexican currency (often referred to as financial “bullet-
proofing”)94 achieved in 1999.95   
 
During the Fox administration (2000-2006), foreign public debt was reduced by 
SHCP, as well as the government’s deficit, albeit a comprehensive tax reformed was 
aborted by the legislative branch.
96
  BANXICO continued fulfilling its mission of 
fighting inflation quite successfully with the executive branch’s cooperation; both 
imports and exports grew; and three more FTA were signed
97
 plus the Mexico-Japan 
EPA. 
 
1.2 THE PRE-NAFTA MEXICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
 
1.2.1 Expropriation of the Mexican Banks  
 
Before 1974, banks in Mexico were specialized banks in that they provided limited 
services and/or served only a limited slice of users of financial services, according to 
the type of service each bank provided.   
 
In order to promote the development of the banking sector and a more efficient 
use of their resources, a 1974 legal amendment created the innovative figure of what 
was called banca multiple [multiple banking] (also known internationally as 
universal banking) whereby banks were to render multiple financial services (or all 
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of them) to all kinds of users, increasing flexibility and risk diversification.
98
  The 
process of mergers to create the new multiple banking banks started in December 
1976, along with the inauguration of the López-Portillo administration.
99
   
 
More legislative changes to the regulation of the banking sector came in 1978 
aiming to establish effectively “multiple banking” banks, firms “authorized to 
exercise the following operations: deposit-taking, savings, financial intermediation, 
mortgages and trust.”  As part of the new legislation, it was prohibited for 
independent specialized institutions to render the abovementioned services that were 
now reserved to banks.
100
   
   
The six years of the López-Portillo presidential administration (1976-1982) 
witnessed drastic changes in the shape of the Mexican financial system, from the 
early days of the newly legally recognized financial groups,
101
 and the establishment 
and consolidation of the figure of “multiple banking” banks to the expropriation of 
that newly developed banking sector.  
 
On September 1
st
, 1982, during his overly dramatized Sixth (and last) Presidential 
Report to the Mexican Congress, López-Portillo announced what he called “the 
nationalization of the private banks,” which was in fact an expropriation or even a 
confiscation, rather than a nationalization, since the banks’ owners were Mexicans.  
Ironically, one of the two private banks that was not expropriated was Citibank, the 
one single foreign bank in Mexico back then.
102
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According to the expropriation decree, the expropriation was due to the following 
reasons: 
 
…private banks had acquired excessive profits by rendering a public 
service by government-concession;
103
 they had created monopoly 
phenomena according to their interests with the public’s money; in 
order for credit not to continue to be in the high strata of society and to 
make it come timely and affordably to the larger part of the people; to 
facilitate the getting out of the economic crisis that had been aggravated 
by the lack of direct control of the State over the financial system; to 
maintain public peace and to be able to adopt the necessary measures 
oriented to correct domestic disruptions.
104
 
 
In the wording of governmental discourse, the main argument was that the 
expropriation was necessary because bankers were saca-dólares (“dollar-drainers”), 
and/or helping other individuals who were dollar-drainers, who by causing such a 
flight of capitals away from Mexico were responsible of the economic crisis.  A 
dollar-drainer was whoever moved their USA dollars abroad from Mexico (to avoid 
the economic crisis).   
 
People protecting their private property against the effects of the economic crisis 
were labeled as traitors.  López-Portillo claimed to have a “little list” of the saca-
dólares who were hurting the Mexican economy.  That list, however, was never 
made public; perhaps because it was not that little and included members of his own 
administration.
105
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
became one of PRI’s “three sectors” (the labor sector).  The expropriation decree also exempted the 
representation offices of foreign banks in Mexico (see Turrent, op. cit.). 
103
 “Public service” is a technical term in Mexican Administrative Law.  In this technical sense, a 
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 Art of the Mexican constitution is the one that lists the 
activities that are regarded as “public service”.  
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The banks’ expropriation came hand-in-hand with the “generalized currency 
exchange control,” announced in the same paragraph of the same Sixth Presidential 
Report, right after the banks’ nationalization. The “reckonings” presented to justify 
such currency exchange control were summarized as follows: 
 
Austerity actions and adjustments in matters of political economy that 
had been applied to contain the crisis had not rendered results chiefly 
because of the amounts of capital flights.  The economic crisis that had 
been suffered at least since the middle of 1981 had been caused by two 
phenomena: contraction of the foreign markets for Mexico’s export 
products, and the unavailability and higher cost of foreign credit.
106
   
 
As explained above,
107
 along with the expropriation and in order to furnish it with 
constitutional grounds, amendments to the constitution were required.  Those 
amendments went beyond the expropriation of the existing private banks establishing 
an absolute prohibition for the private sector to engage in banking activities.
108
  A 
total of 49 private commercial banks were expropriated.
109
   
 
1.2.2 The Years of Government-Owned Banks 
  
Government’s close control over the banking sector (itself a means of controlling the 
financial system, and the economy in general) was effective immediately after the 
expropriation.  In September 4, the government announced measures ruling the 
interest rates banks would be paying and the currency exchange rates applicable to 
banking operations.
110
 
 
Although decreed by López-Portillo, it was the De la Madrid administration 
which had to indemnify the banks and organize the government’s management of the 
government-owned banks, an unprecedented situation in Mexico.  By the time of the 
expropriation De la Madrid was already president elect but was no consulted by 
López-Portillo about the expropriation, a decision with which De la Madrid 
disagreed.   
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Once in office, De la Madrid did not overturn the expropriation but merely 
allowed for up to 30% of the shares to be owned by private investors, in order to 
promote competitiveness.
111
     
 
The experienced bankers disapproved of the expropriation and were let go from 
their positions. Although De la Madrid appointed prestigious professionals to head 
the expropriated banks (or so the official history claims),
112
 the newly created 
bankers still lacked experience and proper training
113
 and had little margin to 
maneuver since, for all practical purposes, all the banks were centrally managed by 
BANXICO through its strict regulations and controls. 
 
Another change was the re-structuring of the banking sector by means of “a 
careful process of mergers,” which reduced the number of banks from 60 in 1982, to 
19 in 1985.  Six of those banks had national presence, seven were multi-regional, and 
six more were regional.
114
 
 
1.2.3 Commercial Banks’ Re-privatization  
 
As discussed above, the economic liberalization hesitantly begun by De la Madrid 
was sped up and expanded during the Salinas administration (1988-1994), and not 
without much political controversy.
115
  Even more controversial was the re-
privatization of the commercial banks carried out between 1989 and 1990, which 
required a constitutional amendment to remove the addition made back in 1982 and 
1983 that made banking an activity reserved to the government.
116
  Once the 
constitutional amendment was passed, all of the 18 banks owned by the government 
by 1990 were auctioned and sold between 1990 and 1992.
117
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The buyers were Mexican individuals and strong Mexican economic groups, 
which paid a total USD$12.4 billion.
118
  The pressure on the re-privatized banks, 
whose purchasers were trying to recover their investment, increased significantly the 
lending, which from 1991 to 1994 grew at an average annual rate of 23.7%, more 
than 8 times the average annual rate of growth of real GDP.
119
   
 
The newly privatized banks were nevertheless the product of the old financial 
system, and after the privatization authorities failed to strengthen the prudential 
controls, increase their supervision, and establish criteria for lending or for 
evaluating portfolio risk.
120
   
 
The Salinas administration was committed with liberalization and privatization,
121
 
including the liberalization of deposit and lending rates, elimination of the mandatory 
requirement for commercial banks to hold long-term commercial paper to maturity 
and the elimination of reserve requirements.  Norton has drawn attention to some 
important legislation such as the Law for the Regulation of Financial Groups, which 
allowed a single holding company to own several financial entities, providers of 
various financial services (e. g. banking, securities brokerage, and insurance).
 122
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1.3 THE POST-NAFTA MEXICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
1.3.1 The Mexican Crisis of 1994: The “Tequila Effect” and the Response to the 
Impact on the Crisis through the Financial Services Liberalization, 
Support Programs and Regulatory Measures 
 
The Mexico’s 1994 crisis, whose consequences would be dubbed later as the 
“Tequila Effect,” has been attributed to several causes.  Domestically, some 
attributed the crisis to the government’s incompetent handling, which was why it was 
dubbed “el error de diciembre” (“December’s Mistake”).  Yet, the 1994 crisis was 
actually due to policy mistakes stretching back over several years.
123
  Among the 
weakness were: the real appreciation of the peso, a very large current account deficit 
by massive (portfolio) capital inflows, and the slow growth of productivity (between 
1988 and 1994).  
 
Real growth averaged 2.8% (significantly lower than Chile), productivity growth 
was almost flat until 1993, export expansion was low, real wages barely reached their 
1980 level, the declining trend in private savings, poverty and income distribution 
continued to be a serious problem,
124
 declining central bank reserves and an unstable 
structure of external debt.
125
 
 
Paradoxically, right before the crisis, the media, financial institutions such as WB 
and IMF, and financial experts were talking about the "Mexican Miracle." During 
this period there was a significant contrast between Mexico's achievement in terms of 
                                                 
123
 See MONTES-NEGRET & LANDA, op. cit.  While improved supervision was extremely important 
and necessary, it was not sufficient to address these problems of incentive.  Neither did it address the 
implicit high cost of a deficient legal framework and weak, slow, costly and often corrupt judicial and 
enforcement mechanisms.  The basic foundations for sound financial intermediation are: 1) Proper 
screening and licensing of new entrants; 2) Properly capitalized banks; 3) Sound banking practices 
and procedures; 4) An adequate legal framework; 5) Adequate judicial practices and enforcement 
mechanisms; and 6) Strong supervision, regulation and enforcement. Of these six basic elements, the 
Mexican financial liberalization process omitted the first five, and was deficient in the last.  That was 
partially responsible for the post-liberalization crisis that erupted in December 1994. 
124
 See HERMAN SAUTTER and ROLF SCHINKE, eds., STABILIZATION AND REFORMS IN LATIN 
AMERICA: WHERE DO WE STAND? (1996) at 70.  In the same sense see George Bratsiotis and Wayne 
Robinson, “Economic Fundamentals and Self-fulfilling Crises: Some Evidence from Mexico” 
(University of Manchester working paper).  See also JAN JOOST TEUNISSEN, ed., CAN CURRENCY 
CRISES BE PREVENTED OR BETTER MANAGED? LESSONS FROM MEXICO (1966). 
125
 See R. C. Maysami & J. J. Williams, National Policy and Structural Reform: Pillars of Stable 
Mexican Economic Growth, 7 J. INT’L BANKING L. (2001) at 174-75.  
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reform policies and economic results.  For Sautter such excessive optimism was due 
to an exaggerated faith in market-oriented reforms and the US administration efforts 
to persuade the public of the benefits of NAFTA.
126
  
 
In December 1994, the Mexican CC
127
 abandoned the exchange rate regime and 
tried to stabilize the foreign exchange market by raising the upper limit.  The CC 
would change later this policy, however, to ensure the establishment of a freely 
floating exchange rate system.
128
  The Mexican Government devalued its currency 
15% against the USA Dollar and two days later let the Peso float freely.  
Subsequently, it fell 50% in one month.   
 
In 1994, Mexico’s government spent USD$20 billion to protect the peso.  Because 
reserves were reduced to USD$6 billion the real interest rates reached high levels 
causing serious difficulties to financial intermediaries and to debtors in general. A 
large amount of investors withdrew their money; consequently the reserves in 
Mexico disappeared.
129
    
 
Some, like Sautter, say that when the crisis began, instead of taking corrective 
measures consistent with the new external circumstances, the government tried to 
maintain the same exchange rate by using large amounts of dollar-linked short term 
debt (Tesobonos) making the economic situation especially vulnerable to speculative 
attacks.  When the attack happened, the government’s belated reaction was to try to 
widen the exchange rate.
130
  
 
Others, like Slover, point out that the government responded quickly in arranging 
the support and liquidity packages to stem the massive outflow of capital. Even 
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more, the regulators were able to constrain the growth of impaired institutions 
successfully without resorting to inflationary financing to resolve banks.
131
    
 
In any case, the fact remains that the Mexican Government tried to handle  
quickly the crisis by implementing several programs such as minimizing the 
inflationary effects of the devaluation, and encouraging constitutional and legislative 
reforms
132
 to promote competitiveness in the private sector. 
 
In response to the crisis, the Mexican government also made significant 
progress
133
 in the following areas, identified by a special G10 Working Party as key 
for a robust financial system:
134
 1) sound and well-developed legal and judicial 
system;
135
 2) accounting practices and disclosures techniques;
136
 3) stakeholder 
oversight and institutional framework;
137
 4) market structure that favors free 
competition and promotes the efficient use of resources and the maximization of 
returns; 5) financial regulatory and supervisory system designed to support and 
enhance market functioning, rather than displacing it, by promoting the integrity of 
the market infrastructure and fostering the efficient operation of the financial 
system;
138
 and 6) financial safety net designed to minimize moral hazard.
139
  
 
The new good accounting practices and disclosure technique applied in Mexico 
made it then possible for the markets to see clearly the financial condition of the 
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Mexican banks as well as monitor the activities of the Mexican financial regulatory 
authorities.  Likewise, by reducing barriers to market entry, a market structure to 
promote free competition was also created.
140
     
 
The second step toward financial services liberalization in Mexico was the 
legislative changes passed by Congress and promulgated on February 15, 1995.
141
  
Among the changes were, the share limit for banks from 1.5% in individual holding 
market to 6% and in aggregate foreign market from 8% to 25% while the aggregate 
foreign investment was limited to 49%.   
 
 The initial implementation once projected by NAFTA (step-by-step during a 
period of six years for financial services until 2000)
142
 was suspended when the 
Mexican peso crashed and the financial system collapsed at the end of 1994.  
 
Although Mexico was entitled (according to the paragraph 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of 
Section B, and paragraph 1 of the Section C of the Schedule of Mexico, Annex VII 
of NAFTA)
143
 to establish market share limits to US and Canadian banks in any 
event of the financial crisis, instead of that the Mexican Congress removed more 
barriers to foreign investment.  
 
Nevertheless, other key factors necessary to promote economic growth, such as a 
sound macroeconomic policy framework that keeps inflation and budget deficit low, 
and a sustainable current account,
144
 were not present at the time of the said 1995 
legislative changes.  
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The USA and IMF played a key role helping the Mexican government to deal 
with the crisis.  IMF even violated its internal rules by granting Mexico a loan equal 
to seven times its quota, which was unprecedented in its negotiation speed.
145
  This is 
explained partly because, although illiquid, Mexico was no insolvent, and partly 
because, as Sachs points out, “Mexico has the luck to share 2000 miles border with 
the IMF’s largest shareholder.”146  
 
In 1994 political and criminal events had an adverse effect on market expectations 
that forced investors to reconsider their investments and jeopardized Mexico’s 
spending policies. The first major event was political, namely, the upraising of the 
Zapatista National Liberation Army, which took place the same day NAFTA entered 
into force (1
st
 January 1994).  
 
The second major event was criminal with political implications, namely, the  
assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio.  The day after that 
tragic event, the Mexican market fell 22 points and the country was exposed to large 
losses in foreign exchange reserves due to investors’ panic.147  
 
Other events were the accusations and resignation of the Deputy Attorney 
General,   Lastly, in September 1994, PRI’s general secretary José Francisco Ruiz 
Massieu was assassinated, putting into question again Mexico’s political stability.  
 
Another measure used by the  executive branch of the Mexican federal 
government, along with BANXICO, to deal with the 1994 crisis was to negotiate a 
unity agreement with the labor sectors (Acuerdo de Unidad para Superar la 
Emergencia Economica [Unity Agreement to Overcome the Economic Emergency]), 
which included keeping inflation under control.
148
  The economic program was 
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supported by the Fondo de Estabilizacion Cambiaria [Exchange Stabilization 
Fund],
149
 which was established with foreign financial authorities and international 
organizations, such as IMF, to lend support to the Mexican currency.  
 
In the financial sector, other programs were implemented such as the Acuerdo 
Inmediato a los Deudores de la Banca [Immediate Support Agreement to Banking 
Sector Debtors], which  was later transformed into FOBAPROA and finally into 
IPAB.
150
  Thus, the Mexican banks that became insolvent in 1995 were put under the 
control of FOBAPROA and were sold afterwards.  Most of them were bought by 
foreign banks (Citibank, HSBC, BBV, Scotiabank, etc.).
151
  
 
Another important financial program to deal with the effects of the 1994 crisis 
was PROCAPTE,
152
 designed to help banks in need of improving capitalization 
levels and increasing depositors’ confidence and to help them prevent a direct impact 
on the money supply and on the overall fiscal stance of the government.
153
   
 
Another measure taken to deal with the crisis was the creation of the UDI 
(inflation-indexed units of account), which helped banks to restructure significant 
portions of their loan portfolios, in order to increase the likelihood of their loans to 
continue to perform in light of high inflation and interest rates.
154
   In other words, 
UDIs were used to relieve debtors and as a means for bank users to save their money 
protected against inflation. 
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The fund to rescue Mexico amounted to more than $US 52 billion Dollars.  USA 
arranged a USD$9 billion credit line from the Federal Reserve, and later agreed to 
exchange USD$20 billion for MXN for 3 to 5 years. Mexico agreed to pay a fee for 
the exchange and set aside oil revenues as collateral.
155
  IMF lent USD$17.8 
billion.
156
  Some members of the BIS lent USD$10 billion Dollars.  Another USD$3 
billion were loaned by commercial banks, and USD$1.5 billion by the Bank of 
Canada.
157
  
 
Mexico was able to repay IMF.
158
  Inflation and interest rates declined and exports 
increased (only in ten years Mexican exports grew from USD$31 to USD$136 
billion).
159
  External deficit was small, and there was a strong increase in the net 
international reserves in 1996.
160
  Trade and current account balances improved as 
well, the Mexican Peso recovered, foreign reserves rose and the stock market also 
recovered.
161
  
 
In 1997 Claudio Loser was able to write: “Mexico has made remarkable progress 
in re-establishing macroeconomic stability and the Mexican government has unveiled 
a medium-term program… PRONAFIDE.”162   
 
In the second quarter of 1995Mexico also regained access to the international 
capital markets, only five months after the December 1994 devaluation. This 
situation makes a contrast with the seven years that took capital markets to be 
negotiated after the 1982 crisis.
163
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The third step in the liberalization of financial services in Mexico was given in 
1999, when its Congress amended the banking law allowing for a 100% of foreign 
investment in Mexican banks.
164
  According to the Executive’s Bill and the debates 
in the Mexican Congress, the motivation of the proposed amendment was the 
continuing and urgent need to attract more capital and modern technologies, and to 
promote competition, efficiency and productivity in the Mexican financial system, 
which was still vulnerable.
165
 
 
As a result of the amendments to the banking law, foreign banks started to 
purchase Mexican banks.  Most notable is the entrance of American and European 
banking conglomerates such as Citibank,
166
 HSBC and BBVA.  These banks injected 
significant amounts of capital into the Mexican financial system.  As a result, Mexico 
became the country with the largest foreign bank participation in Latin America, 
accounting for 50% in 2000, to 74% in 2002 and more than 80% in 2004.
167
 
 
The entry of foreign banks into the Mexican financial system brought about 
significant positive changes in Mexico’s banking sector including, higher efficiency, 
the use of cutting edge technology, improved productivity, more competition, and 
lower interest rates.
168
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By 2002, the OECD Economy Survey said the following about Mexico: 
 
Today, the financial sector has experienced an increase in efficiency 
and profitability, a system wide re-capitalization and an overall clean up 
of balance sheets today. The Mexican banking system is increasingly 
solid and as profitable as in the rest of the OECD counterparts; and the 
supervision and regulatory frameworks are close to the best practices.
169
   
 
 
IMF’s  Financial System Stability Assessment of Mexico concluded that, given 
the large participation of strong foreign banks, the “still low participation of banks in 
financial intermediation, and the recent strengthening of capital, the banking system, 
should not become a source of problems.”   
 
Along with the aforesaid policies taken in response to the 1994 financial crisis,  
the Mexican financial authorities adopted important measures in the prudential 
regulation and supervision arenas to enhance security and transparency, thus 
rendering a more robust and sound financial system.   
 
Among such measures were: a) improved disclosure by financial institutions’ in 
order to promote transparency for the benefit of the investors, b) strengthened 
mechanisms of internal control, c) the establishment of credit bureau to help risk 
management, d) improved asset-valuation methods, encouragement of the use of 
market valuation of the investment portfolio, e) new regulations for loan port folios 
classification  and, f) strengthened functions for rating agencies.
170
    
 
1.3.2 Tax Policy 
 
The Mexican government applied stricter tax rules that were likewise more strictly 
enforced.  Many called that “tax terrorism”.  Among the tax reforms passed by 
Congress, the most significant were: i) corporate tax rate raise from 34% to 35%; ii) 
domestic withholding tax rate raise from 35% to 40%; iii) net capital gains tax raise 
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from 30% to 40%; iv) a new 5% tax to dividends distributed by corporations and 
remittances to head offices by branches; v) new taxation scheme that shifted the tax 
base for USA-owned maquiladoras (in bond companies). 
 
SHCP toughened many rules including the strengthening of its legal audit and 
confiscatory powers under Art 42-A of the Income Tax Law, which enables 
unlimited access to the amount and type of information; tougher penalties for non-
compliance by external auditors, who became liable for any failure to disclose 
taxpayers’ omissions; and the criminalization of tax evasion.   
 
1.3.3 FDI  
 
After the 1994-1995 crisis, Mexico created new investment opportunities
171
 and 
provided more certainty, predictability and legal security for national and 
international investors.  One example is the amendment of the Foreign Investment 
Law,
172
 which establishes procedures, defines legal entities and binds the country’s 
economic sector to NAFTA.  Amendments to the said law in 1996 extended rights 
held by partner countries under NAFTA to investors worldwide.  
 
In 1999 more amendments provided legal certainty, strengthened open foreign 
investment and eliminated investment performance requirements.  Except for the 
areas prohibited by the Mexican Constitution, foreigners are allowed 100% 
participation in Mexican companies.
173
 Summing up, although Mexico is still 
halfway in some areas of investments,
 174
 noticeable progress has been made.  
 
All corporations must be registered at the Ministry of Economy.  The CNIE and 
National Foreign Registry are empowered to record, evaluate and register foreign 
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1994 and December 1998, companies with American capital invested more than USD$24.7 billions. 
Mexico’s total FDI during 1999 was USD$11 millions, it is worth mentioning that three quarters of 
total was assigned to the manufacturing industry. It was also installed mainly in the central region 
state of the country. 
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investments. Normally, investments applications of less than 394 million pesos in 
fixed assets are approved automatically but other require approval from the CNIE, 
e.g. energy, telecommunications and controlling stock holding in companies related 
to governments activities (sector to be considered strategic).  There are also 
economic activities reserved exclusively for Mexican citizens such as retail sales of 
gasoline, non-cable radio and television services, credit unions, savings and loan 
institutions.
175
 
 
Important changes have also happened in the area of the property.  The law now 
permits foreign investment in residential land within 100 kilometers of Mexico’s 
border and 50 kilometers of the coastline via trust arrangements. These allow the 
trustee to use and control land through a 50 years renewable investment trust without 
any rights or entitlements. Also, the concept of neutral investment permits foreigners 
to participate in all domestic companies, through non-voting shares.  
 
The most popular forms of juridical person is the corporation (including its 
variable capital variety).  The latter is popular because of its flexibility in 
subsidiaries.  Branches of foreign corporations as well as partnerships and joint 
ventures are permissible.   
 
Nevertheless, branches have disadvantages because they cannot own real estate 
nor deduct expenditures for royalties, interest or fees that are paid to the parent 
company. The formation of branches consumes more time and expenses, they are 
more restricted than corporations, and are not privileged with limited liability 
status.
176
 
 
The promotional arm of the Mexican government associated with the FDI is 
BANCOMEXT.
177
 This development bank is in charge of promoting and financing 
foreign trade, also acting as a matchmaker between Mexican companies or Mexican 
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 The Representative Office of BANCOMEXT in London also operates as a Trade Commission of 
the Mexican Embassy and its main objective is to promote Mexican exports and investment 
opportunities to the UK and the Republic of Ireland.  See www.bancomext.com. Interview with Ms. 
Elena Espinosa-Wingate, Commercial Counselor and Head of BANCOMEXT-London, (Feb. 19 
2003); and www.promexico.gob.mx.  
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exporters and foreign importers and investors.  It also has expert services of some 36 
offices located all over Mexico and 41 offices overseas.   
 
Moreover, it organizes Trade Missions and individual visits to Mexico, sends a 
list of appropriate suppliers, and provides advice and information on all aspects of 
importing from Mexico. It is worth mentioning that the Mexican Government avoids 
using tax incentives to promote FDI, preferring instead to stimulate exports through 
several development programs, for example the programs for foreign trade 
companies (ECEX).  
 
The maquiladora program is the most successful FDI strategy to promote 
Mexican exports.  Maquiladoras must be registered with the National Maquiladoras 
Industry Registry in order to receive special customs exemptions. These companies 
temporarily export intermediate goods (either in the form of raw materials, 
machinery, parts or equipment) duty free and subsequently, the final goods are re-
exported or sold domestically.
178
  
 
Related with scope of the protection against unfair foreign trade, it is interesting to 
point out that Mexico has begun using similar laws to the famous Section 301 of the 
USA Trade Code, against such unfair practices of other nations. Mexico has 
supplanted Canada as the fourth most active user of these laws.
179
 
 
1.3.4 Other Structural Reforms in the Post-NAFTA Financial System 
 
The reforms Mexico has implemented, which have focused on economic and 
financial liberalization, have enabled the economy to take advantage of the benefits 
of globalization.  The reforms included trade and capital account liberalization, 
increased private sector participation in key sectors of the economy, tax reforms, and 
changes in labor market structures. Capital market liberalization and pension market 
reform have transformed a closed economy into an open, market driven one.
180
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 See Maysami & Williams, op. cit., at 7. 
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 67 
 
The Senate of the Mexican Congress approved the new Commercial 
Reorganization and Bankruptcy Act in April 2000. The new legal framework is 
intended to maintain a balance among firms and their creditors in order to protect 
both entities’ legal rights. The Federal Institute of Reorganization and Bankruptcy 
Specialist was also created, which co-ordinates the provision of technical support in 
reorganization cases.  
 
In recognizing that the Mexican economy is linked with international markets, 
this new law includes a Cross-Border Insolvency Chapter, based on the UNCITRAL 
Model of Insolvency. The role of the judges in the insolvency process has been 
revised, keeping their functions as the main operators.
181
  
 
Later, the Mexican Congress approved reforms that created a new legal 
framework for granting collateral and established an expeditious judicial process for 
executing judgments against security interest, known as the Miscellany of Secured 
Lending reforming the Commerce Code, General Law of Negotiable Instruments and 
Credit Transactions and Credit Institutions Law.
182
   
 
Also, in 1997 then President Zedillo sent the Congress a bill of amendments to 
the banking legislation such as reducing moral hazard incentives, by creating a new 
bank deposit insurance fund, called FOGADE, FOBAPROA and later IPAB, 
enforcing debt payment by making it easier and faster for banks to collect payment 
or take control of collateral, all of which was aimed to lead the country out of its 
financial problems.
183
   
 
1.3.5 Mexico as a Natural Hub in the International Trade System 
 
Mexico enjoys a unique and strategic geographical location being the commercial 
bridge between North and Central and South America, a link between America and 
Europe and between America and Asia.   
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FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1999) at 124. 
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A 2003 OECD study showed that over the previous 20 years, Mexico had moved 
forward from specialization in primary goods to greater specialization in 
manufacturing products such as motor vehicles, consumer electronics and computer 
equipment, in marked contrast to Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which continue to 
specialize in primary products.
184
   
 
In 2008, “Mexico was the 16th largest exporter of goods in the world, and the 38th 
largest exporter of services products,”185 with destinations that included USA, 
Canada, Germany, Spain and Brazil.
186
  In 2009, Mexico was the 15
th
 trader 
(exporter and importer) in world merchandise trade.
187
   
 
In Latin American trade with the USA, while Brazil is the largest economy in the 
region, it accounts for only 10.4% of USA trade with Latin America.  That is below 
Mexico, who in 2009 “composed 11.7% of total U.S. merchandise trade (exports 
plus imports)” and was “the largest Latin American trade partner, accounting for 
58% of the region’s trade with the United States… By contrast, the rest of Latin 
America together makes up only 8.3%.”188 
 
Over the last 20 years, Mexico has pursued an economic model of development 
based on FTA,
189
 privatization and openness to foreign investment.
190
  In addition to 
NAFTA, MEFTA and the FTA with the European Association of Free Commerce, 
Mexico has FTA with: Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, the North Triangle 
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 See BANCOMEXT STUDY at 23.  Between 1994 and 2000, Mexico received more than USD$74 
billion in FDI, becoming a leading recipient country of FDI development (after China and Brazil).  
For the role FTA played in helping Mexico to cope with the 2008 GFC and to recover from its effects 
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(Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), Chile,
191
 Israel,
192
 Costa Rica, Uruguay, 
Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Panama, Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua,
193
 and Japan.  Mexico also has partial agreements with Belize, Peru, 
Ecuador, Brazil and Uruguay. 
 
As a result of the above, as of 2010, Mexico was “the only country with 
preferential access to two-thirds of the world’s gross domestic product.”194  
 
In addition to its many FTA, Mexico has adopted legislative changes remove old 
barriers or discouraging factors to foreign investment, as is the case of expropriation 
in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 (on Investment), which abolishes the Calvo Doctrine.195 
Named after the Argentinean international law scholar Carlos Calvo, the doctrine 
states that foreigners are subject to the same treatment as nationals.   
 
Like other Latin American countries, throughout its history Mexico suffered 
several military interventions making this legal principle justified.
196
  Historically, 
Mexico and other Latin American governments have tried to limit the intervention 
that foreign governments may have in favor their nationals living or investing in 
these countries.  
 
The Mexican government, for example, refused to hear private claims for 
compensation under any law but its own. “The Calvo Doctrine” led to much 
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dissatisfaction among foreign investors, as they had to accept the risk of 
uncompensated nationalizations if they brought assets into Mexico.
197
  
 
It is noteworthy that in the case of trade in financial services, Mexico, like most 
other Latin American countries, is not a net exporter but a net importer.  It is 
therefore understandable why at the beginning of the trend of liberalization these 
countries were reluctant to liberalize trade in services.
198
 
 
Consequently, Mexico surrendered this historic legal principle in order to provide 
more legal certainty and predictability to foreign investors.  NAFTA parties’ banks 
and investors are protected by due process and fair compensation from any act of 
expropriation, nationalization or any act of the prince that could affect them.
199
 
 
1.3.6 Regulatory Framework in the Post-NAFTA Financial System 
 
SHCP is the primary authority regulating and supervising financial services in 
Mexico with the following responsibilities: establishment of credit limits and capital 
reserves requirements, assessment of national and international banking transactions 
in order to monitor the systemic risk, interpretation of financial laws and supervision 
of bank holding companies.
200
   
 
Along with SHCP, CNBV
201
 and BANXICO regulate baking activities and other 
and financial intermediaries in Mexico. In its Institutional Program, CNBV outlined 
the four principles of improvement: prudential regulation, supervision, market self-
regulation and corrective actions.
202
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BANXICO (Mexico’s central bank) has been autonomous since 1994.  It issues 
the official Mexican currency (the Mexican Peso) and has the constitutional mandate 
of keeping its purchasing power (fighting inflation).  It also has the mandate of 
promoting the healthy development of the financial system, for which it has the 
power to impose penalties against financial institutions, including civil monetary 
penalties and suspension of operations in foreign currencies, gold and silver.   
 
It is also responsible for holding the reserves of and acting as a clearing house for 
financial institutions. It is also responsible for imposing penalties on financial 
institutions, including civil monetary penalties and suspension of operations in 
foreign currencies, gold and silver.
203
 
 
Financial groups are governed under the rules set forth in the Law of Financial 
Groups, enacted in 1990. Three different types of structures are permitted for 
financial groups. The first two types must be headed by either a bank or a brokerage 
firm and must offer leasing, factoring, foreign exchange and mutual fund 
management services. 
 
In the third and most common type, each firm is headed by a holding company 
and may include a bank, a brokerage house and a leasing company.  More than one 
mutual fund and insurance company are allowed to operate in each holding company, 
subject to the requirement that they serve different markets.  Regardless of the model 
chosen, financial conglomerates must receive authorization from the SHCP in order 
to establish a financial group and then from the appropriate regulator.
204
   
  
                                                                                                                                          
management of funds, capital adequacy, asset quality, profitability and organization. This scheme 
changed the methods used by on-site inspections, where previously the inspectors were stationed 
inside of the financial institutions. With the new system the inspectors stationed outside of the 
financial institutions carry out regular on-site inspections. Off-site inspections have been strengthened 
through the Financial Analysis System (SAF), which is a database that electronically receives the 
financial information that institutions must provide to the CNBV. This information allows the off-site 
inspectors to create individual, comparative and sector analyses concerning the performance of 
financial institutions and consequently develop early warning mechanisms that make it possible to 
detect, in a timely manner, any wrong behavior risky enough to lead to critical levels.  
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Mexican law provides for two kinds of banks: commercial and development 
banks.  Commercial banks render services such as savings, mortgage, deposit-taking, 
loans and credits.  Commercial banks are authorized by SHCP hearing BANXICO’s 
recommendations.   
 
Development banks play a large role in the Mexican Economy. They are 
established by their respective organic laws for special objectives such as promotion 
of foreign trade, housing, industrial and agricultural development. The main 
development banks are NAFIN and BANCOMEXT. Foreigners are not allowed to 
own stock of development banks. 
 
1.3.7 Universal Banking 
 
The universal banking model is one of the main products of the deregulation process 
and is followed by a large number of nations around the world.
205
  A universal 
banking model ranges from offering all financial services through the same 
organization (or financial group, as is the case in Mexico) with different entities, to 
the possibility of a single institution performing different financial services (for 
example Germany). 
 
As mentioned above, universal banking (known in Mexico as banca múltiple 
[multiple banking]) was adopted in Mexico back in 1974, as well as the creation of 
financial groups that provided an assortment of broader financial services in addition 
to banking services.
206
  Yet, the 1982 expropriation of commercial banks isolated the 
banking activity and made it exclusive to the government.  Thus, Mexican financial 
groups were able to offer an assortment of financial services, except for those 
peculiar to the banking activity.   
 
Upon the re-privatization of commercial banks and the updating of the legislation 
regulating financial groups universal banking was again allowed to private banking 
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corporations, as well as their participation in financial groups that offer a wide 
variety of financial services under the same brand. 
 
  SHCP is the authority in charge of planning, coordinating, evaluating and 
supervising Mexico’s banking system.  Discretional power constitutes an exceptional 
situation to the principle of law by which the administrative authority applies or does 
not apply the general rule established in a legal provision.
207
 In Mexico, the power to 
grants a bank concession is discretionary.  
 
1.3.8 Prudential Regulation in the Post-NAFTA Financial System 
 
BANXICO instructed commercial banks to increase their capital to risk weighted 
asset ratio to 8% by 1993. However, the poor risk management, the exchange rate 
management and the non-performing loans were the main causes of the peso crisis 
and the increase of the capital to risk did not help too much.  
 
After the crisis, CNBV enforced strict rules to protect banks against losses from non-
performing loans.  Since 1995, financial institutions have been required to maintain 
reserves equal to the largest of either 60% of non-performing loans or 4% of their 
entire portfolio.  To date Mexico also applies internationally recognized GAAP.
208
  
 
1.3.9 Pension System (Retirement Savings System) in the Post-NAFTA 
Financial System  
 
Since 1997, retirement funds are privately managed by AFORES (Retirement 
Savings’ Managers).  Nevertheless, the federal government’s IMSS is still in charge 
of enforcing the social security system, which includes collecting the fees coming 
from the employer and the employee (withheld from his salary by the employer).  
Each worker has an individual account to which all the fees collected are deposited, 
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which is a significant departure from the “common pool” of the previous system. 
AFORES invest the workers’ retirement savings in special investment funds, strictly 
regulated, known as SIEFORES (Specialized Investment Societies in Retirement 
Funds).  Workers have the right to choose the AFORE that will manage their 
retirement savings and, within that AFORE, the SIEFORE in which they want those 
funds to be invested.  The authority that supervises the SAR (Retirement Savings 
System) is the CONSAR (National Commission of the Retirement Savings 
System).
209
 
 
Firms from the USA and Canada are allowed to invest in, thus be stockholders of, 
AFORES on a basis consistent with NAFTA. 
 
1.3.10 IPAB in the Post-NAFTA Financial System 
 
The Mexican government created FOBAPROA in 1990 as a response to the need of 
liquidity that followed the devaluation of the Mexican currency.
210
  IPAB is the 
successor of FOBAPROA,
211
 as of January 20, 1999.  Its purpose is establishing a 
guarantee system for people who have bank deposits or who have given loans or 
credit to financial institutions and of regulating the supports given to financial 
institutions for the protection of depositors.  
 
IPAB is expected to accelerate the recovery of the financial system and lay the 
groundwork for better supervision over financial institutions through the promotion 
of market discipline and the efficiency and capitalization of the banking system.
212
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1.3.11 The Mexican Stock Exchange 
 
The Mexican Stock Exchange was established in 1894, but was practically ignored 
until the 1970s when market capitalization rose.  Nevertheless, it has suffered 
significant setbacks as resulting from the 1982 crisis, the 1987 stock market crash, 
and the 1994-1995 crisis.
213
   
 
The Mexican Stock Exchange is regulated by the Ley del Mercado de Valores 
[Stock Exchange Law].  It is own and operated by a corporation whose shareholders 
must be securities brokers or stock capitalists.  It has an auction hall divided into two 
trading floors, one for capital markets, including an intermediate market for trading 
shares, a derivatives market for trading of futures, warrants and options, and the 
other floor for money market for trading of debt instruments.
 214
   
 
Starting in 1999, trading is electronically conducted from the brokers’ offices 
while the derivatives market is operated on a trading floor.
215
 
 
1.3.12 Foreign Participation and Affiliates of Foreign Financial Entities in the 
Post-NAFTA Financial System 
 
According to the Mexican law the affiliates of foreign financial institutions are 
Mexican corporations which are authorized to operate as financial institution, and 
whose capital stock is owned by a foreign financial institution that has been legally 
established as such in a foreign country. The foreign financial institution must be 
from a country with which Mexico has signed a treaty that provides for the 
establishment of foreign affiliate in Mexico.
216
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In the same sense, an affiliate holding company as the foreign financial 
institution must hold at least 51 percent of the capital stock. An affiliate, a foreign 
financial entity and affiliate holding company are terms that apply to entities in a 
NAFTA country, which permits affiliate of foreign financial entities to operate in 
Mexico. In order to have an affiliate, the foreign financial institution must perform in 
their countries of origin the same activities authorized for the affiliate in Mexico. 
Mexican legislation regulates affiliates operations.  
 
As it has been said earlier in the first section of this chapter, there were basically 
three steps towards liberalization of financial services in Mexico: 1) NAFTA, 2) the 
legislative reforms of 1995, and the 3) the legislative reforms of 1999.  According to 
the Reforms of 1999 the permissible foreign ownership for both NAFTA and non-
NAFTA firms entering the sector was increased to 100%.  
 
1.3.13 SOFOMES created in the Post-NAFTA Financial System  
 
On July 18, 2007, amendments to various provisions of the financial legislation were 
promulgated
217
 establishing new regulations for financial leasing and factoring 
companies, as well as creating a new form of financial entity called SOFOMES.  The 
aim of the amendments was to facilitate lending, financing and factor in transactions, 
permitting these activities to be carried out by SOFOMES, without the necessity of 
obtaining authorization from the Mexican federal government.  
 
SOFOMES may have as their principal activity the continuous and professional 
offering of loan transactions, leasing and/or financial factoring. Additionally, the 
decree eliminates restrictions on foreign investment in relation to financial leasing 
and factoring companies, so that the corporate capital of the new SOFOMES may be 
comprised up to 100% by foreign investment.  
 
From a tax perspective, SOFOMES will enjoy, in general terms, the same tax 
treatment that SOFOLES enjoy, with the decree establishing that interest generated 
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from financial leasing and factoring activities of SOFOMES will not cause the 
imposition of Mexican Value Added Tax (IVA). 
 
1.3.14 Mexico’s Challenge 
 
Mexico recognizes the importance of a robust financial system as an engine to 
promote economic growth
218
 and that there is plenty of room for improvement. 
According to the G10’s Working Party on “Financial Stability in Emerging Market 
Economies,” there is still an inadequate bankruptcy system. A robust financial 
system includes a well-defined bankruptcy laws in order to take possession of 
collateral. The 1995 bankruptcy law was so inefficient that they provided many 
debtors with virtual immunity from collection efforts.
219
 
 
Taking into account the severe financial crisis of the 1982 and 1994, Mexico 
represents a significant example where financial liberalization can be devastating if it 
is not accompanied by strengthening of financial market institutions, especially an 
adequate supervision and regulation.
220
  
 
Hence, is true now that recently Mexico has made important developments in its 
financial laws as well as its regulatory and supervisory system.
221
  However, the fact 
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of Nations, FURSTENBERG, op. cit. 
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remains that there are still pending tasks, such as to break from old practices of 
banking supervision, which have allowed formal compliance without addressing the 
crucial issues of bank, solvency, profitability and competition.
222
  
 
Additionally, in some cases the regulators in Mexico forgot his role of watchdog 
and played only as supporters of financial institutions. This was the case of a drug-
cartel which successfully bought a bank in 1995, and surprisingly it was until 19 
months later when the fraud was discovered. Also, the involvement of Mexican 
banks in many laundry operations raised a lot of doubts.
223
 
 
Summarizing, Mexico began the liberalization process slowly in the 1970s; this 
liberalization combined with serious macroeconomic disorders took the country into 
a financial crisis in 1982. Again in 1990s the government continued encouraging 
liberalization when in 1994 it faced another crisis. Fortunately, with USA and 
international financial institutions combined with a better regulatory and supervisory 
mechanism the effect was much less than the prior crises. 
 
 With the overlapping negotiations in unilateral, multilateral, regional and bilateral 
instruments raises the question of what will be the most appropriate forum for 
liberalization of services of developing countries, such as Mexico.  
The discussion in Chapters III and IV suggests that for some services sectors, 
especially financial services, the most appropriate level for liberalization of 
developing countries is the regional or bilateral arena. Consequently, at regional level 
it is where governments should focus its negotiation efforts. However, it should be 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_4164000/4164678.stm).  
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considered as well together with some other circumstances, such as the political 
context and the definition of national interests. 
 
1.4 G20 AND ITS ROLE IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MEXICAN FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM 
 
1.4.1 Introduction 
 
Aiming to achieve financial stability, G20 has played a significant role in the 
construction of the current global financial architecture in general, and in the 
evolution of the Mexican financial system in particular.  As shown in what follows, 
since G20’s inception, Mexico has adopted a proactive role, both domestically and 
externally, in sketching and adopting measures that portray the current global 
financial architecture.
224
   
  
The main issue discussed in the first G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank 
Governors’ Meeting was crises prevention and resolution.  Among other things, G20 
members agreed back then to: 
 
…implement the emerging international consensus on policies to reduce 
countries’ vulnerability to financial crises, including through 
appropriate exchange rate arrangements, prudent liability management, 
private sector involvement in crisis prevention and resolution, and 
adoption of codes and standards in key areas including transparency, 
data dissemination, market integrity, and financial sector policy.
225
 
 
By 2001, crisis prevention and resolution still remained as a main issue, and G20 
concluded that the adoption of “the best practices embodied in international 
standards and codes also will help support strong, stable growth and reduce the risk 
of future financial crises.”226 Accordingly, it continued promoting the adoption of 
international standards and codes, and the assessments under one or both of the 
                                                 
224
 For the background, history, development, mandate, objectives, members and structure of G20, see 
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225
 G-20, Communiqué, “G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting,” (Montreal, 
Oct. 25, 2000) at paragraph 7. 
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 G-20, Communiqué, “G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting”, (Ottawa, 
Nov. 16-17, 2001) at paragraph 5. 
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IMF/WB-led FSAPWB and Reports on Observances with ROSCs, which had been 
implemented on a voluntary basis by the majority of G20 members.  
 
1.4.2 Mexico and G20 
 
On 2003, under Mexico’s leadership, G20 followed up discussion on such issues as 
crises prevention and resolution, globalization, and the interdiction of terrorist 
financing.  Additionally, a major step was taken to reach a consensus to solve 
financial crises: Mexico announced that it had included collective action clauses in 
an international bond with the purpose of restructuring debts in case the debtor is 
unable to carry out its commitments.   
 
Eventually other G20 countries and smaller developing countries such as Brazil, 
Korea, and South Africa followed this example.
227
  Endeavouring to achieve UN’s 
“Millennium Development Goals” was another resolution of 2003, at the “Monterrey 
Consensus,” which concerns and involves Mexico.228 
  
In 2004, G20 members Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, together with private 
sector creditor groups, including IFF and IPMA, issued the “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.”  In that document 
it is reaffirmed “the importance of an international financial architecture that sets 
incentives for pursuing sustainable policies and prudent risk-taking.”229  
 
On 2004, two mid-term issues were also discussed in 2004, regional economic 
integration and demography and growth.  On regional integration, a subject matter in 
which Mexico has played and continues to play a key role, G20 concluded that 
“regional cooperation and integration can be important steps for national economies 
in opening up to global trade and financial flows and in achieving gradual 
improvements in competitiveness.”230 
 
                                                 
227
 See G20, THE GROUP OF TWENTY: A HISTORY (2008) at 32 [hereinafter, THE GROUP OF TWENTY]. 
228
 UN Conference on Financing for Development held in March, 2000, in Monterrey, México. 
229
 G20, Communiqué, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, (Berlin, 
Germany, Nov. 20-21, 2004) at paragraph 3. 
230
 Id., at paragraph 6. 
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...policy challenges differ greatly among countries in the short-term. 
Countries that will encounter aging problems first need to integrate to 
the labour force a larger part of their working-age population, expand 
individual working life, and implement life-long learning. Countries 
that will experience a rise in the working age population before the 
problematic impact of aging becomes apparent should increase 
investment in human-capital and infrastructure while pursuing prudent 
fiscal policies.
231
 
  
By 2005, another issue concerning Mexico became the focus of G20, namely, the 
importance migrant remittances have for developing countries to reduce poverty and 
promote economic development.  Therefore, G20 urged the international community 
to improve remittance services.  
 
The subject matter of G20’s 2006 Annual Meeting was “Building and Sustaining 
Prosperity,” with the aim of promoting global development and growth, based upon 
open trade.
232
  It was recognized that “maintaining a strong world growth and 
containing inflation will require on-going adjustments to monetary and fiscal policies 
while ensuring appropriate exchange rate flexibility and structural reform.”233   
 
President Calderón’s administration (inaugurated on December 1, 2006) has 
follow suit promoting fiscal discipline and giving continuity, in coordination with 
BANXICO, to the fight inflation, and to maintaining sound and prudential monetary 
and exchange policies, even in spite of the strong antagonism of the opposition 
political parties.  This on-going antagonism has been the reason why structural 
reforms have not been achieved, as the Legislative branch is controlled by the leftist 
opposition parties, chiefly PRI and PRD.
234
   
 
On 2007, under the leadership of South Africa, G20 followed up on the 2005-
2006 Bretton Woods Reform discussion. The statement “Reforming the Bretton 
Woods Institution” was intended to strengthen the “credibility, effectiveness and 
                                                 
231
 Id., at paragraph 7.  
232
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Australia, Nov. 18-19 2006) at paragraph 5 [hereinafter MELBOURNE 2006 G20 COMMUNIQUÉ]. 
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legitimacy of IMF and WB.”235  Consequently, G20 insisted that the reform should 
enhance the representation of dynamic economies, many of which were emerging 
market economies, whose importance in the global economy had increased.  
 
Thus, although a creation of the G7, the G20 developed as an autonomous, 
informal group,
236
 firstly, then to become (due to the September 2008 USA financial 
crisis) a permanent summit, quickly repeated to become a permanent feature of 
international political life.
237
   
 
As a result, G20 meetings are no longer forums merely for finance ministers and 
central bank governors, but a summit of its member’s leaders.  “G20 leaders still 
meet with their finance ministers by their side, and thus far only ministers of tourism 
(from all members but America) and ministers of labour seem ready to join the G20 
governance game.”238  
 
Mexico’s participation in the Bretton Woods institutional system, through G8 
(from which G20 sprung), dates back to 1989. Mexico started participating in G8 
summit governance at the leaders’ level in 1989, did so again in 2003 and has done 
so continuously since 2005. It has participated as an equal at the ministerial level, 
starting with the Global Health Security Initiative since 2001, and at the official level 
in the Heiligendamm Process since 2007.
239
  
 
Mexico has been a full member of the G20 at all levels from the start, but with the 
very recent emergence of an inner pentarchy, replacing the troika, as the steering 
group for the G20 summits and thus system, Mexico is not a member of this inner 
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grouping.
240
 A 2003 G20 assessment of Mexico’s Institution241 building in its 
financial system, deemed Mexico’s case a positive example regarding liberalization 
on institution building.
 242
 
 
As already mentioned above, in 2003 and under its leadership, Mexico announced 
that it had included collective action clauses in an international bond with the 
purpose of restructuring debts in case the debtor is unable to carry out its 
commitments, an example that other G20 countries and smaller developing countries 
followed later.
243
 In 2004, Mexico was one of the G20 members that, together with 
private sector creditor groups, issued the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and 
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.”  
 
In November 2006, G20 recognized that, “maintaining a strong world growth and 
containing inflation will require ongoing adjustments to monetary and fiscal policies 
while ensuring appropriate exchange rate flexibility and structural reform.”244 
 
President Calderón’s administration (inaugurated on December 1, 2006) has 
followed suit promoting fiscal discipline and giving continuity, in coordination with 
BANXICO, to the fight inflation, and to maintaining sound and prudential monetary 
and exchange policies, even in spite of the strong antagonism of the opposition 
political parties and pundits.  
 
The great “Made-in-USA” financial crisis that erupted in September 2008, 
inevitably affected the Mexican economy especially, because of its strong 
dependence on the USA’s economy.  Income was affected because of the crisis effect 
on Mexico’s exports of manufacture and oil, USA tourism to Mexico, remittances of 
migrant workers.
245
   
                                                 
240
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 Institution understood as the rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that shape the 
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As a result, the Calderón administration (2006-2012) has participated actively in 
G20’s pursuit of durable solutions to the global crisis.  As of 2010, Mexican efforts 
are focused on following up fiscal and monetary measures aimed at restraining 
global crisis consequences.
246
  
 
At the London 2009 G20 meeting, Mexico supported, among other measure, the 
enforcement of international coordination to make information available on a timely 
basis, in order to be able to design global strategies that allow for the prevention and 
resolution of financial institutions’ bankruptcies.247  Mexico implemented this 
measure by creating the Council of the Financial System Stability.
248
  It was the first 
emerging economy to adopt this measure, which most developed countries had 
already implemented.
249
  
 
In the speech to introduce this act, President Calderón said: 
 
With this council we are generating a privileged forum to strengthen the 
coordination and exchange of information between the country’s 
financial authorities which will allow us to act in a faster and more 
accurately manner, when risks for financial systems are detected, and 
also will allow us to comply with commitments proposed to reinforce 
national finances and also contribute to the international effort in 
accordance with commitments acquired at G20.
250
   
 
 
The concern for finding and applying durable solutions to the global crisis is not 
restricted to Mexico but constitutes one of the most frequent discussions in 
international forums such as G20.
251
  In this regard, anti-cyclical policies,
252
 reform 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.fesmex.org/common/Documentos/Ponencias/Paper_Mexico_y_el_G20_Victor_Godinez2
010.pdf   
246
 See id. 
247
 See President Calderón’s speech at the signing of act that created the Mexican Council of Financial 
System Stability (Jul. 29, 2010); available at: 
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/index.php?DNA=42&Contenido=58992.  
248
 DOF, Jul. 29, 2010. 
249
 See http://www.cnnexpansion.com/economia/2010/07/28/mexico-economia-calderon-estabilidad-
cnn. 
250
  See President Calderón’s speech at the signing of the act that created the Mexican Council of 
Financil System Stability, op cit.  
251
 It is worth highlighting that Mexico’s participation in G5 as coordinator has opened a more 
effective dialogue with G8 and G20.  
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of financial institution and market liberalization were measures implemented by 
Mexico, in some cases, even before they were proposed by G20 as a reaction to 
global crisis
253
. 
 
Mexico has adopted a proactive role in proposing issues to be discussed by G20, 
such as: 1) Coordinating developed and emerging economies and IMF, WB and, in 
general, international financial organisms; 2) Rebuilding the international financial 
structure; 3) Implementing a “Green Fund” to address climate change; and 4) 
Committing to achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.
254
 
 
Along with Germany, Mexico coordinates G20’s Working Group, which is in 
charge of the “Reinforcement of international cooperation and promotion of financial 
markets integrity,” the following purposes: follow up and develop proposals to 
strengthen regulatory cooperation  of institutions and financial markets, strengthen 
negotiation and resolution of international effects of financial crisis, elaboration of 
proposals to protect global financial system from illicit activities and strengthen 
cooperation between international agencies. 
255
 
 
Mexico has also endeavoured to increase the involvement of the emerging 
economies in the decision making and the implementation of international economic 
and financial guidelines.  Together with Argentina and Brazil, Mexico has promoted 
the voice and vote reform of IMF and WB moving the deadline from 2013 to 
2011.
256
  
 
On January 13-14, and upon Mexico’s invitation, G20’s Sherpas met at the 
Mexican Foreign Ministry to discuss the group’s rules of operation. “Among other 
issues, they discussed their positions on the group’s rotating presidency; the scope, 
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frequency and timing of the summits, support structures and the relationship with the 
meetings of the finance ministers and Central Bank governors.”257 
 
On March 12, in the context of the delivery of his paper Why the World Needs G8 
and G20 Summitry: Prospects for 2010 and Beyond,
258
  Prof. John Kirton 
(University of Toronto) said that “Mexico is called to occupy a very important role in 
G20, above all as a communication bridge between developed and developing 
nations.”259  Likewise, Kirton highlighted the interest demonstrated by Mexico in 
updating the so-called ‘international architecture’.”260 
 
On May 15, 2010, under “Global Issues” in the V EU-Mexico Joint Statement: 
 
On global economic and financial issues, both sides stressed the 
importance of the multilateral trading system of the World Trade 
Organization and an ambitious and balanced outcome of the Doha 
Development Round as soon as possible. Both sides agreed on the need 
for the G20 to deliver on existing commitments and to set ambitious 
goals for the future to get a stronger, more balanced and more 
sustainable growth. They shared similar views about the priorities to 
pursue in this context, notably on supporting global recovery; ensuring 
a consistent implementation of financial market reforms and 
strengthening international financial institutions, among others. From 
its side, the EU welcomes and supports hosting the G-20 Summit in 
2012. The EU is committed to make a strong contribution to this 
Summit.
261
 
 
  
At the summit, President Calderón said that although the strategy of recovering 
growth (at the expense of  fiscal stability) generally work for those countries that 
adopted it, “there are certain consequences that are starting to be paid which, 
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paradoxically, are becoming one of the main inhibitors of growth.”262  He said that it 
is fundamental that those G20’s developed countries that have decided to keep their 
expansive fiscal policies and have not yet a solid recovery, “start to make credible 
and real fiscal adjustments that would generate in the markets certainty and trust.”263   
 
Along those lines, President Calderón also warned at the summit that “economies 
with growing deficit and public debt are in the process of becoming one of the larger 
obstacles for the development of the world economy.”264  He also alerted about the 
dangers, for future growth, of the permanence of expansive policies and its high 
deficits, as public debt in industrialized countries is at levels never seen before (83% 
of the GDP in the USA, 68% in the UK, and 73% in Germany), the implications of 
which must be analyzed.
265
      
 
President Calderón also urged the drafting of new clear rules for the financial 
markets to eliminate uncertainty and provide a rout map toward recovery.  He called 
for an agreement for the regulation of markets, in order to reduce “systemic risks for 
the global financial system and, at the same time, to promote world economic 
recovery.”266  He called for higher capital requirements for activities that generate 
systemic risks, for the strengthening of international cooperation among supervisors, 
as well as designing joint measures to identify non-cooperating jurisdictions. 
267
   
 
He expressed that Mexico “backs the proposal accumulated at the G20 Summit to 
face the problems associated to financial institutions of systemic importance.”268  
Following suit, he announced he would be sending the Legislative branch “a bill that 
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includes a resolution framework for the bankruptcy of banks, based on the best 
international practices.”269   
 
After South Korean President Lee Myung-bak state visit to Mexico on July 2, 
2010, a joint communiqué was issued by Mexico and the Republic of Korea stating: 
 
The Mexican leader reiterated his disposition to work closely with 
Korea and support his work as G20’s President in turn, looking forward 
to the upcoming Summit of Leaders to be hold next November in Seoul.  
Both leaders reckoned that G20 must continue adding efforts to ensure 
the economic recovery, the fulfilment of its commitments in financial 
regulation and supervision, to promote a comprehensive reform of the 
international financial institutions, and to adopt the measure needed to 
promote a vigorous, sustainable and balanced growth.  Likewise, they 
fully concurred on the need for the G20 to push the development 
agenda in order to share the benefits of economic development and to 
contribute to the fulfilment of the Development Millennium Objectives.  
President Lee expressed his satisfaction for the decision that Mexico 
leads and be host of the G20’s Leaders Summit in 2012.270 
 
 
It is worth highlighting G8’s concern for what became the top priority early in 
President Calderón’s administration, namely, “the drug trafficking and transnational 
crime that is proliferating in Mexico and infecting the Caribbean, North America, 
Africa and even distant Europe itself.”   
 
G8 has appropriately listed the above as its “fourth security priority... the new 
multi-faceted, non-state security challenge coming from vulnerable states.”271  This 
is consistent with the frequent appeals President Calderón has made to the 
international community to cooperate with the Mexican government in its war 
against drug cartels whose criminal activity is carried out across borders.       
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1.4.3 G20’s Assessment of Mexico’s Institution Building in Its Financial 
System.
272
 
 
Mexico’s case has been considered a positive example regarding liberalization on 
institution building.  Hereby a brief reference to some milestones in the development 
of the Mexican financial system that eventually lead to the adoption of the prudential 
financial standards that have contributed to its recent sustainable financial stability in 
accordance with the consensus reached by G20.
273
  
 
As developed above, the foundations of the current Mexican financial system are 
found in the legislative changes that took place in the 1970s and 1980s.
274
  A 1975 
Stock Exchange Law provided the legal framework for the expansion of securities 
operations and strengthened the regulatory role of the National Securities 
Commission.
275
 Another innovation (introduced in the 1978) was the issuing of 
federal government bonds known as Certificados de la Tesorería or CETES.  Other 
financial instruments were created in the late seventies, such as the non-bank paper 
and convertible securities.  
 
The road to liberalization was hindered by the 1982 expropriation of the Mexican 
private banks and the consequent government management of all the banking 
activity.
276
  Such “financial repression” affected in several aspects of the Mexican 
economy, externally and domestically.
277
  By the late 1980s, Mexico started a 
process of radical economic transformation.
278
  Among the main steps taken were the 
deregulation of the financial sector, its internationalization, and the re-privatization 
of the commercial banks.
279
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Deregulation was mainly focused on reducing limits to banks maintaining the 
supervision and regulation of their activities in order to make more efficient their 
services and operation but yet subjecting them to strictly necessary regulations.
 280
  
 
One of the most important institutional paradigm changes derived from the 
signing of NAFTA in 1993.  The purpose of this agreement was to create an 
environment that promoted the opening of the financial sector to foreign investment.  
In accordance with the terms and obligations assumed under NAFTA, Mexican 
Congress modified financial regulations in order to allow foreign financial 
institutions the establishment of fully-owned subsidiaries in Mexican territory.
281
  
 
The opening of the Mexican economy derived from NAFTA intended to balance 
competition and financial stability through gradual modifications in the countries’ 
applicable regulations in order to adjust them to the guidelines provided by NAFTA. 
Nevertheless, Mexico drafted certain conditions to NAFTA to guarantee the gradual 
transition to foreign access; such provisions mainly limit the amount of capital and 
assets that foreign investors are allowed to hold from the total capital of all financial 
institutions in Mexico
282
.  
 
Although origins of economic crisis in Mexico in 1994 are extremely complex; 
such situation forced Mexico to implement unanticipated measures in an attempt to 
stabilize the country’s banking system.283  In 1994 Mexico had an important amount 
of foreign investment considerably conformed by liquid and short term equity and 
debt portfolio investments that may be quickly withdrawn that allowed Mexico to 
support the large deficit of its current accounts.
284
  
 
On this kind of scenario, countries normally reduce their deficit adjusting its 
monetary and fiscal policy or its exchange rate. Though, Mexico permitted a 
significant inconsistency between its monetary and fiscal policy and its exchange rate 
                                                 
280
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282
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system forcing Mexico to either, raise interest rates or devalue peso; however making 
a decision was complicated due to upcoming presidential election.  
 
Domestic political events in Mexico caused an increasing withdraw of large 
amounts of foreign investment and, as a reaction, several actions were taken in order 
to stop the outflow of capital, such as depreciating the MXN, securing short-term 
credit agreement with the USA and Canada, and increasing rates on short-term 
CETES.
285
.  
 
Finally, Mexico was forced to completely devalue its currency on December 22, 
1994 leading Mexican economy to recession
286
. As we may notice, the fundamental 
problem was not liberalization per se, crisis was a result of a combination of diverse 
factors, external, domestic, economic and political; specially the fact that ideal 
liberalization conditions did not exist at that time (i.e. stable macroeconomic 
environment, adequate timing and sequencing of domestic and capital account 
liberalization, a financially sound banking system)
287
.  
 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned crisis, Mexico continued with its financial 
liberalization process presumably due to Mexico acknowledged the benefits of 
liberalization and because the process of institutions building was difficult to revert 
since international efforts were involved in this process.
288
  
 
Since 1995, BANXICO adopted a gradual disinflation process and in 2001 finally 
introduced a formal specific inflation framework including: 1) Consolidation of the 
autonomous monetary authority; 2) Reiteration of price stability as the fundamental 
objective of the monetary policy; 3) Announcement of short and medium term 
inflation targets; 4) A permanent analysis of all potential sources of inflationary 
pressures; 5) An emphasis on transparency and communication with society; and 6) 
An improved framework for central bank accountability. 
289
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288
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Also, Mexican efforts after the crisis focused on two aspects: maintaining the 
integrity of the financial system and establishing adequate policies to ensure correct 
operation of the financial system in an increasingly liberalized environment.  
Consequently, the Congress passed a financial reform in December 1998 pursuing 
those aspects.
290
  
 
Of the other measures taken during this period, it is worth highlighting the 
aforementioned reformation of the pension system
291
 and the passing of the 
bankruptcy and secured lending legislation by the federal Legislative branch in 2000.  
 
In addition, supervisory and regulatory frameworks were strengthened to 
accomplish with applicable best international practices.
292
  Legislative amendments 
approved between 1995 and 2000 strengthened the financial system and improved 
the operation of financial markets, thus achieving strength in banks’ financial 
conditions, higher efficiency in banking system and foreign participation in the 
domestic banking system that promoted competition capitalizing banking system.
293
  
 
Among the aforesaid legislative amendments are changes to banking law and the 
financial groups law, aimed at strengthening their corporate governance by 
introducing timely risk identification mechanisms and creating an audit committee.  
Likewise, the Rules of Capitalization Requirements for Multiple Banks were 
amended in order to accelerate the process of homologation between banking 
regulation and international standards by simplifying processes and establishing 
uniform criteria with CNBV, as well as eliminating certain discretional faculties of 
financial authorities.
294
 
 
Amendments to the Miscellany on Credit Collateral were made in order to 
promote bank lending by reducing transaction costs, interest rates, and risks related 
with lending operations.  An act for Credit Information Institutions was passed to 
regulate the establishment and operation of credit information companies, 
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establishing transparency regulations for the proper operation of such companies and 
providing secrecy in financial matters.
295
  
 
In order to improve financial inclusion and promote creation of SME the 
following laws were passed: the Federal Mortgage Association’s satute, Popular 
Savings and Credit Law, BANSEFI’s statute, and the statute of Financiera Rural.296  
 
Concerning the Mexican Stock Exchange, it has been affected by diverse 
problems, such as low firms controlled by a small group of investors and the fact that 
the domestic debt is dominated by public sector instruments. As a result, Congress 
approved important reforms to the Stock Exchange Law and the Mutual Funds Law 
with the intention of promoting development of the stock market by establishing 
provisions under transparency and efficiency principles. In general, these laws 
establish the new basis for corporate governance in this regard.
297
  
 
1.4.4 Conclusions 
 
Mexico’s importance and relevance in the global economic and financial scene, even 
as emerging economy, is attested by its participation in G20, even since the inception 
of its predecessors.  Although such importance and relevance was first made 
apparent in a painful way (on occasion of its 1994 crisis), the 2008 “Made in USA” 
crisis proved that Mexico learned the lessons from its past crises and has been 
dutiful, ever-since, in reforming its regulatory and institutional framework, in order 
to be protected against the risks inherent in liberalization and a growing involvement 
in the globalized economy.   
 
The above also shows, on the other hand, the benefits that membership in G20 has 
given Mexico, especially when sound free market economics approaches are still 
harshly repudiated by a significant portion of Mexico’s political players, as well as 
other regional leaders.   
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Moreover, the positive balance of Mexico’s participation in G20 has encouraged a 
more active role on the part of Mexico, who has become a leading member, both by 
voice (proposals) and by example (compliance).  This has been increasingly the case 
over the second half of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, which makes noteworthy 
the impetus that President Calderón and his economic cabinet has brought to the 
Mexico-G20 relationship and the positive fruits it has borne.  
 
1.5 CHAPTERS CONCLUSION´S AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 
During the 20
th
 century, Mexico took various paths in search of economic growth 
and development in general.  For decades, the Mexican government focused and 
committed all its efforts on increasing its intervention and control over ever 
increasing areas of the economy, which entailed (in addition to central planning of 
the economy) protectionism, inflation, and over-regulation to the extreme of micro-
management of several firms, industries and whole sectors. Eventually, the 
interventionist model was exhausted and Mexico was left broke as a result of it.  This 
came to pass during De la Madrid administration (1982-1988) whose economic 
advisors were successful in persuading the decision makers that the only way to face 
the economic emergency was to move in the direction of liberalization of the 
economy.  The change was not going to be welcome by many.  Illegitimate interests 
and complacency, as well as ideological dogmatism, fostered resistance to the 
economic reformed required, in spite of the severity of the crisis.  
 
A first a quite modest step given by the Mexican government in the direction of 
economic reform (multilateral liberalization) was Mexico’s accession to the GATT, 
as will be seen in the next chapter, as a measure aimed primarily towards curbing 
hyperinflation and opening foreign markets for Mexican products which in turn 
would provide the Mexican economy with an income of American Dollars urgently 
needed to be able to face the country’s foreign debt.  Liberalization started to bear 
modest first fruits which provided the Mexican decision makers (within and without 
the government and its political party) with sufficient element to encourage them in 
furthering the liberalization agenda up to the point of being willing to negotiate and 
inter into a regional free trade agreement that included the largest market and most 
powerful nation of the world. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
 
MEXICO'S ACCESSION TO THE  
 
MULTILATERAL REGIONAL AGREEMENTS:  
 
GATT, GATS/WTO,  
 
THE MEXICAN POLITICAL DEBATE  
 
REGARDING ITS ACCESSION,  
 
AND CROSS BORDER FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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2.1 THE VARIOUS FRAMEWORKS AND THE PECULIAR MEXICAN APPROACH 
 
2.1.1 Background 
 
International trade is a tool to promote economic growth among the nations.  As its 
influence has increased, the world has become more interdependent.  The prosperity 
of the nations involved in international trade has increased significantly over the last 
decades, in general.
298
  As a result there is more competition, more freedom as to 
where to invest, buy or sell and, consequently, consumers have more choices.  Trade 
allows countries to focus on what they can do best, thus resulting in better products 
and services.
299
 
  
Liberalization of financial services has been affected in various ways: unilaterally, 
bilaterally, regionally, and/or multilaterally.  This situation seems to have created 
duplicity of functions.  The international trade system has had to develop such 
different tools to reduce dysfunctions, thus making a fairer play for the participants, 
allowing them to choose the most appropriate way for themselves. It is argued for 
instance that RTAs can help positively the world trade system when they go beyond 
multilateral rules, enhancing further liberalization.
300
 
  
For purposes of this work, the primary frameworks for liberalization are 
multilateral or global (e. g. GATS/WTO), regional (e. g. NAFTA), and bilateral (e. g. 
MEFTA),
301
 though the unilateral framework has played an important role in trade 
liberalization of financial services as shown in this chapter. 
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It is also worth mentioning the relationship between regional integration and 
development. It has been recognized that there is a close link between regional 
integration and development. Since then, many developing countries have been 
focusing on regional and bilateral agreements as a strategic framework to leverage 
their standards of living and development, such as Mexico’s case with NAFTA.  
 
The duality of regional rules versus multilateral rules has arisen, developed and is 
still a topic of some debates
302
 together with the issue of compatibility between 
RTAs and the multilateral rules such as GATS/WTO.
303
  The overlapping 
membership in RTAs adds more complexity and uncertainty.   
 
Most developing countries are involved in several trade agreements, which 
produce what is called “a spaghetti bowl.”  An average Latin American country 
belongs to seven agreements which have their different rules of origin, tariff 
schedules and periods of implementation, all of which complicates matters in the 
international arena and in the domestic procedures of every country.   
 
Such overlapping of treaties may run counter to the primary objective of RTAs 
quoted in Arts. XXIV of GATT and V of GATS, which is not to raise barriers to the 
trade of third countries but to facilitate trade among members.   
 
For Mexico and other developing countries it is important to know to what extent 
liberalization of services has been adequate as well as determine whether those 
various frameworks might duplicate or triplicate the same functions. If this were the 
case, then, it should be known how to co-ordinate those frameworks in order to 
maximize complementariness instead of antagonism.  
 
 
                                                 
302
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2.1.2 Multilateral Integration: Global Trade Agreements 
 
Multilateral liberalization is one of the pillars of the strategy towards liberalization. 
Between 1983 and 2003, it accounted for 25% of the share of total tariff reduction 
whereas regional had 10%.
304
  Collectively considered, it can represent a kind of 
fortress to some countries (especially the small ones) in which they can achieve 
significant results, such as market access for agricultural products and reduction of 
subsidies by developed countries.
 305
 
  
GATT/WTO represents an example of multilateral economic integration and 
liberalization.  GATT was never organization as such, neither with regulatory nor 
jurisdictional powers.  The countries were called “contracting parties” due to the 
nature of agreement without international legal personality.  It was until the Uruguay 
Round (1986-1004) that WTO was established as its successor.  
 
The Marrakesh Agreement (April 15, 1994) contains the institutional framework 
for this organization. The WTO Ministerial Conference, comprised by 
representatives of all its members, gathers every two years.
306
  This multilateral 
integration is explained in Chapter 2 along with the analysis of GATS. 
 
Countries in the process of joining WTO must first introduce domestic reforms in 
their core trade policies, laws, regulations, institutions, and policies that affect trade 
and investment. Mexico, for instance, from being a protectionist country moved to 
one of the most liberalized in just 15 years (1985-2000).  
 
Interestingly, the countries that have benefited the most from joining WTO are the 
ones that used it as a tool to support their reform program. China, for example, 
throughout the fifteen years of accession negotiations focused on locking in domestic 
                                                 
304
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reforms that reduced state controls over production and increased competitiveness in 
key areas of its industry.
307
  
 
2.1.3 Regional Integration 
 
This work focuses mainly on NAFTA as a model of RTA.
308
  NAFTA established 
free trade between USA, Canada and Mexico.  It is an improved extension of 
CUSFTA (August 12, 1992).  Regarding regional integration, NAFTA
309
 created a 
360 million people market, the largest market in the world when it was first 
implemented.  Although it has been disregarded in some areas, it is important to bear 
in mind that it is still an ongoing process.     
 
2.1.4  Bilateral Integration 
 
Bilateral integration will be analyzed though MEFTA.  Bilateral agreements are 
attractive due to the weaknesses and disadvantages of the multilateral system 
mentioned above. In the specific case of the MEFTA, EU represented an attractive 
opportunity for Mexico because it is the largest and most integrated trade 
arrangement in the world bound into customs unions which are committed to 
political and economic integration.
310
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 MEFTA (TRADE IN SERVICE AGREEMENT) at 21. 
 100 
The home of more than 400 million people (now with the enlargement of 25 
countries), with a GDP of over 7 trillion, EU is the world’s second largest economy 
after the USA.
311
  
 
2.1.5 Unilateral approach: The Mexican “Bottom up Approach”, Unilateral or 
Autonomous Liberalization; Is It More Important than Multilateral and 
Regional Liberalization?  
 
Autonomous liberalization has accounted for most of the reductions in border 
protection over the last 20 years.  Several reforms of developing countries such as 
Mexico, Brazil, China, Argentina and India were primarily unilateral reforms carried 
out to increase the productivity of the domestic economy. It has been used for most 
of the countries to liberalize their trade since 1980s.  
 
An examination of tariff reduction by developing countries found that neither 
regional trade agreements nor multilateral agreements were the driving force in the 
liberalization. Autonomous liberalization accounted for 66% of the liberalization, 
while multilateral agreement 25% and regional agreements only 10%.
312
  
 
Most recently, over the last six years, 31 countries have implemented important 
reforms, lowering their MFN tariffs by 4% or more.  Such is the case of India, Egypt, 
Chile and Mexico.  The reforms were focused mainly on trade policy: exchange rate 
reforms, tax policy reforms and liberalization of domestic markets.
313
 
 
Unilateral reform or autonomous liberalization has many advantages: 
a) promote global competitiveness by lowering costs of inputs, b) increase 
competition from imports to drive productivity to growth and c) integrate the 
national economy into the global economy. Also having low barriers minimize the 
risks of trade diversion (when RTAs exist) and promote trade with other markets.
314
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Unilateral liberalization has been greatly influenced by RTA´s such as NAFTA, 
in the case of Mexico.  In this case, and in attempt to comply with NAFTA 
obligations, Mexico had to amend several financial and commercial internal laws and 
regulations, producing in Mexico further autonomous liberalization.
315
   
 
As it has been said before, purely top-down legal reform is not viable in the long-
term as much has to come from the bottom up.  Especially regarding prudential 
financial standards, active and fully committed country participation is needed from 
the very beginning.  
 
Keeping in mind that each country represents an individual case, nations may 
need to adopt solutions that correspond to their different needs and levels of 
development.  This means that the initiative for conducting and construing reform in 
a broader developmental context should rest primarily on the country involved.
316
 
 
In the case of México, it is interesting how its 1994 crisis brought about a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the role of financial law and institutions with the 
consequent development, for the first time, of a comprehensive framework of 
internationally acceptable standards delineating minimum requirements for financial 
stability, which is analyzed in Chapter 3.
317
 
 
2.1.6 Overlapping Membership in RTAs: The Current Case of Mexico 
 
The explosion of many economic integration agreements has created a complex web 
(or “spaghetti bowl”318), which complicates matters in the international trade system 
and in the domestic procedures of each country. For example, customs agents report 
that this “spaghetti bowl” reduces transparency and delays considerably the process 
of goods through customs offices.  And the bigger the delays are in trade and 
customs, the smaller the role of trade in the GDP.
319
    
   
                                                 
315
 See infra Chapter 3. 
316
 See Norton, “Taking...,” op. cit., at 33. 
317
 See ARNER, FINANCIAL...,op. cit., at 2.    
318
 See Devlin and Castro, op. cit., at 7.  
319
 See WB 2005 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS REPORT at XIII.  Customs agents have reported that 
it complicates the matters and thus takes longer to process goods covered by preferential agreements.  
 102 
During the last 20 years Mexico has been actively involved in the negotiating 
RTAs.
320
 Mexico’s trade liberalization is supported by a rich network of 12 RTAs 
covering America, Europe, Middle East and Asia,321 and has inspired many 
developing countries in the region to join the wave of trade liberalization.322  
 
However, Mexico is an example of some of the problems that overlapping RTAs 
can produce:  
1) Members of the Central American Common Market have signed a free trade 
agreement with the Dominican Republic covering services, even when they do not 
have such provisions among themselves. 
2) Colombia and Venezuela have agreed on the elimination of barriers to services 
trade between each other in the context of the Andean Community but have not 
agreed to the same objective in the context of the Group of the Three Treaty they 
signed with Mexico.
323
 
3) Members of the Central American Common Market are now negotiating with 
Chile at the same time that they are finalizing a services agreement among one 
another.
324
 
 
Such multiple rules may run counter to the primary objective of RTAs expressed 
in Arts. XXIV of GATT and V of GATS, which is not to raise barriers to the trade of 
third countries but to facilitate trade among members, resulting in net trade 
diversion.
325
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2.1.7 The “Mexican Vision” and International Development Law  
 
2.1.7.1 Developed and Developing Countries 
 
There is a close link between regional integration and development. As a result, 
many developing countries, like Mexico are focusing on regional and bilateral 
agreements as strategic frameworks for leveraging their standards of life and 
development.
326
  
 
Within international law international development law has been added, which 
focuses on the position of developing countries.  It is important to point out that there 
are two basic principles of international development law:
327
 1) Developing countries 
have a right to development; and 2) Developed and developing countries have a duty 
of solidarity. 
 
2.1.7.2  Duty to Cooperate, Solidarity, the Right to Development and the 
Mexican Vision 
 
There is a duty of solidarity and cooperation in the development process.328  Such 
duty is shared among developed and developing countries. In this context, countries 
should act in good faith and help the countries that need it more.  In other words, it is 
the unity of action towards a common end: the development of all nations.
329
    
 
This rule has been stated in many international agreements.  The most important is 
the Declaration on the Right to Development of 1986.  Does this mean that reach 
countries ought to help poor countries?
330
  Is the right to development a kind of 
human right or an economic right?  Rich countries have not yet accepted the right to 
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development as a binding norm of international law; however, they grant aid or 
trade
331
 preferences on a voluntary basis.
332
  
 
As Wolfensohn has stated, we live in a “world out of balance… and it is time to 
restore it to the way we use it;” with six billion people living on earth, one billion 
own 80% of global GDP, while another billion survives on less than USD$1 a day.  
In the Millennium Development Goals, world leaders agreed to cut poverty by half 
by 2015, setting targets for health, education, and equal opportunities for women, 
environment and preservation of the forest and oceans.
333
 
 
The former Mexican President Vicente Fox also proposed the “Mexican vision” 
on priority issues regarding the Millennium Goals, such as the connection between 
sustained development, security and human rights and the reduction by half of 
extreme poverty in the world by 2015.
334
   
 
This statement represents one of the world’s main objective; the urgency and the 
need to link sustained development, security, human rights with the reduction of 
poverty, which would provide a minimum level of a sound economic development of 
a particular developing country. 
 
At the Monterrey and Johannesburg meetings, developing countries agreed to 
strengthen governance, create a positive investment climate, build transparent legal 
and financial system and fight corruptions.  Developed countries agreed to support 
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these efforts by enhancing capacity building, increasing aid and opening their 
markets for trade.
335
  
 
However, there is a strong paradox and rhetoric in this issue, since “the aid today 
is at its lowest level ever.  It has fallen from 0.5% of GDP in the early 1960s to about 
0.22% today.  And this is at a time when incomes in developed countries have never 
been higher.”336  Developing countries have a right of development, and developed 
countries could help greatly acting without delay to stop the famine, disease and 
chaos that have been spreading within the developing world.  
 
2.1.7.3 Qualification as a Developing Country 
 
The differentiation between developing and developed countries is usually based on 
economic and social parameters (e. g.  GDP, national product per capita, and level of 
literacy). The “preferential treatment for developing countries depends on auto-
selection.”337  In other words, a country presents itself as a developing country and is 
usually accepted as such. 
 
2.1.8 Common and Shared Objectives with Respect to Liberalization of Trade 
in Services on These Various Frameworks: Transparency, Stability and 
Liberalization 
 
Has trade liberalization in financial services been more successful in the form of the 
RTA or multilateral liberalization?  GATS Art. V states that regional trade 
agreements must go further in their market access liberalization than the multilateral 
system. However, it does not specify how far they should go.  
 
These different frameworks (multilateral, bilateral and regional) contain similar 
disciplines with respect to trade in services and especially to financial services, 
                                                 
335
 Wolfensohn, op. cit., at 7.  
336
 Id., at 9.  
337
 See VAN HOUTTE, op. cit., at 38.  
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sharing and overriding the same objectives such as: transparency, stability and 
liberalization.
338
   
 
2.1.9 Political Confrontations in Mexico Regarding Its Accession to GATT 
 
“From the late 1940s until the mid 1970s, the basic thrust of [Mexican] trade policy 
was the use of high tariffs and import-substituting industrialization...”339  In the 970 
and through the mid 1980s trade protectionism increased even more.  
Notwithstanding the above, Mexico started to participate in the capacity of “active 
observer” at the multilateral commercial negotiations known as the Tokyo Round.340   
 
During almost the whole term of the Tokyo Round, Luis Echeverría Álvarez was 
President of Mexico (1970-1976), and José López-Portillo headed SHCP.  An Office 
for Trade Negotiations and Tarrifs was established at SHCP during the early stages 
of the Tokyo Round, as well as an inter-ministerial commission for the same topics, 
formally presided by López-Portillo.
341
     
 
In 1978 USA issued “emphatic invitations” for Mexico “to join GATT before the 
end of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) and to open up its economy”.342  Mexico 
“assumed certain commitments in principle, and its representatives believed it was 
only logical for Mexico to negotiate accession in order to receive improved market 
access as a result of GATT membership.”343  When López-Portillo became president 
of Mexico (December, 1976), he maintained the “incipient interest in GATT.”344   
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On January, 1979, López-Portillo’s Ministry of Commerce sent to Director 
General of GATT the letter of intent required to join expressing, among other things: 
 
...that Mexico would accept accession only insofar as three basic 
principles were upheld: that it should be recognized as a “developing 
country,” that it be allowed to implement the measures required to 
achieve the aims of its economic and social development policies, and 
that its commitments during the Tokyo Round be considered part of the 
concessions give for GATT accession.
345
  
 
 
On January 29, a Working Group was established to negotiate with the Mexican 
authorities to examine its application to join GATT under Art. XXXIII and to submit 
recommendations to the Council.
346
  On October 26, the protocol of accession was 
ready, yet “an acrimonious debate involving government officials, politicians, 
academics, public intellectuals and business leaders, among others, on the merits of 
GATT accession that continued throughout 1979 and early 1980,” sidelined the very 
successful negotiations.
347
   
 
In April 1979, the Colegio Nacional de Economistas (CNE) [National Bar of 
Economists], during its Third Annual Conference and in the presence of then 
President López-Portillo, “expressed concerns over the consequences of Mexico’s 
entre into GATT, chief among them that it would represent a threat to the sovereign 
management of trade and industrial policy and provoke serious dislocations in the 
Mexican economy.”   
 
One month later, speaking through the national media, the CNE stated that: 
 
...accession to GATT should be postponed indefinitely given that the 
national economy was not ready for increased foreign competition, and 
that the existing trade policy instruments were adequate to combat the 
prevailing anti-export bias.  In arguments reminiscent of those used 
some thirty years earlier by Finance Minister Beteta,
348
 the CNE also 
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346
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 Herztein and Whitlock, op. cit., at 221. 
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claimed that the GATT was ineffective in dismantling protectionism 
and did not deal effectively with the needs of developing countries.
349
  
  
 
Likewise, in the legal academic realm, essays and articles were published by UNAM 
(usually leftist in its ideological affiliations) opposing a priori (in spite of claims to 
the contrary) Mexico’s accession to GATT.  Ricardo Méndez-Silva, for example, 
writes: 
 
Mexico’s accession or not to the... [GATT] has, in any case, positive 
and negative aspects that need to be pondered carefully in order to 
arrive to a balance of costs and benefits that would translate in a 
rational decision, free of emotions and aprioristic labelling. At the 
national level, the discussion has been impregnated with stereotypes: 
those who defend the accession represent the conservative current and 
those who oppose it represent the progressive one. Above ideological 
varnishes, it is convenient to go into a technical analysis of the 
dispositions of the GATT, their extent and the incompatibilities there 
are with respect to the Mexican development policies.   
 
At any rate, the author wants to express from these initial words that 
this study starts and concludes in a position that it is at the same time 
the premise and conclusion: the non-convenience [sic] of Mexico’s 
accession to the GATT.
350
 
 
 
One of the three facets of Méndez-Silva’s position against Mexico’s accession to 
GATT (under the subheading “The Conditioning Framework”) was that during the 
1970s the USA had:  
 
...significant setbacks... in its political and economic strategies... [and] 
experienced a loss of valuable geopolitical and geoeconomical pieces...  
the Middle-East... Afghanistan... Pakistan... Yemen... Iran... [all of 
which] point in the direction of an undermining the North American 
[USA] influence and, on the other hand, although not in an automatic 
manner, in benefit of the Soviet preponderance. The chief fear of the 
USA in this conflictive effervescence is that a chain reaction would be 
produced that affects Saudi Arabia, which is one of its chief partners in 
the region and the chief oil exporter of the world.  Thus, in the 
background of these political readjustments is the danger of the 
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 Ricardo Méndez-Silva, The non Accession of Mexico to the GATT, 36 BOLETIN MEXICANO DE 
DERECHO COMPARADO (Sep-Dic, 1979) at 747; available at:  
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suspension of the supply of oil or its reduction in the medium term for 
circumstances that not quite unforeseeable.
351
      
 
 
One paragraph of two sentences and five lines is devoted to the decrease in USA 
exports, before going back to the thesis of the USA pretention “to avoid cracks in its 
immediate sphere of action” and its search for “fundamentally energetic self-
sufficiency.”352 In the same paragraph Méndez-Silva calls dangerous “The idea —in 
principle ethereal or exotic— of building a North American Common Market that 
has as engine axis the USA and that includes Canada and Mexico as supply sources 
of oil and gas, raw materials and, in the case of Mexico, of low-cost manpower.”353 
 
Other objections Méndez-Silva raised under this sub-heading were that the GATT 
“consecrates, in spite of institutional make-up..., a capitalist development model;” 
that the Dollars Mexico would get from oil sells would be recovered by the USA by 
means of its exports to Mexico;
354
 and those who wished to ignore that would rather 
“fall to the promise of the world markets longingly await for the Mexican 
products.”355   
 
The anti-capitalist theme is the most prevalent in the article referred, with 
statements as the following: 
 
...the accession to the GATT would close dangerously the circuit of 
influence of the financial and commercial world institutions of 
capitalism, as the Mexican State hands over to this instances, faculties 
connected with the conduction of its economy that ought to be handled 
according to the national interests and needs and not adjusted to 
                                                 
351
 Id., at 748. 
352
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prefabricated models that pursue the free circulation of the capital and 
merchandizes according to the interests of the industrialized countries.  
A reflection that is worth commenting, is the one that notices the danger 
of the “privatization of the State,” which is an objective pursued by all 
transnational strategy that attempts to debilitate the traditional 
sovereign attributes of the State, that are still a break or at least de-
accelerant element to the world projection of supercapitalism (Juan 
María Alponte, UnoMásUno, 7th April).
356
   
 
 
Under the subheading “Specific Clarifications”, Méndez-Silva raised the argument 
that Mexico did not have products to export,
357
 and that it was not in shape to start 
competing at world level.
358
  Under the subheading “Normative and Political 
Incompatibility”, Méndez-Silva argues that the principle of non-discriminatory 
treatment, “at first sight could appear the incarnation of justice, postulates a factual 
situation of inequality, since it is not possible to treat in the same conditions 
countries that are in different degrees of development”.359    
 
Under the subheading “Minimum Basis of Negotiation,” Méndez-Silva outlines 
the approach he recommends to take regarding the USA’s invitation to adhere to the 
GATT, namely: 1) To postpone the accession to the GATT or join only as observer 
or with a conditioned membership;
360
 2) In case that is not possible, to submit the 
accession process to a more or less long process of adjustments; 3) To request that 
the principles of equality and reciprocity be not applied strictly; 4) To detect clearly 
the diverse policies and available subsidizing measures, established to foment the 
development of industrial branches and of regions in order to prevent that the 
guidelines of the GATT force their dismantlement;
361
 5) To apply the Mexican 
                                                 
356
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system of customs valuation, which allows the use of official prices; 6) To ensure the 
freedom of the Mexican State to purchase in any place, preferably in national 
territory, without applying the damaging notion of equality between nationals and 
foreigners;
362
 7) To guarantee that Mexico will be able to continue using its regime 
of licenses prior to the imports.
363
 
 
CNE’s and UNAM’s arguments above mentioned were echoed by the powerful 
Congreso del Trabajo (CT) [Labor’s Congress].  The, chief organization of the 
Mexican labour movement,
364
 stated, by means of a study, that the entrance of 
Mexico to the GATT would hurt the autonomy of the national State; that it would 
compromise the sales of oil products.
365
  This latter argument was repeatedly denied 
by the Minister of Commerce, who expressed that oil sales would continue to be sold 
by means of separate agreements.
366
    
 
Opposition to joining the GATT also came from SME, whose spokesperson said: 
 
...joining the GATT will benefit the exporting groups, where big 
national and transnational capital predominates, while abandoning a 
protectionist policy and opening the domestic market to the 
manufacturing products of the GATT’s partners would damage 
noticeably the less powerful firms.
367
  
 
 
Luis Pazos, a long-time advocate of free trade and market economics, observed back 
then that detractors of the GATT in the business sector “were those who had made 
big fortunes taking advantage of that fictitious economy of protectionism.”368 
The industrials taking the anti-GATT position were those associated in, and 
represented by, the National Chamber of the Transformation Industry 
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(CANACINTRA). This chamber said that joining the GATT would be harmful for 
Mexico therefore it should wait 20 years to make that decision.
369
    
   
Along the lines of arguments already referred above, several other critics of 
joining the GATT said to the media that, “An inefficient industrial stripe and which 
has captive the domestic market will be put in the tight-rope of unequal competition, 
bankruptcy, or disappearance, which... would provoke more unemployment and deep 
social conflicts.”370   
 
On the other hand, in his newspaper and magazine writings to the general public, 
Pazos stated clearly that joining the GATT implied no danger, if by danger we 
understand unemployment and bankruptcy, and not an increased competition and 
more efficiency in our private and state-owned firms.
371
  He also wrote that the 
industrials’ and economists’ groups that opposed the GATT were not interested on 
improving the Mexican living standards; that they just wanted “to keep their interests 
and secure their power on the political economy.”372 
 
There was opposition also of some members of the presidential cabinet,
373
 notably 
from the Secretary of National Patrimony and Industrial Promotion, José Andrés de 
Oteyza, whose secretary was in charge of the administration of the oil sales income, 
a position of political and economic power he was not willing to lose.
374
 Finally, 
giving in to the pressure, López-Portillo instructed his Minister of Commerce to 
communicate to the Director General of GATT his decision, “after consultations at 
the national level, to postpone the accession of Mexico to GATT,”375 on May 16, 
1980.   Mexico remained, nevertheless, an observer at some of the GATT sessions.
376
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2.1.10 Some Observations to These Various Frameworks  
 
The liberalization of trade and the liberalization of financial services have been 
affected in a variety of ways: unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally, and/or 
multilaterally.  This situation seems to have created duplicity of functions. However, 
it is suggested that the international trade system has had to develop such different 
tools in order to reduce dysfunctions in the world’s trading system and thus making a 
play fairer for all the participants, allowing them to choose the most appropriate way.  
 
In the case of Mexico and its RTAs, they are the more likely to encourage world 
trade efficiency if their primary effect is to create new investment and trade rather 
than to divert existing trade (of course after unilateral liberalization, which is the 
most successful framework). 
 
Developing countries wishing to harness to trade to their development strategy 
should see each framework as one of the elements in the four pillars strategy that 
includes: unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral liberalization. The 
GATT/WTO represents an example of multilateral economic integration and 
liberalization. Multilateral integration accounts for 25% of the aggregate 
liberalization. Collectively considered, it can represent a kind of fortress to some 
countries (especially the small ones) where they could achieve significant results.  
 
Firstly, they have to introduce domestic reforms in their core trade policies, laws, 
and policies that affect trade and investment. Mexico, for instance, from being a 
protectionist country moved to one of the most liberalized in just 20 years (specially, 
in financial area). Thus, multilateral framework has played an important role in the 
liberalization of trade.  
                                                                                                                                          
preference for conducting relations with the USA on a bilateral basis. Internal political pressures 
reflected the continued reform of the Mexican political system at the upper levels and the relative 
autonomy of some elite groups from the state.  López-Portillo's decision did not constitute an outright 
rejection of trade liberalization. However, the decision could have international repercussions in 
‘politicizing’ USA-Mexican trade relations, in slowing trends toward freer trade (especially in Latin 
America), and in strengthening multilateral organizations like UNCTAD in which Third World 
countries exercise considerable power”  (id., at 767, abstract); available at: 
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Since 1990, there has been a new wave of regionalism, the “South-South” 
agreements have shifted to “North-South” agreements, which link up commercially 
with industrialized countries in reciprocal trade.  This is seen in NAFTA, Canada’s 
FTA with Costa Rica and Chile, and Japan’s with Mexico and Singapore. RTAs can 
help sensitive domestic constituencies to liberalize and maintain lower tariffs.  
 
Additionally, as the case of Mexico in NAFTA, RTAs help as an incubator for 
developing country producers to learn to trade with RTA partners without facing 
global competition. In the positive effect mentioned “first-mover advantage”. 
Countries may need to maximize their benefits through moving first and engage in 
North South agreement as in the case of Mexico in NAFTA.  
 
The results in the statistics of the WB Global Economic Report 2005 provide 
some justification for developing countries’ pursuit of RTA with the developed 
countries if they do so exclusively or at least get a first mover advantage by getting 
there first. 
 
Also, developing countries can negotiate faster RTAs than multilateral agreements 
assuming that successive governments will try to change the commitments once 
implemented. This is especially important in Mexico, where the new party tried to 
change some of its predecessors’ policies.377  Also RTAs can be used as leverage to 
facilitate domestic reforms.  
 
Summarizing, regional framework or RTA´s has been functioning as an “axis” in 
the world trading system, since it has been the tool on which depend and which 
influence the other frameworks. Paraphrasing has become the most powerful 
integrating device which fosters the rest of the frameworks.  
 
Unilateral framework constitutes the best strategy to achieve development for the 
developing countries.  The fact is that it has accounted for most of the reductions in 
border protection in the last 20 years.  Several reforms of developing countries such 
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as Mexico, Brazil, China, Argentina and India were primarily unilateral reforms that 
were carried out to increase the productivity of the domestic economy. In this way, 
the autonomous liberalization accounts for 66% of the liberalization, while 
multilateral agreement 25% and regional agreements only 10%. 
 
Open Regionalism represents a good option to solve this situation. It is recognize 
it as a device through which regionalism can be used to accelerate the progress 
toward global liberalization. This concept looks to assure that RTAs will in practice 
be building blocks for further liberalization rather than stumbling blocks that delay 
such progress. This applies as well in the case of the trade in financial services.
378
 
This concept has been adopted as a principal of the APEC, whose members account 
for about half of world trade (USA, Japan and China among others).  
 
Since it was recognized that there is a close link between regional integration 
(RTA) and development, many developing countries have been focusing on regional 
and bilateral agreements as strategic framework to leverage their standards of life 
and development, as was the case of Mexico with NAFTA.   
 
In the Monterrey consensus developing countries agreed to strengthen 
governance, create a positive investment climate, build transparent legal and 
financial system and fight corruption.  Developed countries on their part agreed to 
support these efforts by enhancing capacity building, increasing aid and opening 
their markets for trade. 
 
Additionally is it worth mentioning that these different frameworks (multilateral, 
bilateral and regional) contain similar disciplines with respect to trade in services and 
special to financial services, sharing and overriding the same objectives such as: 
transparency, stability and liberalization.  
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2.2 CROSS BORDER FINANCIAL SERVICES: GATS AND ITS FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AGREEMENT 
 
2.2.1 Introduction  
 
Cross-border trade in Financial Services is a tool to increase possibilities to conduct 
cross-trade business in order to make stronger markets and stronger economies. 
Liberalization of services and especially in financial services can help countries to 
build more robust and efficient financial systems by introducing international 
practices and standards and by opening the markets to foreign competition.
379
  
 
However, the developing countries and emerging economies were not keen, at the 
beginning, on opening
380
 their markets to the foreign financial services because they 
were afraid that this openness would damage their whole economic sector, trade in 
services, and especially trade in financial services like banking is of special concern; 
“banking is treated as special, it has to do with control of economy…foreign control 
of the banking system would be at the very last, a symbolic surrender of economic 
sovereignty…the GATS has had recognized it.”381 
 
Even more, the liberalization of this sector could bring some dangerous 
consequences as it may be a threat to domestic financial services companies, the 
undermining of prudential controls, the increased volatility of capital flows,
382
 and 
the threat of the general financial system stability. In other words, such liberalization 
carries the risk of leading to banking and financial crises. 
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For these reasons, developing countries are still reluctant to accept a new regime 
for liberalization of international trade especially in financial services,
383
 with some 
exceptions as Singapore.
384
  Many developing countries argued that the liberalization 
of trade had benefited mainly the developed countries, with 64% of the direct 
benefits.
385
  It is also worth noting that USA and Germany governments had strong 
protection policies against foreign trade in the 19
th
 century, like Japan and Korea.
386
  
 
Developing countries argue that such liberalization has largely benefited the 
developed economies of the north.
387
  They claim that northern countries opened 
their markets only when it was convenient, maintaining trade barriers and restrictions 
when it was not.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, developing countries have continued to make big 
efforts in liberalization, mainly because the USA, the WB and the IMF have been 
encouraging them, as in the following example: during the past decade 60 developing 
countries have reduced trade restrictions and 20 of the top 24 industrialized countries 
have raised them.
388
 
 
Some tried to explain that international services transactions had common trade 
properties and that the liberalization of services and the financial reform could be 
beneficial to developed and developing countries alike.
389
 However, this issue is still 
unsolved due to the fact that although many have argued in favor of such 
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liberalization many others, like the OXFAM Report
390
 have opposed or at least they 
state that such liberalization should be designed in a different way. 
 
As a result, the liberalization of the international trade
391
 and especially the 
internationalization of the financial services has become very important as it is one of 
the sectors which has grown significantly in the last 15 years,
392
 partly due to the 
enormous growth in world trade, the significant increase in the foreign direct 
investment, the financial deregulation, new telecommunication technology and 
sophisticated changes in financial innovation.
393
 Thus, it is important to determine 
whether the benefits of the liberalization of financial services exceed their potential 
costs for a developing country such as Mexico.  
 
Among the main benefits one can find providing a legal framework that reassures 
foreign institutions investing for the long term and providing a source of external 
pressure for change and transparency.
394
 In addition to the liberalization of financial 
services, and in a parallel and complementary framework, there has been a general 
and international attention to the requirements of sound financial systems.   
 
As Norton points out: 
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TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY, at Ch. 8 [hereinafter RIGGED RULES AND 
DOUBLE STANDARDS). 
391
 Protectionism can be expensive as it generally raises prices and makes other countries retaliate by 
raising their own trade barriers. The WTO Secretariat argues “that’s exactly what happened in the 
1920s and 30s with disastrous effects” (see  WTO, “10 Benefits of the WTO trading system” at 6 to 
11; available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b00_e.htm).   
392
 See id., at 225. See also Hall, op. cit., at 3. The fastest-growing sector of the world economy is that 
of services.  Annual trade in services has tripled to $1.2 trillion or one quarter of total world trade. 
Specifically, the banking industry has grown at more than 20% per year, which is twice as fast as 
world trade.  Between 1960 and 1990 branch assets of foreign located in the USA grew from 
USD$3.5 billion to USD$378.8 billion.  However, as a group, developing countries are running a 
deficit in their services trade of about USD$33 billion, only five have a surplus. The USA by contrast 
has a surplus of USD$80 billion.  
393
 See id. According to Murinde, GATS provides further impetus to NAFTA’s chapter on trade in 
financial services, especially in the perspective of telecommunications. NAFTA includes rules on 
trade in services affecting telecommunications, such as investment; US-based firms are expected to 
invest new resources in Mexico’s value-added network data services market, estimated grow to 
USD$100 million by 1995. Trade in Financial Services is likely to grow steadily in the next decade as 
its reliance on telecommunications increases, within the provisions of both the GATS and NAFTA.  
394
 See Dobson, op. cit., at 3. 
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…to develop agreed minimum principles and standards necessary to be 
implemented in order to encourage and improve confidence in and 
viability of domestic financial institutions, to minimize systematic risk 
as is the case of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision…the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO).
395
     
 
 
Also, the liberalization of trade and financial services in trade means more 
transactions and more trade which denotes a possibility for more disputes to arise. 
Consequently, WTO members should be able to use efficiently the Dispute 
Settlement in the WTO.
396
 
 
2.2.2 Historical Growth and Development of GATT/WTO 
 
GATT was never intended as an international organization, however, it was de facto 
acting as an organization with neither regulatory nor jurisdictional powers. GATT 
was functioning as follows: the contracting parties had regular meetings (like 
international conferences) and through these meetings they exercised their 
jurisdictional powers.   
 
After 1960, the administration was given to the GATT Council composed of 
representatives of the contracting parties.  GATT continued until the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994)
397
 when WTO was finally created and took over its institutional role.
398
 
Nevertheless, GATT as a treaty still exists.
399
 
 
WTO was created and is regulated by the Marrakesh Agreement of April 15, 
1994.400  The WTO Ministerial Conference, composed of representatives of all 
member states, meets at least once every two years. The General Council conducts 
                                                 
395
 J. J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (2000) at 16.  
396
 WTO, “10 Benefits…,” op. cit., at 3.  Before WWII, countries were not able to bring disputes to an 
international organization.  These rules included the obligation for members to submit their disputes to 
the Panels and Appellate Body of WTO and consequently not to act unilaterally. 
397
 See Goyos, op. cit., at 2.  Interestingly, during the Uruguay Round, and for the first time, the 
European Community and Japan resisted the pressure from the USA. Traditionally the USA has 
supported multilateralism. However, in this Round there was a radical change in the position of its 
trade policy introduction, turning now towards regionalism. 
398
 See VAN HOUTTE, op. cit., at 39. 
399
 See, JACKSON, op. cit., at 59.   
400
 Philip Ruttley, The WTO Financial Services Agreement, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS (1999) at 2. 
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the functions of the Ministerial Conference in the period between the two 
conferences.  The administrative body is known as the WTO Secretariat.  Other 
bodies are: Council of Trade in Goods, Council of Trade in Services, Council of 
TRIPS, Dispute Settlement Body, and Trade Policy Review Body.
401
  
 
Even if it is true that WTO panels have been gathering a huge amount of 
jurisprudence and that the Appellate Body’s comments have given interesting 
guidelines thus making positive progress in the certainty and predictability of the 
world trade system, the fact still remains that from a developing country’s point of 
view the consistent violation of GATT’s basic rules and principle of non-
discrimination by developed countries increases instability.
402
  One would say that it 
is still in some ways a weak organization.  As the very Pascal Lamy said, “WTO is a 
medieval institution.”403      
 
2.2.3 Common Objectives of GATS and Other Services Agreements; NAFTA 
and MEFTA: Transparency, Stability and Liberalization 
  
The OECD observes that WTO consistent preferential regional trade agreements can 
complement, but cannot substitute for, coherent multilateral rules and progressive 
multilateral liberalization and that in some particularly sensitive areas, regional 
initiatives have been no more successful –and in some cases less successful– than 
activity at the multilateral level.  
 
                                                 
401
 VAN HOUTTE , op.cit., at 41.   
402
 See SILVIO BORNER, ed., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE IN A POLYCENTRIC WORLD (1988) 
at 102.  Perhaps unintentionally, the GATT has encouraged developed countries to abuse 
discriminatory quantitative import restrictions.  
403
 See Larry Elliot, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2004). Unfortunately, developing countries waited a long 
time for US and EU cut farm support. The WTO as a multilateral authority would have been shattered 
in some way. Developing Countries consolidated the strong negotiating position they established in 
Cancun, Brazil, India and China were leading. Metaphorically can be said that despite the mobile 
phones and the laptops, the way the WTO does business could be referred to the “Catholic Church” of 
six or seven centuries ago. The way that a small group of influential players hold the fate of the 
meeting in their hands, secret negotiations, difficult rules that are just few aware. It is just like 
medieval popes when Europe was divided up into princedoms all of which shared the same faith and 
owed allegiance to the Pope. Now, the world is divided into princedoms that owe allegiance to the 
“free trade god.” Geneva has its own articles of faith and a court for prosecuting wrongdoers. Its aim, 
like that of Rome, is to embrace the world. WTO needs to refresh structures and thinking. The reality 
gap has to be closed between the way the global trading system operates in theory and the way it 
operates in practice.  
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In the specific case of financial services, an OECD study shows that while GATS 
has achieved a higher level of liberalization in financial services than is found in 
most RTAs, the development of GATS Understanding on Commitments in Financial 
Services took advantage of insights gained in financial market opening at the 
regional level.
404
  Having said that, relevant results should be known to what extent 
RTAs could go beyond GATS/ WTO Agreements.
405
  
 
In this context, OECD study points out that GATS has gone beyond most RTAs in 
financial services, a situation that is considered inaccurate in the case of NAFTA and 
MEFTA as examined below in Chapter 4. What is more, the main aim of GATS is 
the promotion of transparency through Arts. III, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX.   
 
Nevertheless, and paradoxically, the practice has been short in its achievements. 
The fact that countries have had to schedule all the information in national 
commitments has made it impossible to get information on services not included in 
such commitments. Moreover, when any of the four modes of services sectors is 
declared “unbound”, it turns the area into a blind point, since there is no more legal 
obligation to show transparency or disclose any regular practice. 
 
Stability and liberalization are also the main objectives of all bilateral, regional 
and multilateral agreement shares and promotion.
406
 Stability is an important element 
for the international trade in order to guarantee security, certainty, credibility and 
predictability. These key factors give the investors and consumers in general, the 
vision of market opportunities. 
 
                                                 
404
 See OECD, “Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading System” (Doc. No.  222003031P1, 2002) at 
20 [hereinafter OECD STUDY 2002]. 
405
 It should be noted that NAFTA, like many other RTAs, is inconsistent in some degree with GATS 
and consequently brings incompatibility and uncertainty to the world trade system. The lack of clarity 
of Art. V of GATS (and Art. XXIV of GATT) has been generally recognized and the ambiguities 
surrounding these provisions leave the compatibility of RTA’s largely uncertain. See Sherry M. 
Stephenson, GATS and Regional Integration, PIERRE SAUVÉ & ROBERT M. STERN, eds., GATS 2000: 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION (2000), at 509.  See also Luis Abugattas 
Majluf & Sherry M. Stephenson, Liberalization of Trade in Services: Options and Implications, 
DIANA TUSSIE, ed., TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA (2003) at 91.  See N. E. Scott, 
Compatibility of EU Regional Trade Agreements with WTO rules in the Post Uruguay Round, INT’L 
TRADE L. & REG. (1996).      
406
 See Stephenson, GATS…, op. cit., at 187 (NAFTA Agreement has become a prototype for many 
developing countries to join the wave of services trade liberalization). 
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Although GATS has contributed in many ways to this road of credibility and 
predictability, the fact remains that service providers are not necessarily equipped 
with accurate information about market access possibilities through this multilateral 
agreement.
407
  A good example is Art. XXI of GATS, which allows any country to 
modify or withdraw any commitment already given: 
 
A Member (referred to in this Article as the “modifying Member”) may 
modify or withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at any time after 
three years have elapsed from the date on which that commitment 
entered into force, in accordance of the provisions of this Article.
 408
   
 
  
On the contrary, Art. 1404 NAFTA state as follows:  
 
No Party may adopt any measure restricting any type of cross border 
trade in financial services by cross border financial services of another 
Party that the Party permits on the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement, except to the extent set out in Section B of the Party’s 
Schedule to Annex VII. 
 
 
In the same sense, Art. 12 (3) of the MEFTA says that: 
 
No party may adopt new measures as regards to the establishment and 
operation of financial services supplier of the other party, which are 
more discriminatory that those applied on the date of entry into force of 
this Decision.
 409 
 
 
Thus, NAFTA and MEFTA have gone notoriously beyond GATS in this issue by 
providing the status quo provision
410
 in a more predictable way for the treatment of 
existing trade in services binding the parties, so that no new restrictions can be 
introduced.
411
 Some argue that GATS services schedules have been useful in that 
very few disputes have arisen in this area.  Yet, it should be noted that sometimes 
either the service providers are not aware of the content of such commitments or the 
                                                 
407
 See Stephenson, Regional…, op. cit.  
408
 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS at 301.  
409
 “Joint Council Decision No. 1 Covering Trade in Services, Investments and Related Payments, 
Protection in Intellectual Property Rights and Dispute Settlement,” MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES 
AGREEMENT, at 428-29. 
410
 This provision means actual regulatory practice, and it gives the promise to the parties involved 
that they will not go back, withdraw or decrease their current commitments or regulatory practice. 
411
 See NAFTA DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT (1994) at 577, 601 and 615 [Hereinafter NAFTA 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT].   
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commitments are not used as an effective tool for pursuing trade policy interest due 
to the fact that most services commitments are below status-quo levels.
412
 
 
GATS in liberalization of services has made a good step forward, Yet it is still 
half way as there is a limited number of sectors included in national schedules as 
well as a limited number of overall commitments especially by developing 
countries.
413
  The NAFTA and EU experiences also demonstrate deeper integration 
than GATS in financial services.   
 
2.2.4 Trade in Services and Developing Countries 
 
Services is the fastest growing component of the global economy. Even in 
developing countries, the services sector grew faster than manufacturers in the 1990s. 
The main services such as financial, communications, transportation, retail and 
professional business have been improving notably the whole developing 
economies.
414
  
 
However, it is clear that the comparative advantage in services belongs to 
developed countries, and therefore the returns to extension of orderly trade rules to 
services enabling services transactions to expand will accrue to the developed rather 
than the developing countries.   
 
Developing countries tend to see the economic arguments advanced by developed 
countries in favor of services trade as deceitful, because developed countries used to 
have their services sector heavily regulated and protected against external 
competitors, and in the case of USA even against inter-state competition.
415
  
 
                                                 
412
 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS at 301. See also Stephenson, Regional…, op. cit.  
413
 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS at 301. See also Stephenson, Regional…, op. cit.  One 
exception is the telecommunications area with the adoption of the four protocols where countries have 
made a lot of sector binding. 
414
 RESPONSIBLE GROWTH at 63.  
415
 See Bhagwati, op. cit., at 27. 
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For most of developing countries, such as Mexico, their advantage remains in the 
goods sector. In other words, in the services versus goods issue, the developed 
countries want to swap concessions on services against concessions on goods.
416
 
 
Also, most developing countries have no comparative advantages in services such 
as banking and insurance since they are net-importers of such services. However, the 
fact remains that there are still some countries that can find some comparative 
advantages in some services such as South Korea, India and Pakistan, where there 
are some skills with software, data being transmitted in overseas locations for 
engineering, medical, and a host of other skilled services (long distance services).
417
  
 
As a result of liberalization in services in general, competition increases and thus 
improves.  Competition is the most effective instrument to lower average costs and 
increase quality and variety of services. Interestingly, only Latin American countries 
have been approaching recently developed countries in their degree of competition in 
financial services and telecommunications.
418
  Also, data point out that countries that 
have fully liberalized trade and investments in finance and telecommunications have 
grown on average 1.5% faster than other countries over the past decade.
419
   
 
2.2.5 GATS and Trade in Services 
 
Trade in services in the global and legal trade system was a recent development since 
it was not included in GATT until 1986, when USA negotiated the inclusion of 
services in the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration.  In the declaration it was 
agreed that trade in services would not be placed within the legal framework of 
GATT, but that GATT practices and procedures would nevertheless apply to them.  
 
This means that all of GATT’s jurisprudence and regulation that is applicable will 
be implemented into the GATS arena.
420
  The main problem in addressing trade in 
                                                 
416
 Id., at 31.  
417
 Id. 
418
 See RESPONSIBLE GROWTH at 64. In financial services after developed countries in liberalization 
are: 1) Latin American Countries, 2) Europe and central Asia, 3) Middle East and Central Asia, and 4) 
East Asia.   
419
 Id., at 64. 
420
 See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A 
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT´L L. (1995) at 44. 
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services, as opposed to trade in goods, is locating the service geographically and 
consequently jurisdictionally.
421
  GATS was born in 1993, and it was said that it 
would fill the gap left in the 1947 GATT, since back then services were not a 
significant component of the world trade.
422
 
 
2.2.6 Barriers to Trade in Services 
 
In GATT there are tariffs and non-tariffs barriers.  In contrast, the barriers to trade in 
services are intangible, usually in the form of government regulation. That is why it 
is difficult to provide quantitative measures of commitments to liberalize services 
trade as it is done for goods.
423
 Although trade in goods is also subject to national 
regulation, this must be compatible with GATT as long as it is not discriminatory.
424
   
 
With respect to services, barriers have three dimensions: barriers to competition, 
barriers against foreign entry to provision of services, and regulatory barriers 
affecting the performance of the service sector.  The regulation on services is mainly 
in finance and telecommunications, and takes the form of licensing requirements and 
prudential restrictions.  
 
Interestingly, regarding services WB states that the policies in 2005 in developing 
countries are more restrictive than those in the developed ones. In South Asia, the 
index of liberalization in financial services was three, while in the developed world 
was eight. In the telecommunications sector, the most liberal are Latin America 
together with developed countries and by contrast Middle East and North Africa 
keep the least liberal approach.
425
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 Trachtman, Trade…, op. cit., at 44. 
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Trachtman, Trade…, op. cit., at 52. 
423
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 WB, “Trade Progress Report…,” op. cit., at 9. 
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2.2.7 Assessing GATS and the Development of Cross Border Trade in Financial 
Services 
 
The term liberalization as applied to financial services refers to “market opening,” 
that is the removal of restrictions on market entry for foreign service-providers.  
WTO decides which market access should be distinguished from capital account 
liberalization or convertibility, which refers to the freedom with which capital 
inflows and outflows (short term debt and equity, portfolios flows, commercial bank 
lending and bonds) of varying maturities are allowed to move across borders, and 
which are within the scope of the IMF.  Central to the success of both concepts is 
“domestic liberalization” known as well as “financial reform,” which refers to the 
process of deregulation.
426
 
 
This thesis distinguishes three types of financial liberalization: 
 
1. Domestic financial deregulation, which allows market forces to work by 
eliminating controls of lending and deposit rates and on credit allocation, and 
reducing the role of the state in the domestic financial system. 
2. Capital account liberalization as has been said aims at removing capital 
controls and restrictions on the convertibility of the currency. 
3. Internationalization of financial services, whose objective is to eliminate 
discrimination in treatment between foreign and domestic financial services 
providers and the removal of barriers to the cross-border provision of financial 
services.
427
 
 
This work focuses on the latter, the elimination of discrimination in treatment 
between foreign and domestic financial services providers and the removal of 
barriers to the cross-border provision of financial services. 
                                                 
426
 Dobson, op. cit., at 2. Deregulation has several dimensions: a) the withdrawal of government 
intervention through privatizing state-owned banks, for example freeing key prices like interest rates 
to be marketed-determined, b) the freeing of restrictions on intrasectorial activities so that banks can 
offer insurance, this was the situation in the US for many years. c) Strengthening of domestic financial 
institutions and markets to increase the efficiency of services, for example cheaper financing. The 
three concepts (market opening, capital account liberalization and domestic liberalization) do not 
necessarily need to move together (e.g. Chile reformed its domestic financial market in the late 1970s, 
opened its capital account in 1980, experienced a financial crisis and reversed its capital account).  
427
 See CLAESSENS & JANSEN, op. cit., at 3. 
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The financial services sector has been one of the most difficult to negotiate.  In 
1995, negotiations were made, but USA withdrew of them.  In April 1997, 
negotiations were re-activated and successfully ended. The main trading countries 
agreed to include financial services on a permanent and MFN basis in GATS and 70 
WTO members improved their commitments on market access and NT.
428
  
 
In December 1997, WTO members signed the Financial Services Agreement that 
established a framework for future liberalized market access for financial services 
providers.
429
  Seventy-one WTO members adhered to this agreement and it is said 
that around 95% of the world’s financial services markets are affected by the new 
agreement.
430
  
 
Together with the BCBS, IOSCO
431
 and GATS, this can be seen an international 
effort (encouraged mainly by the G7 countries)
432
 to build up a comprehensive, 
sound and safe international financial system, which is essential to be followed by all 
the countries, especially by those which have suffered domestic crises with 
international implications, such as the case of Mexico (tequila crisis). 
 
In its Art. I, (Scope and Definition)
433
 GATS defines trade in services as follows: 
1. This agreement applies to measures by members affecting trade in services. 
2. For the purposes of this agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of 
a service: 
(a) from the territory of one member into the territory of any other member 
(cross-border supply);
434
 
                                                 
428
 Rosa Maria Lastra, Cross Border Trade in Financial Services, DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF, JOHN 
RAYMOND LABROSSE, and GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, eds., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: 
GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL REGULATION, Vol. 2, (2007) at 428.  
429
 Although some countries made some reservations, like Mexico, to this Agreement, the trend moves 
clearly to the Liberalization of the financial services. The GATS also envisages that the commitments 
to liberalize the services will take initially the form of changes of domestic legislation, such as 
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 This Agreement came into force on schedule on March 1, 1999. See P. Ruttley, op. cit., at 1. 
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 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS at 286. Part I, Art. I. 
 128 
(b) in the territory of one member to the service consumer of any other 
member (consumption abroad);
435
 
(c) by a service supplier of one member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other member (commercial presence);
436
 
(d) by a services supplier of one member, through presence of natural persons 
of  a member into the territory of any other member (movement of 
individuals).
437
 
 
GATS aims to enhance the predictability and to provide transparency under the 
principles of progressive liberalization. The GATS framework is as follows: a) Rules 
and obligations specified in the articles of the agreement, b) Annexes on specific 
sectors and subjects including an annex on financial services, and c) National 
schedules of market access and NT commitments and list of MFN exemptions.
438
 
 
GATS Art. II requires that members “accord immediately and unconditionally to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less favorable than 
that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country”.439 This 
obligation is referred to as the MFN requirement. Under the MFN obligation, all 
countries must allow service providers from different countries non-discriminatory 
access to their markets. 
 
Also, there are specific obligations related to market access (Art. XVI)
440
 and NT 
(XVII).
441
 They apply only to services that are registered in the Schedule of 
Commitments of countries. Such limitations might be horizontal (cross-sectoral) or 
sector specific and are listed for each of the modes of supply.  Art. XVIII offers the 
                                                                                                                                          
434
 This includes international transportation, the supply of a service through mail or 
telecommunications.  In the financial area, this would cover domestic consumer taking a loan, buying 
insurance or securities in another country.  
435
 This relates to the movement of the consumer as well of the movement of his property. In finance it 
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436
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438
 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS at 287 Art. II. See also WTO, OPENING MARKETS IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS (1997) at 4 [hereinafter OPENING MARKETS IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES]. 
439
 Id., at 5. 
440
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441
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possibility for countries to inscribe additional commitments not dealt either under 
Art. XVI (market access) or XVII (NT). As a result, some countries have made their 
specific commitments in accordance with the Understanding on Commitments in 
Financial Services - an optional text containing a formula approach to the scheduling 
of commitments.
442
 
 
Nonetheless as mentioned above, “the process of liberalization of the GATS still 
will be slow and still is a halfway,”443 and Art. XIX recognizes that fact.444 The 
members will enter successive rounds of negotiation (beginning no later than in five 
years) with the view to achieve progressively higher levels of liberalization.
445
 Thus, 
the best part of this liberalization is still to come, hopefully for the benefit for all 
members, taking into special consideration emerging and developing countries.
446
    
  
GATS is governed by three core principles: MFN, non-discrimination,
447
 NT, and 
market access.
448
 The agreement prohibits a range of policies that restrict market 
access.
449
  GATS Art. III also sets up transparency rules. These rules require from all 
members establishing inquiry points to provide specific information on laws, 
regulations and administrative practices affecting services covered by GATS.
450
  
 
Art. VI (domestic regulation) require members to establish disciplines 
guaranteeing that qualification requirements, technical standards and licensing 
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procedures are based on objective and transparent criteria and should not be more 
burdensome than necessary and do not constitute a restriction on supply.
451
  
 
Art. XI prohibits members from applying restrictions on international transfers 
and payments for current transactions relating to activities for which specific 
commitments have been made.  Art. VII (recognition)
452
 allows the establishment of 
procedures for mutual recognition of licenses, education or experience granted by a 
particular member.   
 
Art. VIII covers rules governing monopolies and exclusive service suppliers and 
other business practices restraining competition.  GATS allows monopoly or 
oligopoly for supply on services providing that governments ensure that firms do not 
abuse their power market to nullify commitments.
453
  
 
Art. XIV gives similar exceptions that were found in GATT, providing members 
with the legal cover to make measures safeguarding public morals, order, health, 
security, consumer protection and privacy. It also includes violating NT if they are 
forced to ensure equitable or effective collection of direct taxes or violating MFN if 
it results form a double taxation agreement.
454
 
 
In the case of bilateral negotiations being unsuccessful members will opt for 
arbitration and the retaliation will be allowed when members do not comply with 
arbitration. The WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism will be solving disputes 
relating to GATS, GATT and TRIPS.
455
  
 
The Annex on Financial Services
456
 enables members to take prudential measures 
for investor protection and the integrity of the financial system. However, this 
exemption should not be used as a means of avoiding a member’s commitments.  
 
                                                 
451
 See id., at 292. See also Martin and Winters, op. cit., at 96.   
452
  See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS, at 292. Art. VII; and Martin and Winters, op. cit. 
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 Id., at 293 (Art. VIII). 
454
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Therefore, carve out means that priority is given to the goods of bank regulation 
over the demands of competition and liberalization.  Beside Arts. XVI, XVII and 
XVIII, more specific commitments can be made in accordance with the Annex on 
Financial Services that complement the basic rules of GATS.  
 
As mentioned earlier, paragraph 2(a) of the Annex recognizes that countries may 
take measures for prudential reasons (e. g., Fireman´s Fund Insurance Company v 
Mexico case in NAFTA).  Likewise, Art. XII allows countries to introduce 
restrictions of a temporary nature in the event of serious balance of payments and 
external financial difficulties subject to consultation with WTO members.
457
 
 
The right of establishment could be implemented in either a branch (not separately 
incorporated) or a separately incorporated subsidiary. This difference has important 
consequences for regulatory, bankruptcy and tax purposes. A subsidiary will be 
treated as a local person, with its own legal personality, and automatically receive 
NT.   
 
On the other hand, from a regulatory perspective, a branch will have the 
regulation and supervision of the home office and will have the advantage of taking 
the home office’s capital.  Finally, for bankruptcy purposes and in the event of 
failure, the subsidiary is a different legal person. 
 
2.2.8 Some Observations to GATS 
 
According to OXFAM, GATS represents in sum a singular and unique framework 
because it establishes the right of corporate service providers to locate in another 
country and to provide services to the citizens of that country.  According to its 
report this was the central demand of the USA, the EU and the big corporate groups 
during the Uruguay Round. Consequently, this constitutes a “huge extension of 
investors’ rights and a potential curtailment of policy sovereignty for developing 
countries.”458  
                                                 
457
 See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS, at 295 (Art. XII). 
458
 In the same sense, WTO Services Division Director David Hartridge said: “Without the enormous 
pressure generated by the American financial services sector like American Express and Citicorp, 
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OXFAM also says that one of the reasons for the current imbalance in the global 
trade in services is that global markets for labor are far more restricted than global 
markets for financial services to the detriment of developing countries.  Therefore 
developing countries have concentrated on the mode d), because labor is the area 
where they have the greatest comparative advantage.  Yet, since labor markets are 
subject to the greatest restrictions on trade, there is a striking disparity between the 
development of global and mobile financial markets and immobile labor markets.
459
  
  
OXFAMS’s argument of the GATS central demand of the corporate groups being 
true is certainly right. It should be said as well that it was like that when GATS was 
initially launched.  Nevertheless, later on, negotiations increased the attention and 
interest in developing countries reaching the point that they are now key players in 
the current negotiations.
460
  
 
To sum up, on one hand GATS is a landmark achievement and on the other it is a 
half way the road, although as well it is considered in some ways a failure. It is a 
landmark because it has created a multilateral treaty in a new area and a failure 
because of the limited commitments. 
 
Regarding GATS transparent rules, it has been short in its achievements. 
Scheduling the national commitments or declaring “unbound” any of the four modes 
of services sectors, turns the area into a blind point, since there is no more legal 
obligation to show transparency, especially, as it has happened often, with the 
sensitive areas.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
there would have been no services agreement” (RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS at 226 and 
228). 
459
 At the present services provided through transnational corporations established in other countries 
account for about 33 % of the global services trade, compared with 1% through the transfer of labor 
(id., at 228). 
460
 Between March 31, and 30 October 2003, 39 Members have submitted initial offers, of them a 
significant number are developing countries: Argentina; Bahrain; Bolivia; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; 
China; Chinese, Taipei; Colombia; Czech Rep; EC; Fiji; Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; 
Israel; Japan; Korea;  Macao, China; Mexico; New Zealand; Norway; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; 
Poland; Senegal; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Sri Lanka; St Christopher & Nevis; 
Switzerland; Thailand; Turkey; Uruguay (see: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm).  
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This lack of transparency is a serious shortcoming in trade in services.  A negative 
list approach could have been a better solution for market access and NT. Without 
clear rules of transparency, the negotiations will remain driven by powerful export 
interest.  
 
Moreover, GATS’ impact could have been better if the status quo had been bound 
to all sectors. Market access is heading for the right direction.  However, the positive 
list approach was wrong and mainly because developing countries’ influence in the 
negotiations, in the end, provided a counterproductive effect, due to slowing down 
the free trade and limiting the value of GATS to governments seeking to liberalize. 
Market Access and NT should have been a general obligation with the negative list 
instead of the current positive approach.  
 
2.2.9 GATS and NT 
 
NT is one of the cornerstones of GATS, and means that a host country ought to treat 
foreign services no less favorably than (like) domestic services and service suppliers.  
In contrast with GATT, NT in GATS is negotiable among parties (the parties only 
commit to the extent they actually want, such as specific sectors and supply modes).    
 
2.2.10 Arguments against the Liberalization of Financial Services, and the 
Possibility of Generating Financial Crises 
  
Liberalization in services and specifically in financial services is more complicated 
than any other kind of liberalization.461  Among the arguments against liberalization 
is national pride and the avoidance of foreign economic domination, a need to allow 
time for local services to mature, rapid capital flight, the presence in the banking 
system of large non-performing loans, and domestic regulators having limited the 
ability to monitor a more complex financial system.  
 
                                                 
461
 See RESPONSIBLE GROWTH at 67. Liberalization in services is more complicated that liberalization 
in goods. Privatization without competition and proper regulation may get nothing else than passing 
from public monopoly into private monopoly, ending without improvement in services. Thus, should 
be carry out proper regulation in all liberalization.  
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Developing countries have been dominated in many ways throughout the history 
and as a result they have been reluctant to continue opening their markets. Even 
some developed countries, members of the OECD such as Canada, USA, Japan and 
Australia, have restricted foreign banks and investments at some point of their 
history.
462
  
 
The experiences of countries that have deregulated and opened their financial 
markets show that the states were affected by financial crises. One of the analyses of 
banking crises worldwide found that in 18 of 25 cases studied, financial liberalization 
has occurred sometime in the previous 5 years.
463
  
 
In this context, financial liberalization may have helped to create crisis in some 
countries because the combination of trade and financial liberalization may be 
explosive
464
 and lead to a rapid increase in consumption of durable consumer goods 
and this will have dangerous effects on savings and the balance of trade.
465
  
 
However, it is thought that such crises could be seen as the price that countries 
have to pay for the growth process.
466
 Then, more than delaying the crisis, the 
attention should be paid on how to handle it and take the correct measures to 
diminish its effects, as has been the example of the Mexico crises of 1994.  
 
A weak institutional financial framework makes liberalization more likely to lead 
to a banking crisis as well as excessive free trade or competition.
467
  OXFAM has 
correctly stated that such systematic financial crises are related in many ways to the 
                                                 
462
 See CRANSTON, op. cit., at 428. 
463
 See DOBSON and JACQUET, op. cit., at 8.  
464 Sigal Ribon and Oved Yosha, “Financial Liberalization and Competition in Banking: An Empirical 
Investigation” (Working Paper no. 2399, Tel Aviv University, Oct. 1999). Israel Banking system lost 
power market as a consequence of its financial liberalization, despite the fact that the market remains 
highly concentrated.  In the same sense, see also Slover, op. cit., at 8.  Financial liberalization can 
contribute to financial instability during transition period by increasing the exposure to credit and 
foreign exchange risks, especially when is taken in a risky macroeconomic environment. 
465
 See MIGUEL URRUTIA, ed., FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF 
CAPITAL MARKETS IN ASIA AND LATIN  AMERICA (1988) at 3. In the same sense Dobson, op. cit., at 8.    
466
 In the same sense, see Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin We and M. Ayhan Kose, 
Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence (IMF 
Occasional Paper, 220) at 25. 
467
 BBV surprised observers with its offer of $4.1 billion for Mexican bank Bancomer, the Spanish 
giant and other big banks (HSBC and Citibank) have gradually acquired Mexico’s banks since the 
country’s banking system crashed in 1995 after a financial crisis.  
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liberalization of the financial services,468 mainly because the financial sector has 
some characteristics that do not fit very well into the “competition and market 
economy structure.”   
 
For example, excessive competition in the financial sector could bring lower 
profits and thus make the financial institutions lower their safety standards, stimulate 
imprudent behavior, which in the end could trigger a domino effect. In other words, 
liberalization in financial services is different from other services in the sense that 
over the top competition is and should be counterbalanced by prudential reasons.
469
  
Therefore in this area there is a tension between competition and prudential 
supervision, which will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
Moreover, effective regulation is essential to ensure that the poor have access to 
basic services.
470
  WB recommended to developing countries in financial services to 
get “gradually opened.”471  For example, in the case of China’s financial sector, it is 
suggested that “financial markets be opened gradually to allow regulations and 
institutional developments to precede liberalization.” As a result, China could avoid 
destabilizing financial losses by state banks that were saddled with poor portfolios as 
efficient foreign banks entered the market.
472
        
 
In developing countries trade liberalization follows financial liberalization and 
also a higher GDP growth. Financial and trade liberalization leads to faster growth, 
but also higher probabilities of crises. In fact most of the developing countries, such 
as Mexico and South Korea, in their process of liberalization have experienced 
boom-bust cycles.473  
 
                                                 
468
 See RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS at 225. 
469
 Mahmood Bagheri and Chizu Nakajima, Optimal Level of Financial Regulation under the GATS: 
A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Framework for Capital Adequacy and Disclosure of 
Information, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2002). 
470
 See infra Chapter 3. 
471
 RESPONSIBLE GROWTH at 66.  
472
 Id.  
473
 See Aaron Tornell, F. Westermann and L. Martinez, “The Positive Link between Financial 
Liberalization Growth and Crises” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper 10293, 
2004) at 31. 
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The financial liberalization in South Korea for example, generated rapid growth, 
high savings and large capital inflows into direct and capital market investments. It is 
thought that the lack of liberalization in many developing countries is one of the 
most important reasons why they have been prevented from growth and absorption 
of capital.
474
 
  
In addition to the liberalization factor, the impact of instability of developing 
countries was “aggravated by the increasingly close linkages and mutual 
dependencies that had developed between developed and emerging economies.”475 In 
other words, the world has become more and more interconnected and any financial 
problem in any country would have in short or medium term some or strong side 
effects in the others.  
 
Another reason why some developing countries are reluctant to accept trade 
liberalization in services and financial services is that it would involve adopting the 
WTO/ TRIPS agreements, which means adopting USA style patent and copyright 
laws that one said are to be protective of western companies.  For example, 
developing countries would have to pay more for drugs, software and videos.  That’s 
why for some developing countries the costs on balance probably outweigh the gains 
from trade liberalization in services.
476
 
 
Developing countries consider that it is inconsistent and a strong paradox to 
preach the benefits of free trade and then maintain the highest subsidies and barriers 
                                                 
474
 See also Manuel Agosin, Isabelle Grunberg, Mark Mobius, et al, “Perspectives on International 
Financial Liberalization,” (United Nations Development Program discussion paper, 1998) at 20. The 
authors state that Mexican Crises was not due to financial liberalization, but the lack of it. Mexico 
pursued a fixed exchange rate regime that resulted in a large current account deficit financed by 
capital inflows. It was widely recognized that the exchange rate regime and the current account deficit 
were the destabilizing factors to the Mexican crisis as has been studied in Chapter 1 of this work, not 
capital inflows. A floating exchange rate allows current accounts positions to be redressed and 
introduce currency risk for investors, forcing them to examine the merits of potential investments and 
ensuring a more efficient allocation of resources. Exchanges rates are only after all prices. Price risk is 
inherent in any market and is essential in transmitting changes in markets conditions. 
475
 See WALKER, INTERNATIONAL…, op. cit., at 276 and 277. Between 1980 and 1996 almost two 
third of all IMF members had experienced an important financial problem. Problems in any emerging 
market could not be more ignored, since one quarter of all industrial countries’ exports had been 
purchased by developing countries by 1990 and between 1991 and 1994 developing countries have 
received 40 percent of global inflows of foreign direct investment. See also J. J. Norton, Asian 
Contagion and Latin America, AGUIRRE and NORTON, REFORM…, op. cit., at 291. 
476
 See Robert Hunter-Wade, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 11, 2005).  
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for goods in which they have a comparative advantage,
477
 for example the case of the 
agricultural sector where the USA
478
 and EU still keep a high level of protection.
479
  
 
The Mexican example has shown that a way of preventing crises is implementing 
proper judicial reform, prudential regulation and improving contract enforceability.  
Authorities must focus on what to do after the crises (such as proper prudential 
regulation) instead of trying to stop them.  Delaying an inevitable crisis will make the 
effects worse.
480
   
 
Mexico’s 1982 and 1994 financial crises are a good example of how financial 
liberalization can be devastating when not accompanied by the strengthening of the 
financial market institutions, especially by an adequate supervision and regulation.
481
 
 
Lastly, among the policy responses to counteract such financial crises by the G7 
and subsequent groups such as G10, and according to Walker, in order to enhance 
the construction of the “new international financial architecture”, the following are 
worth mentioning: market transparency, market supervisory and regulatory factors, 
proper corporate governance, accountancy and audit standards, insolvency 
procedures improving prudential standards.
482
 
 
2.2.11 Arguments in Favor of the Liberalization of Financial Services 
 
The presence of foreign banks provides access to foreign savings, lower financing 
costs, technical transfer as well as increased competitiveness, efficiency and diversity 
of the financial sector.
483
  What is more, open financial sector makes it possible for 
                                                 
477
 See FINANCIAL TIMES (Sep. 16, 2003) at 22. The expectations of the WTO’s ministerial meeting in 
Cancun were never high but the collapse of the talks confounded even the pessimists.  
478
 See THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 16, 2005) at 37.  On this, President Bush offered at the United Nation 
to end all US agricultural and industrial subsidies, if the others did so too. Also in this context, Jagdish 
Bhagwati argues in his DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION that the greater trade freedom should move at the 
optimal pace, not the fastest. He believes that the costs of going to fast are often overestimated and 
says that powerful lobbies in USA have pushed, disgracefully for over rapid opening markets prior to 
the WTO entry.    
479
 See Wolfensohn, op. cit., at 10.   
480
 See Tornell, Westermann and Martinez, op. cit., at 31. 
481
 See Blommestein & Spencer, op. cit., at 6. 
482
 WALKER, INTERNATIONAL…, op. cit., at 282. The most important papers were the Halifax Summit 
in 1995, the Denver Summit in June 1997, the G7 Cologne Financial Ministers Report in June 1999.     
483
 Dobson, op. cit., at 4.  
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better macroeconomic policies and regulation and efficient international allocation of 
resources.  
 
In this sense, GATS and other WTO agreements related to the trade in financial 
services, in terms of liberalization and regulation, contribute to a process of 
production of optimal level of financial regulation (mandatory disclosure of 
information and capital adequacy).
484
  
 
2.2.12 Financial Services Liberalization in NAFTA Parties and MERCOSUR 
 
NAFTA’s Chapter 14 binds the parties to provide: a) Access to the financial service 
providers of the other party; and b) Better NT or MFN to the other parties’ financial 
institution providers, cross border financial service providers and eligible investors. 
Nevertheless, the cross border branching is subject to national discretion as it is in 
the case of Mexico which has reservations in Annex VII.
485
  
 
Within the range of the NAFTA there are no tariffs on trade, although individual 
external tariffs are sustained. What it means is that the three countries form a free 
trade union but not a customs union. Chapter 14 of the pact and its Annexes deal 
with the financial services and obtain unqualified NT but they do not require any 
harmonization or impose mutual recognition like the case of the EU. What they 
allow is the autonomy of the member countries as far as regulation is concerned.
486
 
 
MERCOSUR was started by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991, 
and now constitutes the third biggest trade market in the world. The assumptions of 
the treaty were to establish an internal market by the year 1994 with the 
incorporation of common external tariff and free movements of labor, goods, 
services and capital, which were supposed to liberalise the market gradually. 
                                                 
484
 Bagheri and Nakajima, op. cit., at 509. 
485
 See CRANSTON, op. cit., at 433.  For the liberalization of financial services among NAFTA parties, 
see infra Chapter 4. 
486
 See GEORGE A. WALKER, EUROPEAN BANKING LAW: POLICY AND PROGRAMME CONSTRUCTION 
(2007) at 61. 
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Similarly to GATS and NAFTA, MERCOSUR fosters both the intercontinental and 
local trade.
487
 
 
2.2.13 Liberalization Commitments of Developing Countries in GATS 
  
The negotiations in 1995 resulted in an interim agreement and the final permanent 
agreement was finally achieved on 12
th
 December 1997. A total of 56 schedules of 
commitments representing 70 WTO countries were annexed to the fifth protocol of 
GATS.
488
  Section 5 of the Annex of GATS states that two broad categories of 
financial services are covered by GATS: banking and other financial services, and 
insurance with insurance related services. Banking relates to all traditional services. 
 
The commitments were: no restrictions apply to both market access and NT is for 
high-income countries 25% and for low and middle-countries is 7%. These numbers 
could show how far GATS is from getting free total global trade.
489
 Also, high 
income countries accepted commitments covering 45% of their services sector and 
low and middle income countries scheduled only about 12%.
490
  
 
Generally, developing countries were reluctant to make offers with only 16.2% of 
sectors in developing countries listed and 6.9% listed with no policy exemption.  It 
was the “aristocracy of developing countries”491 that was willing to make GATS 
commitments, which listed 40 percent of total sectors.
492
 This reluctance to liberalize 
stands in contrast to the liberal commitments made by the developed countries, most 
of which had a clear interest in exporting financial services. 
                                                 
487
 See id. 
488
 See Ying Qian , "Financial Services and GATS - Analysis of the Commitments Under the GATS at 
the WTO" (paper in the Liberalization and Internationalization of Financial Services Conference, May 
10, 1999) at 1.  
489
 See Martin and Winters, op. cit., at 104. The Committee on Trade in Financial Services looks at the 
status of acceptance of the Fifth Protocol whether the Members who participated in the financial 
services negotiations in 1997 have ratified their commitments. It also looks at the classification of 
financial services and at developments in financial services trade.  See for example, WTO, 
S/FIN/M/46, Oct. 29, 2004, (04-4602), Committee on Trade in Financial Services, “Report of the 
Meeting Held on 28 Sep. 2004; note by the Secretariat. 
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 See GALLAGHER, op. cit., at 49.  
491
 Surya Subedi,: “The Law of Foreign Investment in a Changing World: The Challenge of 
Reconciling the Competing Principles” (Distinguished Shihata Conference 2005).  Among this 
aristocracy are: Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Mexico.   
492
 For the list of all financial services commitments and MFN exemptions see: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/finance_e/finance_commitments_e.htm.  See also Martin 
and Winters, op. cit.  
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The format of the schedule is as follows: “none” means that a member binds itself 
to not having any measures that violate market access or NT for specific sector or 
mode of supply. “Unbound” means that no commitment is made for any specific 
sector or mode of supply, and “other” implies that restrictions are listed and 
consequently bound for a mode of supply or sector. 
 
Low and middle-income countries, mainly eastern European, made the highest 
number of specific commitments, with more than 300 sectors or modes 
of supply: the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic.  In market access 
the high-income countries were more liberal, 60% of commitments for the high-
income group imply no restrictions as compared to 45% for low-income ones.  In the 
same context, developed countries were keen on setting limitations on residency 
requirements whereas developing countries focused more on ownership 
requirements.  
  
What is more, a comprehensive WTO study has found that members’ 
governments have made more commitments in financial services than any other 
except tourism.  However and paradoxically, the number of limitations maintained 
on market access and on NT is higher than any other sector.
493
 This is a mirror which 
reflects on one hand, the importance for developing countries of the foreign banking 
investments and on the other, still shows some fears about prudential regulation and 
reservations about systemic risk.  
 
Another study shows that GATS commitments were driven by self-interested 
politicians granting protection or liberalization to special interests. Also, the absence 
of an own export interest took developing countries into a more restrictive bondage 
in their commitments in comparison with previous practice.
494
 In his study Mattoo 
points out that a government’s decision to liberalize may be affected by the economic 
                                                 
493
 See OPENING MARKETS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES; and Qian, op. cit., 3. 
494
 See Phillip Harms, Aaditya Mattoo et al, “Explaining Liberalization Commitments in Financial 
Services” (WB Policy Research paper 2999, Mar. 2003), at 2. For example, India used to issue 15 
licenses every year for new foreign bank branches, but in the commitments under GATS is bound to 
issue only 12 licenses.  
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environment, especially the macroeconomic stability and the quality of prudential 
regulation.  
 
The WTO study shows that the commitment coverage in general is more 
comprehensive among developing countries compared to other groups, but the 
African countries such as Sierra Leona Malawi, Mozambique and Gambia have 
made all banking and other financial services commitments.
495
  Moreover, 80 percent 
of the limitations on the market access have been taken in banking and other 
financial issues. 60 percent of the measures were made in Mode 3; by contrast, there 
were few limitations scheduled in Mode 1 and 2.
496
  
 
2.2.13.1 Africa 
 
Sierra Leona Malawi, Mozambique and Gambia have made commitments on all 
banking services and other financial services.
497
  This is worth noting since they are 
in the category of the least developing countries.  Specifically Sierra Leona which 
has covered all financial services in its schedule without exclusions.
498
  Also, for 
these countries domestic factors have played significant role to determine their 
GATS commitments, for instance macroeconomic policies and prudential regulations 
have slowed down liberalization and the need to protect domestic markets imposed 
certain limitations in commitments. 
 
2.2.13.2 East Europe 
 
Easter European countries made the highest number of specific commitments (with 
more than 300 sectors or mode of supply), mainly the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovak Republic. These countries liberalized their insurance sector equally to or 
better than their banking sector, indicating increasing sophistication of their 
economies, which requires more internationalization of insurance services.
499
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 See Qian, op. cit., at 3. 
496
 See id.  
497
 See id.  
498
 See id. 
499
 See id., at 4. 
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2.2.13.3  Latin America and Mexico 
 
It is worth noting that members in Latin America tend to have higher probability to 
impose requirements of discrete licensing or economic need test compared to other 
members. The additional probability is near to 30% for the insurance sector and 7 
above in the banking sector.
500
 Mexico signed WTO/GATS and its commitments are 
annexed in its Schedule to GATS.  
 
Specific commitments are made according to the four modes of supply for each 
services sector: (1) cross border supply, (2) consumption abroad, (3) commercial 
presence and (4) free movement of natural persons.
501
  Mexico’s commitments set up 
some deviations from the non-discrimination and NT principles, for example, foreign 
institutions must obtain authorization from SHCP. Additionally, foreign institutions 
should remain under effective control of Mexican holders, and foreign investments 
by governments are not permitted.  
 
Mexico has accepted a higher degree of liberalization of cross-border trade in 
financial services within NAFTA and MEFTA members rather than with other 
GATS members.
502
  
 
2.2.13.4 Some Observations to the Commitments 
 
In general, member governments have made more commitments in financial services 
than in any other sector except tourism. However, the number of limitations kept on 
market access or on NT is higher than in several other sectors. Member countries 
preferred commercial presence to cross-border supply. 
 
Also, members tend to have more liberal commitments in banking sector than the 
insurance sector.  For example in Latin America it is more likely to have very liberal 
                                                 
500
 See Qian, op. cit., at 3. 
501
 GATS SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS MEXICO, at 3. 
502
 See Sherry M. Stephenson, “Multilateral and Regional Services Liberalization by Latin America 
and the Caribbean” (OAS Trade Unit/Ser.D/XXII SG/TU/TUS-9, 1st d. Mar. 2001) at 10.  It is worth 
mentioning that in the Financial Services Agreement of GATS (1997) most of the Latin American 
countries did not make commitments in the banking and insurance sector in the mode 1, 2 and 4. This 
is because such governments still wanted to have strict control over cross-border flows capital and 
regulatory controls. 
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commitments in banking sector and at the same time remain closed in the insurance 
sector.
503
  The fact that eastern European countries were among the major players in 
the process of GATS commitments is mainly because they had previously liberalized 
their legal frame-works to become recipients of foreign investments, especially in the 
banking sector.
504
 This legal reform emerged as a result of the harmonization 
programs that were taken towards the enlargement of the EU.  
 
According to IADB “Financial liberalization makes a financial system function 
better”.  The empirical evidence available, albeit scarce and fragmented, suggests 
that “the effects of internationalizing the banking system are positive, since banking 
systems increase their competitiveness and efficiency in particular when foreign 
banks comes from a more developed country.”505 On whether the presence of foreign 
banks reduces credit volatility there is controversy.506 According to IADB, some 
economists claim that foreign banks are more prone to react to shocks in the host 
economy given their ability to “substitute local assets with alternative investments 
abroad that are not easily available for local banks.”507 
 
On the other side, it is argued that, because of their access to external funds and 
consequent increased liquidity,508 and the incentive they have to protect their 
reputation, foreign banks are able to stabilize local deposits. Likewise, the 
competitive pressure that the entry of foreign banks may generate can lead to 
measures that guarantee future stability through more aggressive provisioning 
standards and higher capital ratios.509  This was the actual case with Mexico’s 
financial liberalization experience. 
 
                                                 
503
 See Qian, op cit., at 15. 
504
 See IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 109.  Eastern European Countries and Latin America were the 
major recipients of international capital flows to the banking sector between 1990 and 1998. In Latin 
America the foreign ownership grew notably between 1994 and 2001.  
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 IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 112. 
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 IADB refers to L. G. GOLDBERG, When Is U. S. Banking Lending to Emerging Markets Volatile?  
Staff Reports 119, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2001); and J. CRYSTAL, G. DAGES, AND L. G. 
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 IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 112.  
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 See L. G. Goldberg, The Competitive Impact of Foreign Commercial Banks in the USA, R. ALTON 
GILBERT, ed., THE CHARGING MARKET IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (1992). 
509
IADB refer to Crystal, Dages and Goldberg, op. cit. 
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In addition to the above, IADB refers to the tendency of foreign banks to follow 
the more stringent prudential practices of their home countries, which “leads 
domestic banks as well as supervisors to adopt international standards in order to 
ease competitive pressure coming from the depositors searching for the safest 
institutions.”510  Therefore, foreign banks can be a stabilizing factor because they 
help to improve the regulatory environment.511  
 
Therefore, on balance, the positive effects of financial services liberalization in 
the host country out-weight the risk argued above.    
 
Regarding liberalization commitments, in the final agreement (GATS) there is no 
strong correlation between a member’s actual level of economic or financial sector 
development and its commitments in the banking sector.  GATS has been less 
successful in the introduction of competition though Mode 3- commercial presence.   
 
Some members showed greater probability in applying restrictions through 
minority equity and discretionary licensing to protect the position of incumbents. 
Also, more advanced members tend to withdraw from more liberal commitments in 
Mode 3 compared to other Modes, perhaps due to the need to protect domestic 
companies.
512
 
 
This work agrees in general that future liberalization in services would need to 
take into account also the causes and effects of the financial crises.  Nevertheless, 
since interests of WTO members in liberalizing trade services under GATS lie in 
long term, short-term concerns should not nullify the long term benefits from 
liberalization.
513
 However, it is also recognized that there cannot be a complete 
liberalization of financial services, because this would bring the risk of systemic 
instability providing financial legal framework it is strong.  
 
                                                 
510
 IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 122. 
511
See Phillip Harms, Aaditya Mattoo et al “Explaining Liberalization Commitments in Financial 
Services,” at 3. For example, in the South Korean case, when they had a liberalization crisis, the 
government decided to end restrictions on foreign presence, as par of the adjustment program 
negotiated with the IMF. 
512
  See Qian, op. cit., at 17.  
513
 See GALLAGHER, op. cit., at 49. 
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2.3 A COMPARISON WITH THE EU AS AN EXAMPLE OF PROPER SEQUENCING IN 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
 
Because of NAFTA’s benefits for Mexico and the EU’s success in economic 
integration, the Fox administration in Mexico (2000-2006) tried to deepen regional 
integration.
514
  From its beginning, the Fox administration proposed to expand 
NAFTA to a North American Common Market, as a copy in North America of the 
EU.
515
  However, the proposal has not been followed up by USA and Canada.
516
  
 
The example set by the EU continues to be relevant in connection with Mexico’s 
bottom-up approach to liberalization. For this reason, this section will analyze the 
EU’s financial integration and as a comparison of proper sequencing in financial 
Liberalization. 
 
2.3.1 Banking and Financial Markets in Europe 
 
One of the activities of the EU is the creation of an internal market characterized by 
the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of the four freedoms mentioned 
above.  In the Gaston Schul case, the Court stated that “the aim of the treaty is to 
eliminate all obstacles to intra community trade in order to merge the national 
markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those 
of a genuine domestic market.”517  
 
                                                 
514
 See TARDANICO and ROSENBURG, op. cit., at 257.  
515
 See DANIEL LEDERMAN, WILLIAM MALONEY & LUIS SERVEN, LESSON FROM NAFTA FOR LATIN 
AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN (2005) op. cit., at 177. Lederman et al present some important 
lessons from the EU experience: The accession of Portugal and Spain (1986) was accompanied by a 
boom in FDI.  Between 1980 and 1992, investment inflows rose by a factor of eight in Spain and a 
factor of six in Portugal.  However, the boom was temporary because by the mid 1990s the ratio of 
FDI to GDP was the same as in the years prior the accession.  The reallocation was not an automatic 
result of accession to EU.  In the case of Greece, on the other hand, its accession (1981) was not 
accompanied by any important changes in FDI, a fact that was attributed to its poor domestic policy 
during those years and to the lack of structural reforms in strategic sectors such as banking, financial 
services and foreign investments in general.  This suggests that if Mexico had not been sufficiently 
prepared with proper legal and judicial reform, NAFTA would not have been as beneficial as planned.  
516
 See Jennifer E. Harman, Mexican President Vicente Fox’s Proposal for Expanding NAFTA into a 
EU-Style Common Market—Obstacles and Outlook, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. (2001) at 208. 
517
 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteurder Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 
Roosendaal (1982) ECR 1409, paragraph. 33.  
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Upon laying the foundations for the EU, its creators skilfully used already existing 
international agreements such as GATT, but also moved a few steps forward.  The 
main ideas and operational procedures of GATT initially inspired the “founding 
fathers” of the EU, but their vision improved the scope of GATT regarding market 
integration. 
 
The Treaty of Rome provided the platform for the integration in services (Art. 
59), the rights of establishment (Art. 52), free movement of capital (Art. 67) and free 
movement of workers (Art. 48).
518
  In 1992 the Treaty on the EU changed the name 
from the European Community to EU, with its scope covering, among others, 
provisions on justice and home affairs.
519
 
 
The ECJ passing a verdict on the Van Binsbergen case announced that "specific 
requirements imposed on the person providing the service cannot be considered 
incompatible with the treaty where they have as their purpose the application of 
professional rules justified by the general good - in particular rules relating to 
organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability which are 
binding on any person established in the state in which the service is provided.”520  
 
Thus, non-discrimination regulation may be protected under certain 
circumstances, even though the regulation differs from that imposed by other 
member states and even though it imposes differential burdens on persons than other 
member states.  The ECJ invalidated here the Dutch residence requirement.  
 
The goal of the EU in financial services was to create a legislative framework that 
would allow greater integration of financial markets without sacrificing the public 
policy interests of each member state regarding prudential rules, market stability and 
consumer protection.  The new way of looking on the goods and services in general 
led to reconsidering the idea’s implementation into the financial services area which 
applied a parallel principle of home country control.  
 
                                                 
518
 Treaty of Rome Arts. 59, 52 and 48.  
519
 J. P. Trachtman, International Trade in Financial Services under GATS, NAFTA and the EC, 34 
COLUM. JOURNAL TRANSNATIONAL L. (1995) at 59.   
520
 Id.  
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In spite of the initial economic obstacles that EU encountered in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, further advancement followed gradually to end up with the 
establishment of the internal market by 1992, founded on the judgement of the 
European Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon of 1979.
521
  
 
The EU’s regulatory and supervisory schemes include all the main domains of 
domestic and cross-border financial services. The programme itself results from 
different approaches to multinational cooperation in the institution’s history and 
gradual development from ideas of full harmonization, which was supposed to 
impose entire collections of fixed standards on all of the fields listed in General 
Programmes falling under the original EEC Treaty, to notions of the mutual 
recognition of agreed standards, which stressed the importance of outlining common 
minimum standards for all the members in important areas.
522
 
 
The EU experience is important because in some countries financial sectors were 
competitive prior to the single market while in others they were heavily regulated 
with a major part in hands of the government.
523
 To sum up, the EU is a good 
example of the liberalization in the financial services as a single market.
524
  Yet, 
some still believe that the EU is “still a fragmented market,”525 and that in practice it 
has brought a heterogeneous integration across both, sectors and countries.
526
  
 
In spite of Schefer’s opinions, she also acknowledges that one of the EU’s most 
outstanding achievements was to call into being one single market for banking and 
                                                 
521
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 40. 
522
 See id., at 11. 
523
 See CLAESSENS & JENSEN, op. cit., at 5. For example, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain were 
heavily regulated.  
524
 See Trachtman, International…, op. cit., at 59.  The EU’s single passport idea has become greatly 
exported to other regions, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR. This objective has been achieved since 
the Second Banking Directive (SBD) in 1989.  
525
 See SCHEFER, op. cit., at 261. Schefer and Rogers consider that despite the liberalization in the 
provision of banking services the integration of the banking market in the EU is far from complete. 
Also Wijsenbeek a European Parliament deputy from Netherlands said: “Possibly in response to the 
advent of the monetary union, there was a mergers of financial institutions…however the banking 
sector is still a highly fragmented market…even the largest European banks do not account for more 
than one or two per cent of the total volume of banking services at Union level.”  See also Arthur 
Rogers, “EU Parliamentarians Weigh Changes to Allow Freer Cross-Border Banking Activity” (70.20 
BNA Banking Rep 826; 18 may 1998).  
526
  See IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 106.  While the banking sector deepened its integration 
process, retail banking remained fragmented and strongly localized. Securities market led to deeper 
integration but insurance faced obstacles due to legal barriers.  
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financial services, on which the whole community economic and financial is based. 
One particular difficulty here is to stabilize the market both at a local and regional 
level trying to foster the market access within the internal system at the same time.   
 
Appropriate supervision and monitoring are necessary to lessen the vulnerability 
of the financial sector which is subject to instability due to the interdependence with 
other members’ economies. The organization has been gradually working on the 
issues of ensuring both the access and the control over it. While doing so, it evolved 
its approach from the full harmonization to the mutual recognition and minimum 
harmonization.
527
 
 
2.3.2 Assessment 
 
Although EU’s regulatory and supervisory schemes are of the most advanced in the 
world FSAP, while evaluating the program and appreciating its achievements, one 
cannot forget that some issues concerning further development, present frame and 
substance, together with its successful termination, may demonstrate a few problems. 
To be fully recognized as an efficient financial scheme it has to address some general 
integration issues as well as specific financial ones to avoid partial evaluation 
diminishing its importance or pertinence.
528
 
 
One of main differences between the EU and NAFTA is that NAFTA is open to 
any new members. Also, within the range of NAFTA there are no tariffs on trade, 
although individual external tariffs are sustained.  That means that in NAFTA the 
three countries form a free trade union but not a customs union.   
 
Chapter 14 of NAFTA and its annexes deal with the financial services and ordain 
unqualified NT but they do not require any harmonization or impose mutual 
recognition.  What they allow is the autonomy of the member countries as far as 
regulation is concerned.
529
 
 
                                                 
527
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 12. 
528
 Id., at 11. 
529
 Id. 
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As Cranston correctly points out, the aim in the EU is to have a single market in 
financial services that allows establishing branches in other EU member states and 
providing financial services across borders.  Thus through mutual recognition a bank 
established in one member state has a “single passport” to establish branches or to 
provide services in other member state.
530
  A single license is thus sufficient for the 
whole EU, instead of each member state requiring its own license.  
 
As said earlier, this directive gave the idea of home country control and minimum 
harmonization as opposed to full harmonization of regulatory rules.  Home country 
control means that the primary responsibility for regulatory oversight of banking 
institutions resides with the institutions’ home country supervisors.531   
 
The same is with the principle of “freedom of establishment,” which flows from 
EU Treaty Rights and provides any financial institution in the EC with conducting 
permitted services in another EC member country. This has become known as the 
single banking license.   
 
Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition entails recognition by all member 
states of all of the other member states’ banking laws and regulations.532 This was 
designed to encourage free trade in financial services without having to harmonize 
banking laws among all the member states, and its impact has been remarkable.
533
 In 
this sense, participants’ national laws do not have to be fully harmonized and home 
rules are accepted to govern cross border provisions.   
 
The adoption of minimum harmonization and mutual recognition outside the EU 
is problematic because its implementation is premised upon a transfer of sovereign 
                                                 
530
 See CRANSTON, op. cit., at 433. The passport does not apply to a bank based outside the EU the 
third country bank must incorporate a “subsidiary” in the Community and be licensed in at least one 
jurisdiction.  
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 See IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 112.  
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 See WALKER, EUROPEAN …, op. cit., at 199. 
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 OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM Vol. I (1997) at 79 [hereinafter THE OECD 
REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM]. 
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authority from member states to the EU Commission and such compromise of 
national sovereignty is impossible to achieve in other contexts.
534
  
 
In this context, the EU Single Passport idea has become attractive for other 
foreign banks, such as the USA banks, which having a subsidiary in Europe allow 
them to use the single passport within the 25 countries.
535
  However, if the USA bank 
sets up just a branch, this single passport benefit would not apply.
536
   
 
EU financial integration has brought the following benefits: a) greater exposure to 
international competition, b) improved efficiency in financial intermediation, c) more 
efficient capital utilization, d) development of the financial industry itself and e) 
better fiscal discipline.
537
 
 
When establishing any regional trading scheme or treaty, a conflict between easy 
market access and control inevitably emerges. Together with disappearing current 
national market levels and diminishing technical and consumer protection to ensure 
market entry to new incumbents, applicable control mechanisms may be remarkably 
diminished or completely withdrawn from.   
 
Given the lack of central body exercising its surveillance within the regional 
integration system, the European Community Treaty faces a strategy void in the 
matter of supervision.  As financial market is extremely susceptible to insecurity, the 
market regulation is influenced at national or host levels.
538
 
 
An interesting and complex case involving licensing, regulatory, supervisory and 
consumer protection issues in the context of the integration of a single EU financial 
market (and of globalization, for that matter) is that of BCCI which eventually 
                                                 
534
 See Jane Kaufman Winn, National Treatment v. Reciprocity in International Banking: USA and 
European Community, J. J. NORTON, CHIA-JUI CHENG, and I. FLETCHER, eds., INTERNATIONAL 
BANKING OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (1994) at 9. 
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 The single passport idea is better understood now with the new enlargement. 
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 Because the branch is just an office of the parent bank without legal entity and thus it would not be 
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 IADB, Financial…, op. cit., at 106.  
538
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 345.     
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derived in the Three Rivers District v. Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England litigation.
539
   
 
2.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Liberalization in services in general promotes competition, which is the most 
effective instrument to lower average costs and increase the quality and variety of 
services.  Latin American countries have been recently coming close to developed 
countries’ levels of competition in some services (such as telecommunications).   
 
From the perspective of the trading system and an examination of tariff reduction 
by developing countries found that neither regional trade agreements nor multilateral 
agreements were the driving force in the liberalization. Autonomous liberalization or 
bottom up approach accounted for 66% of the liberalization, while multilateral 
agreement 25% and regional agreements only 10%. So unilateral is the most 
successful way to liberalize. Most recently, over the last six years, 31 countries have 
implemented important reforms, lowering their MFN tariffs.  Such is the case of 
India, Egypt, Chile and Mexico. The reforms were focused mainly on trade policy. 
 
Unilateral reform or autonomous liberalization has brought many advantages,  
among them, to promote global competitiveness by lowering costs of inputs, increase 
competition from imports to drive productivity to growth and integrate the national 
economy into the global economy.  
 
                                                 
539
 See Appendix 6: Three Rivers District v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England.  It 
should be highlighted from the outset that this case falls outside the scope and object of this thesis.  
The litigation known as Three Rivers District v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England (the 
Three Rivers case for short), was originated by a law suit filed by ex-depositors of the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) accusing the Bank of England of insufficient surveillance over 
BCCI, which resulted in losses of about 10 billion Sterling Pounds for around 6,000 depositors in 
Britain (including the Three Rivers District Council, Hertfordshire, the Western Isles Council and 
other authorities in Scotland), after the Bank of England closed down BCCI in July 5, 1991.  BCCI 
SA was incorporated in Luxembourg but had its headquarters in London.  Most of BCCI branches in 
the UK belonged to another corporation called BCCI Overseas, incorporated in Cayman.  Back then, 
the Bank of England was the supreme financial authority in the UK.  Yet, because the banks were not 
incorporated in the UK, it was allegedly unclear whose responsibility was the supervision of the said 
banks that, nevertheless, had branches and their headquarters in the UK.  BCCI was therefore able to 
exploit the loopholes thus begetting what seems to be the biggest financial scandal in history. 
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Interestingly, unilateral liberalization has been greatly influenced by RTA´s such 
as NAFTA, in the case of Mexico. In this case, and in attempt to comply with 
NAFTA obligations, Mexico had to amend several financial and commercial internal 
laws and regulations, producing in Mexico further autonomous liberalization. As it 
has been said before, purely top-down legal reform is not viable in the long-term as 
much has to come from the bottom up. Especially regarding prudential financial 
standards, active and fully committed country participation is needed from the very 
beginning.  
 
  Keeping in mind that each country represents an individual case, nations may 
need to adopt solutions that correspond to their different needs and levels of 
development, as the case of México that will be seen in the next chapter.  This means 
that the initiative for conducting and construing reform in a broader developmental 
context should rest primarily on the country involved. In the financial sector, the 
presence of foreign banks provides access to foreign savings, lowers financing costs, 
enables the transfer of knowledge and technology, and increases the competitiveness, 
efficiency and diversity of the sector.  An open financial system makes it allows 
better macroeconomic policies and regulation and efficient international allocation of 
resources.  GATS and other WTO agreements pertaining trade in financial services 
contribute to a process of production of optimal level of financial regulation. 
 
However, developing countries argue that northern countries have opened their 
markets only when it has been convenient to their interests, while developing 
countries have made big efforts in liberalization. Also, for some developing 
countries, deregulation has been associated with financial crises. A weak institutional 
financial framework makes liberalization more likely to give way to financial crises.  
Attention should be paid on how to handle the crises and take the correct measures to 
diminish its effects.  
 
Mexico signed WTO/GATS and its commitments are annexed to its Schedule to 
GATS.  Specific commitments are made according to the four modes of supply for 
each services sector related: (1) cross border supply, (2) consumption abroad, (3) 
 153 
commercial presence and (4) free movement of natural persons.
540
 Mexico’s 
commitments set up some deviations from the non-discrimination and NT principles, 
for example, foreign institutions must obtain authorization from SHCP, and 
governmental foreign investment is not permitted.  
 
To sum up, GATS is a good step forward in financial services liberalization but is 
still half way, as there is a limited number of sectors included in national schedules 
as well as a limited number of overall commitments, especially by developing 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. NAFTA and the EU experience have 
demonstrated deeper integration than GATS in financial services.  EU’s FSAP is one 
of the most complex regulatory and supervisory schemes in the world and includes 
all the main domains of domestic and sophisticated cross-border financial services. 
 
This author agrees that liberalization in financial services needs to take into 
account also the causes and effects of financial crises.  Therefore there cannot be a 
full liberalization of financial services because of the risk of systematic instability.  
Competition must be limited at some point in favor of prudential regulation, as will 
be seen in the section. 
 
As next chapter shows as well, Mexico’s latest approach to liberalization in 
financial services (after the 1994 crisis) is an example of the aforesaid.  Within less 
than two decades, Mexico went from a government owned banking sector to a 
liberalized, yet stable and solid, financial system that has been successful in 
weathering the GFC.  This success in stability and resilience has come, nevertheless, 
at the cost of limiting competition and consequently the ability to achieve a much 
sought-after financial inclusion. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
 
MEXICO´S DOMESTIC EFFORTS TO DEREGULATE  
 
AND TO PROMOTE FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
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3.1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION, HARMONIZATION AND 
LIBERALIZATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
Institutions, committees and bodies such as IMF, WB, OECD, BIS, BCBS, IOSCO, 
IAIS, CPSS, CGFS,
541
 oversee the international financial system, promoting 
monetary stability and currency support, and generating common standard rules and 
regulations in these areas,
542
 and are therefore concerned with the harmonization of 
financial standards, which can indirectly bring about liberalization.
543
  
 
3.1.2 Banking Regulation 
 
Governments must regulate banks in order to protect banks’ depositors and 
shareholders, and to provide a safe financial system in general limiting their exposure 
to risk, thus preventing potential economic or political crises.  There are various 
forms of protection such as deposit insurance, guarantees to shareholders that come 
and minimum capital requirements for banks (a percentage of their assets) in order to 
provide with sufficient backup in case of unexpected losses or public panic.
544
 
 
3.1.3 Basel Accord and BCBS 
 
The main international banking committee is the BCBS, created in 1974 as a 
response to the Bank Herstatt failure
545
 to be forum for regular consultation among 
banking regulatory authorities from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
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 IOSCO was founded with the mission of organizing meetings of securities regulators for wealthy 
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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.  It has issued 
several important documents on banking supervision and regulation,
546
 and 
represents one of the most successful models for technical cooperation in the 
complex and sensitive area of finances.
547
  
 
Although initially focused almost exclusively on cross-border supervisory issues 
(beginning with its 1975 First Concordat), BCBS has also produced a number of 
common regulatory standards in areas such as capital adequacy, financial derivatives, 
financial conglomerates, operational and interest rate risk management, electronic 
banking and bank systems and controls.
548
   
 
Its most significant achievement is perhaps its “1997 Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision,” which created a full regulatory and supervisory model for 
national and internationally active banks, as well as for those within G10 and non-
G10 countries.  This also became the main model for the production of core 
principles in a number of other key financial areas including securities, insurance, 
and payment and settlement.
549
     
 
3.1.4 IOSCO 
 
The most important body in the securities area is IOSCO.  Originally setup as a 
North American conference forum (1974) for organizing meetings of securities 
regulators, it subsequently converted into a full international regulatory organization 
in 1983.  It established a Secretariat in Montreal Canada in 1986; and in 1987 was 
formed under Quebec law as a not-for-profit organization.
550
  
 
IOSCO has a large direct membership (with over 130 participating countries and 
national supervisory agencies).  It operates through a complex committee structure 
which includes its President’s Committee, an Executive Committee, an Emerging 
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Markets Committee and a Technical Committee (which parallels the BCBS in the 
banking area) as well as four regional committees (Asia-Pacific, Interamerican, 
Africa/Middle East and Europe).  IOSCO has issued a large number of documents in 
specific securities and exchanges and subsequently market related areas. 
 
3.1.5 Basel II - The Emergence of the New Regulation of Banking: The 
Privatization of the Regulation?    
 
Some new features of the new paradigm of regulation (from the implementation of 
the New Basel Capital Accord) have arisen, such as delegation of duties to 
informational intermediaries. These intermediaries are risk rating agencies and 
account professionals who have the task of monitoring and enforcing regulatory 
goals.  
 
This situation remains complex since the regulatory incorporation of private 
sector elicits new questions of public policy, as well as the question whether 
informational intermediaries should be subject to more extensive regulatory systems 
and regulators should focus on regulating professional bodies which hold the key to 
good governance and implementation of substantive regulation.
551
    
 
3.1.6 Mexico’s Successful implementation of International Financial Standards 
at Unilateral Level: The Bottom-up approach to prudential liberalization  
 
The adoption, by the Mexican financial groups that owned banks, of the GAAP and 
BCBS principles from 1994 and onwards, strengthened and made them attractive to 
foreign firms.  Those changes are analyzed by comparing banking indicators and by 
comparing the international and the Mexican banking regulatory principles.   
 
The internationalization of the Mexican financial system, in general, and of its 
banking sector in particular, is a relatively recent phenomenon, which came as an 
aftermath of the 1994-95 financial crisis.  This was part of a reorganization strategy 
for the recovery of the financial system, justified as a measure to secure the public’s 
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 See Mahmood Bagheri, Informational Intermediaries and the Emergence of the New Financial 
Regulation Paradigm, 24 (11) THE COMPANY LAWYER (2003).  
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deposits and recapitalization of the existing banks, many of which were in trouble.  It 
was necessary in order to make possible the bailout of the banking sector.   
 
Allowing foreign capital to invest in larger proportions in Mexican banks quickly 
changed the distribution of shares between Mexican and foreign capital.  On 
December 1996 (right before the new regulation on foreign investment came into 
effect) only 7% of the total shares of Mexican banks were in hands of foreigners.  
Just three months later, by March 1997, 17% of shares were owned by foreigners.   
 
As of June 2008, 19 of 32 Mexican private banks were controlled by foreign 
capital, including the most important private banks: Bancomer, BANAMEX, and 
(then) Banca Serfin.  Chart 2 shows the Chronology of the first wave of acquisitions 
and mergers of private Mexican banks by foreign firms.  
 
Chart 2 
Chronology of Mergers and Acquisitions of Mexican Banks by Foreign Firms
552
 
Date Foreign Bank Mexican Bank 
May 30th, 1995 BBV Banco Mercantil Probursa 
August 9th, 1996 BBV Banca Cremi and Banco Oriente 
March 18th, 1997 Santander Grupo Financiero Serfin 
May 16th, 1997 Santander InverMexico and Banco Mexicano 
August 27th, 197 Citibank Banca Confia 
May 8th, 1997 Santander Grupo Financiero Serfin 
March 30th, 2000 Nova Scotia Bank Grupo Financiero Inverlat 
June 29th, 2000 BBVA Grupo Financiero Bancomer 
May 17th, 2001 Citibank Grupo Financiero Banamex 
December, 2002 HSBC Grupo Financiero Bital 
 
At the same time (January 1997), new accounting principles were adopted, which 
modified some concepts such as loans and overdue accounts. Market to market value 
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analysis was introduced; and inflationary effects were taken into account in bank 
accountings. One of their aims is to provide clear and accurate information the 
markets.  It is believed that GAAP rules contributed to accelerate the 
internationalization of bank management practices in Mexico, as they made it 
possible to compare Mexican banks against their international counterparts. 
 
In this way the financial system was concentrated and capitalized between 1998 
and 2003. The financial system reached systemic stability due to a reduction in 
competition among the banking institutions. The analysis on the intermediaries’ 
financial performance is done by implementing profit and banking operation 
indicators. Particularly, the profit analysis is made by means of financial margin 
estimation and the total interest, while the operational analysis is done based on 
administrative costs over assets ratio. 
 
The bank loans to the private sector and the unpaid credits of Mexican banks 
decreased after the internationalization. This is relevant since the origins of the 
banking crisis of 1994-95 are related to inappropriate policies related to credit 
expansion and unsuitable accounting practices.  Starting in 1998, housing 
commercial loans and delinquent loans were reduced.   
 
Mexican banks have been ever since more risk adverse in the long run.  Therefore, 
financial globalization brought, as benefits to the Mexican economy, greater 
systemic stability, higher profitability and efficiency for banks, and most likely better 
authorization practices and higher loan repayment rate.  
 
In México, the regulation and risk management practices are differentiated 
according to the type of financial intermediation activity. The difference in Mexico 
assumes that the intermediaries carry on their activities in a very specialized 
approach so as to guarantee the stability and performance of the financial system 
performance, which justifies the existence of institutional practices and specialized 
regulation for banking intermediaries as well as for non banking intermediaries, in 
addition to the existent common practices for any other institutions. (See Chart 3). 
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Chart 3 
REGULATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN MEXICO
553
 
Institution type Risk Management Memoranda Issued by 
Commercial banks 1423 CNVB 
Development banks 1473 CNVB 
Securities Brokers 10-247 CNVB 
Insurance companies S-11.6 CNSF 
Retirement funds 51-1 CONSAR 
All 31 BANXICO guideline to operate in the derivatives market BANXICO 
 
 
Bank management in Mexico adopted gradually and increasingly the definitions and 
development of international practices, especially after the 1994-1994 crisis.  At the 
regulatory level, the globalization of the Mexican financial system started in 1994 
with the implementation of BCBS (1988) recommendations, which imposed 
international standard to measure the solvency and performance of Mexican banks.   
 
Internationally, the creation of new financial instruments and the risk position 
enlargement in the markets throughout the 1990s led to better risk management.  
Toward that end, BCBS rules were updated in November 2005.  Although originally 
meant to be regional, BCBS’s recommendations have reached global dimensions in 
practice.  Ever since, management practices and bank risk regulations have been 
influenced by Basel II, which is recognized by more than 130 countries, including 
Mexico, as well as by IMF and WB.  The Mexican financial system had no trouble 
adopting Basel II, since its regulation has been very strict after the “Tequila Crisis.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
553
 KPMG (2005). 
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Chart 4 
 
BASEL AGREEMENTS INSTRUMENTATION IN MEXICO 
Date Basel Mexico Contents 
July 
1998 
Capital 
Agreement  
Capital measures and standards to acquire international 
convergence. 
July 
1994 
 
Rules on capitalization 
requirements (SHCP) 
Memorandum 2019/95 
(BANXICO) 
This regulation aim to assure a given "regulatory 
capital" which would face the banks duties regarding the 
economic crises.  
Sept. 
1995 
 
 
The 31 requirements to participate in the derivative 
market are presented and it intend to minimize 
insolvency risks and the financial system liquidity. 
June 
1999 
First 
document 
 
First consultancy document. The new agreement 
consists in three core principles: minimum capital 
requirement, supervision process and effective market 
discipline implementation. 
Nov. 
1999 
 
Memorandum 1423 
(CNBV) 
Prudential dispositions in terms of integral risk 
Management.  
Jan. 
2001 
Second 
document 
 
Second consultancy document. Internal methodologies 
are emphasized, into market disciple supervision. It is 
more flexible and induces to better risk management. 
Feb. 
2001  
Memorandum 1480 
(CNBV) 
Methodology used by commercial banks to evaluate the 
given loans. 
Oct. 
2002 
Third 
Quantitative 
Impact 
study (QIS)  
Technical orientation on the quantitative impact study to 
estimate the impact of the new agreement in the given 
loans. 
Nov. 
2002 
Third 
document 
Memorandum 1506 
(CNBV) Prudential dispositions for internal control. 
April 
2003 
 
 
Third consultancy document. Reform recommendations 
regarding regulation and supervision of the financial 
system, emphasizing quality management and banking 
risk administration. 
June 
2004 
New 
Capital 
Agreement 
or Basel II 
 
Important recommendations focused on measurement 
and control including financial risks (liquidity, interest 
rate, exchange rate) as well as operative risks. It is of 
remarkable importance the politics, processes and 
procedures evaluations for the risk management. 
July 
2004 
 
Modifications C-1423 
(CNBV) 
Prudential dispositions in terms of integral risk 
Management Basic principles related to this 
management and mechanisms that allow activities that 
involve risk levels linked to the net capital and operative 
capacity. Derogation of the C-1423. 
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Ever since, Mexican regulation has aimed to reduce information asymmetry 
problems and improve risk management. Specially, information problems are 
confronted by implementing early warning systems and market discipline.  The 
adoption of these systems aims to detect and prevent capitalization problems and 
banks’ insolvency.  Market discipline changes seek the homologation of the 
information must be revealed and published by the banks to analyze their solvency 
and financial situation.  
 
The Mexican directives on risks (CNBV 2004a and 2004b) are in agreement with 
BCBS’s principles. The purpose is to have time series to analyze the mentioned 
events via financial modelling.  Regarding credit risk, the guidelines allow grading 
the portfolio by the types of credit it contains and also establishes methodologies to 
define risk estimations and the possibility to implement internal methodologies.  This 
regulation became compulsory in Mexico in 2007. 
 
In order to guarantee that banks are duly capitalized (which is necessary to protect 
the public that trusts their savings or investments to their hands), and to promote 
financial stability (which is also necessary to promote economic development), 
Mexican financial authorities and the ABM agreed to adopt the New Capital 
Agreement (NCA) stated by Basel II. 
 
The aim of the BCBS is to elaborate a new agreement for the adequate capital 
ratio in the banks. In order to strengthened them and assure stability, by means of 
adopting of risk management practices more strict and precise. This effort was 
officially stated in the document entitled “International Measures and Capital 
Standards convergence, reviewed framework” which contains the principles and 
standards usually named as Basel II or NCA. 
 
Among Basel II core purposes are the establishment of principles and standards, 
to reflect with precision and sensitivity the effects on the banks capital due to the 
risks that the intermediaries face. Such as: credit risk, market risk and operational 
risk.  
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The NCA has three core principles.  Principle 1 is “Minimum Capital 
Requirement.”  For credit risk, four aspects are considered: 1) Standard simplified 
focus; 2) Standard focus; 3) Basic internal qualification focus; and 4) Advanced 
internal qualification focus.  For the operational risk, four focuses are also taken in 
account: 1) Basic indicator focus; 2) Standardized focus; 3) Alternative Standardized 
focus; and 4) Advanced Measurement focus.   
 
Principle 2 is “Supervision process” and refers to a higher independency level and 
institutional autonomy.  The supervisor may request the banks to maintain a 
capitalization level above the minimum.  Principle 3 is “Effective use of market 
discipline” and encourages the implementation of best practices when information is 
revealed, so that the market and society have the tools to evaluate the banks’ 
financial condition. 
 
Mexican financial authorities considered the following key points to implement 
Basel II: 1) All financial institution had to implement at least the Standard Focus 
when calculating credit risk of capital requirement.  As for the operational risk, banks 
had to adopt the Basic Indicator Focus with the option of using the Standard method 
or the Alternative Standard method. Regarding market risk, banks may use the 
internal model to determine the risk value. 2) Communication channels with external 
financial entities were established, in order to coordinate the transitions to Basel II.  
3) The following chronogram was considered to implement the NCA in Mexico, in 
order to operate synchronized with the best international standards and thus embrace 
a healthy and progressive development. 
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Chart 5 
SUBJECT DATE 
Principle 1: “Minimum Capital Requirement”  
   
a. by credit risk  
Standard focus January 2007 
Basic internal qualification focus January 2007 
Advanced internal qualification focus January 2008 
   
b. by operational risk  
Basic indicator focus January 2007 
Standardized focus January 2007 
Alternative Standardized focus January 2007 
   
Principle 2: “Supervision process”   
   
Adoption of Principle 2 January 2007 
Principle 3: “Effective use of market discipline”  
   
Adoption of principle 3 January 2007 
 
 
3.1.7 Basel III and Its Implementation in Mexico 
 
“At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of 
Supervision, the oversight body of the BCBS, announced a substantial strengthening 
of existing capital requirements,”554 in response to the global financial crisis.  
Immediately upon that announcement, both BANXICO and CNBV “expressed 
confidence that the banks would meet the new requirements ahead of time.”555   
 
In a press communiqué, BANXICO said: 
 
For the particular case of Mexico, the new accord will not represent as 
profound changes and those that the banks of other countries will have 
to face.  This, because, after the 1994-1995 financial crisis in Mexico, a 
new and very demanding regulatory framework was established in the 
                                                 
554
 BIS, “Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital 
standards” (Sep. 12, 2010); available at: http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.htm  
555
 Adam Thomson & Jonathan Wheatley, Mexico and Brazil confident on capital rules, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Sep. 13, 2010); available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a5fa210-bf66-11df-965a-
00144feab49a.html.  
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area of capitalization, both for the amounts of required capital, as for 
the quality demanded for such capital.  It is for this that banks in our 
country will not have to make extraordinary efforts to fulfill with the 
new regulatory parameters. 
 
This is also why the country’s credit institutions [banks] will be able to 
meet the new demands before the end of the international transition 
period, which goes up to 2019. 
 
It is pertinent to point out that the decisions made in the country in the 
past on bank capitalization were appropriate, as they made possible that 
our credit institutions were not contaminated by the deterioration of the 
foreign banking systems.  This is confirmed by the fact that the new 
global regulatory framework is close to the one applied in Mexico. 
 
[SHCP, CNBV and BANXICO] will work on the implementation in our 
country of the new accord with the intent of starting its public 
discussion during the first semester of 2011.
556
   
 
 
In fact, Mexico’s banks were so very well capitalized by the time Basel III was 
announced, that as of August 2010, the Mexican banking sector “had a capital ratio 
index of 13 per cent, a calculation that used similar methodology to that of the new 
Basel requirements.”557   
 
3.1.8 Balance between Liberalization and Financial Supervision and 
Regulation.
558
 
 
Liberalization is understood as the “freedom to engage in economic activity at home 
and/or abroad, a freedom subject to institutional and policy constraints needed to 
guarantee public interests at large.”559  Such constraints are the object of financial 
regulation and supervision, and one of the larger public interests it aims to guarantee 
is financial stability.   
                                                 
556
 BANXICO, “Comunicado de prensa: Estableció hoy el Comité de Basilea para Supervisión 
Bancaria estándares más Exigentes a Nivel Mundial” [Press Communiqué: The Basel Committee for 
Bank Supervision Established Today More Demanding Standards at World Level] (Sep. 12, 2010) at 
2; available at: 
 http://www.banxico.org.mx/informacion-para-la-
prensa/comunicados/miscelaneos/boletines/%7B082605CD-1EC1-29AC-795A-
9ED990B1E939%7D.pdf.   
557
 Thomson & Wheatley, Mexico..., op. cit. 
558
 Trachtman, International…, op. cit., at 59.   
559
 Victor Ognivtsev, “Economic Liberalization as a Driving force of Globalization: Experiences of 
Countries in North and Central Asia” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Sep. 
29, 2005) at 4. 
 166 
 
History proves that both poles are necessary and should coexist in order to have a 
healthy and prosperous global economy. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis was 
due to excessive borrowing, lending and investment, principally in the context of the 
market for subprime residential mortgages in the USA; such excesses impacted 
globally in every market and asset class.
560
  Before that, the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997 and 1998, caused mainly by improper regulatory systems in real estate; the 
collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), the world’s largest and 
most famous hedge fund by 1998, among others.  
 
As a response to the global financial crisis, in April 2008, FSF issued a report on 
regulatory reforms including the following areas: (i) prudential oversight, especially 
capital, liquidity and risk management; (ii) transparency and valuation; (iii) role and 
uses of credit ratings; (iv) authorities’ responsiveness; and (v) arrangements for 
dealing with financial stress. 
561
  In October of 2008, FSF reaffirmed the regulatory 
reforms proposed in April, but also focused on:  
 
(1) international interaction and consistency of emergency 
arrangements and responses; (2) mitigation of pro-cyclicality, including 
in the context of capital, loan-loss provisioning, compensation and 
valuation / leverage; (3) addressing the scope of financial regulation to 
emphasize currently unregulated aspects; and (4) better integrate 
macroeconomic oversight and prudential supervision.
562
 
 
In accordance to the abovementioned proposals, on November 15, 2008, G20 issued 
the Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy in which 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors analyzed the causes of the global 
crisis and established common actions and principles for reform of financial markets, 
such as: (i)  Strengthening Transparency and Accountability; (ii) Enhancing Sound 
Regulation; (iii) Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets; (iv) Reinforcing 
International Cooperation; and (v) Reforming International Financial Institutions.
563
  
 
                                                 
560
 Douglas W. Arner, “The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes, Consequences and Implications for 
Financial Regulation” (Asian Institute of Financial Law Working Paper No. 3) at 1. 
561
 Id., at 24. 
562
 Id., at 25 
563
 G-20, Communiqué, “Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,” (Nov. 
15, 2008). 
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Therefore, liberalization of financial services should never mean the elimination 
of prudential regulation and supervision aimed at preventing systemic instability and, 
therefore, at the preservation of the liberalized financial system. Prudential regulation 
aimed at the preservation of the financial system by preventing systemic instability 
must be maintained even if in some cases it can bring about consequences reckoned 
as anticompetitive.
564
  
 
GATS Art. VI endorses such criterion.
565
 According to GATS, a member may 
eventually discriminate or restrict market access if it is done for prudential reasons. 
However, this shall not be used as a means for avoiding the member’s commitments 
or obligations under the agreement.
566
  
 
Fireman’s Fund v. United Mexican States567 was “the first case under the NAFTA 
to be heard under Chapter Fourteen, devoted to cross-border investment in Financial 
Services,”568 and serves as a good example of how financial services freedom is to be 
limited in favor of prudential regulation.  
 
 In October 2001, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company [hereinafter Fireman’s 
Fund], a USA corporation that sells personal and fire insurance, filed a notice of 
arbitration against Mexican government. Fireman’s Fund claimed that Mexico 
violated Arts. 1102, 1105, 1110 (Chapter 11) and 1405 (Chapter 14) by facilitating 
the purchase of debentures denominated in MXN and owned by Mexican investors, 
but not the purchase of debentures denominated in USD and owned by Fireman’s 
Fund; despite both series were issued at the same time and for USD$50 million.
569
 
 
                                                 
564
 Mahmood Bagheri and Chizu Nakajima, at 518. 
565
 Together with Art. VI. Also Arts. XIV, II, XVII recognize the right of the member states to 
regulate financial services. See GATS/WTO THE LEGAL TEXTS. 
566
 Hamid Mamdouh, “The GATS and Financial Services” (class presentation, 2005) at slide 7.  
Typical prudential measures are: (i) Capital adequacy ratios and solvency margin requirements; (ii) 
Requirements for preserving asset quality; (iii) Liquidity ratios; (iv) Control of market risk; (v) Check 
of management controls; and (vi) Fit and proper tests for members of the board of directors.   
567
 For analysis of this case, see infra Chapter V. 
568
 Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico –Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01 (Redacted Version), at  
paragraph 1; available at http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Mexico/Fireman/FiremansFund-Mexico-
Final_Award.pdf [hereinafter Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico] 
569
 US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Fireman’s Fund v. United Mexican States, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5817.htm. 
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Fireman’s Fund claimed that expropriation under NAFTA includes deprivation of 
the use and value of its investment, so Mexico, by permanently depriving Fireman’s 
Fund of the use and value of its investment expropriated it within the meaning of Art. 
1110 of NAFTA, and that it did not receive fair market value for its investment 
(USD$50 million).
570
 
 
On the other hand, Mexico contended that emergency measures taken by its 
government to handle the crisis, and contested by Fireman’s Fund, concerned 
prudential measures authorized by Chapter Fourteen of NAFTA, particularly Art. 
1410.
571
  In other words, Mexico argued that all the measures it took to handle the 
crisis were actually “reasonable measures for prudential reasons” covered by the 
understanding of Art. 1410 (Exceptions) of the NAFTA.  
 
The Tribunal expressed that the Fireman’s Fund’s claims brought under Arts. 
1102, 1105, and 1405 of NAFTA were not within its competence, so it would only 
know of Art. 1110 and, thus, Fireman’s Fund’s allegation related to the expropriation 
suffered.
572
   
 
Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the article invoked by Mexico is entitled 
“Exceptions”, thus it provides that measures usually prohibited in Part Five of 
NAFTA (e.g. comprising Chapter eleven and Chapter fourteen) would not be 
transgressing of it if they meet the requirements of “reasonable measure taken for 
prudential reason”.573 
 
The claimant leveled as argument that if a mean is unfavorable, it cannot be 
treated as reasonable and thus, it is included under the regulations of the NAFTA. 
Mexico declared that Claimant misunderstood Art. 1410 and should not bring the 
claim of discrimination under Chapter Fourteen as it is obviously exempted from it.  
 
Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the exception applied to all regulations of 
Part Five “Investments, Services and Related Matters” of the NAFTA relevant to 
                                                 
570
 See Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico at 103, 106, and 107. 
571
 Id., at 120. 
572
 Id., at 143, 147. 
573
 Id., at 159. 
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Financial Services comprising the NT article (Art.1405) according to Art. 1410(1), 
allowed to implement sensible measures of a prudential character even though their 
effect could be biased. Hence, the Tribunal refused to treat a measure discriminatory 
in effect as by that fact unreasonable.
574
 
 
Having being a chief negotiator of the Financial Services Chapter of the NAFTA 
as a representative of the United States, Olin L. Wethington wrote in his book 
FINANCIAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION that Art. 1410(1) (a), bypassing NT and other 
obligations, ensures the right to apply reasonable measures in order to protect the 
security and stability of the financial system, even though the implementation of the 
tool can be discriminatory.
575
  
 
Wethington emphasizes that exceptions include only sensible measures, e. g. 
connected with capital adequacy, loan loss reserve requirements, cash reserve and 
liquidity requirements.  But, focusing on Mexico, he adds that the exempted means 
cannot be utilized as a disguise for discriminating USA or Canadian incumbents or 
for making discretionary judgments as to granting licenses and assessing particular 
firm applications.
576
 
 
 
  
                                                 
574
 Id., at 161-162. 
575
 Id., at 163. 
576
 Id., at 164. 
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3.2 FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO 
 
3.2.1 Some background information  
 
One complaint raised against the shape the Mexican private banking sector took after 
the reforms carried out between 1995 and 2006, and the changes those brought about, 
is that it was a highly concentrated sector that lacked enough competition, which 
consequently discouraged or even excluded potential users. 577 
 
This was one of the motivations for changes made to the LIC between 2007 and 
2008, which allowed smaller specialized banks (“niche banks”) to be authorized with 
smaller requirements and for banking operations to be carried out by means of non-
banking agents on behalf of the banks.  The complaint decreased in frequency and 
intensity after the said changes but has not ceased to be a favorite theme of leftists, 
and anti-market, anti-globalization voices, who blame the problem on the re-
privatization of banks and on allowing foreign firms to control them.
578
   
 
                                                 
577
 At the time of NAFTA's negotiation only 8% of the Mexican population had a checking account 
and there were an average of 18,500 people per banking branch in Mexico as opposed to 
approximately 2,000 people per branch in the USA and Canada.  See Cally Jordan, Financial Services 
Under NAFTA: The View From Canada, in 9 REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES (Mar. 
24, 1993), at 52, n.43.  Cited in Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public 
Choice over Public Policy, 32 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (1998), at 14; available at: 
 http://assets.wnec.edu/78/cornell_international.pdf.  
578
 See, for example, the heavily editorialized rendering of a news-clip published by leftist magazine 
PROCESO.  Under the title “IPAB Calls Upon Banks to Reactivate Loans,” the magazine opens the 
news report saying: “Due to the great banking concentration and the low amount of loans toward firms 
in Mexico, …[IPAB] urged banks to a greater opening-up to competition.” (“Llama IPAB a la banca a 
reactivar el crédito,” PROCESO (Jun. 10, 2010); available at: 
 http://www.proceso.com.mx/rv/modHome/detalleExclusiva/80228.)   Nevertheless, the actual speech 
of María Teresa Fernández Labardini (IPAB’s Executive Secretary), referred by PROCESO as source, 
contains no reference whatsoever to “banking concentration” (speech available at: 
http://www.ipab.org.mx/foro_estabilidad_economica/documentos/presentaciones_ok2/DiscursoMTFL
.pdf). Likewise, the reference to competition is not an “urge” to “open up,” but a matter of fact 
statement that, “being a common objective of financial authorities and the sector, it is important for 
banks to grant loans, come close to the client to compete and return to the traditional manner of doing 
the receiving and lending business.”  A few paragraphs later, the speech touches again on competition 
saying.  In order   Unlike the implication that PROCESO’s news-clip conveys the speech implies that 
there are competition conditions that are not being exploited by the competitors.  IPAB acknowledges 
that “banking credit to the non-financial private sector grew at an average rate of 16%” between 2004 
and 2009, but notices that as of March 2010, it was contracted by 6.1%.  The real problem that IPAB 
addressed in this speech (and that other financial authorities have being addressing between 2009 and 
2010) is the underdevelopment of the Mexican banking sector. 
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Therefore, before addressing directly the question of financial inclusion in 
Mexico, the question of whether Mexico’s concentration and competition levels are 
acceptable is addressed.   
 
Much is being said and written on the subject of “financial inclusion” (broadly 
speaking), but the several terms used and their varying meanings are so ambiguous, 
that the lack of uniformity hinders accurate academic discussion on what the problem 
is, what are its causes, and therefore how to solve it.  The way in which the issue is 
defined or understood determines the approach taken and the suggestions made to 
tackle the problem.   
 
This hindrance to proper research is first shown and analyzed, followed by the 
identification of a more circumscribed understanding of the problem in Mexico’s 
peculiar case, which is supported by data generated by Mexican authorities that have 
worked more (and more recently) on the issue.
579
   
 
Lastly, the legal and institutional frameworks in which the challenge of financial 
inclusion is being addressed in Mexico’s particular case is identified, and the actions 
that have been (and continues to be) carried out by the Mexican government 
according to it, are explained and its results reported.  
 
3.2.2 Concentration in the Banking Sector 
 
3.2.2.1 Whether Concentration in the Banking Sector is Good 
 
According to the Federal Reserve of the USA, unlike other sectors of the economy, 
over-competition in the banking sector may generate unstable and fragile systems 
during economic crises.
580
  In fact, oligopolistic banking systems are more stable 
                                                 
579
 Shortly before submitting this work to revision more data relevant for the matter of financial 
inclusion was released, most of which was used to shape this section but not necessarily quoted. 
580
 See WILLIAM GRUBEN and ROBERT MCCOMB, “Privatization, Competition, and Supercompetition 
in the Mexican Commercial Banking System” (Research Department Working Paper (US) 99-04; 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2009). 
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since the presence of numerous competitors encourages riskier behaviors and lower 
levels of credit prudence.
581
  
 
Increasing competition may lead to a natural concentration on the profitable 
clients, consequently turning uneconomic to provide services to less profitable 
clients, when more resources have to be destined to beat competitors. In fact, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers recently concluded that “A very aggressive competition 
policy and social inclusion are mutually exclusive.”582 
 
There are studies that demonstrate the positive relationship between consolidation 
and competition.
583
 In the EU banking deregulation and the promotion of 
transnational financial services generated a larger banking concentration that had as a 
result more competition in the sector.
584
  
 
3.2.2.2 Recent History of Banking Concentration in Mexico 
 
At the time of the “Tequila Crisis” (1994), there were 19 banks in Mexico.  By 1996, 
after the amendments made to open unilaterally the financial sector to foreign 
investment, there were 40 private banks. By 2002, the number decreased to 32.
585
  
Yet, at the end of 2010, there were 41 banks in Mexico.
586
  Therefore Banking 
concentration in Mexico has decreased over 15 years following the “Tequila Crisis.” 
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(Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No. 2000-12).  
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JANSEN, op. cit. 
584
 Xavier Vives, Lessons from European Banking Liberalization and Integration, CLAESSENS and 
JANSEN, op. cit.   
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The figures above do not take into account other entities that are legally 
authorized to render basic financial services under the regulation and supervision of 
CNBV such as government development banks and popular thrift and loan entities. 
 
3.2.2.3  Mexico’s Banking Concentration Levels 
 
Mexico banking concentration levels are within the international average.  Countries 
such as Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Uruguay, among others, have much more concentrated banking systems than 
Mexico.
587  As of 2006, “Of 105 countries for which data on bank concentration were 
available for 2005, 85 had three-firm concentration ratios above 50%, 53 above 75%, 
and 31 above 90%.”588 
 
As of October 2007, BANXICO’s assessment of the Mexican banking sector was 
that: 
 
The most visible tendency has been toward the entrance of a larger 
number of participants in the market.  The authorization of new 
multiple banks
589
 has derived largely from a deliberate policy adopted 
by the authorities in order to allow the conformation of new banks 
looking for a very desirable end: to induce more competition in the 
sector.  With that it is sought not only to reduce the fees of services but 
also to narrow the margins of intermediation.
590
   
 
  
3.2.3 Ambiguity of the Terms used in Discussing Financial Inclusion 
 
WB bank uses interchangeably and synonymously the terms “financial inclusion,” 
“access to finance,” “inclusive financial systems,” “access to financial services,” 
“broad access to financial services,” and “improving access,”591 but the meaning of 
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 See 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20696
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 FINANCE FOR ALL? at ix, 1-2,7-8, and 21-24, 27, 28.  
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such terms is at best ambiguous.  In WB’s literature these terms refer sometimes 
merely to “improving the degree to which financial services are available to all at a 
fair price,”592 or the “absence of price and non-prices barriers in the use of financial 
services.”593   
 
In other instances such terms refer merely to having “an account with a financial 
institution,”594 while other times they mean actually getting loans and other financial 
services and products,
595
 and even having  financial services “available when and 
where desired, and products... tailored to specific needs.”596   
 
Taking a different approach, the BBA has used a better and more realistic 
explanation.  For the BBA, “promoting financial inclusion” involves four elements: 
1) Trying to make sure that an assortment of appropriate financial services is 
available for all; 2) Helping people to understand those services and to have access to 
them; but also, 3) Acknowledging the solutions have to be profitable (otherwise they 
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of more efficient asset portfolios as well as more efficient organizational forms, such as 
incorporation” (at 7-8).  Among some of the definitions of financial inclusion recently attempted by 
“different initiatives,” the 1ST REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO lists the following: 
“Financial inclusion means having access to a set of financial products and services that include credit 
[loans], savings, payment system, pensions, as well as financial education and consumer protection.”  
It adds under such definition that “The products and services have to be attainable, of high quality, 
and available within physical and sustainable proximity” (1ST REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN 
MEXICO at 14).   
596
 Id., at 22.  Several pages below the cited statement, WB qualifies it saying that, “Of course this 
does not mean that all households and firms should be able to borrow unlimited amounts at prime 
lending rates or transmit funds across the world instantaneously for a fraction of 1 percent of the 
amount” (at 27).  Along similar lines, another of the definitions listed by the 1ST REPORT ON 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO for financial inclusion says it is, “Universal and continuous access 
of the population to diversified financial services, adequate and formal, as well as the possibility of 
using them according to the needs of the users to contribute to their development and wellbeing” (at 
14). 
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will not work);
597
 and 4) Acknowledging that some people will opt to exclude 
themselves.
598
   
 
Meanwhile, the AFI and the Mexican government refer to “access to financial 
products and services” as merely “a first component of financial inclusion,”599 thus 
giving the impression that for them “financial inclusion” comprehends more 
ambitious state of affairs than the one described by WB’s concept of “financial 
inclusion” and “access to finance”.  Nevertheless, a few pages further into the 
document cited, the 1
ST
 REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO contradicts its 
own earlier statement by adopting as working definition the following:  
 
Financial inclusion refers to the access and use of a portfolio of 
financial products and services that reaches the majority of the adult 
population with clear and concise information in order to satisfy the 
growing demand, under an appropriate regulatory framework.
600
 
  
 
There is a fundamental hindrance for proper research and discussion on “access to 
financial services”, namely, the very meaning and reach of the terminology used by 
the specialized literature.  “Access to finance”, “financial inclusion,”601 
“bankarization,”602 “financial penetration,”603 “depth of the financial systems,”604 and 
                                                 
597
 WB also mentions, albeit rather marginally, this element: “Efforts to improve inclusion should also 
make business sense, translate into profits for the providers of these services, and therefore have a 
lasting effect”, FINANCE FOR ALL?, at 22. 
598
 BBA, “Promoting Financial Inclusion...,” op. cit., at 1.  It is a better defined and more realistic 
explanation because: 1) It acknowledges (albeit tacitly) that a financial system cannot achieve, in and 
of itself, the state of affairs described by other organizations as financial inclusion; but that it can only 
help trigger the motion toward (promote), to make sure some financial services are available for all, 
even if some people exclude themselves from the financial system.  2) In connection with the later, it 
acknowledges that people’s culture and education are crucial factor in the broad phenomenon of 
financial exclusion.  3) It acknowledges that lack of profitability is another crucial factor in the 
phenomenon of financial exclusion which is a burden that cannot be forced upon financial 
institutions.   
599
 1ST REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO at 10.  AFI & CNBV acknowledge in this 
document that “there is no universal definition of financial inclusion” (id., at 6, 10 and 14). 
600
 Id., at 14. 
601
 Financial inclusion is the terminology used by the AFI and the CNBV (see 1
ST
 REPORT ON 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO at 6, 10, etc.).  The British FSA has used the language of “financial 
exclusion” (cf. FSA, IN OR OUT? FINANCIAL EXCLUSION: A LITERATURE AND RESEARCH REVIEW 
2000). 
602
 From the Spanish Word bancarizar.  According to FELABAN, “Bankarization is the ability of the 
population to use the set of financial services without obstacles to prevent it” (FELABAN, ¿QUÉ 
SABEMOS SOBRE BANCARIZACIÓN EN AMÉRICA LATINA? UN INVENTARIO DE FUENTES DE DATOS Y 
LITERATURA [What Do We Know about Bankarization in Latin America? An Inventory of Data 
Sources and Literature] (Mar. 2007) at 2).  FELABAN’s comprehensive, far reaching and unrealistic 
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microfinance,
605
 are terms used loosely and ambiguously by the specialized literature 
to refer broadly to overlapping phenomena and policy objectives.   
 
This lack of accuracy results in a hindrance to identify accurately the problem to 
be addressed, its dimensions, the state of affairs pursued as objective, and 
consequently the paths to achieve that state of affairs.    
 
3.2.4 Identifying the Problem in Mexico and Its Size 
 
The ambiguity shown above has been true about the discussion on financial inclusion 
in Mexico.  Upon the publication of WB’s FINANCE FOR ALL?, one of Mexico’s 
leading financial newspapers, EL FINANCIERO, printed a rather sensationalist front-
page headline and subsequent column according to which the WB stated that the 
Mexican private banking sector was excluding 75% of the Mexican population.
606
  
Nevertheless, a careful reading of FINANCE FOR ALL?, and its sources demonstrates 
that assertion is, not just inaccurate and outdated, but plainly false.   
 
Firstly, WB has never conducted any survey or study to measure financial 
inclusion in Mexico.  WB merely resorts to the data provided by the local 
                                                                                                                                          
meaning of “bankarization” here echoes one of the meanings ascribed by WB to the term “financial 
inclusion” (FINANCE FOR ALL?). 
603
 AFI & CNBV, 1
ST
 REPORT ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN MEXICO at 7; and Dictamen de la Cámara 
de Diputados [Lower House’s Assessment of the Bill of amendments to the LIC] (under “I.  
Actividades de banca y crédito” [Banking and Lending Activities]) 
604
 See Gonzalo Castañeda Ramos & Clemente Ruiz, Avances y los asuntos pendientes para la 
profundización de los servicios financieros en México [Advances and Pending Issues for the 
Deepening of Financial Services in Mexico], SECRETARÍA GENERAL IBEROAMERICANA (CUMBRE 
IBEROAMERICANA), LA EXTENSIÓN DEL CRÉDITO Y LOS SERVICIOS FINANCIEROS: OBSTÁCULOS, 
PROPUESTAS Y BUENAS PRÁCTICAS [Credit and Financial Services Extension: Obstacles, Proposals and 
Good Practices] (2006) at 99; and FINANCE FOR ALL? at 147.  Likewise, the Mexican government’s 
development bank BANSEFI uses this terminology: “Formal financial systems are characterized by 
lack of depth, leaving the majority of the population without access to financial services” (see 
 http://www.BANSEFI.gob.mx/BANSEFI/Paginas/English.aspx).  
605
 This term is used, for instance, by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (www.cgap.org), and 
the OECD.  Moreover, the use of this terminology is not limited to proper financial institutions 
(recognized as such and thus regulated by governments).  
606
 Alicia Salgado, Excluyente, la banca en México, dice el BM [Excluding, the [private] Banking 
Sector in Mexico, Says WB], EL FINANCIERO (Nov. 15, 2007) at 1 and 4: 
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/ElFinanciero/Portal/cfpages/contentmgr.cfm?docId=90077&docTipo
=1&orderby=docid&sortby=ASC).  The figure appears in FINANCE FOR ALL? at 34, Box 1.3, but it is 
taken out of context and mistakes the information provided in the source, as it will be shown below.  
In the document entitled “Plan Estratégico 2008 – 2012” [Strategic Plan 2008 - 2012], BANSEFI 
quotes a similar figure (26% of the Economically Active Population) without citing any source, in 
spite of the fact that CONDUSEF has used BANSEFI’s information to contradict the aforesaid, as 
documented later in this chapter. 
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governmental agencies of each country.  Accordingly, WB acknowledges the 
limitations and frailty of the information used in FINANCE FOR ALL?  Hereby some 
examples: 
 
Much less is known about how inclusive financial systems are and who 
has access to which financial services…  Better data are needed to 
advance research on financial inclusion, and significant efforts have 
recently been made in this direction.
607
 
 
Ideally, one would like to have census data on the number and 
characteristics of households that have a bank account or an account 
with a bank-like financial institution.  In the absence of census data, one 
would at least like to have survey-based measures that are 
representative of the whole population and of important subgroups, 
again collecting information about the types of financial services they 
are consuming, in what quantities, and at what price, as well as 
complementary data on other characteristics of the household that might 
affect or be affected by their financial service use.
608
 
 
…surveys prepared by or for the World Bank in India, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico (Box 1.3), though even these are not always 
representative of the whole country and are not consistent across 
different countries.
609
 
 
To date, however, survey-based data are quite limited both in terms of 
the number of countries that are covered and the amount of information 
collected about the respondents. The data are often not comparable 
across countries because the surveys use different definitions. Only a 
handful of the large and long-established Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) surveys sponsored by the World Bank cover financial 
services, and even these provide limited financial information…  
Different surveys have different primary objectives…  Findings based 
on surveys of individuals cannot easily be compared directly with those 
from surveys of households.  Different survey methodologies and their 
impact on the quality of information gathered are the subjects of an 
ongoing research effort at the World Bank.
610
 
 
 
 
 
Along similar lines, FELABAN explains that: 
 
                                                 
607
 FINANCE FOR ALL? at 26-27.  
608
 Id., at 30. 
609
 Id. 
610
 Id., at 30, and 33. 
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The availability of data on bankarization comparable across Latin 
American countries is very limited, which itself imposes important 
restrictions in the ability to perform analysis on the issue.  The existent 
data come, in its majority, from polls made at a worldwide level by the 
multilateral institutions of Washington, particularly the World Bank.  
The regional polls focused on the particularities of Latin America are 
extremely scarce.  Some studies at country level have more ample 
information, but because each study follows a different methodology, 
the data are in general not compatible across countries.
611
 
 
 
Secondly, the 75% of the exclusion figure posted in Box 1.3 of FINANCE FOR 
ALL?,
612
 and publicized by EL FINANCIERO, cites as source the 2006 WB’s Policy 
Research Working Paper 3835,
613
 which in turn refers as source a 2002 “National 
Poll of Financial Services” by the Mexican “National Institute of Geography, 
Statistics and Informatics” (INEGI).   
 
In spite of the poll’s title, the figure cited by WB refers to a poll restricted to 
Mexico City’s Metropolitan Area with a sample of 1,500 individuals.  Moreover, that 
poll also reported that 48% of the people polled did have a bank account, not just the 
25% so much publicized.  The 25% figure refers only to those individuals who had a 
bank account that was not a mandatory bank account associated with a housing loan.      
 
From the above it becomes clear that the data published by FINANCE FOR ALL? is 
an improper extrapolation of an outdated statistical estimation of individuals (rather 
than households) who actually use banking services in Mexico City, rather than 
updated hard data of the number of the households that have access to financial 
services in general (or even exclusively banking services), even if they are not 
currently account holders, or if for whatever reason they opt voluntarily to exclude 
themselves from the financial system.      
 
A couple of private firms carried out surveys after 2002 (the year of INEGI’s poll 
used by WB) which rendered very different results: 
 
                                                 
611
 FELABAN, op. cit., at 3. 
612
 FINANCE FOR ALL? at 34. 
613
 Caskey et al, op. cit., at 32-47. 
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At a national level, the GEA-ISA opinion poll on the banking sector 
performed on January 2005, says that… the 70% of the population 
above 18 years old has some type of relationship with a bank (34.4% 
credit-card holders, 9.9% checking/investing accounts, 9.2% savers, 
9.4% payroll deposit account holders, 7.5% users).
614
  
 
 
Later that year (October 2005), another prestigious private polling firm, carried out a 
“National Household Poll on Banking Services in Mexico” which reported that 
49.3% of people polled was users of at least one banking service.
615
  
 
More recent and comprehensive data published by CONDUSEF (the Mexican 
authority in charge of the defense and protections the users of financial services) 
indicates that as of 2007, 82.1% of the population of Mexico had their financial 
services needs covered by 10,861 offices of financial entities.  Of that total number, 
9,451 offices belong to the private banking industry and 1,410 to BANSEFI’s 
“People’s Network”.616   
 
This has been the result of a 21.4% increase in the number of offices and/or 
branches of financial entities between 2002 and 2007, that is 1 664 more 
offices/branches that cover 33 more municipalities than in 2002.  Thus, 1 447 
municipalities had not yet presence of the private banking industry (as of 2007), 
which meant 14.1 million people or 4.2 million households.
617
 
 
The most recent data available has come from a 2009 SHCP “Survey on The Use 
of Financial Services”, and reports that 57% of Mexico’s population are actual users 
of financial services:  48% are users of traditional deposit services (savings account, 
checking account, and payroll account with a debit card); 27% are users of traditional 
                                                 
614
 Castañeda Ramos & Ruiz, op. cit., at 126 (note 7). 
615
 Consulta Mitofsky: 
http://www.consulta.com.mx/interiores/99_pdfs/12_mexicanos_pdf/mxc_NA051006_ServiciosBancar
ios.pdf 
616
 The “People’s Network” is comprised by popular thrift and credit societies that are supported by 
BANSEFI. 
617
 CONDUSEF, “Presencia de la banca a nivel geográfico, 2002-2007: Una visión general” [Presence 
of The Banking Sector at Geographical level, 2001-2007: A General Vision], (Apr. 2008) at 1-5. 
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loan services (personal or payroll loan, credit card, house mortgage, car loan); 12% 
are users of insurance services.
618
     
 
The obvious discrepancy between the data reported by CONDUSEF in 2008 
(82.1% of Mexico’s population having access to financial services) and that reported 
by the SHCP in 2009, is explained by the difference in each of these governmental 
authorities’ concept of access to financial services and therefore of what they are 
reporting.  To be more accurate, the 2009 SHCP’s survey is talking about actual 
users of financial services.  The criticism to the SHCP’s data would then be that it 
does not account for voluntary exclusion.   
 
On the other hand, CONDUSEF is reporting the percentage of the population that 
lives in areas with physical/geographical access to a branch or office of a financial 
institution in general, not just private banks.  The criticism to this approach would be 
that it focuses only on potential physical access, which would seem to ignore the 
major cause of involuntary exclusion from financial services in Mexico, namely, 
poverty.
619
   
 
Nevertheless, when studied as a whole, CONDUSEF’s understanding of the 
problem, approach and information becomes all the more relevant and useful, 
precisely because it highlights the role economic underdevelopment plays and the 
                                                 
618
 SHCP, “Encuesta sobre Uso de Servicios Financieros 2009” [2009 Survey on The Use of Financial 
Services].  Cited in Alejandro Werner Wainfeld (Undersecretary of SCHP), “10º Aniversario de la 
CONDUSEF: Los beneficios de la información, la transparencia y la competencia” [CONDUSEF’s 
10th Anniversary: The Benefits of Information, Transparency and Competition], (Apr. 2009) at 2 
(http://www.shcp.gob.mx/SALAPRENSA/sala_prensa_presentaciones/aww_presentacion_condusef_
22042009.pdf).  The cited document claims that as a result of the legislation introduced to promote 
people’s access to information on financial institutions, products and services, enforced by 
CONDUSEF, competition has increased and “access to financial services has improved significantly 
over the last 5 years”.  The point of comparison is the above multi-cited 25% figure published by WB.  
The media report of the cited presentation quotes the Undersecretary saying that WB’s data from 5 
years earlier is half of what the 2009 survey found, thus concluding that financial access has been 
doubles in Mexico over the last five years (see México duplica usuarios de servicios financieros 
[Mexico Doubles Financial Services Users] in EL ECONOMISTA [The Economist] (Apr. 22, 2009): 
http://eleconomista.com.mx/notas-online/finanzas/2009/04/22/mexico-duplica-usuarios-servicios-
financieros.  In light of the analysis made on WB’s information, it is obvious that this claim is grossly 
exaggerated and ungrounded.   
619
 Paulina Beato, Introducción, SECRETARIA GENERAL IBEROAMERICANA, op. cit., at 104. 
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public policies the executive branch of Mexican Government is using to address that 
particular factor.
620
       
 
3.2.5 The Chief Cause of Financial Exclusion in Mexico: Poverty 
 
CONDUSEF explains the absence of offices/branches in or near population centers 
as due to economic underdevelopment of the places where that phenomenon exists.  
“The more the relative development is, the larger presence of banks also is, and the 
smaller the economic activity, the smaller the presence of banks is, which indirectly 
perpetuates the ballasts for economic integration and growth.”621   
 
Consequently, when and where there has been improvement in economic 
variables, financial inclusion has improved as well.  According to CONDUSEF: 
 
The penetration of almost all of the “savings, consumer loan, and 
housing loans instruments, as well as the handling of accounts and 
means of payment with cards, has been growing rapidly over the last 
years, in the same measure in which inflation has been reduced, 
unemployment levels are stable, and the per capita income recovers 
gradually and the effects provoked by the external shocks derived from 
the behavior of the international economy are ameliorated.
622
  
 
 
Accordingly, CONDUSEF identifies inequality of income as “one of the chief 
factors that limit the possibilities of individuals and their families to develop socially 
and economically.”  Therefore, “we ought not be surprised that the offer of banking 
services also keeps a close correlation with the proportion of the available 
income.”623  
                                                 
620
 By no means this claim denies the presence of other barriers to financial inclusion in Mexico, 
including those (few) that can be overcome by means of regulatory liberalization (as will be addressed 
below), and those that pertain more to voluntary rather than involuntary exclusion.   
621
 CONDUSEF, op. cit.  
622
 Id.  Similarly, WB says that, “There is little disagreement that the ability of financial service 
providers to reach a broad clientele is highly dependent on macroeconomic environment,” among 
other variables.  Furthermore, “Theoretical and empirical research has confirmed that macroeconomic 
instability is an important obstacle to effective intertemporal contracting. Fiscal imbalances in 
particular generate high and variable inflation, often making the future value of money so uncertain 
(and difficult to hedge) for both suppliers and demanders that long-term financial contracts simply do 
not exist. Households will not give up control over their savings for longer time-periods in unstable 
macroeconomic environments, and financial institutions will not commit beyond short-term contracts 
given funding uncertainties. (FINANCE FOR ALL?, at 146).   
623
 CONDUSEF, op. cit. 
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CONDUSEF reports that “68% of the households not covered by bank branches 
have income below two minimum salaries (MS),
624
 while the households making 
more than seven MS that aren’t covered by the banks are just the 4.8%;” and 
concludes that “the larger the proportion of households with income of two MS or 
less, there is also a smaller presence of banks or, even, the absolute absence of the 
traditional banking service.”625     
 
At this point it is worth highlighting that, according to CONEVAL (the Mexican 
Government’s commission in charge of measuring poverty), households that have an 
income of two MS or less are in situation of poverty.  Poverty is defined there as “not 
having an income enough to satisfy their food, educational, health, housing, 
transportation, clothing, and foot-ware expenses.”626  Consequently, people in 
poverty have no use for financial services since they have no money to save, no 
assets to use as collateral for loans (which makes them ineligible for a mortgage from 
a commercial bank), and no money to use insurance services.
627
   
 
                                                 
624
 The current MS in Mexico is equivalent to approximately USD$4.00 a day (USD$120.00 
monthly), as of 2010.     
625
 Id. 
626
 CONEVAL, “Informe ejecutivo de pobreza en México 2007” [2007 Executive Report on Poverty 
in Mexico] (Jun. 2007) at 3 (http://www.coneval.gob.mx/contenido/normateca/2328.pdf).  
CONEVAL’s methodology comprehends three levels of poverty: 1) Food poverty (inability of a 
household to afford a basic set of nutritional food even if spending its whole income); 2) Poverty of 
capabilities (in addition to food poverty, the inability of a household to afford health and education 
expenses, even if spending its whole income); and 3) Poverty of assets (in addition to 1 and 2, the 
inability of a household to afford clothing, housing, and transportation, even if spending its whole 
income (id.). 
627
 Sources are practically silent on whether the cashing of remittances from abroad (mostly from 
Mexican migrant workers in USA) are among the financial services considered in their measurements.  
Yet, in light of CONEVAL’s working definition of poverty, it is quite unlikely that people in the said 
condition are recipients of this kind of money transfers.  According to BANXICO’s information on 
household remittances during 2008, the average monthly income per household was USD$346.00, 
which more than USD$100.00 (or 43.33%) above the poverty line (this data already reflects, by the 
way, a decrease in 3.6% decrease in 2008 as a result of the crisis in the USA).  In light of 
CONDUSEF’s analysis of on the economic underdevelopment of the areas without presence of 
financial institutions, the presence of that kind of money influx would by itself bring about more 
economic activity and development and thus attract financial institutions.  Moreover, according to 
BANXICO’s report, 95.9% of the remittances were sent via electronic transfers, and 2.4% via money 
orders, which means that the recipients have access to, and actually use, financial services.  Only 1.7% 
of the remittances where done using “other instruments,” which likely implies non-financial services 
means. See BANXICO, “Las remesas familiares en 2008” [Family remittances in 2008] (Jan. 27, 
2009); available at: http://www.banxico.org.mx/documents/%7BB7CBCFAF-AB7D-BE65-F78F-
6827D524C418%7D.pdf.      
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As of 2008, CONEVAL estimated that 47.4% of the population in Mexico was in 
poverty.
628
  That means that only 52.6% of Mexico’s population is potentially user of 
financial services, which is close to the 57% figure of actual users of financial 
services reported in early 2009 by SHCP (which reports the state of affairs as of 
2008).  This reasonably confirms that the chief cause of financial exclusion in 
Mexico is poverty.
629
  
 
Exclusion due to poverty cannot be solved by the private sector of the financial 
system alone, neither solely by means of its liberalization.  Alluding to the BBA’s 
understanding of financial inclusion it has to be acknowledged that solutions have to 
be profitable or they will not work.
630
  Along the same lines, WB acknowledges that, 
“Efforts to improve inclusion should also make business sense, translate into profits 
for the providers of these services, and therefore have a lasting effect.”631   
 
Therefore, the role the private financial sector in Mexico and its regulatory 
framework can play in promoting financial inclusion of people in poverty is very 
limited, if not practically inconsequential.  Accordingly, the primary approach of the 
Executive branch of the Mexican Government has been a comprehensive programme 
delineated in the PND (National Development Plan).  
  
                                                 
628
 CONEVAL, “Evolución de la pobreza en México” [Evolution of Poverty in Mexico] (2009) at 7 
(http://www.diputadosfederalespan.org.mx/lxi/campanas/foroEco2010/1234.pdf).   
629
 There of course are other factors that have been identified as barriers to financial access that are 
very much present in Mexico.  Nevertheless, poverty is often behind or somehow related to some of 
such other obstacles.  Lack financial education and culture is clearly one of those obstacles in which 
poverty is involved (see Beato, op. cit. at 11; and Castañeda & Ruiz, op. cit., at 124).   According to 
CONEVAL, “The educational level of the head of household strongly influences the difficulty to 
overcome the poverty circle”; and only “26.7% of the heads of household in poverty of assets have 
more basic education” (CONEVAL, “Executive Report…”, op. cit., at 4-5).  Lack of financial 
education and culture is connected with another obstacle to financial inclusion, namely high levels of 
informality with the consequent excessive use of cash instead of the payment instruments offered by 
the financial system (see Beato, op. cit.; and Castañeda & Ruiz, op. cit.).  This is not to deny, 
nevertheless, that there is still in Mexico a need of institutional development and regulatory reform.         
630
 BBA, op. cit.  
631
 FINANCE FOR ALL?, at 22.  A recent measure of the Legislative branch of the Mexican Government 
(controlled by parties that favor governmental interventionism and disfavor market approaches) 
intended to favor low-income people in their use of banking services has been to mandate BANXICO 
to regulate (even re-regulate) the fees private banks are allowed to charge to account-holders and other 
kind of users for various services and penalties.  
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3.2.6 Legal and Institutional Framework to Address Final Inclusion 
 
The Mexican Constitution (Art. 25) mandates that the ruling of the national 
development corresponds to “the state” (meaning government), in order to guarantee 
it is comprehensive and sustainable, among other things.
632
  Furthermore, “The State 
will plan, conduct, coordinate, and orient the national economic activity...”633   
 
Art. 26, section A, further mandates the government to organize a “democratic 
planning system of the national development”, for which therefore there has to be “a 
national development plan [PND] to which the programs of the Public Federal 
Administration shall obligatorily subject”.   
 
Therefore, no serious discussion on the regulation of fairness and inclusion in the 
Mexican financial system and its role in economic development can ignore the 
PND,
634
 which is part of the Mexican legal frame-work.   
 
Within “Axis 2. Competitive and Employment-generating Economy”, and under 
the subheading (2.2) entitled “Efficient Financial System”, the PND says:  
 
It is to be reminded that the families of lesser income are also the most 
vulnerable, due to the fragility of their income and to the fact that along 
with their assets such income is often more affected by extreme climatic 
events.  To count with financial instruments designed for the needs of 
these forgotten segments of the population entails improvements in the 
wellbeing, the equality and even the economic growth.
635
  
 
 
Then in the strategy section, the PND appoints the development banks (government 
owned and managed banks) as primarily responsible of achieving the inclusion of the 
lower classes into the financial system: 
 
                                                 
632
 For the updated official text of the Mexican Constitution, see 
http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Constitucion/cn16.pdf 
633
 Art. 25, second paragraph.   
634
 For PND’s official text, see http://pnd.calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/.  
635
 PND, 2.2.  “Efficient Financial System,” at 99. 
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Strategy 2.4.  Focusing the actions of the Development Banks on 
addressing the population in priority sectors that are un-addressed by 
the private financial sector… 
 
…It will correspond to the development banks to conduct the 
enlargement of the credit given toward strategic sectors that still have 
limited access to financing: the SME, infrastructure, housing for low 
income individuals and rural producers of medium and low income…636 
  
 
Accordingly, the 2007-2012 “Economy Sector Program”637 lists as 10th of its “10 
Challenges and Priorities”: 
 
10. To encourage a more strengthened social banking sector with a 
larger social capital, especially for the sector of the population that is 
excluded of the commercial financial sector by means of the 
implementation of public policies that support the strengthening of 
popular
638
 thrift and credit institutions that promote the economic 
development of communities and small scale firms.
639
   
 
  
In order to deepen the social banking sector, the PSE lists the following actions 
(under Strategic Line 1.2.3): 
 
a) To diversify the social banking sector, fomenting the creation and development of 
the solidarity boxes,
640
 and other thrift and credit cooperative societies; of popular 
financial societies; of trusts and other associative entities that would promote 
popular savings and credit. 
                                                 
636
 PND, Axis 2 (“Competitive and Job-Generating Economy”), Objective 2 (“To Democratize the 
Financial System without Jeopardizing The System’s Solvency as A Whole…”), Strategy 2.4.   
637
 “Sector Programs” derive from the PND. 
638
 In Mexican political and policy contexts, the term popular refers mostly to lower socio-economic 
classes or otherwise marginalized segments of the population.  
639
 Diagnostic of the Economy Sector / Characteristics of the Economic Context / Competitiveness / 
10 Challenges and Priorities.  
640
 “The Solidarity Boxes are a peculiar organizational system of thrift and/or loan entities for low-
income population, primarily rural, that does not have access to formal financial services.  Its 
objective is to reach out peasants, and indigenous people, and social sector groups in urban areas with 
quality financial services, above all those who subsist in micro regions of extreme marginality.  
FONAES [National Support Fund for Enterprises in Solidarity] implements support mechanisms to 
allow for the incorporation and transformation of the Solidarity Boxes into Popular Thrift and Credit 
Entities, within the current legislation on the subject” (FONAES, “Cajas solidarias”: 
http://www.fonaes.gob.mx/index.php/banca-social/cajas-solidarias).  The use of the word “box” to 
refer to this type of entities is borrowed from the popular “cajas de ahorro” (literally “savings boxes”) 
or cajas de ahorro y préstamos (thrift and loaning boxes), they are similar to thrift banks, although 
according to Mexican legislation they are not considered banks or “credit institutions” (instituciones 
de crédito) as the LIC denominates private banks.  
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b) To incentivize the territorial diversification of the entities that constitute the social 
banking sector, in order to bring close popular saving and credit instruments of the 
scarce resources population. 
 
c) To contribute to the capitalization and strengthening of the social banking sector, 
fomenting their utilization as instances for the dispersion of the resources of the 
federal social programs, for the revolving of such aids, and for the transfer and 
payment of the remittances coming from migrants. 
 
d) To press on the growth of the deposits of remittances by means of solidarity boxes 
and to lower the cost of such remittances. 
 
e) To stimulate the use of the resources liberated due to the lowering of the cost of 
remittances in profitable productive projects that bring about the rooting of the 
rural population in their communities.  
 
f) To increase the resources for the consolidation and promotion of micro-financers 
that help productive projects in the most needful areas, in order to favor the 
support new entrepreneurs.  
 
g) To carry out business accompaniment and strengthening for the entrepreneurs 
obtaining a micro-credits. 
 
The primary development bank involved in this strategy is BANSEFI.  Originally 
created as a National Savings Patronage (Patronato del Ahorro Nacional, PAHNAL), 
in June 2002 was transformed into BANSEFI with the mandate of completing and 
giving depth to the Mexican financial system, so that financial products and services 
can be offered to the majority of the population, particularly those with lower 
income, in competitive conditions and with more security and legal certainty.
641
    
 
                                                 
641
 See the first paragraph of BANSEFI’s website’s introduction: 
http://www.BANSEFI.gob.mx/BANSEFI/Paginas/BANSEFI.aspx.  
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According to Art. 2 of the act that transformed PAHNAL into BANSEFI, this 
bank “shall render banking and credit services… supporting the national 
development policies…  procuring the adequate development of the popular thrift 
and credit sector…”642  Likewise, according to Art. 3 of BANSEFI’s statute, its 
mission is:    
 
…to promote saving, financing, and investment among the integrating 
parties of the Sector, to offer financial instruments and services among 
them, as well as to channel financial and technical support necessary to 
encourage saving habits and the healthy development of the Sector, and 
in general the national and regional development of the country.    
 
 
Toward this end, among other policies and actions, BANSEFI:
643
 
 
 Does not charge commissions and offers the best interest rates of the market, and 
allows for opening accounts with small amounts of money. 
 Serves the Popular Thrift and Credit Organizations as second floor development 
bank, with services that allow them to improve their income, reduce their costs, 
and make efficient their processes, as well as widen the variety of services they 
render to the partners and clients. 
 Temporarily coordinates the funds that Mexican Government is giving to the 
Popular Thrift and Credit sector in order to facilitate its transformation and to 
position it as a strategic component of the financial system; as well as to 
strengthen the operation and functioning of the popular thrift and credit 
organizations, with the end of promoting their viability in the mid and long terms.  
These aids are being funded by multilateral organism, particularly WB, and the 
Multilateral Fund of Investments managed by the IDB. 
 
According to CONDUSEF’s studies, BANSEFI and the People’s Network644 are 
helping significantly to improve financial inclusion.
645
  As of 2009, 1 623 branches 
                                                 
642
 “Decree whereby the National Savings Patronage, Decentralized Organism of the Federal 
Government Is Transformed into the Bank of National Saving and Financial Services, Development 
Bank Institution.”  
643
 See http://www.BANSEFI.gob.mx.   
644
 La Red de la Gente (The People’s Network) is a commercial alliance between BANSEFI and the 
intermediaries of the Popular Sector that enables distributing financial products and services to the 
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of the People’s Network covered 700 municipalities, which places it as the second 
largest financial network in the country, and the first in municipal coverage.
646
   
 
In light of the above, CONDUSEF reckons at another study that: 
 
The role that the People’s Network has played along with BANSEFI, 
has being determining, not just in terms of the larger and more varied 
offer of financial products, among other equally important services, but 
also in terms of the level of effective geographical coverage, and the 
effort to bankarize the population.
647
 
 
The [thrift] boxes attached to the People’s Network –many of which are 
in process of authorization—are aimed fundamentally to the low-
resources population, which is also the group that does not have, or has 
less, financial services accessible to them, both from a geographic as 
well as a practical point of views, due to the design and cost of the 
products that the market offers.
648
 
 
Many of these popular thrift boxes make it possible for people to have 
access, among other financial services, to thrift accounts with minimal 
amounts to open and deposit; saving programs to acquire social 
interest
649
 housing loans; cashing of remittances send by their relatives 
abroad...
650
  
 
 
Achieving a more inclusive financial system in Mexico will take more time but also 
the improvement of the general economic conditions of the population that is 
currently excluded.  Therefore, there is little that can be achieved by means of 
financial liberalization, especially if prudential regulation is kept as a priority.    
  
                                                                                                                                          
low-income population.  As of 2009, there are 182 intermediaries of the Popular Sector in alliance 
with BANSEFI.    
645
 See CONDUSEF, “Presence of the Banking...,” op. cit., at 3. 
646
 As of 2007, 1 410 branches of the People’s Network covered 625 of the municipalities and were 
able to supply the needs of 70.4 million people.  Some of such branches were the exclusive suppliers 
of financial services at 269 municipalities with 4.4 million inhabitants (See CONDUSEF, “Presence 
of the Banking...,” op. cit., at 3). 
647
 Id., at 43. 
648
 CONDUSEF, “Comentarios a la Cobertura Geográfica del Sistema Bancario y de la Red de la 
Gente y BANSEFI en 2006” [Commentaries to The Geographical Coverage of the Banking Sector, 
and the People’s Network, and BANSEFI in 2006], at 67. 
649
 “Social interest” refers in Mexico, and in this context, to the lowest income (or “most affordable”) 
type of housing. 
650
 Id.  
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3.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 
The homologation of Mexico’s accounting regulatory standards with those of the 
BCBS, and their implementation made Mexican financial groups attractive to foreign 
banks, which purchased almost all of them.  As a result the Mexican financial system 
achieved higher systemic stability as a whole, and Mexican banks achieved higher 
profitability, efficiency, and better practices.  Regulatory framework improvements 
strengthened the Mexican banking sector.  Operative risk management and credit risk 
management, the publication of banks’ information, plus market discipline became 
essential to the Mexican financial system.   
 
Chapter 5 documents the way in which the Mexican financial system that resulted 
after the latest reforms has proved to be a solid and stable one in the midst of the 
GFC. 
 
Thanks to the bottom up approach to the prudential liberalization in México, bank 
management adopted gradually and increasingly the definitions and development of 
international practices, especially after the 1994-1994 crisis.  At the regulatory level, 
the globalization of the Mexican financial system started in 1994 with the 
implementation of BCBS recommendations, which imposed international standard to 
measure the solvency and performance of Mexican banks.   
 
Internationally, the creation of new financial instruments and the risk position 
enlargement in the markets throughout the 1990s led to better risk management.  
Toward that end, BCBS rules were updated in November 2005. Ever since, 
management practices and bank risk regulations have been influenced by Basel II, 
which is recognized by more than 130 countries, including Mexico, as well as by 
IMF and WB. The Mexican financial system had no trouble adopting Basel II, since 
its regulation has been very strict after the “Tequila Crisis.” This, since several 
Mexican directives (for example on risks, CNBV 2004a and 2004b) are in complete 
agreement with BCBS’s principles.  
 
For the particular case of Mexico, the new Basel III will not represent as profound 
changes and those that the banks of other countries will have to face.  This, because, 
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after the 1994-1995 financial crisis in Mexico, a new and very demanding regulatory 
framework was established in the area of capitalization, both for the amounts of 
required capital, as for the quality demanded for such capital.  It is for this that banks 
in México will not have to make extraordinary efforts to fulfill with the new 
regulatory parameters. This is also why banks will be able to meet the new demands 
before the end of the international transition period, which goes up to 2019. It is 
pertinent to point out that the decisions made in the country in the past on bank 
capitalization were appropriate, as they made possible that our credit institutions 
were not contaminated by the deterioration of the foreign banking systems.  This is 
confirmed by the fact that the new global regulatory framework is close to the one 
applied in Mexico. 
 
In fact, Mexico’s banks were so very well capitalized by the time Basel III was 
announced, that as of August 2010, the Mexican banking sector “had a capital ratio 
index of 13 per cent, a calculation that used similar methodology to that of the new 
Basel requirements. 
 
Concerning financial inclusion, although liberalization can help promoting 
financial inclusion, the extent of that help is limited when the chief cause of 
exclusion is poverty.  A liberalization that would attempt to solve this kind of 
financial exclusion would need to compromise on prudential standards allowing for 
high risk operations.  Therefore, that kind of exclusion is to be addressed by other 
public policies (as is the case in Mexico) that do not put in risk the financial system. 
 
NAFTA was Mexico’s most significant step toward liberalization in services in 
general and in financial services in particular.  Therefore, next chapter is devoted to 
taking a closer look from the point of view of the Mexican liberalization agenda in 
the late 20
th
 century.      
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
 
MEXICO´S POSITION ON NAFTA AND 
 
ITS LIBERALIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES INCLUDING 
 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE 
 
RELATING TO GATS/WTO AND NAFTA 
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4.1 MEXICO’S POSITION ON NAFTA 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the advantages NAFTA has brought to Mexico and the 
alleged disadvantages that some critics have raised against it.  Secondly, it explains 
the relevant aspects of NAFTA for trade in financial services.   
 
This chapter also analyzes and compares some of the common objectives of 
liberalization in trade in services, and specifically in financial services, among 
NAFTA, EU and GATS.   Moreover, it shows how financial services are not 
completely amenable to some of the trade disciplines found in GATT, such as 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions, MFN treatment, NT and reduction of tariffs.  
Thus, though regulatory barriers can be compared to quantitative restrictions, yet, 
they cannot be eliminated.651   
 
A comparison is then made between some of the common objectives of 
liberalization of trade in services, and specifically in financial services, in NAFTA, 
EU and GATS.  It also examines to what extent NAFTA has gone beyond GATS but 
not as far as the EU.  Lastly, this chapter examines the dispute settlement mechanism 
en NAFTA y GATT/WTO.  
 
4.1.2 Mexico under NAFTA 
 
NAFTA is the most important among Mexico’s FTA network.  When it was first 
implemented, NAFTA created a 360 million people market, the world’s largest 
market when it was first implemented.  This was a promising opportunity for 
Mexico, the weakest party in the agreement.   
 
Mexico is a natural hub for trade and investment. It is situated in a strategic 
geographical position as it shares 2000 miles border with the largest market in the 
world.  It is located in the center of the American continent between the Pacific and 
                                                 
651
 See Trachtman, Trade…, op. cit., at 41. 
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the Atlantic oceans.  It has become a commercial bridge between the northern and 
the southern parts of America, between America and Europe, and Asia and America.   
 
Taking advantage of its location and as a result of its network of FTA, as of 2010 
Mexico enjoyed “preferential access to one billion consumers in 44 countries,”652 
and has achieved important relative preferences in trade in services with respect to its 
competitors.  WTO’s 2003 World Trade Report said that Mexico benefited in general 
terms from NAFTA, as shown below.  But some say the success has not been as 
promised by its advocates.  
 
4.1.3 Alleged Disadvantages for Mexico- 
 
NAFTA critics have long contended that such FTA does not benefit Mexico.  Goyos, 
for instance, argues that the USA obtained from Mexico total opening of its market 
in services, while keeping its own market closed by means of horizontal barriers to 
the free circulation of service workers.   
 
The USA is certainly the largest exporter of services,
653
 and getting the Mexican 
market was a priority for the negotiators.
654
  However, free circulation of workers 
was not allowed in NAFTA, keeping Mexico without the opportunity of exercising 
its highest potential: the skills of its workers. 
 
Yet, it must be pointed out that free circulation of services workers is the most 
controversial of the modes of services supply not only in NAFTA but also in GATS 
and many other agreements.
655
  At the multilateral level, there has been a very slow 
progress in this liberalization. NAFTA represents an important small step towards 
negotiations in the liberalization of the free circulation of persons.   
                                                 
652
 See The NAFTA Office of Mexico in Canada, “FTA’s Signed by Mexico;” available at: 
http://www.nafta-mexico.org/ls23al.php?s=501&p=3&l=2.   
653
 See WTO Report 2010, at 29. 
654
  See Goyos, op. cit., at 3.  The Mexican service sector it is estimated at US $146 billion. 
655
 See OECD, Service Providers on the Move -- Labour Mobility and the WTO General Agreement 
on Trade in Services, POLICY BRIEF (Aug. 2003).  See also Gary Hufbauer & Tony Warren, “The 
Globalization of Services: What Has Happened? What are the implications?” (OECD Paper, Oct. 
1999).  See also PAZOS, LIBRE COMERCIO…, op.cit., at  216 and 221.  Pazos stated, a year before 
NAFTA was launched, that such an agreement would help to ease economic pressures in Mexico, 
which would imply a substantial reduction in the flow of illegal immigrants to the US. 
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Goyos also says that USA can apply its laws extra-territorially in a way that the 
treaty extended onto Mexico certain legal concepts, such as investments, intellectual 
property, competition and antitrust law, labor law, environmental law, the traffic of 
drugs, illegal immigration and even the administration of justice. He calls as 
euphemism: “convergence of values”.656 
 
Mexico has been greatly benefited with the trade north - south, since the concept 
of “rule of law” has been more understood and consequently applied.  Since then, 
Mexican legislation (e. g. the foreign investment and banking laws) have been 
improved, and consequently, the predictability and legal certainty in the judiciary has 
increased significantly since NAFTA came into force.   
  
Another argued disadvantage of NAFTA is that it discriminates unduly against 
third parties and frustrates the attainment of multilateral objectives built on non-
discrimination, which engenders a degree of trade diversion and the application of 
numerous rules of origin and differing standards that could make international trade 
more complex and costly.  The overlapping of these agreements may also undermine 
the transparency of trading rules, some of the fundamental principles of the WTO.
657
  
 
Other antagonists of NAFTA claim that, as negotiated and then implemented, it 
was one of the main causes of the 1994 Mexican crisis.  They argue that as a result of 
the NAFTA model, “Mexico became a client state of the USA designed to buy 
services, industrial and agricultural products and to produce huge trade deficits to be 
financed with speculative borrowings by the financial sector.” 658  
 
But Mexico’s liquidity crisis and consequent currency’s devaluation at the end of 
1994 and the beginning of 1995
659
 cannot be blamed on NAFTA since, as seen in 
Chapter 1, they were the result of the multiple weaknesses of an immature financial 
system which predated NAFTA.  
                                                 
656
 Id., at 4. 
657
 See WTO REPORT 2003 at xvi; and WTO REPORT 2010 at 28.  Mexico’s trade value in 2010 
reached USD$230 billion. 
658
 See Maysami & Williams, op. cit., at 2. 
659
 See id. 
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4.1.4 Advantages for Mexico 
 
As of 2001 (seven years after NAFTA started), Mexico’s exports to the USA grew 
twice as fast as its exports to the rest of the world.
660
  As of 2003, WTO commented: 
 
Participation in RTAs, particularly the NAFTA, has exposed Mexican 
producers to foreign competition and subjected them to strong pressure 
to increase productivity.  Average productivity per worker, in the 
manufacturing sector, which accounted for an average 21% of total 
GDP during 1996-2000, increased at an average rate of 6.8% in the 
period 1999-2001.
661
 
 
 
Preferential access to the North American market has granted Mexican producers a 
demand base, and the capital and technology necessary to exploit economies of scale 
and sustain productivity gains.   
 
Regarding access to new technologies, and the time it takes for such technologies to 
be reflected in the productivity of the labor factor, a 2005 WB-Stanford University 
publication
662
 shows the improvements that NAFTA has brought about. 
                                                 
660
 See De la Calle Pardo, op. cit., at 2. 
661
 See WTO REPORT 2003, at xvi and 63. 
662
 LEDERMAN, MALONEY & SERVEN, op cit.  Graphic elaborated (in Spanish) and provided by Dr 
Jaime Serra Puche. 
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The above confirms, at least in Mexico’s case, that integration encourages 
productivity growth either through trade or foreign investment, and that global and 
regional integration grant productivity gains.
663
  As a whole, global integration can 
bring about larger gains because it involves larger markets and thus results in larger 
comparative advantages that would generate larger potential gains.  
 
FDI inflow into Mexico, which averaged USD$3.9 billion between 1990 and 
1993, trebled in the period 1994-1999 and reached $25 billion in 2001.”664  
According to a WB-Stanford University publication, “without NAFTA Mexican 
exports would have been 50% less, and the FDI to Mexico 40% less.”665  Based on 
that publication, Mexican economist and former Secretary of Commerce, Dr Jaime 
Serra Puche, elaborated the following chart showing the how different Mexican 
exports and FDI to Mexico would have been without NAFTA:
666
  
                                                 
663 See LOPEZ CORDOVA ERNESTO, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE EXPERIENCES 
OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO (2003). Mexico's more aggressive stance with NAFTA seems to have paid-
off at least as far as productivity is concerned. Tariff reduction undertaken during the agreement 
appears to have had a sizeable positive impact on productivity growth, which added to already 
substantial gains reaped during the period of non-preferential liberalization.  
664
 Id.   
665
 See LEDERMAN, MALONEY & SERVEN, op. cit. 
666
 The chart is not published but was kindly provided by Dr Serra Puche upon personal request. 
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In the midst of the dramatic decline in world trade in 2009, in which the global GDP 
output fell by 2.3%, the Mexican economy remained steady as its exports and 
imports oscillated only by 2% and 1%t respectively from 2005 to 2009.
667
  The WTO 
system of trade regulation prevented another descent into protectionism that so 
exacerbated economic conditions in the 1930s.
668
 
 
One of the advantages of NAFTA was its gradual implementation for most of 
sectors in Mexico.  This means that some sectors were reckoned more sensitive and 
therefore were liberalized after a reasonable time.  NAFTA’s 15-year phase-in 
sounded reasonable, as it was meant to prevent serious disruption by allowing the 
markets to adapt gradually to the changes.  
 
Between 1994 and 1998, the annual average growth of the total trade between 
Mexico, USA and Canada was 12%, above the growth in the global trade in goods 
                                                 
667
 See WTO Report 2010, at 28. 
668
 Id., at 20. 
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(9%).
669
  In only five years, total trading between the three nations increased 75% 
(nearly USD$227 billion) to achieve half a trillion USD in 1998.  In 1995 Canada 
became the second market for the Mexican products.
670
   
 
Although the GFC hit severely the NAFTA region, by November 2010: 
 
…the Flows of the Mexico-Canada trade increased 39% compared to 
last year, resulting in USD$27.4 billion … a value that surpassed in 
13.4% the trade level observed before the international crisis started (in 
November 2008 bilateral trade was USD$24.1 billion).
671
 
 
 
During the NAFTA era, bilateral trade between Mexico and Canada “has grown 
almost 7 times…  equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 12.6% between 
1993 and 2010.”672  In 2010, “Mexico kept its position as Canada’s 3rd largest trade 
partner in the world.”673  “Mexico is the 5th largest export market for Canadian 
products with a value of USD$7.8 billion… 655% higher than sales recorded in 
1993,” in spite of a 9.8% contraction since 2008, due to the financial crisis.674 
 
Regarding Mexican Exports to Canada: 
 
By November 2010, Mexico kept its position as the 3
rd
 greatest supplier 
for the Canadian market (5.5%), only exceeded by imports from the 
United States (50.5%) and China (11%).  Exports of Mexican products 
to Canada in this period totaled USD$19.6 billion, 651% more than 
exports registered in 1993 (USD$2.6 billion).  The average annual 
growth rate of exports from Mexico to Canada was 12.6%.
675
  
 
 
                                                 
669
 Marise Cremona (remarks at the Class of Regional Economic Integration, International Economic 
Law Course, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, Apr.  
28, 2003). Among other positive points for NAFTA are that provides abundant opportunities for local 
interest groups. The rules of origin are designed to safeguard originating goods with preferential 
treatment against non-originating goods, such as the goods imported from other non-members 
countries.  In other words, it limits the benefits of the agreement to producers of the member states.  
670
 See BANCOMEXT STUDY at 26.  Mexican exports to Canada increased at a rate of 12% from 
1994 to 1998, reaching more than USD$5 billion. 
671
 The NAFTA Office of Mexico in Canada, “Mexico-Canada Trade and Investment” (Jan. 2011) at 
1; available at: http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sic_php/pages/files_varios/pdfs/Can_Nov10.pdf.  
672
 Id. 
673
 Id. 
674
 Id. 
675
 Id. 
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As for trade between Mexico and the USA, Mexico has become one of the most 
important partners of the USA.
676
  In 2001 Mexico replaced Japan
677
 as the second 
largest supplier of (non-oil) goods and services to the USA.
678
  Twelve years after 
NAFTA, trade between both nations had increased by almost 120%, from USD$88.1 
billion in 1993, to over USD$187 billion in 2005.  The same year, Mexican exports 
to the USA increased to USD$103 billion, an increase of 143% compared to 1993. 
 
The growth rate of Mexico’s exports to the USA has been superior to the average 
of those from the rest of the world.
679
  In 2009, Mexico was the third largest supplier 
of goods imports to the USA (USD$176.5 billion).
680
  Total Mexican exports of 
goods to the USA reached USD$229.65 billion in 2010, while USA’s total exports of 
goods to Mexico that year reached USD$163.32 billion.
681
 
 
Contrary to the antagonists’ forecasts, NAFTA has not only not made Mexico’s 
trade more dependent on the USA but has actually helped decrease the proportion of 
trade between the USA and Mexico compared to trade with other countries, as shown 
in the following chart:
682
 
 
 
                                                 
676
 See MARCEAU & REIMAN, op. cit., at 28.   
677
 See Harman, op. cit., at 207, 208, and 212.  Mexico took over Canada’s place as non-oil supplier of 
the USA, just behind China.  
678
 Harman, op. cit at 212. 
679
 At New Orleans summit (Apr. 22, 2008) President Calderón stated that 1 of 5 jobs in Mexico are 
related to exports to the USA within NAFTA, and that the annual growth rate of bilateral trade 
between both nations is of at least USD$10 billion (see REFORMA, Apr. 23, 2008).  A 2010 
BANCOMEXT press-release informs that as of August 2010, Mexican exports to the USA reached a 
record level of USD$20.269 billion, USD$5.208 billion more than the same month in 2009, which 
means an increase of 34.6%, whilst Mexican imports from the USA, USD$14.228 billion, 28.5% 
more than August 2009 (BANCOMEXT, “Exportaciones record de México a EU” [Record Exports 
from Mexico to USA] (Oct. 15 2010); available at: 
http://www.bancomext.com/Bancomext/secciones/sala-de-prensa/noticias/exportaciones-record-de-
mexico-a-eu.html).   
680
 Office of the United States Trade Represenatative, “North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA);” available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta.  
681
 U. S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance): 2010;” available at: 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html#2010.  
682
 Chart kindly provided by Dr Jaime Serra Puche. 
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Mexico’s exports also display strong structural change, evolving from petroleum to 
machines.  Trade diversion has not been an issue and risks may have been even 
further reduced by MEFTA.
683
 
 
Lastly, from the point of view of ad coherent legal structure, NAFTA is more 
integrated and its enforceability is more effective.
684
  WTO for example, is still 
fragmented into three parts with disciplines applying to goods in Part I (GATT), 
another applying to services in Part II (GATS), and Agreement applying to 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS) in Part III. In contrast NAFTA have incorporated 
investments, technical barriers to trade that apply to both trade in goods and trade in 
services alike, etc. in only one body.
685
 
 
 
 
                                                 
683
 See Devlin and Castro, op. cit., at 22.  See also A. Krueger, “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
under NAFTA” (Working Paper 7429, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999); and A. 
Krueger, NAFTA’s effects: A Preliminary Assessment, WORLD ECONOMY (Jun. 2000). 
684
 RTAs generally have a more effective and sophisticated dispute-settlement procedure.  For 
example, see NAFTA’s Ch. 11 and 20. 
685
 See Stephenson, Regional…, op. cit. at 193. 
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4.2 NAFTA AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
4.2.1 Objectives, Regulation Sources, and Definitions 
 
NAFTA’s main objectives are: 1) To reduce or completely eliminate economic 
barriers and promote economic integration among NAFTA members; 2) To promote 
the development of a key legal framework needed to improve security for 
investments; 3) To facilitate the free flow of goods and services.
686
 
 
Mexico’s objectives in financial services in NAFTA are: 1) To expand its 
economic growth by linking its economy to the USA economy in a way that provides 
its products favored access to the USA market; 2) To encourage flows of foreign 
capital into Mexico, thereby providing its industry with the resources necessary to 
enhance Mexico's economic performance; 3) To contribute to the economic 
efficiency and facilitate the globalization of its financial sector.
 687
 
 
NAFTA’s Chapter 14 was a priority for USA and Canada negotiators,688 while for 
Mexico it was a sensitive issue.  For the first time in 50 years, Mexico was going to 
allow foreign financial institutions (in this case, from NAFTA countries) to be 
established in its territory and wholly own Mexican banks, insurance companies, and 
companies rendering securities services.  Accordingly, NAFTA established a 
transitional phase for each financial service through the year 2000.
689
 
 
NAFTA’S Chapter 14 contains the main body of the treaty’s financial services 
rules: the regulated financial institutions from each country, investments in financial 
institutions by investors from another party country, and cross border trade in 
                                                 
686
 See PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, op. cit.; NAFTA at Ch. 1 and 2.  
687
 See OLIN L. WETHINGTON, FINANCIAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION: THE NAFTA FRAMEWORK 
(1994).  
688
 See Eric Miller, “Financial Services in the Trading System: Progress and Prospectus” (IADB 
Occasional Paper No. 4, 1999) at 2. The CUSFTA was the FTA ever to include provisions on 
financial services, as both countries have been net-exporters of financial services.  This explains as 
well why USA and Canada put pressure on Mexico to open its market in financial services.  
689
 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS; CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, 4th ed. (2002), at 868; and NAFTA, Ch. 14, 
32 I.L.M. at 657. 
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financial services.
690
  Still, numerous matters connected with financial services are 
ruled by other chapters.  Sometimes this is because one chapter refers to another or 
other chapters.
691
  Likewise, some provisions of the treaty outline conditions 
applicable to all of its chapters.
692
  
 
Some of the regulations and conditions of the financial services chapter of the 
previous CUSFTA were transferred to NAFTA and are cross-referred.
693
 
 
NAFTA also imposes on its members the obligation of ensuring that their laws 
and regulations conform to the general standards of Chapter 14, including the 
measures of any state, province or local government.
694
   
 
NAFTA lays on their members duties connected with measures (for instance 
provisions, laws and other regulations) embracing the means of any state, province or 
local authorities in a NAFTA country.  Specifically, NAFTA countries are bound to 
abide by overall regulations and norms outlined in the chapter – among them NT, 
MFN treatment, market access, cross-border services, and integrity principles.
 695
 
 
Generally speaking, a NAFTA country may not implement a state or province 
regulation that is in opposition to the country’s obligations, unless the applied 
measure was exempted and incorporated into a special list.
696
 All three countries 
used their rights to except some of the measures associated mainly with market entry 
and cross-border service supplies.  Some ‘exemptions’ allow a NAFTA country to 
apply measures incompatible with the agreed norms of the treaty. These refer chiefly 
to means taken for ‘prudential’ reasons697  
 
                                                 
690
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691
 See id. Arts. 1401(2), 1412(2), 1414, 1415, 1416. 
692
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694
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695
 Id., Art. 1401(1).  See also id. Arts. 105, 201(2), 1409(1) 
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 Id., Art. 1409; The reservations taken by each NAFTA country with respect to the financial 
services chapter are set out in annex VII and in annexes to several specific articles of Chapter 14. 
697
 NAFTA, Art. 1410.  Mexico applied successfully this exception to protect its financial system.  See 
infra 5.8. The Financial Services Case Presented before Chapter 14 of NAFTA: Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company. 
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Concerning the compatibility between NAFTA and WTO, the great majority of 
the NAFTA obligations are compatible with the WTO parties’ obligations.  
However, there is one GATS provision could be contrary to WTO, that is GATS’s 
MFN obligation of Art. II,
698
 which is a basic GATS obligation.  Nevertheless, it has 
been subject to a legitimizing exception for FTAs and customs unions.
699
 
 
NAFTA sets out special definitions.  “Financial services” means any service of a 
financial nature, whether or not provided by a regulated financial service provider.
700
 
“Financial services” also covers all services “incidental or auxiliary” to services of a 
financial nature, the services provided by government related entities are excluded 
from the agreement.
701
  Financial institution is any entity authorized to do business 
and regulated as a financial institution under the laws of any NAFTA country.
702
     
 
NAFTA differentiates between a ‘financial service providers’ which can be 
subject to regulation but not necessarily, and ‘financial institutions’ which need to be 
regulated. In light of the various regulatory policies among the three member 
countries, companies involved in specific kinds of financial activities, such as 
factoring or leasing, may be considered as regulated ‘financial institutions’ in one 
NAFTA country and as unregulated ‘financial service providers’ in another.  
 
NAFTA defines ‘investment’ as any participation in any kind of business, if that 
participation means that the owner of such business is entitled to obtain a share in the 
income or profits of the business. It also comprises any equity investment and all 
types of property.
 703
 
 
 
                                                 
698
 SCHEFER, op. cit., at 343. 
699
 Art. II of GATS states that members of the agreement may legitimately offer each other more 
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 Id. Art. 1401(3), 1410(3). 
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4.2.2 Rules of Origin 
 
To be able to take advantage of NAFTA’s financial services regulations, financial 
entities and investors must meet specific requirements of ‘rules of origin’ cross-
referred to from Chapter 12 on Cross-Border Trade in Services.  Under these 
requirements a NAFTA country may deny benefits when the financial institution or 
the financial provider is owned or controlled by nationals of a non-NAFTA country 
and has no substantial business activities in the territory of a NAFTA country.
704
 
 
Likewise, a NAFTA country may deny benefits to a financial entity if the 
investment is controlled by nationals of a non-NAFTA country with which the 
NAFTA country does not have diplomatic relations or trade restrictions exist.
705
  
Canada may additionally deny benefits to any investment which is not ultimately 
controlled by nationals of NAFTA country.
706
   
 
4.2.3 Common Objectives with Respect to Liberalization of Trade in Financial 
Services on These Various Frameworks: Cross Border Services, 
Transparency, Stability and Liberalization 
 
NAFTA, like GATS and other RTAs, establishes basic principles guiding investment 
in financial services such as: commercial presence, cross border services, non-
discriminatory treatment, progressive liberalization, transparency, stability, 
protection of privacy, competition rules, movement of natural persons, movement of 
capitals, the general exceptions, and prudential exceptions.  
 
4.2.4 Commercial Presence and Cross Border Services707  
 
Financial Services providers of a NAFTA country may establish banking, insurance 
and securities operations, as well as other types of financial services in any other 
                                                 
704
 Id., Art. 1211. 
705
 Id., Art. 1211 (1)(a). 
706
 NAFTA, annex VII (B)(2) Canada. 
707
 Id., Art. 1404. 
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NAFTA country.  This is known as “mobility of provider.”708 Each country may 
determine the juridical form that the services providers should take.  
 
Each country must permit its residents to purchase financial services in the 
territory of another NAFTA country, which is known as “mobility of consumer,”709 
although the country does not have to allow solicitation activities by such providers 
in its own territory.
710
  
 
There is also an obligation known as “standstill” by virtue of which a country may 
not impose new restrictions on the cross-border provision of financial services in a 
sector.
711
  This means that a NAFTA country may maintain the measures it had 
before NAFTA came into force to regulate cross-border services and mobility of 
providers but may not adopt any new measure increasing restrictions, unless there is 
an exception clearly specified in the reservations.
712
   
 
Some of the standstill rule exemptions are: 1) Canada right to impose more 
restrictive means on cross-border trade in securities after NAFTA;
713
 2) A similar 
reservation by the USA concerning Canada;
714
 and 3) A specific obligation assumed 
by Mexico to free particular cross-border insurance services.
715
 
 
All three countries opted for subsequent liberalization of financial services across 
the borders with the inclusion of insurance services and negotiations due to no later 
than January 1, 2000.
716
 
 
In the case of Cross-Border services in GATS,
717
 members must explicitly 
indicate the types of services that they commit to allow into their markets by this 
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means.  NAFTA coverage of cross-border trade, while only binding the parties not to 
worsen their present practices, is an unconditional requirement for them.  
 
In their GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments, Canada and USA committed 
to ensure that WTO Member financial services suppliers are permitted to deliver 
their services by means of cross-border supply methods. Thus, NAFTA obligations 
are compatible with WTO obligations in this area. 
 
Mexico left its GATS commitments for cross-border supply modes unbound for 
banking service delivery.  Thus, Mexico may restrict other WTO Members’ banks 
from engaging in cross border trade to the extent it sees fit. In the case of NAFTA, 
however, Mexico is obliged to offer party banks access to its market through cross-
border supply. 
 
 For non-NAFTA member banks, these obligations could result in disadvantages. 
The fact that Mexico did not include cross-border supply within the scope of its 
GATS commitments is legitimate; consequently, there is no actual violation of a non-
party’s WTO rights caused by this competitive inequality.718 
 
NAFTA allows consumer movement.  NAFTA members adopted a rule to let 
their citizens obtain financial services from any financial services supplier within the 
territory of another NAFTA state that meets the requirements of the principle of rules 
of origin.
719
 Moreover, NAFTA members ought to allow their citizens and residents 
located outside their territory to procure financial services from NAFTA financial 
service suppliers located outside that territory as well. 
 
4.2.5 NT and MFN 
 
NAFTA’s financial services chapter binds its member states to grant financial 
institutions, cross-border financial service suppliers and investors from other 
NAFTA countries, NT as well as MFN treatment.
720
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720
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NT principle requires awarding investors, their investments, and financial entities 
of other NAFTA states, treatment no less favorable than it does to its own national 
incumbents under similar conditions.
721
  This requirement is met by NAFTA’s 
countries’ provisions that guarantee tantamount comparative chances to institutions, 
investors and their investments from other NAFTA states.
722
  
 
A NAFTA country may satisfy the requirement of NT even though it may treat 
financial services providers of another party differently from domestic financial 
services if it accords equal competitive opportunities.
723
   
 
MFN regulation
724
 binds NAFTA countries to secure to investors, their 
investments and financial entities of other NAFTA countries treatment no less 
propitious than it gives to investors, their investments and financial incumbents from 
any other state under similar conditions. 
 
The effect of requiring each NAFTA country to provide both above mentioned 
treatments is to require the better of the two in any situation where one or the other is 
more favorable.  
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also  JACKSON, op. cit., at 157. 
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The guiding principle of NAFTA regarding financial supervision is reserved to 
the host country affair.  However, regulators are permitted to negotiate bilateral 
agreements leading to regulatory and supervisory harmonization.
725
 
 
Mexico signed WTO/GATS and its commitments are annexed to its Schedule to 
GATS.  Specific commitments are made according to the four modes of supply for 
each services sector related: (1) cross border supply, (2) consumption abroad, (3) 
commercial presence and (4) free movement of natural persons.
726
 Mexico’s 
commitments set up some deviations from the non-discrimination and NT principles, 
for example, foreign institutions must obtain authorization from SHCP, and 
governmental foreign investment is not permitted.  
 
4.2.6. Transparency (GATS Art. III and NAFTA Art. 1411) 
 
Drafted with the conviction that visibility reduces protectionism, GATS Art. III 
provision on transparency has as goal that each WTO Member’s laws and regulations 
affecting trade in services are made public and available to interested persons. 
Specifically, the article states that members shall publish promptly and, at the latest 
by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general applications 
which pertain to the operation of this Agreement.  
 
In addition to publishing their measures, WTO members shall promptly, and at 
least annually, inform the Council for Trade in Services of the introduction of any 
new, or any changes to existing, laws, regulations or administrative guidelines which 
specifically affect trade in services covered by their specific commitments. 
 
A comparison of the requirements of GATS Art. III with the parallel provision in 
NAFTA Chapter 14 reveals no exclusivity in fulfilling the obligations of each treaty. 
The requirements of publications of new measures and the establishment of 
information centers to distribute detailed information are also present in the NAFTA.  
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However, NAFTA Art. 1411 is not only more detailed than the GATS Art. III, it 
is also targeted at involving all interested persons in the rule-making processes of the 
NAFTA Parties - not just persons of NAFTA Parties.  GATS obligation is phrased in 
terms of government-to-government (that is, member-to-member) notification.  
 
Thus, assuming that private persons will maintain vigilant watch over the 
implementation of the treaty requirements, NAFTA has a higher potential for 
achieving non-discrimination in domestic measures.  Art. 1411 begins, for instance, 
by requiring that notice of proposed measures of “general application” be published 
in order to allow an opportunity for such persons to comment on the measure.  
 
This idea of allowing for comments on proposals before a rule is made suggests 
(without an explicit requirement) that the rule makers of the party take the comments 
into consideration before deciding whether to enact the proposed rule.
727
 
 
4.2.7 Progressive Liberalization728  
 
The GATS that came into effect in 1995 was a framework agreement.  Even with the 
additional commitments that have since come into effect, GATS is not an instrument 
that completely covers the international service trade.  Knowing that it was only a 
good first step, GATS was agreed on and signed by the members on the condition 
that further liberalizations were to be negotiated in the future.  Together Art. XIX 
through XXI of GATS are a clear symbol of this open-endedness.  
 
Comprising Part IV (Progressive Liberalization) of GATS, these provisions set 
out the framework requirements of future negotiating rounds in the services sectors. 
Starting no later than in 2000, and “periodically thereafter”, the members shall enter 
into successive rounds of negotiations, with a view to achieving a progressively 
higher level of liberalization.  
 
The schedules of specific commitments completed by each member at the end of 
the Uruguay Round, the Second Protocol, and/or the Fifth Protocol are the basis on 
                                                 
727
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which further developments in financial services are to proceed, while the existing 
commitments may be withdrawn or modified.
162
 
 
NAFTA Chapter 14 is more complete than was the GATS Annex on Financial 
Services.  Yet, since NAFTA did no accomplish all that the negotiators had hoped it 
would, its parties also provided for further attempts to liberalize their financial 
service markets in “two of Chapter Fourteen’s Annex Provisions”.  
 
In Annex 1404.4 there is an obligation to consult on further liberalization of 
cross-border trade in financial services.  Annex 1413.6 also requires consultations on 
certain provisions of Mexico’s commitments.  Neither of these NAFTA provisions 
would have an adverse effect on a non-Party, WTO Member. 
 
4.2.8 Market Access 
 
A NAFTA state is bound to allow individuals and enterprises from other NAFTA 
countries to set up financial institutions in its area and to expand their functioning 
throughout its territory.
729
  NAFTA restricts this advantage to ‘financial service 
providers’, which means that, to be entitled to this, an entity needs to be involved 
already in performing business connected with financial services.
730
 
 
NAFTA states may limit cross-border subsidizing of financial institutions, which 
permits member states to demand individual incorporation for financial incumbents 
in their territory, forbidding through this a direct cross-border branching.
731
 Yet, 
NAFTA members have decided on discussing the possibility of direct bank 
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branching across NAFTA country borders if and when the USA permits Mexican- 
and Canadian-controlled USA banks to extend cross-state by subsidiaries or branches 
to include all the area of the USA.
732
 
 
One of the limitations on market access of NAFTA is that it restricts cross border 
branching of financial institutions. In other words, NAFTA member will require 
separate incorporation for financial institutions in its territory (by subsidiaries).
733
  
Nevertheless, the members have agreed to re-negotiate cross border branching 
throughout the time.
734
   These general principles of market access are in connection 
with the specific commitments and reservations made from every NAFTA country in 
its annexes. All these form an integral part of the Agreement. 
 
Thanks to the broad range of NAFTA’s financial services chapter it deals with 
new sorts of financial services that may be non-existent so far.  According to the 
regulation of that chapter, NAFTA countries have consented to allow entry into its 
market to all regulated financial institutions from another NAFTA country provided 
its services are authorized in the territory of the country of origin.
735
  
 
In addition, NAFTA countries have agreed to let regulated financial institutions 
from other NAFTA countries to pass the information for data processing into and out 
of the country of origin’s area, given that such a transfer is demanded in the regular 
conduct of business of these entities.
736
 
 
4.2.9 Staffing 
 
Chapter 14 severely restrains each country’s capability to apply residency or 
nationality requisites on financial institutions. Therefore, no NAFTA state is 
permitted to demand from a financial institution being under control of persons from 
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other NAFTA country to hire personnel of any specific nationality as “senior 
managerial or other essential personnel”.737  
 
It is also forbidden to impose requirements on a simple majority of the board of 
directors of financial institutions to be comprised of a country’s own citizens or/and 
residents.
738
 The USA reserved the right to maintain citizenship and residency 
requisites in relation to national bank presidents subject to the current law.
739
 
 
4.2.10 Investment in Financial Institutions 
 
Chapter 14 includes, by cross-reference, some regulations of Chapter 11 (on 
investment).
740
  These provisos, among other things, allow each NAFTA country to 
introduce particular demands (like incorporation, residency requisites for investors or 
information requirements) in relation to investments by investors from other NAFTA 
countries, under condition that these demands do not weaken the essence of the 
profits of the treaty.
741
 
 
These regulations establish numerous other rights and duties. For instance, a 
NAFTA state is not allowed to nationalize or dispossess of ownership, either directly 
or indirectly, the property of an investor from another NAFTA country except: 1) 
When done for a public purpose; 2) On NT and MFN grounds; or 3) In agreement 
with rules of due process of law.
742
 
 
If an expropriation happens anyway, the investor must be remunerated at a fair 
market value, verified and paid meeting particular criteria.  These criteria need to 
take into consideration the timing of assessment and payment, the payment of 
interest, the currency in which the payment is made, going-company value, and other 
issues determining the fair value of the enterprise.
743
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NAFTA states also agreed to allow investors from other NAFTA countries to 
make transfers directly connected with the investments (such as dividends, 
apportions of profits, interests and other payments) in the currency they select.
744
  
 
This duty is subordinate to applicable bankruptcy and securities laws, criminal 
laws regulating currency transfers, laws regarding the satisfaction of judgments, 
emergency balance of payments means and provisions connected with the safety, 
soundness, integrity or financial responsibility of financial service providers.
745
 
 
Concerning environmental issues, NAFA countries decided that environmental 
regulations should not be forgone or renounced to draw, maintain or facilitate 
investment.
746
  The investment chapter grants investors a right to a special dispute 
resolution mechanism for investor-state arguments connected with investments.
747
 
 
4.2.11 Reservations and Commitments 
 
Taking into account all the provisions included in NAFTA, and in the financial 
services chapter in particular, one has to notice the importance of numerous 
exemptions opted for by the three NAFTA countries. These exemptions reconcile 
differences in legislations, aims and negotiation privileges between NAFTA 
countries.  
 
From the practical point of view the division of the exemptions from the main text 
of the agreement allowed many regulations to be expressed explicitly, as a 
declaration of general rules.  This move can facilitate the future enlargement of the 
NAFTA by easing access to the treaty by subsequent countries.
748
 
 
Annex VII provides for the chief exemptions to Chapter 14 which constitute two 
kinds.  Firstly, all the countries have kept the right to apply already existing means 
that are not compatible to Arts. 1403 (setting up the financial institution), 1404 
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(across border trade), 1405 (NT), 1406 (MFN), 1407 (new financial services and data 
processing), and 1408 (personnel employment).
749
 To be reserved, a regulation needs 
to have been existent on the date of entry into life of the Agreement (January 1, 
1994).
750
 
  
Mexico did not reserve any restrictions as to national measures under Chapter 
Fourteen.  Local authorities’ regulations already in place, that are inconsistent with 
NAFTA, may be exempted without any particular need to enumerate them on a 
specific list.
751
  
 
The second group of exemptions comprises country-by-country arrangements as 
to reservations related to specific regulations, which are enlisted in every country’s 
section B to annex VII.  Like the exemptions enumerated in section A, the 
exemptions enlisted in section b of annex VII may be used only against particular 
regulations of the chapter, to be specific Arts. 1403 through 1408.  
 
Yet, section B reservations are not restrained to already existing means.
752
 
Interestingly, the ones which are the longest and most thorough belong to Mexico 
and determine stipulations and requirements by which Mexico agrees to allow entry 
to its financial markets to USA and Canadian financial institutions. 
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4.2.12 Exclusions 
 
Art. 1410 states that nothing in the part of the NAFTA, including the financial 
services chapter, shall be interpreted as regulation refraining a NAFTA country from 
applying measures for ‘prudential’ reasons or in search of monetary and credit 
related or exchange rate resolutions.
753
 This proviso is crucial and embraces various 
regulatory notions and aims.  Above all, it exempts from a number of chapters of the 
NAFTA sensible means applied or kept for prudential regulatory reasons.  
 
This so called ‘carve-out’ guarantees that each member country has the elasticity 
to control and oversee financial institutions and financial markets. Prudential 
measures may be means employed for the security of investors and depositors, or to 
sustain the integrity of financial institutions, or to guarantee the security and 
steadiness of a NAFTA country’s financial system.754 
  
An independent chapter includes a related exemption which applies to the whole 
NAFTA in general.  In particular, Art. 2104 excepts from the regulations employed 
for balance of payments reasons, if the NAFTA country introducing them undergoes 
a grave crisis in this area, and provided the measures are compatible with IMF 
actions.  This exemption is subordinate to numerous terms which change according 
to whether the balance of payments means is connected with across borders trade in 
financial services or not. 
 
Other reservations of Chapter Fourteen recognizes NAFTA countries’ authorities’ 
freedom to decide on their public retirement and statutory social security plans or any 
activity or service with the guarantee of utilizing the financial expedients of a 
government or a governmental body.
755
 
 
Eventually, other chapters of NAFTA include exemptions that may be 
implemented in the financial services area under some conditions. Art. 2102, for 
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instance, excepts means regarded as crucial by a NAFTA state to protect national 
security.
756
  NAFTA also excludes issues of taxation, which are mainly managed by 
two-sided tax settlements.
757
 
 
4.2.13 Administration and Dispute Settlement 
 
NAFTA is superintended by a body called a Free Trade Commission.
758
 This 
Commission on its part is propped by a NAFTA Secretariat.
759
 NAFTA also appoints 
various committees and working panels on numerous matters, all being under the 
surveillance of the Free Trade Commission.
760
  
 
Among the latter is the Financial Services Committee comprised of financial 
services regulatory experts from each of the NAFTA countries.
761
 The main 
responsibility of the Financial Services Committee is to oversee the application of 
the financial services chapter, dealing with the financial matters addressed by any 
NAFTA state and part taking in financial services dispute settlement proceedings. 
 
The dispute settlement process is considered by all countries as crucial matter 
that involves national sovereignty.  Dispute settlement issues are contained in 
chapters 11 (investment), 19 (antidumping and countervailing duty questions), 20 
(administration and general approach to dispute resolution), and various other 
provisos.   
 
The resolution process for financial services is similar to the one used for other 
parts of NAFTA. Yet, some differences exist.  The process entails a number of 
stages.  In the first place, a NAFTA state may ask for consultations with one or more 
NAFTA countries on any problem related to financial services.
762
  These talks are 
supposed to be carried out by appointed entities regulating financial services.  A 
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participation of other regulatory entities is allowed at the request of a NAFTA 
country.
763
 
 
If consultations do not achieve the expected success, a NAFTA state may resort 
to the Free Trade Commission to help resolve the debate.
764
  The Commission may 
apply various tools to reach a compromise - additional consultations, hearings, 
working groups or counselors, provide recommendations, and utilize arbitration and 
employ other available operations to ensure the maximum satisfaction for both of the 
sides while resolving the matter.
765
 
 
If the parties are not content with the result achieved by the Commission, a 
NAFTA country may demand the designation of an arbitral panel to hear the 
arguments of the debate.
766
  Each panel should be composed of five impartial experts 
selected from a group of arbitrators, which group is nominated by each party 
according to the principles contained in the agreement.
767
  Independent groups of 
financial experts and other experts are designed to serve the purpose of resolution.
768
  
 
In the case of financial services disputes all five arbitrators may be chosen from 
the roaster of financial experts, provided all involved countries agree.  If the 
countries do not agree on this matter, there exists a possibility of selecting experts 
from both financial arbitrators’ roaster and non-financial arbitrators group.769 If the 
line of defense of a defendant country entails prudential regulation or monetary 
policy, then the panel needs to be comprised of financial experts obligatorily.
770
 
 
The mediation panel submits its initial and final reports to the Free Trade 
Commission, which decides on the final settlement together with the disputing 
parties. Usually, the Commission oversees implementing of the panel’s 
recommendations.
771
  Yet, it is not the rule.  If the advice of the panel is not 
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followed, the dominant party may reciprocate through refusing profits in the 
financial services sector that equilibrate the losses in the affected area.
772
 
 
4.2.14 Provisions Regarding Access to Mexico 
 
The financial Services chapter and associated annexes, in particular annex VII, 
ensures an easier access to Mexican financial markets for USA and Canadian 
financial services entities.  The regulations will enter into force by the means of new 
laws, provisions and interpretations and other measures introduced by SHCP and its 
subsidiary commissions such as CNBV and CNSF. 
 
4.2.15 Establishment of Financial Institution Subsidiaries in Mexico 
 
American and Canadian financial services suppliers and investors conducting 
business in their countries may ask to set up or purchase Mexican governed financial 
institutions to engage in ‘alike’ activities in Mexico.  When it comes to some kinds 
of financial services, like foreign exchange, bonding and general deposit warehouse 
services, the requests may be made at once after entering into life of the Treaty. 
 
When a USA or Canadian investor legitimately sets up or procures a bank or 
securities enterprise in Mexico, that investor acquires a right to establish a ‘financial 
group holding company’ subordinate to Mexican law and can extend the scope of his 
activities to other sorts of financial services under the same conditions as national 
Mexican investors.
773
  
 
Taking advantage of the Mexican financial group organizational system, qualified 
USA and Canadian investors may create or purchase supplementary Mexican 
enterprises involved in the complete scope of financial services activities allowed 
under Mexican law, comprising banking, securities, insurance, factoring, leasing, 
bonding, and warehousing, among others.  Moreover, according to Mexican law, 
financial services entities branched through a financial group may have the same 
name and sell their products through the agency of any other enterprise in the group. 
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4.2.16 Special Restrictions and Powers 
 
In Annex VII, Mexico restricted the right to employ various terms and stipulations 
on financial services suppliers and investors pursuing access to Mexico.  Therefore it 
may require from an investor to be already involved in providing the same type of 
financial service in its home NAFTA country.
774
  Mexico may prevent investors from 
possessing more than one financial entity of each kind in Mexico.
775
 
 
Moreover, Mexico can require from a financial entity (other than an insurance 
company), which is supposed to be set up or purchased in Mexico by an investor 
from another NAFTA country, to be completely owned by that investor.
776
 
 
 Investing in Mexican insurance companies is exempted from the above 
requirement because Mexican provisions have for a number of years allowed alien 
insurance companies to access joint venture enterprises or make significant minority 
investments in Mexican insurance entities.  Other regulations concerning insurance 
companies and included in the financial services annex of Mexico maintain the same 
privilege. 
 
Mexican financial services enterprises owned by investors of other NAFTA state 
are granted the same powers, and are subordinate to the same restrictions and 
provisions, as national companies, with a few exclusions, among them being the ones 
related to the capital and asset limits though applying only for a definite period of 
time and not to all kinds of financial services.  Mexican financial services companies 
owned by investors from other NAFTA countries may be prevented from setting up 
branches, affiliations and agencies outside Mexico.
777
 
 
 
                                                 
774
 Id. annex VII(B)(14)(a)-Mex. This is in addition to the more general requirements that an investor 
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4.2.17 Capital and Asset Limits 
 
A unique particular type of financial institution called SOFOLES will be subservient 
to restrictions grounded on the amount of their assets, not their capital.
778
 Control 
capital requisites (and sometimes asset restrictions) efficaciously restrict the extent of 
a Mexican financial institution’s transactions.779 Thanks to that, these restrictions are 
frequently called ‘market share limits’. 
 
 
4.2.18 Banks, Securities, Insurance 
 
For banks owned by investors from NAFTA countries, the whole industry capital 
limit started at 8% in 1994 and was meant to increase to 15% by 1999.
780
  The sole-
institution capital limit was meant to be 1.5% through year 1999.
781
  
 
For securities brokers owned by investors from NAFTA states, the whole 
industry capital limit increased from 10% in 1994 to 20% in 1999.  The sole-
institution capital limit was 4% though year 1999.  As to bank branches, Mexico was 
entitled, until the year 2004 and under some circumstances, to freeze or expand for 
three years the whole industry capital limit of alien investor securities enterprises 
under a safeguard regulation.
782
 
 
For insurance the whole capital limit increased from 6% in 1994 to 12% in 
1999.
783
 The sole-institution capital limit was 1.5% through 1999.
784
 Both limits 
ceased to be applicable in January 1, 2000.
785
  Separate measure and application of 
capital limits could be imposed on life and health insurance and to casualty and other 
kinds of insurance. 
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4.2.19 Other Financial Services 
 
The same whole capital limits on Mexican factoring and leasing firms owned by 
investors from another NAFTA state were applicable to securities brokerage firms, 
until the year 2000.
786
  Such firms were not, nevertheless, subordinated to individual 
capital limits.
787
  Among those not subject to any restrictions in this matter were 
warehousing, bonding, foreign exchange and mutual funds management companies. 
 
Mexico allowed by its regulations to establish SOFOLES which are mandated to 
involve in lending and other types of bank-like activities except for deposit-taking. 
Under NAFTA Mexico permitted USA and Canadian non-bank investors to set up 
SOFOLES in its territory, offering conditions no less favorable than it offers to its 
national Mexican companies as to providing consumer, commercial or mortgage 
lending or credit card services.
788
  
 
Until 2000, NAFTA imposed on these alien-possessed SOFOLES the whole, but 
not individual, limits grounded on their assets, not on their capital.
789
  The total assets 
of such companies cannot surpass 3% of the total assets of all banks and limited-
scope financial entities in Mexico.
790
  The limit is calculated without taking into 
consideration lending by limited-scope branches of automobile manufacturers, which 
are not subordinate to this restriction. 
 
4.2.20 Cross-Border Insurance Services in Mexico 
 
NAFTA bound Mexico to allow USA and Canadian companies to supply some 
cross-border insurance services so far banned by Mexican regulations. To be 
specific, Mexico agreed on the insurance of tourism-related risks in Mexico (with an 
exception of risks of liability to third parties) and associated intermediary services, if 
procured through physical mobility of the consumer without requesting in Mexico by 
the provider.  
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Mexico, as well, agreed to let Mexican consumers obtain from USA and Canadian 
companies the following: insurance of shipments of goods in international transit to 
or from any NAFTA country from point of origin to final destination; insurance of 
the vehicle transporting such goods (including vehicles used in maritime shipping, 
commercial aviation, and space launching and freight, including satellites) during the 
period of its use in such transportation, provided that such vehicle is licensed and 
registered outside Mexico; and related intermediary services.  
 
Mexico keeps the right to other restrictions on across border insurance services in 
accordance with the law current at the time of signing NAFTA.
791
 
 
4.2.21 Provisions Regarding Access to Canada 
 
Canada has reserved fewer restrictions and assumed fewer new obligations than 
Mexico under the financial services chapter. Generally, it granted Mexican 
companies and investors the same benefits already in place for USA investors under 
CUSFTA.   
 
Canada allows Mexican investors to set up affiliate financial institutions in its 
territory and excludes them from some of the regulations of the so-called 10/25 
investment rules applicable to aliens, under which no investor may possess 10% of 
the capital of any national-wide Canadian financial institution, and non-nationals in 
total may not own more than 25% of such capital. 
  
NAFTA allows Mexican and USA investors to have a control over Canadian 
financial institutions affiliates (Schedule II subsidiaries) without those limits.  These 
settlements subordinate USA, Mexican, and national Canadian investors alike, to 
10% limit on investments in Canadian largest nation-wide financial institutions. Yet, 
NAFTA excepts USA and Mexican investors from the restriction on the 25% total 
investments by non-Canadians in nation-wide institutions.
792
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Moreover, Canada has decided on exempting Mexican-controlled bank branches 
from the requisite of acquiring Canadian ministry of Finance approval before 
establishing supplementary affiliations in Canada.
793
 
 
What Canada did not agree on is covering Mexico with the provisions of 
CUSFTA in term of all financial services. Additionally, Canada also reserved some 
restrictions under the financial services chapter related with securities regulation, 
reinsurance, and any current incompatible local measures.
794
 
 
4.2.22 Provisions Regarding Access to the USA 
 
The USA has made significantly more reservations under the financial services 
chapter compared to Canada.
795
  What is more, the USA was allowed, up to January 
1, 1995, to exclude existing incompatible means operating in forty-four states.
796
 
Juxtaposing NAFTA and CUSFTA, it becomes clear that USA did not make too 
much further advancement in giving new possibilities for Canadian financial services 
providers’ functioning.797  
 
USA did not assume the obligations to spread out all the financial services 
regulations of the CUSFTA to Mexico, either.  Unlike the Canadian government 
securities under the CUSFTA, USA has not awarded the Mexican government 
securities the status of being ‘bank eligible’ in accordance with the Glass-Steagall 
Act.
798
 
 
NT and MFN principles of the chapter on financial services should nevertheless 
be applicable in Canadian and Mexican investors’ involvement in any subsequent 
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financial services freeing that may take place in the USA.  This may comprise, for 
instance, multi-state subsidizing and the Glass-Steagall Act reform.   
 
In relation to it, it is noteworthy to mention that Mexico and Canada have opted to 
review the manner of market access allowed for financial services companies – 
together with permitting direct, across border affiliating rather than merely 
individually incorporated branches (with an exception of revisiting Mexico’s market 
entry restrictions) – at the same time at which USA decides to let Canadian and 
Mexican banks to extend their operating multi-state throughout all of the USA.
799
 
 
Eventually, USA has committed itself to Mexico, though not fully, in relation to 
the Glass-Steagall Act matters.
800
  USA agreed to release Mexican financial entities 
from provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and connected limitations for a period of 
five years, given that while establishing the entity before NAFTA came into life it 
purchased: 1) A Mexican bank with USA transactions, and 2) A Mexican securities 
company that possesses or controls a USA securities company.
801
  
 
The allowed activities of the USA securities subsidiary need to be restricted to 
those in which it was involved in on the date of purchase, and the USA branch is not 
permitted to extend its operations through acquisition in the USA for five years.
802
 
This limited five-year disclaimer would seem to favor only a few Mexican banks that 
became subsidized with Mexican securities companies (and their USA securities 
transactions) while privatizing Mexican state-owned banks in 1991 and 1992.
803
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4.3 NAFTA, MEFTA, GATS/WTO AND THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE 
LIBERALIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES IN MEXICO 
 
Although RTAs such as NAFTA and MEFTA should go beyond GATS in terms of 
liberalization (at least theoretically, according to GATS Art. V), it has been 
recognized that there is a lack of clarity as to how far or to what extent this should be 
achieved.
804
  Even more, OECD states in a study that the liberalization of financial 
services in GATS has been more ambitious than most RTAs, including NAFTA.
805
  
 
This section argues that in achieving financial integration NAFTA has gone 
beyond GATS, but less ambitious than the EU. In doing so, it explored how this 
integration in financial services has been achieved, through the different principles of 
NT, market access and MFN in NAFTA.   
 
The difficulty arises in interpreting what exactly means ‘to go beyond,’ as there is 
a lack of clarity with respect to the kind of barriers that RTA should be expected to 
eliminate.
806
  Also, the WTO Secretariat has acknowledged that, “it is difficult to 
establish to what degree a large number of RTAs achieve a deeper level of 
integration than the WTO.” 807 
 
The OECD study observed that RTAs can complement but cannot substitute for 
multilateral rules and progressive multilateral liberalization, and that in some 
particularly sensitive areas, “regional initiatives have been no more successful – and 
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in some cases less successful – than activity at the multilateral level.”808  Addressing 
financial services in particular it stated that: 
 
…while the GATS has achieved a higher level of liberalization in 
financial services than that found in most RTAs, the development of the 
GATS Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services took 
advantage of insights gained in financial market opening at the regional 
level.809   
 
 
Yet it is still of considerable relevance to know, from a legal perspective, to what 
extent each RTA has gone or not beyond WTO Agreements.
810
  
 
 Two of the main objectives that bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements 
share and promote are: stability and liberalization.
811
   
 
Stability is an important condition in international trade in order to guarantee 
security, credibility and predictability.  These key factors give investors and 
consumers in general the vision of market opportunities.  Although GATS has 
contributed in many ways to this road of certainty, credibility and predictability, it is 
also evident that GATS scores rather poorly in general.  
 
For example, the possibility allowed for under GATS of including commitments 
in national schedules that are bound at a more restrictive level than the status quo (or 
less than actual regulatory practice) means that effectively service providers are not 
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necessarily provided with accurate information on market access possibilities 
through this multilateral instrument.
812
  
 
In this context, Art. XXI of GATS
813
 states that: 
 
1. (a) A Member (referred to in this Article as the “modifying 
Member”) may modify or withdraw any commitment in its Schedule, at 
any time after three years have elapsed from the date on which that 
commitment entered into force, in accordance of the provisions of this 
Article.   
 
 
NAFTA and MEFTA, on the other hand, have gone notoriously beyond GATS 
because they provide the status quo provision
814
 in a more predictable way for the 
treatment of existing trade in services binding the parties, so that no new restrictions 
can be introduced.
815
  
 
With respect to its financial services chapter, NAFTA’s Art. 1404 states: 
 
1. No Party may adopt any measure restricting any type of cross border 
trade in financial services by cross border financial services of another 
Party that the Party permits on the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement, except to the extent set out in Section B of the Party’s 
Schedule to Annex VII. 
 
 
In the same sense, MEFTA Art. 12 (3) says that: “No party may adopt new measures 
as regards to the establishment and operation of financial services supplier of the 
other party, which are more discriminatory that those applied on the date of entry 
into force of this Decision.” 816 
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Regarding liberalization, although GATS has made a good try and introduced a lot of 
positive changes in services trade, it is still short in the liberalization of services 
markets.  Stephenson points out that: 
 
…most specific commitments scheduled by both developed and 
developing countries are in fact “stand-still bindings” and do not 
enlarge market access for service providers, committing the government 
concerned only to maintain the current level of access.
817
  
 
  
On the other hand, NAFTA and MEFTA improve such a legal framework.  NAFTA 
includes a clause requiring that the better of either MFN or NT should be given to a 
service provider from a member (Standard of Treatment: Art. 1405, and 1406 in the 
case of the chapter of financial services of NAFTA and in the same sense Art. 14 and 
15 of MEFTA).
818
 
 
Art. 1205 of NAFTA
819
 is also beneficial for all members because it allows 
service providers to determine the most efficient way to carry out their trade:  
 
Art. 1205: Local Presence 
No Party may require a service provider of another party to establish or 
maintain a representative office or any form of enterprise, or to be 
resident, in its territory as a condition for the cross-border provision of a 
service.   
 
 
Art. 1210 paragraph 3 and 1111 of NAFTA say that:
820
  
 
Article 1210: Licensing and Certification
821
  
1. With a view to ensuring that any measure adopted or maintained by a 
Party relating to the licensing or certification of nationals of another 
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Party does not constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade, each Party 
shall endeavor to ensure that any such measure:  
… 
3. Each Party shall, within two years of the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement, eliminate any citizenship or permanent residency 
requirement set out in its Schedule to Annex I that it maintains for the 
licensing or certification of professional service providers of another 
Party. Where a Party does not comply with this obligation with respect 
to a particular sector, any other Party may, in the same sector and for 
such period as the non complying Party maintains its requirement, 
solely have recourse to maintaining an equivalent requirement set out in 
its Schedule to Annex I or reinstating:  
(a) Any such requirement at the federal level that it eliminated pursuant 
to this Article; or  
(b) On notification to the non-complying Party, any such requirement at 
the state or provincial level existing on the date of entry into force of 
this Agreement.  
4. The Parties shall consult periodically with a view to determining the 
feasibility of removing any remaining citizenship or permanent 
residency requirement for the licensing or certification of each other's 
service providers.  
… 
Art. 1111: Special Formalities and Information Requirements
822
  
1. Nothing in Article 1102 shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting or maintaining a measure that prescribes special formalities in 
connection with the establishment of investments by investors of 
another Party, such as a requirement that investors be residents of the 
Party or that investments be legally constituted under the laws or 
regulations of the Party, provided that such formalities do not 
materially impair the protections afforded by a Party to investors of 
another Party and investments of investors of another Party pursuant to 
this Chapter. 
 
 
4.3.1 What Can NAFTA Learn from EU? 
 
NAFTA pursued different objectives than those pursued by EU.  NAFTA’S 
economic integration is lower and the financial systems are different, however, it 
includes the following:  
                                                 
822
 Id. 
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1) Clearly defined long-term aims beyond sectoral efficiency, including economic 
development, and global competitiveness; 
2)  Recognition that minimum harmonization of regulatory frameworks and cross 
border financial activities require reform of public administration, specially tax 
treatment, banking and insurance legislation and joint supervision of securities 
markets, in order to make the “single passport” system reliable; and 
3) Commitment to a considerable degree of fiscal harmonization and economic 
coordination, to avoid financial crisis that would affect financial integration.
823
 
 
Unfortunately, there is still a long way to go because: a) NAFTA lacks the political 
will to enforce legislative programs similar to the EU; b) The heterogeneity of 
domestic regulatory institutions and the persistence of fiscal imbalances; c) The lack 
of recognition of foreign regulations constraining the “home country control” 
principle; d) The threat of currency differences (currency risk).
824
  Nevertheless, 
some corporate groups are pushing for harmonizing regulations and institutional 
arrangements for information sharing across countries.    
 
4.3.2 NAFTA and Other RTA 
 
Creating a FTAA is a complex issue.  MERCOSUR may not be able to join NAFTA 
because, for USA, NAFTA and other similar ones derived from Uruguay Round and 
involving the WTO have a lower hierarchy than federal law.  In Latin America, as in 
Europe and the majority of the countries, treaties have a higher precedence than local 
laws.  This does not occur in the USA; consequently this might produce a conflict of 
application or rules.
825
 
 
The USA has been pressing to make NAFTA join MERCOSUR,
826
 and in some 
occasions it has tried to create the FTAA.  Nevertheless, there is still resistance from 
                                                 
823
 IADB,  Financial…, op. cit., at 108.  
824
 Id., at 107.  Countries towards a harmonization should move toward adopting a common regime. 
825
 Goyos, op. cit., at 5. 
826
 MERCOSUR has become the third wealthiest regional trading organization, following EU and 
NAFTA.  It is expanding its membership and trading relationships within Latin America and beyond, 
including the aforesaid regional trading blocs.  It is therefore poised to provide its members of the 
Southern Cone states of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay, along with associated members 
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MERCOSUR.
827
  According to Goyos, an FTAA structured along the NAFTA 
model: 
 
…would have a most destructive impact on the agricultural sector of all 
MERCOSUR economies (which represents approximately 28% of the 
collective GDP) in view of the subsidies in place in the USA and 
Canada…for the service sector, would be equally damaging to 
MERCOSUR countries, as a result of the infamous one-way quota 
system in place in NAFTA. Thus it seems that for the MERCOSUR 
countries, it would be better to stay away out of FTAA.
828
 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Mexico and FTAA829  
 
USA used to be the one interested in signing FTAA, mainly because of the expansion 
of their services sector, government procurement, and tightening rules to protect 
investment and intellectual property.  USA was quick to stress that the Cancun fiasco 
did not spell the end of its efforts to get FTAA signed.
830
  
 
In Cancun, many Latin American countries joined G21, a new group of 
developing countries led by China, India and Brazil.  This group pushed hard for 
more ambitious agricultural reform by rich countries while defending high farm 
tariffs in poor countries. 
                                                                                                                                          
frontiers to many other nations (see Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR: The Emergence of a Working 
System of Dispute Resolution, 6 NAFTA: LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS (2000).     
827
 MERCOSUR, created by the Asuncion treaty (March 26, 1991), started operating from 1 January 
1995, integrating its four members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It is started operation 
as a free trade zone and a customs union as a first stage. In general, its goals are: free circulation of 
goods, services an production factors; creation of a common external duty and adoption of a common 
commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries, co-ordination of macroeconomic and other sectorial 
policies; commitment of the associated countries to harmonize their legislation in the pertinent areas 
so as to strengthen the integration process.  It is the most important commercial undertaking ever 
carried out in South America, embracing a population of 200 million, a GNP of near one trillion USD 
and an estimated trade volume for 1994 of USD$112,600 millions. Unlikely previous attempts at 
regional economic integration, which never really materialized, MERCOSUR has excellent chances of 
achieving long-term success. It is important to take into account that these figures will increase as 
from 1995 due to integration. The market will then appear highly attractive to investors both inside 
and outside the free trade zone. MERCOSUR created an external common duty between 0 and 20 per 
cent for almost 9,000 products. Also, each of the member countries provided a list or products which 
will not be freely traded (about 200 per country) in an effort to protect certain sensitive industries.  
See J. F. Norman and J. A. Pezzuti, MERCOSUR: Recent Developments, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
AND REGULATION (1995).  See also Jorge M. Guira, MERCOSUR as an Instrument for Development, 
3 NAFTA: LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS (Sum. 1997). 
828
 Goyos, op. cit., at 5. See also Guira, MERCOSUR as an Instrument…, op cit.. 
829
 For more detail analysis of this see Witker, op. cit  at 75. 
830
 See THE ECONOMIST, Oct.18, 2003, at 55. 
 232 
 
Today FTAA is almost stagnant due to the opposition of Venezuela’s president 
Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s president Evo Morales.  Both presidents see FTAA as 
means for the USA to take legally complete control of the political and economic 
systems of the region.  In addition, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, Luis 
Ignacio Lula Da Silva and Néstor Kirchner, respectively, state that the agreement 
should provide a real and true free trade, consequently, agricultural and other 
subsidies by the USA must end.
831
 
 
These subjects, who at that time had all the attention from the nations that wanted 
to enter the FTAA, are in the author’s opinion a way to present to everybody the span 
and dimensions of the treaty on commerce that is being discussed. It is worth 
emphasizing that during all the negotiation summits has never been any opacity on 
the debate.  
 
Similarly, the role that the FTAA plays is of vital importance as “the Latin 
American countries developing in general and countries especially, face the great 
challenge to solve not just a transmission, but three great processes of change, that 
interlace in the equation State-region-globalization;”832 and for that reason it is 
extremely important to retake all previous commercial treaty experiences to be able 
to develop all the acquired abilities and to implant new models that, in consequence, 
increase the efficiency of the treaty to include more strengths than defects. 
 
It is therefore noticeable that FTAA retakes as a precedent base the NAFTA 
document, especially the chapters on the solution of controversies and the subject of 
intellectual property.  As far as the arbitration of controversy solving is concerned, 
NAFTA treaty regulations are outstanding as they “establish a system by means of 
which individual investors or in representation of a company can seek protection 
from violations on the part of a government, state companies or monopolies before a 
court of international arbitration.
833”  
 
                                                 
831
 Witker, op. cit  at 75. 
832
 Id., at 159. 
833
 Id., at 175. 
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In this sense, one of the great innovations that were introduced within the NAFTA 
is the “right conferred to the investors to initiate arbitration trial versus a State, right 
that traditionally corresponded to the States.”834  However, as mentioned above, 
these single experiences serve as a framework of reference and in this sense there is a 
need to grasp other significant experiences of the NAFTA, in order to present a more 
effective system in the dispute resolution. 
 
 
4.4 MEFTA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NAFTA 
 
4.4.1. Mexico and EU 
 
EU is the second largest commercial power in the world as it brings together around 
one fifth of world trade.  It is comprised by 25 countries with a total population of 
around 400 million, and has a GDP of over 7 trillion.
835
  EU is Mexico’s second 
commercial partner and its second source of FDI.
836
   
 
The advantages of MEFTA are numerous.   Mexico represents a strategic partner 
for EU because of the potential of its market and its privileged position. 
837
  For 
Mexico, MEFTA gives it the opportunity to diversify its products, increase the 
supply of goods and services and balance its international relations, as well as bigger 
exports, better technology transfer, more competitiveness, enterprise efficiency and 
creation of more and better jobs. 
 
MEFTA is comprised by three documents:  
                                                 
834
 Id., at 177. 
835
 Burges, op. cit. 
836
 European Commission, “Trade. Mexico;” available at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/mexico/.  In 1998 trade between Mexico and EU was over 
USD$15.6 billion, 6% more than in 1997. Exports to EU were almost USD$4 billion and imports 
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for Mexican merchandise exports in 2006, which reached USD$13.3 billion, representing 5.4% of 
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billion. See “Mexico-European Union: Seven Years of a Successful Trade Relationship;” available at: 
http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx.  
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 As of 2008, MEFTA has represented for Mexico in commerce USD$59.6 billion (40.5 billion 
Euros), 18% more than the one of 2007, and 222% more than that of 1999 (see op. cit.). 
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1) Decision 2/2000 of the Joint Council of the Interim Agreement of Commerce and 
Issues Related to the Commerce between Mexico and the EU that entered into 
force on July 1, 2000;
838
 
2) Agreement of Economics Association, Political Understanding and Cooperation 
between Mexico and the EU, came into force on 1
st
 October 2000; and 
3) Decision of the Joint Council of the Agreement of Economic Association, 
Political Understanding and Cooperation between Mexico and the EU came into 
force on 1
st
 March 2001. 
 
MEFTA covers all goods originating in the parties’ territories,839 classifying such 
goods in the following categories:
840
 1) Industrial products that include all type of 
goods; 2) Fisheries; and 3) Agricultural goods.  Fisheries and agricultural goods were 
subject to specific regulations having a gradual reduction of customs duties until 
2010.
841
  According to De la Pena, they were the most complex ones in the 
negotiations because the Agricultural Common Policy in the EU which implemented 
subsidies of the exports threatened the Mexican sector.
842
 
 
According to MEFTA, around 82% of the Mexican goods are allowed to enter the 
EU duty-free.  This however, does not include many of Mexico’s top agricultural 
tariff reductions.  For Mexico, manufacturing is the sector that is most likely to 
benefit from MEFTA, particularly the local auto industry.  Meanwhile the EU 
investments will mostly go into locally-based European manufacturers seeking to 
export to the USA market. 
 
EU has been highly interested in maintaining trade with Latin America. 
Negotiations to liberalize trade between the EU and MERCOSUR started in 1991.  
Right after signing the Treaty of Asuncion, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
                                                 
838
 Decision 2/2000 of the Joint Council of the Interim Agreement of Commerce and Issues Related to 
the Commerce between Mexico and the EU, CE-MX 3854/00 DG E V1. 
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 Id., Art. 9 at 16. 
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 Id., Art. 10 at 22. 
841
 During the VI Joint Council, both parts reaffirmed their interest on moving toward negotiations as 
previewed in MEFTA on the revision clauses on this regard. See VI Joint Council 8436/09 (Presse 
79); available at: 
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 See Alberto De la Pena, Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the European Union, 7 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. (2001), at 373. 
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MERCOSUR’s four member states met in Luxembourg with representatives of the 
EU in order to explain the objectives of the Southern Cone regional bloc. 
 
Regarding trade, both parties agreed to work together as to increase and diversify 
commercial exchange.
843
  Both parties main intention was to prepare the gradual 
tariff and non-tariff liberalization and the creation of the inter-regional association. 
 
According to the text of the agreement this task will be fulfilled by analysis of the 
commercial relations with third parties.  In this sense particular attention was given 
to the agreements reached by MERCOSUR with Chile and Bolivia and with the other 
States of ALADI (Latin American Integration Association) and the actual negotiation 
with NAFTA.  
 
Regarding EU, MERCOSUR representatives paid special attention to the special 
treatment agreements reached by EU and African and Asian developing countries - 
the identification of sensitive products.  This includes, in particular, agricultural and 
other primary products.  
 
EU is concentrating its efforts on negotiating the reduction and further elimination 
of non-tariff barriers instead of tariff barriers.  It is well known that EU, and in 
particular countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, are very 
protectionist regarding the agricultural sector and are not willing to remove all their 
protectionist measures. 
 
But although there is a clear intention to free the trade between both regional 
blocs, the agricultural sector has greatly influenced the negotiations
844
.  That EU 
wanted to start talking about non-tariff barriers, instead of tariff barriers as expected 
by MERCOSUR, also contributed to the stagnation of the latter negotiations.
845
 
                                                 
843
 This was reaffirmed by the VI Joint Council 8436/09 (Press 79) celebrated in Prague  
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bilateral relations, and their decision to establish a Strategic Association.  
See VI Joint Council, at: 
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845 G. Biazi, “Trade liberalization Negotiations between the EU and Mercosur” (International Trade 
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4.4.2 Implications for NAFTA 
 
MEFTA has significant implications for NAFTA members and NAFTA in general.  
 
The EU is the largest aggregate trading partner and Mexico is its second 
largest national trading partner. Any Agreement that eliminates trade 
barriers and improves market access between these two crucial trading 
partners potentially has major implications for USA business.
846
  
 
 
Mexico has become a bridge for EU to USA and Canada and vice-versa.  
Consequently, enterprises from Mexico’s commercial partners are now able to 
establish operations in Mexico to take advantages of its preferential access to USA, 
Canada, European and Latin American markets.
847
   
 
 EU represents an attractive opportunity for Mexico because it is the largest and 
most integrated trade arrangement in the world bound into a customs union that is 
committed to political and economic integration.
848
   
 
Until 1975, links between both parties were mainly focused on historical and 
cultural ties.  A First Framework Cooperation Agreement was signed in September 
1975 and renewed in October 1980.  In the late 1990s, as a result of structural 
changes, modernization process and trade liberalization in Mexico (including 
Mexico’s participation), political, economic and commercial cooperation with the 
EU improved considerably ending up in this commercial agreement.  
 
From 1993, EU’s trade with Mexico registered and accumulated growth of 4.7%. 
The EU became the second largest investor in Mexico. During 1994 - 1998, 
accumulated FDI in Mexico was USD$41.2 billion of which 21% was EU 
                                                 
846
 THE EU-MEXICO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT xviii (James R. Holbein & Nick W. Ranieri eds., 
Transnational Publishers, 2002) [hereinafter MEFTA TRADE IN SERVICES AGREEMENT]. 
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 Id., at 23.  See also BILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS at 1.  Mexico’s imports from EU are engines, 
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 MEFTA (TRADE IN SERVICE AGREEMENT)  at 21. 
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investment.  The main investors were: UK (32%), the Netherlands (30.5%) and 
Germany (19%).
849
  
 
Mexico and NAFTA were extremely attractive to EU.  This was, among other 
factors, a result of the economic growing rate of NAFTA parties:  
 
A study by the Centre for Policy Studies Showed that NAFTA 
economies are growing at a rate twice that of the EU. Between 1992 
and 2000 Mexico had a 38 percent increase in jobs while the USA and 
Canada had a 13% increase. During the same period, the EU only 
experienced a 3 percent increase in employment.
850
 
 
 
The EU and Mexico signed three legal instruments (known together as MEFTA): 
1. Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement 
(Global Agreement) 
2. Interim Agreement to the Global Agreement (Trade in Goods Agreement) 
3. Final Act of the Global Agreement (Trade in Services Agreement)851  
 
 Regarding the similarities and differences between MEFTA and NAFTA it can 
be said that MEFTA stimulated trade by liberalizing almost all trade by 2007, a bit 
earlier than NAFTA in some areas.  Even more, MEFTA has negotiated tariffs lower 
than those within NAFTA.
852
  In NAFTA, members “are not required to give up a 
portion of their sovereignty… with the possible exception of Chapter 11 
arbitration,”853 while EU has supranational authorities which share common policies. 
 
 In the services sector,
854
 most of the sub-sectors were negotiated, such as 
telecommunications, energy, tourism and financial services, although certain  
sub-sectors for example: audio-visual, maritime cabotage, and air transport are 
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explicitly excluded.  It should still be considered to have “substantial sectoral 
coverage” according to Art. V of GATS.855 
 
 MEFTA has gone beyond the commitments of GATS, as it has set out as an 
objective the progressive and reciprocal liberalization of trade in services (not 
exceeding 10 years). For example, the financial services sector was practically 
liberalized when the MEFTA Trade Services Agreement came into force. Art. 12 
paragraph 4 sub paragraph (e) of the Trade in Service Section of MEFTA states the 
general rule:
856
  
 
No Party shall maintain or adopt the following measures: 
… 
(e) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in the terms of 
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of 
individual or aggregate foreign investment… 
 
 
The exceptions are described in the list of reservations set out in the Annex I of the 
Trade in Service Agreement.
857
  This liberalization was consistent with the one 
previously adopted by Mexico, when in 1999 its legislative branch approved that 
foreign economic agents were allowed to own 100% of the capital stock of Mexican 
banks.
858
 
 
In the services sector, EU benefits more than Mexico due to its net-exporter 
nature of services and financial services.  European banks and insurance companies 
are authorized to operate and establish directly in Mexican territory like their USA 
and Canadian counterparts.
859
   
 
Mexican banks have similar access to EU
860
 but, since it is not a net-exporter in 
financial services, this potential market is not likely to be exploited (at least in the 
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 Proposal for a Council Decision on the Community Position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council 
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short and medium term), as the one in industrial products and manufacturers where 
the Mexican competitive world advantage lays. 
  
 The future of the MEFTA might depend on the future integration of FTAA.
861
 It 
might interact and complement each other, converting Mexico into the trade hub 
between the Americas and Europe. 
 
4.4.3 Benefits of MEFTA
862
 
 
There are many reasons why EU investors look towards Mexico to do business. 
Among the main ones are the following:
  
 Low wages in Mexico 
 As of 2009, Mexico was the 10th exporter and importer in the world (excluding 
intra-EU trade).
863
 
 The USA is its largest trading partner. 
 Due to its network of FTA, as of 2010 Mexico enjoyed “preferential access to one 
billion consumers in 44 countries,”864 
 Mexico has become a natural platform for trade and investment, strengthened by 
its strategic geographic position. 
 Mexico is the only country in the world with free trade access to NAFTA market 
and EU markets. 
 
4.4.3.1 Trade in Goods
865
 
 
The most basic achievement of MEFTA is the permanent elimination of all tariffs 
among the partners according to a rapid phase-out schedule. Only the most sensitive 
products are subject to a long phase-out. 
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Industrial products account for more than 90% of the total bilateral trade in 
merchandise.  In this case, the liberalization covers the entire range of products and 
is implemented progressively over a transitional period of 7 years. All tariffs are 
eliminated by 1 January 2007.  
 
On 1 July 2000, date of entry of MEFTA,
 
EU eliminated tariffs on 82% of the 
Mexican industrial products, while Mexico liberalized tariffs on 48% of EU 
industrial products, and eliminated the 1999 tariff increases on EU footwear and 
certain textile products (dismantling from 25%-35% to 10%-15%). 
 
On 1 January 2003, EU liberalized customs duties on all Mexican industrial 
products, while Mexico eliminated tariffs on an additional 5% of EU industrial 
products (to total 52% of the same), and ensured that the remaining 48% of the EU 
industrial products were subject to a maximum tariff of 5%. 
 
4.4.3.2 Trade in Services
866
 
 
The service markets of both parties are to be progressively liberalized within a period 
of no more than 10 years, that is, by the year 2011.  The agreement covers all 
services including: financial (allowing all EU banks and insurance companies to 
directly operate in Mexico), telecommunications, distribution, energy, tourism, and 
environmental services.  The only exceptions are audiovisual, maritime cabotage and 
air transportation services. 
 
From the date of entry, the parties agreed not to introduce new restrictions on EU 
or Mexican investors. 
 
The relevant provisions for services ensure investors that: no restrictions on the 
number of operations or services provided in the other party’s territory will be 
introduced; full enjoyment of NT at equivalent conditions; treatment of MFN will be 
granted, surpassing the benefits bestowed on third parties. 
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4.4.3.3 How Do EU Investors Access the NAFTA Market?
867
 
 
Any EU company may benefit from the existence of NAFTA and MEFTA, by 
combining the rules of origin of each treaty.  Products with content from both 
Mexico and EU have a tariff advantage for import into the USA and Canada 
compared with products either coming directly from the EU or from other parts of 
the world. 
 
Preferential access to USA and Canada for Mexican production requires that a 
certain proportion of the finished product contains regional components (Mexico, 
US, or Canada).  The key is the correct combination of the rules of origin provided 
for in each of NAFTA and MEFTA. 
 
 
4.4.3.4 NAFTA’s Rules of Origin868 
 
NAFTA requires that all non-originating components undergo a shift of tariff 
classification.  As such, the classification of the non-NAFTA components imported 
into Mexico must be different from the tariff classification of the finished product to 
be exported. 
 
NAFTA provides two different types of valuations to determine the NAFTA content 
of the products: 1) Valuation based on the ex-works price of the finished product; 
and 2) Valuation based on the cost of the non-originating component. 
 
Non-originating components can be 40% to 50% of the ex – works price of the 
finished product.  There is no limit as to the percentage of regional (NAFTA) 
components to be included in a finished product. 
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4.4.3.5 Comparison between NAFTA’s and MEFTA’s Rules of Origin869 
 
The two basic rules of origin provided for in both agreements: 1) The non-originating 
components must be transformed into a different tariff classification in order to 
qualify as an originating product, i.e., a tariff shift must take place; and 2) There is a 
quantitative non-regional limitation of an average of 40% to 60% of the total ex-
works price of the finished product 
 
The basic difference is the method of valuations of regional content.  In MEFTA, 
the applicable rules of origin are determined by tariff classification per individual 
component.  In NAFTA, the rules of origin may be determined by a percentage of the 
ex-works price of the finished product or the cost of the non-originating component. 
 
All finished products that comply with the NAFTA rules of origin are not subject 
to USA or Canadian import duties on their export from Mexico.  However, from 1 
January 2001, NAFTA required Mexico to grant the same tariff treatment to all non-
NAFTA components, which are destined to be exported to the NAFTA region. 
 
Consequently, all non-originating NAFTA components, incorporated into finished 
products to be exported to the USA and Canada, are subject to Mexican import 
duties, and the corresponding 15% Value Added Tax.  To minimize the impact of 
such obligation, Mexico implemented Sector Promotion Programs, which objective 
is to grant a preferential ad-valorem tariff to non-NAFTA components to be 
incorporated into finished products to be exported anywhere in the world. 
 
As such, the Sector Promotion Programs eliminate import duties on some of the 
non-NAFTA originating components, and reduce the remaining ones to a maximum 
duty of 5%. 
 
Mexico offers major benefits for all EU investors that desire to access the NAFTA 
region free of duties.  The key lies in the correct combination of the rules of origin 
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provided for in MEFTA and NAFTA, together with the applicable Mexican domestic 
trade program, such as the maquiladora and the Sector Promotion Program.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that Mexico has a privileged position as a free trade 
partner, being the only country in the world, which is a member of both the NAFTA 
free trade area and the EU trading block.
 
 
 
4.5 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE RELATING TO GATS, NAFTA AND 
MEFTA 
 
One of the issues that raised controversy in the GATT was its dispute settlement 
procedure, which was one of a kind. Some claimed that the system should aim at 
immediate problem resolution through settlements, obfuscation, carrying threats 
from the position of power, etc.  Others underlined the importance of outlining the 
general long-term goals like text interpretation foreseeability and unchangeability.
870
  
Today, WTO’s dispute settlement is responsible for the resolution of disputes under 
GATS, GATT and TRIPS.
871
  
 
4.5.1 Dispute Settlement in Services 
 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is the member dispute mechanism and 
it applies to disputes under any WTO Agreements.  The dispute settlement process 
consists of three stages: 1) bilateral consultations, 2) adjudicative process before the 
panel and in case of the appellate body and 3) implementation and enforcement 
under surveillance of the DSB. 
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4.5.2 Dispute Settlement in Services under GATS/WTO: Security and 
Predictability 
 
The DSU provides certainty, security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system.
872
  In order to provide such predictability in the interpretation of GATS and 
in general all the WTO Agreements, the panels and the Appellate Body have been 
applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation described in Arts. 31 to 33 of the 
Vienna Convention.
873
 
 
 In this sense, the rules that have been applied by other International Courts such 
as the International Court of Justice in the public international law arena are the same 
that the panel and the Appellate Body have been applying for the dispute settlement 
procedure of GATS and other WTO Agreement.  
 
Principles such as “good faith” in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the 
terms in their context and in the light of their “object” and “purpose” (Art. 31 of the 
Vienna Convention) have been ratified under the Art. 3.2 of the DSU. In the same 
sense, the Panels and Appellate Body of the WTO expressively have quoted several 
times Arts. 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention when interpreting the 
agreements of the WTO: GATT, GATS and TRIPS.
874
   
 
Related to the preamble’s language of the texts we have the US-Section 301-310 
of the Trade Act of 1974,
875regarding the “textual” interpretation - a representative 
case is the Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,876 “subjective intention” is shown 
by the International Court of Justice in the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya vs. Chad).
877
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The “preparatory work” interpretation (travaux preparatoires) has been used for 
the Panels and Appellate Body as a supplementary means of interpretation as Art. 32 
of the Vienna Convention stated.
878
 
 
4.5.3 The Jurisprudence of the WTO 
 
1998 was a year of great success for WTO’s dispute settlement procedures. In 
comparison to the GATT, there were four times more cases brought there and quite a 
big number of settlements reached.  It may point to a real concord of procedures 
imposed and settlements complying with them. It may also mean that governments 
enjoy high predictability of the settlement outcomes which see eye to eye with the 
rules.  
 
What is more, the general feeling among the member states considering 
compliance with the finalization and formal adoption of the official panel reports is 
extremely positive.  The issue may only be if, in the light of international law, the 
country is bound to obey the WTO rules when it is required to do so by the panel, or 
if it can provide a kind of compensation employing other trade measures.
879
 
 
Another positive aspect in this respect has been a continuously growing number of 
cases brought by developing countries both against trade super-powers and other 
developing nations.  The improvements introduced in the text of the GATT/WTO 
treaty and mentioned above together with the possibility to appeal to an Appellate 
Body affected the whole worldwide trade system.  The Appellate Body visibly 
indicated that rules of the GATT and WTO are in absolute concordance with the 
general international law.  
 
Moreover, the reports prepared by the Body, which proves to keep being rather 
independent and neutral, have been thoroughly thought and worked on to such an 
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extent that they are followed by legal institutions in judicial systems of numerous 
nations.
880
 
 
Being more analytical and rule-oriented than they tended to be earlier in the 
GATT, the Appellate Body has been demonstrating higher respect towards the 
rulings of national governments and as a consequence has been manifesting 
cautiousness in hasting to adopt new interpretations of the treaty language.  As a 
result, it may contribute to better understanding and acknowledgement of the WTO 
mechanisms on the global scale.
881
 
 
The world trade system largely benefited from the improvements of dispute 
settlement procedures as one can see on the bases of cases brought and won by some 
countries against other which carefully made use of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  
 
Yet, another interesting point, in the evolution of the process, is allowing 
governments to hire private attorneys in order to obtain an expertise complying with 
the regulations if they are not able to have one on their own.  Certain limitations on 
this practice has been introduced but the general move has been in favor of this 
procedure, though some preventive measures towards avoiding the conflict of 
interests and information confidentiality should be taken.
882
 
 
Being appreciated, as it is, the WTO will have to be up-to-date with changing 
situations, issues and problems in today’s fast moving world of economy not to get 
marginalized in terms of international relations.  Giving the upper hand to bilateral or 
regional arrangements and treaties can have a detrimental effect on combined effort 
expected under the multilateral scheme.  For example, the treaty will have to handle 
with time some its rule vagueness or lack of precise regulations.
883
  
 
This may be done either by introducing some changes to the Uruguay Round 
treaty text or working out a completely new document, which is quite a tricky issue. 
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If the members wished for the treaty text alterations, they would encounter numerous 
problems. Having tried to maintain a balance, the member states, in the Uruguay 
Round, opted for inserting laws which would restrain institutions from intrusion into 
sovereignty.  
 
Thus, clauses of Art. IX and X constitute a collection of restrictions as to what can 
be done as a result of the membership of the WTO.  For instance, it is clearly said 
that new liabilities, even agreed on by majority, cannot be imposed on members.
884
  
 
In addition, there is a necessity of obtaining three-fourths of the votes to reach the 
conclusion of new text interpretation.  Putting aside the restrictions, one could note a 
fact that it is extremely inviting to try at least and alter all the rules which contain 
disparities or vagueness in the course of the dispute settlement process.  However, in 
Art. 3, paragraph 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, legislators reserved 
themselves a way out of this inconvenient scenario.  
 
According to the document, recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.  In 
other words, the system cannot be overeager to change the regulations dramatically. 
In comparison, the GATT rules were written in such an ambiguous and imprecise 
language that it was much easier to shift and exchange the ideas covered by it.
 885
  
 
WTO can take various paths to improve its rules as a way of developing the 
system itself.  Some of them may be adapting the two-thirds scheme for amendment 
introduction, taking small steps of reform in the course of practice under the 
resolution, avoiding national ratifications while agreeing on amendments considering 
both alterations in the text of the treaty and decisions reached by the DSB, using the 
‘consensus rule’ in some aspects of it and others not necessarily, or encouraging the 
members to refrain themselves from blocking in cases of crucial national interest 
non-existence if the text ceased to be inconsistent with any of the current rules of the 
WTO together with its clauses.  
 
                                                 
884
 Id., at 185. 
885
 Id., at 186. 
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Other paths could focus on forwarding the proposals for the plurilateral 
agreements by an ample number of members or keeping the door open for the 
accession by any other member, bearing the burden of the introduction and 
maintenance costs by the acquiescing members, etc.  What is important is the fact 
that employing some or all of these means could facilitate the improvement of the 
WTO’s works and avoidance of deadlocks while debating in the future disputes. 886 
 
4.5.4 Other General Interpretative Principles 
 
Regarding other principles of interpretation, Panels and Appellate Body have been 
applying the “principle of effectiveness” which means that a treaty interpreter must 
give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. In other words, “all applicable 
provisions have to be read in a way that gives meaning to all of them harmoniously, 
and all the parts and its sections should be interpreted as a whole.”887 
 
The principle of deference is also understood by the Appellate Body in the case 
EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), in which it stated 
that interpretation was being made in deference to the sovereignty of states (in dubio 
mitius). “If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred 
which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation or which interferes less 
with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party.”888 
 
Regarding the dynamic interpretation, the Appellate Body said that the 
interpretation of the WTO Agreements and rules was not rigid or inflexible that it 
could not consider variable circumstances. In the case US – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products it stated regarding the term “natural 
resources” in Art. XX (g) that GATT is not “static” in its content or reference but is 
rather by definition, evolutionary, and their interpretation cannot remain unaffected 
by the subsequent development of law.”889 
                                                 
886
 Id., at 188. 
887
 Weiss, op. cit., at 186. 
888
 In this case the Appellate Body referred to the ICJ Jurisdiction EC – Measures Concerning Meat 
and meat Products (Hormones)WT/Ds26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R para 154. To The ICJ cases we 
have the ICJ Reports 1974, 253 at 267 para 44: Nuclear Test Case (Australia vs. France): Access of 
Polish War Vessels to the Port of Danzig (1931). 
889
 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimps and Shrimp Products, para. 130. 
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4.5.5 The Rule of Stare Decisis in GATS/WTO 
 
Related to the subsequent practice and the binding effects of the panel and Appellate 
Body reports it is understood that the WTO shall be guided but not bound by its own 
decisions. The authority of its previous decisions is only declaratory.
890
 The 
foregoing consideration agrees with Art. 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention which 
states that any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty shall be taken into 
account. However, the precedents have a persuasive power. In other words, panels 
and Appellate Body have to consider in some way previous reports. 
 
Paraphrasing, panels and Appellate Body have to give certain degree of deference 
to previous GATT/WTO panel or Appellate Body reports. This is because previous 
reports create expectation among WTO, mainly for the countries who participate 
systematically as third parties (as the case of the USA, the E.U. and China).  In case a 
panel decides to deviate from previous reports, such deviation has to be justified.  
 
4.5.6. The Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Rules 
 
NAFTA’s integration has been much less ambitious than the EU and the methods 
chosen for the dispute resolution is another example of that idea. The European 
Court of Justice has characteristic similar to the judicial processes and the NAFTA 
dispute processes are more related to arbitral processes.
891
 Financial disputes in 
NAFTA will be solved under Chapter 20 (general disputes NAFTA provisions) 
unless they involve a financial investment dispute which will use Chapter 11 
(investment provisions).  
 
NAFTA has given high priority to arbitration and mediation to settle disputes, 
regulated by the ICSID Convention rules, which were altered to end up with 
                                                 
890
 See Appellate Body, Japan – Taxes, pp 13f. Also, US – Restrictions on Import of Tuna, 
WT/DS29/R, PARA.3.74. 
891
 However, NAFTA’s chapters 19 and 20 are more judicial than similar processes in GATT.  See 
Michael Wallace Gordon, NAFTA and the Financial Dispute Resolution, J. J. NORTON AND NORBERT 
HORN, NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (2000) at 
209.  See also GARY HORLICK, WTO & NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON ANTIDUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND OTHER MEASURES (2003). After WWII, international trade law 
became a matter of primary interest, which resulted in creating brand new international and national 
provisions as well as spiking political involvement in case-law and personnel decisions.   
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appointing three arbitrators. It means that each party is allowed to choose one 
arbitrator and the third one is appointed as a result of an agreement between the two.  
 
Because the arbitrators are not obliged by any NAFTA or other treaties to be of 
the nationality of any of the parties, there is a likelihood that neither of them will be 
the national of the opponent in the matter. If there is no concord as to the third 
mediator, the one who takes decision is the Secretary-General who has a choice of 45 
arbitrators chosen by the parties and one more time the nationality does not play an 
important role here. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure the unbiased opinion of 
the panelists with regard to compensation scheme adopted.  
 
NAFTA does not contain any compensation regulations.  According to the ICSID 
Convention, the mediators calculate the expenses incited by the proceedings and they 
are restrained by the ICSID Administrative Council.  Additionally, as provided by 
Art. 1132 of the NAFTA, a panel may appoint experts to report in writing on the 
matter handled by the panel.  It may do so at the request of the disputing party or as a 
result of its own initiative.
892
 
  
Chapter 11 provides for arbitration requests in case of investor’s conviction about 
a party’s transgressing of the NAFTA regulations. The panel’s decision is obligatory, 
though no specific times to arrive at it are outlined, which can make the entire 
process a long one.
893
 
    
AC/CVD disputes solutions under Chapter 19 are binding and each party has to 
comply with the panel’s decision.  Chapter 20, though not providing for the 
automatic adoption of the panel’s final report, takes a reasonably shorter time to 
                                                 
892
 See id.  In light of NAFTA and its Chapter 19, the arbitrators’ fees, and travel and lodging 
expenses, as well as the overall expenses of the panel shall be divided equally between the parties.  
NAFTA emphasizes that a panel’s decision is binding.  
893
 See id., at 2-7. As has been early significant step on the path for investor-state arbitration 
improvement was the ICSID. However, the restrictions it imposed contributed to the search of other 
ways to resolve the disputes on in investment field.  Another could be an agreement debated on within 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to include the regulations and 
dispute resolution system as more satisfactory to advanced countries and investors. One of the 
drawbacks, however, is the fact that it would apply only to the members of the pact in question.  
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come at a conclusion and permits retaliation in case of one disputant’s avoidance to 
fulfill its obligations resulting from the arbitrators’ decision.894 
 
4.5.7 The Financial Services Case Presented before Chapter 14 NAFTA: 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company895 
 
Grupo Financiero Bancrecer, S. A. de C. V. (hereinafter GF BANCRECER) was one 
of the Mexican financial groups re-privatized in the early 1990’s.   
 
On August 29, 1995, GF BANCRECER’s shareholder’s assembly issued two 
series of subordinated debentures that would be convertible into stock in GF 
BANCRECER.  One series was to be in MXN and the other in USD.  Each series of 
debentures were to be in the amount of USD$50,000,000.  The funds were destined 
to capitalize GF BANCRECER’s bank, which was also its main subsidiary.  
   
The MXN series was purchased entirely by various Mexican investors.  The USD 
series was purchased in its entirety by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company 
(hereinafter FIREMAN’S FUND), a firm incorporated under the laws of the State of 
California, that has as its principal business the provision of insurance of various 
kinds, including accident, fire and other types of personal and business insurance. 
 
In 1997, GF BANCRECER’s bank faced financial troubles, so Working Group 
was formed with representatives of entities of the Mexican government for the 
purpose of carrying out an indemnification and capitalization program for the 
financial group’s bank.  As a result of such program, the Mexican instructed the 
purchase of the MXN debentures by FOBAPROA but not so the USD debentures. 
 
FIREMAN’S FUND, met with representatives of the Mexican government to 
discuss the measure and to seek a similar treatment of their USD debentures, which 
did not happen.   
                                                 
894
 See Gary Horlick, WTO and NAFTA Rules, op. cit., 4-15. 
895
 All the information in this section is taken from Fireman’s Fund v Mexico - AWARD ICSID Case 
(International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Dispute) No- ARB (AF)/02/01 Date of dispatch 
to the parties 17 July 2006; available at: 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/work/snci/negociaciones/Controversias/Casos_Mexico/Fireman/Firema
n.htm.  
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FIREMAN’S FUND then sued Mexico under NAFTA’s Chapter Fourteen, 
pursuant to the applicable provisions of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven, particularly those 
in Section B thereof, which comprises Art. 1115 through 1138.  FIREMAN’S FUND 
alleged that Mexico had violated, to its detriment, Art. 1102, 1105, 1110 and 1405 of 
NAFTA, and requested that the claims set forth to be submitted to arbitration under 
the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID.
 
 
 
FIREMAN’S FUND alleged that the Mexican government violated NAFTA’s 
Art. 1110, as it deprived it of its investment property in GF BANCRECER by 
resorting to prejudicial treatment, therefore banning FIREMAN’S FUND from the 
use and worth of its investment; and by compensating FIREMAN’S FUND to 
alleviate and make up for the loss, as obliged by the article referred.   
 
FIREMAN’S FUND claim was for the Tribunal to grant it indemnification for the 
complete worth of its investment, which was estimated in USD$50 million, together 
with interest grounded on a 90-day LIBOR rate, and additionally, 4% from the day of 
the acquisition up to the time of requital increasing per annum.
 
 
 
Mexico took the stand that all the challenged measures were “reasonable 
measures for prudential reasons” covered by the understanding of Art. 1410 
(Exceptions).  Fireman’s Fund rejected that all the measures fell under the article in 
question, and also argued that the means were not “reasonable”.  
 
This was the first case touching the issue of cross-border investment in financial 
services within NAFTA.  Having different regulatory principles as to securities 
transactions, insurance and banking, NAFTA’s member states were aware of the fact 
that investor-state arbitration for the provisions interpretation could not take place.  
Still, cross-border investments in financial institutions were to be fostered and 
incumbents – protected from expropriation by the NAFTA. 
 
The matter was addressed by the arbitration panel (Tribunal) who decided that the 
dispute indeed entailed investing in a financial institution.  The Tribunal pointed 
since Art. 1410 is entitled “Exceptions”, it lists all the means banned from 
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implementation under “this Part” (e.g. comprising Chapter Eleven and Chapter 
Fourteen) which cannot be treated as transgressing of the NAFTA if it meets the 
requirements of “reasonable measure taken for prudential reason.” 
 
FIREMAN’S FUND argued that if a means is unfavorable it cannot be treated as 
reasonable and thus falls under the general regulations.  Mexico answered that 
FIREMAN’S FUND misunderstood Art. 1410 and should not bring the claim of 
discrimination under Chapter Fourteen as it is obviously exempted from it.  
 
The Tribunal concluded that the exception applied to all regulations of Part Five 
(“Investments, Services and Related Matters”) of the NAFTA relevant to Financial 
Services comprising the NT article (Art.1405) and as such, according to Art. 
1410(1), allowed the implementation of sensible measures of a prudential character 
even though their effect could be biased.  Hence, the Tribunal refused to treat a 
measure discriminatory in effect and by that fact unreasonable. 
 
After having been a negotiator of NAFTA’s financial services chapter on behalf 
of the USA, Olin L. Wethington wrote in his book FINANCIAL MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION
896
 that Art.1410(1)(a), bypassing the NT and other obligations, 
ensures the right to apply reasonable measures in order to protect the security and 
stability of the financial system, even when the implementation of the tool may be 
discriminatory. 
 
Wethington emphasizes that exceptions include only sensible measures connected 
with capital adequacy, loan loss reserve requirements, cash reserve and liquidity 
requirements; and that the exempted means cannot be utilized as a disguise for 
discriminating USA or Canadian incumbents or for making discretionary judgments 
as to granting licenses and assessing particular firm applications.  
 
Another controversy was whether Art.1410 (1) was a self-judging provision.  Yet, 
in the Tribunal’s view that was not the case as the article allows the state-party to 
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 Op. cit. 
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defend before an unbiased panel or committee if the Tribunal finds a measure in 
question to make an expropriation thus violating Art. 1110.  
 
The soundness of the defense is to be addressed by the Financial Services 
Committee or by the arbitral tribunal.  As the Tribunal found out that in this case the 
measures did not constitute expropriation under the NAFA, the debate over the 
means being reasonable or discretionary is purely academic. 
 
The Tribunal decision concluded as follows:
 
 
(a) Reject FFIC’s claim to find the Mexican government guilty of violating Art. 
1110 of the NAFTA by expropriating FFIC´s investment. 
(b) Reject FFIC’s claim for compensation for the complete worth of its investment. 
(c) Assume that all parties shall bear their own costs and cover 50% of the costs of 
the Tribunal. 
 
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 
NAFTA has become the most important FTA of Mexico’s FTA network.  At the time 
of its implementation, NAFTA created the world’s largest market. This was a 
promising opportunity for Mexico, the smallest and weakest of the three parties, as it 
gained preferential access to one billion consumers in 44 countries. 
 
In addition to the economic benefits, there have been also intangible benefits for 
Mexico from NAFTA.  One worth highlighting is a more intentional adoption of the 
principles of the rule of law in Mexican legislation and institutions.  Consequently, 
predictability and legal certainty in the judiciary system has increased significantly 
since NAFTA came into force. This has been reflected in improvements made to 
legislation such as the Foreign Investment Law and the Banking Law.  
 
Some have argued that NAFTA was one of the main causes of the 1994 Mexican 
crisis.  However, Mexico’s liquidity crisis and consequent currency devaluation at 
the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 cannot be blamed on NAFTA since, as 
seen in Chapter 1, they were the result of weaknesses in an immature Mexican 
financial system which predated NAFTA. In the case of Mexico, NAFTA integration 
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encouraged productivity growth through both trade and foreign investment, and that 
global and regional integration resulted in productivity gains.  
 
Regarding financial supervision in NAFTA it should be noted that it is reserved 
for the host country affair, however, regulators are permitted to negotiate bilateral 
agreements leading to regulatory and supervisory harmonization. In relation to 
market access, NAFTA states that it may limit cross-border subsidizing of financial 
institutions, thus allowing member states to demand individual incorporation for 
financial incumbents in their territory, and thereby forbidding a direct cross-border 
branching. Nevertheless, NAFTA members have decided to discuss the possibility of 
direct bank branching across NAFTA country borders if and when the USA permits 
Mexican- and Canadian-controlled US banks to extend cross-state by subsidiaries or 
branches throughout the entire USA. 
 
Interestingly, due to the broad range of NAFTA’s financial services chapter, it 
deals with new types of financial services that may be currently non-existent.  
Furthermore, NAFTA (Art. 1407) states that countries consent to allow all regulated 
financial institutions from another NAFTA country to enter into their markets 
provided that their services are authorized in the territory of the country of origin.  
 
Regarding prudential measures NAFTA has proven its maturity through the 
Fireman´s Insurance Company (arbitration case related to), NAFTA (Art. 1410). 
Arbitrators of this case recently stated that nothing on the part of NAFTA, including 
the financial services chapter, shall be interpreted as a regulation refraining a 
NAFTA country from applying measures for ‘prudential’ reasons or in search of 
monetary and credit-related or exchange rate resolutions. This provision has been 
crucial. Above all, it allows exemptions in a number of chapters of NAFTA for 
sensible means applied or kept for prudential regulatory reasons. This so called 
‘carve-out’ guarantees that each member country has the elasticity to control its 
financial institutions. 
 
NAFTA pursued different objectives than those pursued by EU. NAFTA has a 
lower level economic integration and different financial systems, however, NAFTA 
should take important lessons from the EU. These include the recognition that a 
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minimum harmonization of regulatory frameworks and cross-border financial 
activities require reform of public administration, especially tax treatment, banking 
and insurance legislation and joint supervision of securities markets in order to make 
the “single passport” system reliable as it is in the EU. Nevertheless, there is still a 
long way to go, because NAFTA lacks the political will to enforce legislative 
programs similar to the EU. 
 
 MEFTA has had significant implications for NAFTA, since the EU became its 
second largest national trading partner. Any agreement that eliminates trade barriers 
and improves market access between these two crucial trading partners potentially 
has major implications for US businesses. Mexico has become an important export 
bridge for the EU to the USA and Canada and vice-versa. Consequently, enterprises 
from Mexico’s commercial partners are now able to establish operations in Mexico 
to take advantage of its preferential access to US, Canada, European and Latin 
American markets. In this sense, the EU represents an opportunity for Mexico 
because it is the largest and most integrated trade arrangement in the world that is 
bound into a customs union and is committed to political and economic integration. 
 
 It is worth mentioning that MEFTA has gone beyond the commitments of GATS, 
with the objective of the progressive and reciprocal liberalization of trade in services 
(not exceeding 10 years). The financial services sector in Mexico was practically 
liberalized, as seen in Chapter 1, when the MEFTA Trade Services Agreement came 
into force. It is clear that in the services sector and more specifically in the financial 
services sector, the EU benefits more than Mexico due to its net-exporter nature of 
services and financial services. European banks and insurance companies have been 
authorized to operate and establish themselves directly in Mexican territory like their 
US and Canadian counterparts. Mexican banks have similar access to the EU, 
however, since Mexico it is not a net-exporter in financial services, this potential 
market is not likely to be exploited (at least in the short and medium term), as much 
as the market for industrial products and manufacturing where the Mexican 
competitive advantage lays. Consequently, Mexico offers major benefits for all EU 
investors that desire access to the NAFTA region free of duties. The key lies in the 
correct combination of the rules of origin provided for in MEFTA and NAFTA, 
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together with the applicable Mexican domestic trade program, such as the 
maquiladora (In bond) and the Sector Promotion Program.  
 
Macro-economically the Mexico has made a significant recovery since the 1994-
1995 (tequila crisis) and since NAFTA came into force, as charts have shown, 
however, in 2008 it was hit severely by the GFC. Throughout the more than two 
years that have elapsed since the onset of the GFC, the Mexican economy and its 
financial system have shown resilience that calls for an explanation. Mexico has 
passed the final test and graduated. The next chapter shows that this can be largely 
accredited to Mexico’s “bottom-up” approach to the prudential liberalization of its 
financial system. 
 
  
 258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: 
 
MEXICO TWO YEARS AFTER THE ONSET OF  
THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND  
THE SUCCESS OF ITS BOTTOM-UP APPROACH  
TO PRUDENTIAL LIBERALIZATION  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The saying goes that when the USA catches a cold, Mexico gets pneumonia; and that 
actually used to be the case.  Not long ago, even fifteen or merely ten years ago, a 
crisis like the “made-in-USA” GFC unleashed in 2008 (2008 GFC) surely would 
have drowned Mexico into deep financial trouble and economic crisis.  Yet, unlike 
the 20
th
 century, the biggest global financial crises since the 1930s did not produce 
that outcome.   
 
To be sure, Mexico was severely hit by the 2008 GFC, yet throughout the more 
than two years that have lapsed since the onset of the GFC, the Mexican economy 
and its financial system have shown resilience that calls for an explanation.
897
  This 
chapter shows that this has been largely one of the fruits of Mexico’s “bottom-up” 
approach to the prudential liberalization of its economy, in general, and of its 
financial system in particular.  
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 This situation is not exclusive of Mexico but shared by other Latin American emerging economies 
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International Financial Crises, The Pre-Salt Discoveries by Petrobras and the New Free Trade Areas 
in the Cities of Brazil, LBRA (Sum 2009); and Brazil takes off, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 14
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 2009) at 
15.  
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5.2 EARLY STAGES OF THE CRISIS 
 
5.2.1 A Made-in-USA Crisis 
 
The 2008 GGC was originated in the USA and exported to the rest of the world in 
the form of “toxic assets” derived from its subprime mortgage market.898  The 
downturn was originally related to the weakening of the subprime mortgage market 
in the USA, especially during 2005 and 2006, but spread to the inter-bank market 
and other financial markets.
899
 
 
This crisis resulted from an unprecedented period of excessive borrowing, 
excessive lending and excessive investment incentivized by a series of significant 
economic and regulatory factors.
900
  However, excessive borrowing and lending were 
prevalent in all assets globally, including commercial real estate, corporate lending 
(mergers, acquisitions and private equity transactions), commodities and 
international equities. This broad based excessive borrowing and lending were fueled 
by excessive investment from a wide range of investors around the world.
901
 
 
The combination of excessive lending, excessive risk in the USA mortgage 
market, in addition to the lack of transparency, proper prudential regulation and 
supervision in the financial markets became the perfect storm to produce the crisis 
first in the USA, later in Europe and Japan, then to affect seriously most of the 
emerging economies and developing countries.  On September 18, 2008, the 
international financial system was on the precipice of collapse and global credit 
markets practically stopped working for the following four weeks.
902
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 See Arner, “The Global…,” op.cit., and  Stephen Labaton, Geithner: Regulators Part of the 
Problem, THE NEWS (Aug. 7, 2009) at 15. 
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 See OECD, “2009 Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth.” at 18. 
900
 Angel Gurría, “From the Financial crisis to the economic downturn –Restoring growth is a key 
challenge” op. cit., at 4 
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 See Daniel Tarullo, “Banking on Basel” (2008).  
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5.2.2 Mexico’s Early Resistance and the Success of its Bottom-up Approach to 
Prudential Liberalization 
 
It took some time for the 2008 GFC to hit Mexico and other Latin American and 
Asian countries.  According to Manuel Sánchez, Deputy Governor of BANXICO, 
this was due to “the reasonably good economic performance of various countries in 
Asia and Latin America…, the application of prudent fiscal and monetary policies 
and the endeavors made to improve financial regulation and supervision.”903   
 
Deputy Governor Sánchez also reported that, “when the first symptoms of the 
global financial crisis appeared, the majority of the analysts reckoned that the 
Mexican economy was in a more solid position that in previous episodes of financial 
turbulence.”  It was therefore reckoned that “the magnitude of the impact of the 
international crisis over the economy was going to be smaller than what has been 
finally observed.
904
   
 
According to the OECD Economic Survey of Mexico 2009, the financial sector 
looked relatively sound at the onset of the crisis, and its limited exposure to foreign 
assets and liabilities reduced vulnerabilities to shocks.  Conservative lending policies 
practices helped contain credit demand and avoided housing bubbles.
905
 
 
The above confirms that Mexico’s bottom-up approach to prudential 
liberalization of its financial sector was crucial in delaying and reduce the magnitude 
of the impact of the 2008 GFC in Mexico in the short term, and to prevent worse 
consequences in the medium and long term.  Mexico was indeed much better 
prepared to face this crisis than ever before since at least the Mexican Revolution 
(1910). 
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 Manuel Sánchez, “Impacto de la crisis internacional en México, respuesta de política y 
perspectivas” [Impact of the International Crisis in Mexico, response of policy and perspectives] 
(Speech, Nov. 19, 2009), at 1; available at: 
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 Sánchez, “Impacto…,”, op. cit., at 2-3. 
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 OECD, 2009 Economic Survey of Mexico, at Ch. 1. 
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One example of prudential financial regulation, that according to Deputy 
Governor Sánchez grounded the reckoning above quoted and that certainly protected 
the Mexican financial system, is the Mexican regulation that strictly limits the 
operations that banks can carry-out with related parties, including their holdings,
906
 
which prevented the latter to communicate the effects of their “toxic assets” (those 
linked to the USA subprime mortgage market) to the former. 
 
Another example of prudential regulation and oversight is found in the fact that 
“banks in Mexico did not have “toxic assets.”907  Likewise, as of 2008 it was 
recognized that Mexico was “the number one of Latin America in bank’s financial 
stability with 14.1 in per cent age of capital to total assets in 2008.”908 
 
Thanks to the bottom up approach to the prudential liberalization in México, Bank 
management adopted gradually and increasingly the definitions and development of 
international practices, especially after the 1994-1995 crisis.  At the regulatory level, 
the globalization of the Mexican financial system started in 1994 with the 
implementation of BCBS recommendations, which imposed international standard to 
measure the solvency and performance of Mexican banks.   
 
Internationally, the creation of new financial instruments and the risk position 
enlargement in the markets throughout the 1990s led to better risk management.   
Management practices and bank risk regulations have been influenced by Basel II, 
which is recognized by more than 130 countries. The Mexican financial system had 
no trouble adopting Basel II, since its regulation has been very strict after the 
“Tequila Crisis.” This, since several Mexican directives (for example on risks, 
CNBV 2004a and 2004b) are in complete agreement with BCBS’s principles (See 
Chapter 3). 
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 Id., at 3. 
907
 Sánchez,  “Impacto…”, op. cit., at 3.  See also Fidler, Wheatley and Thomson, Latin America…, 
op. cit.        
908
 See Fidler, Wheatley, and Thomson, Latin America…, op. cit.  
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5.2.3 Early Effects in Mexico 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the crisis still hurt Mexico. In the autumn of 2008, 
investors withdrew 22.19 billion dollars from the Mexican Stock Exchange and the 
federal government’s bond debt market.909   Likewise, at the end of 2008 Mexico’s 
prospects for economic growth in 2009 were notably downgraded to zero,
910
 or even 
“to slip marginally into negative territory.”911   
 
The crisis was transmitted to emerging economies, including Mexico, by multiple 
channels,
912
 but two shocks in particular were of considerable magnitude: the 
demand shock and the financial shock.
913
  According to BANXICO’s Deputy 
Governor Sánchez, the main channel of transmission to Mexico was the reduction in 
the rhythm of world economic activity and in the prices of raw materials and 
commodities, which caused a drop in its income of foreign currency (chiefly USA 
Dollars) coming from the export of goods and services, especially to the USA.
914
   
 
The shortage of USA currency in Mexico, plus the environment of greater risk 
aversion prevailing in the international markets that rarified the debt and foreign 
exchange markets, brought about a devaluation of the Mexican Peso against the 
Dollar.  This hurt private Mexican companies that had derivate operations in USA 
                                                 
909
 See Foreign Investors Withdrew $22.19 Billions from the Country, LA JORNADA (Dec. 18, 2008).    
910
 As of Oct. 20, 2008, “Merrill Lynch reduced its 2009 economic growth forecast for Mexico to 0.9 
percent from 1.9 percent” (Jens Erik Gould, Merrill Lynch Cuts Mexico 2009 Growth Forecast to 0.9 
Percent, Bloomberg (Oct. 20); available at: 
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Recession Stymies Mexico’s Growth for 2009, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 9, 2009); available 
at: http://online.wsj.com/Art./SB123146808512567033.html.  See also Erwan Quintin and Edward 
Skelton, How Much Will the Global Financial Storm Hurt Mexico? SOUTH WEST ECONOMY (Nov-
Dec 2008) at 1. 
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c75e5054-ddb9-11dd-87dc-000077b07658.html#axzz19eO9eNMR.  
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 On the impact on emerging economies in general and on the Mexican economy in particular, see 
Sánchez, “Impacto…”, op. cit., at 1-5. 
913
 Id., at 9. 
914
 Id., at 3.  The author further explains that Mexico’s peculiarities have increased the impact of this 
shock, that is, that 80% of Mexico’s exports of manufactured goods (which account for 80% of 
Mexico’s total exports) are purchased by the USA.  See also Manuel Sánchez, “Mexico’s Economic 
Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities” (Remarks at the Conference “Latin America 2010: 
Economic, business and Trade Forecast”.  Center for Hemispheric Policy.  University of Miami.  Feb. 
5, 2010), at 1-2; available at: http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/discursos-y-
presentaciones/discursos/%7B90A0BE2B-F2C3-0118-02A5-2EDDA1894287%7D.pdf.   
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Dollars, thus increasing the demand of that currency causing a further devaluation of 
the Mexican Peso.
915
   
 
The rarified debt and foreign exchange markets also caused “an increase in the 
long term interest rates, a drastic decrease in securities indexes… an increase in the 
margins of sovereign risk,” and a shortage of foreign financing for Mexican 
companies.
916
  
 
5.2.4 Mexico’s Early Measures to Face the Crisis 
 
In October 2008, the Mexican government announced various tax stimuli aimed at 
mitigating the effects of crisis and the global recession on Mexico, including an 
increase in public investment for 2009.
917
   
 
By January 9, 2009, upon the announcement that Mexico’s prospects of growth 
for that year were downgraded to zero,
918
 President Calderón announced 25 
measures to face the global crisis, to prevent outright recession and layoffs, to help 
households’ and SME’s economy, and to promote competitiveness in general, 
investment in infrastructure, and transparency in public spending.
919
 
  
At this point is worth highlighting commentary THE WALL STREET JOURNAL’s 
commentary, about the Mexican government having “more tools at its disposal to 
confront a recession than at any time in recent memory.”920  It is further explained 
that, “Past Mexican governments were too indebted to ramp up public spending in 
times of crisis and usually had to resort to belt-tightening.   
 
                                                 
915
 See Sánchez, “Impacto…” op cit., at 4.  For more on the negative effects that derivative operations 
had for Mexican companies, see infra 3.2. Impact on Private Companies that Gambled with 
Derivatives. 
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 See id., at 5.  
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last few months of 2008.   
919
 See id. 
920
 Sánchez, “Impacto…,”op. cit.  
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This time, the government is on solid enough ground to boost spending in areas 
such as infrastructure.”921  This was made possible due to economic liberalization 
reforms that implied abandoning the Statist economic model, without losing 
prudential input over the economy. 
 
Likewise, in addition to the measures taken to stimulate economic activity, the 
autonomous BANXICO and the federal government took several measures aimed at 
normalizing and preserving the sound functioning of the Mexican financial 
system.
922
  As for the monetary policy, BANXICO, in its capacity of autonomous 
monetary authority, “decided to start a cycle of monetary relaxation as a measure 
that would help to mitigate the unfavorable effects of the adverse international 
context.”923   
 
Regarding currency exchange policy, an early measure (October 2008) to backup 
the provision of liquidity in USA Dollars was an agreement between BANXICO and 
the Bank of the Federal Reserve of the USA that established a temporary currency 
exchange mechanism.  Likewise Mexico applied for a flexible line of credit with the 
IMIF, which was approved in April 2009.
924
 
 
Domestically, BANXICO was instructed to carry out extraordinary sales of USA 
Dollars in order to satisfy the demand of that currency by private companies and to 
provide liquidity.  Between October and December 2008, BANXICO auctioned 
$18.227 billion USA Dollars of its international reserve.
925
  Additionally, sales of 
USA Dollars were to be made whenever the Mexican Peso would devalue more than 
2% compared to the previous day, in order to prevent excessive volatility in the 
currency exchange market.
926
   
 
In order to provide liquidity in MXN for the domestic market, BANXICO 
allowed for mechanism of liquidity at a lower interest rate and allowing for a wider 
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 Id.  
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 See id., at 5-6, and 9. 
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924
 Id., at 6-7.  
925
 See id.; and Mario Reyna Cercero, Diana Salazar Cavazos & Hector Salgado Banda, “The Yield 
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No. 2008-15, Dec. 2008).  
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range of assets to be taken as collateral by commercial banks in order to acquire 
loans from it.
927
  Other measures were applied by SCHP and BANXICO “toward 
unlocking certain markets after the aggravation of the crisis.”928 
 
5.3 AFTERMATH FOR MEXICO AS OF 2009  
 
5.3.1 Impact on the Economy’s Growth  
 
By April 2009, the imported economic disturbance was aggravated by the measures 
the Mexican government had to take in order to prevent the spreading of the swine 
(or AH1N1) flu epidemic (according to international standards and commitments 
within the World Health Organization), and the role both played immediately and 
directly in the contraction of tourism in particular and the services sector in 
general.
929
 
 
In spite of the several measures taken in several fronts (which certainly helped to 
ameliorate the worst effects of the crisis), Mexico still “experienced a harsh 
economic downturn.”  According to official data, “the economic contraction started 
during the second quarter of 2008 and probably ended in the same quarter of 2009.  
During this five-quarter period, per-capita GDP plummeted by approximately 10%, 
a fall similar to the one observed in the first half of 1995...”930  
 
5.3.2 Impact on Private Companies That Gambled with Derivatives 
 
The crisis has brought to public light the role of financial derivatives in keeping the 
global financial system in a constant state of volatility.  This, however, was not a 
new experience for the Mexican economy. These financial instruments were a key 
factor in triggering the Mexican currency crisis in 1995.  This time, the derivatives 
                                                 
927
 Id., at 7. 
928
 Id.  The author lists five more measures dealing with governmental securities, bonds, swaps, etc.  
See, for instance, José Manuel Arteaga, Se emiten bonos de deuda por 2 mil mdd [Bonds Worth 
USD$2 Billion Are Issued], EL UNIVERSAL (Dec. 19, 2008); available at: 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/finanzas/68241.html. 
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 Sánchez, “Mexico’s…,” op. cit., at 4.  See also OECD. 2009. Economic Survey of Mexico 2009. 
The OECD 2009 [hereinafter OECD 2009. Economic Survey of Mexico 2009]. 
930
 Sánchez, “Mexico’s…,” op. cit., at 1.  See also OECD, Economic Survey of Mexico 2009, Ch. 4. 
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transactions undertaken by the Mexican corporations intensified the effects of the 
recession in Mexico.
931
 
 
The volatility in developed countries’ financial markets was not seen as a threat to 
Mexico’s financial stability until early October 2008, when international investor’s 
quest for liquidity and safety led them to reduce their exposure in emerging 
markets.
932
  The peso reached a six –year high against the dollar in early August but 
then began to fall.   
 
On October 8, this weakening intensified as the peso dropped by 13.8% in one 
day.  The fall was exacerbated when several large Mexican companies started selling 
Pesos to cover speculative bets on the exchange rate.  Mexico had not experienced 
such currency depreciation since the Tequila Crisis.
933
 
 
5.3.3 The Citi Group-BANAMEX Issue 
 
Another problem originated in the USA with which Mexican financial authorities 
had to deal with was the USA government’s ownership of CitiGroup (owner of 
Mexican bank BANAMEX) after the being bailed-out.  According to Art. 13 of the 
Mexican banking law, no governmental entity shall own stocks in Mexican banks.  
 
SHCP concluded that Citigroup did not have to sell its shares in BANAMEX.  
Opposition political parties (leftist) reacted by initiating a constitutional controversy 
before the Mexican Supreme Court.
934
  The resolution of this case needs to take into 
account NAFTA.  
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5.4 SYSTEMIC CRISIS PREVENTED AND FASTER ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACHIEVED 
 
5.4.1 Zero Bank Failures in Mexico 
 
The year 2009 was bad for Mexico; nevertheless a systemic crisis was prevented.
935
  
As of December 31, 2010, not a single bank in Mexico had failed nor were there any 
troubled Mexican banks.  Meanwhile, twenty five banks failed in 2008 in the USA, 
140 in 2009, and 157 in 2010,
936
  that is, a total of 322 failed banks in the USA since 
the beginning of the crisis.  This is noteworthy given the high dependence of the 
Mexican economy on the USA’s economy.   
 
While early analyses attributed this to the relatively small size of the Mexican 
banking system,
937
 the fast recovery of the economy and further research and 
analysis has shown that the explanation is found on the structural prudential reforms 
undertaken over the last 25 years: the bottom-up approach to prudential 
liberalization. 
            
5.4.2 Faster and Larger than Expected Growth in 2010 
 
As of November 2009, BANXICO’s Deputy Governor Sánchez estimated that 
Mexico’s growth for 2010 would be of approximately 3%, “conditioned on the 
magnitude and speed” of the recovery expected in the USA, and therefore with the 
reservation that if the demand of Mexican manufactured goods were to be smaller 
than the analysts’ forecast then the recovery of the Mexican economy would be 
slower.
938
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Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of recovery in the USA in 2010 (whose growth 
was downgraded to 2.5%),
939
 Mexico’s economic growth was estimated to be 5% for 
2010.  
 
According to BANXICO, as of September 24, 2010:  
 Production and manufacture exports were keeping “a good growing pace,” 
although it could decrease as a result of the moderation in the economic activity of 
the USA.” 940 
 Private demand continued “to be lagging behind, with depressed investment and 
consumption still below levels prior to the crisis.
941
  
 The currency’s exchange rate was in relatively stable levels, while long term 
interest rates had reached historically low levels.
942
  
 Inflation was lower than expected by both the market and the central bank, which 
estimated that it would stay below the floor of its own forecast,
943
 and expected to 
reach a 3% inflation rate by the end of 2011.
944
 
 
5.4.3 Key Factors of the Resilience of the Mexican Financial System and the 
Fast Economic Recovery 
 
5.4.3.1 Learning from Past Crises 
 
A special report by THE ECONOMIST highlights that, after the early 1980s crisis, 
“policymakers abandoned the protectionism and fiscal profligacy that had brought 
hyperinflation and bankruptcy. In their place they adopted the market reforms...  
(opening up their economies to trade and foreign investment, privatization and 
                                                 
939
 See The Financial Forecast Center, “U. S. Gross Domestic Product GDP Forecast” (Jan. 1, 2011); 
available at: http://www.forecasts.org/gdp.htm.  
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2010) at paragraph 2; available at: http://www.banxico.org.mx/informacion-para-la-
prensa/comunicados/politica-monetaria/boletines/%7BE1969E22-0202-5FCE-3CB0-
B02C66B029E1%7D.pdf  
941
 Id.  
942
 Id. 
943
 Id., at paragraph 3.  
944
 Id., at paragraph 4. BANXICO acknowledges in the cited document that its monetary policy has “a 
most powerful ally” in the fiscally responsible policy of the federal government.      
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deregulation).”945  Along the same lines, in The New Face of Latin America: 
Globalised, Resilient, Dynamic, WB says past crises have immunized the region, so 
that during this financial crisis, while advanced economies caught pneumonia, Latin 
America “only got a cold”.946  
 
5.4.3.2 Structural Reforms  
 
According to THE ECONOMIST, Latin America weathered the [2008-2009] recession 
partly thanks to good fortune but also to sound policies including “flexible exchange 
rates, inflation-targeting by more or less independent central banks, more responsible 
fiscal policies and tighter regulation of banks, as well as social policies aimed at the 
poor.”947  Since the late 1980s, Mexico has been intentional in pursuing fiscal 
discipline and fighting inflation, and shortly after (1994) amended its constitution to 
bestow autonomy to BANXICO.
948
  
 
 
Along similar lines, BANXICO’s Deputy Governor Sánchez has compared the 
difference of contexts between past Mexican crisis and the 2008 GFC.  Past Mexican 
crisis were homegrown crises “typically linked to major macroeconomic and 
financial disequilibria, in the form of high fiscal deficits, large current account 
imbalances and fragile financial intermediaries,” plus a fixed exchange rate, all of 
which “eventually led to a speculative attack on the currency.”949  
 
Unlike those crises, the 2008 GFC hit a Mexican economy that enjoyed “sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals, including a solvent fiscal position, a floating 
                                                 
945
 Michael Reid, A special report on Latin America.  So near yet so far: A richer, fairer Latin 
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exchange rate system, and an independent central bank committed to price 
stability.”950 
 
5.4.3.3 Economic Liberalization in General  
 
The role of economic liberalization  in general (primarily international free trade) in 
protecting the Mexican economy against the worst effects of the crisis and in making 
possible a faster and larger recovery is also identified by experts and commentators.   
 
Miguel Mancera Aguayo, former General Director and then Governor of 
BANXICO (1982-1998) mentions the larger diversification of Mexican exports 
along with BANXICO’s high international reserves and the system of floating 
exchange rate among the reasons for the better position Mexico had to weather the 
2008 GFC.
951
  Likewise, the F 
INANCIAL TIMES said that “thanks to its trade links with Asia, Latin America’s 
economies were broadly unhurt.”952 
 
As an example of the above, in the beginning of 2009, 50 transnational 
corporations moved their main operations from the USA, Europe and Asia to 
Mexico, with investments worth USD$100 billion Dollars.
953
  
 
Another notable example is found in the car industry.  As of September 2010, 
Mexico’s car exports had reached “1.4 million units, up 71.2per cent on last year and 
10.5 per cent on 2008, the best year on record.”954  Volkswagen, Ford, Chrysler 
(including Fiat) and Nissan have made significant investments in production plants in 
Mexico between 2008 and 2010, moving production, and even design, modeling  and 
engineering, from Europe, Japan, the USA and South America to Mexico. 
955
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This investment has been attracted to Mexico, not only because of the affordable 
labor costs, but also because “Mexico’s 40-odd trade agreements with other countries 
had made it both cheap for manufacturers to import materials and to export finished 
vehicles, in particular to the USA and Canada via” NAFTA.  Thus, Mexico has 
preferential access to two-thirds of the world’s GDP.956  
 
 
5.4.3.4 Financial Prudential Liberalization in Particular 
 
As a response to its early 1980s and 1994 financial crises, Mexico re-evaluated the 
role of financial law and institutions, which consequently lead to the development for 
the first time, of a sound and comprehensive prudential framework of internationally 
acceptable standards delineating minimum requirements for financial stability,
957
 yet 
working from the bottom-up domestically with innovative financial sector reform 
approaches.  Likewise, in attempt to comply with NAFTA obligations, Mexico 
amended several financial and commercial internal laws and regulations.
958
  
 
 Regulation changes strengthened the Mexican banking system as well as strict 
monitoring from the financial authorities.  Mexico empowered its financial system 
through building its markets upon a solid and structural foundation rooted in 
“international prudential financial standards,” as well as promoting the above 
mentioned “prudential liberalization” framework while respecting its domestic 
financial sector.  
 
Deputy Governor Sánchez confirms that another difference between past crises 
and the way Mexico dealt with the 2008 GFC, is “the construction of a strong 
regulatory and supervisory framework together with openness to foreign 
investment,” which has yielded a solid banking system.959  Likewise, the credibility 
earned by prudent financial policymaking over the past two decades may have 
helped Mexico weather the current financial storm without devastating effects.
960
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5.4.3.5 Savvy and Courageous Leadership  
 
Beyond political courtesies, BANXICO Governor’s assessment and endorsement of 
President Calderón’s performance in dealing with the crisis highlights that, in 
addition to proper policies, successfully weathering the crisis required both saavy 
and  courage:   
 
It would be obtuse to skimp on the merits of [the federal government’s] 
fiscal policy when today is amply acknowledged that Mexico knew how 
to foresee in a timely manner the strong adjustment that would follow 
after the global crisis.  Not all the governments of the world had, in the 
most acute moments of the crisis, the political will to defend a strong 
fiscal policy, even at the expense of misunderstandings and criticism.  
Fiscal strength which is indispensable to preserve in order to give 
continuity to an accelerated economic recovery without inflationary 
pressures, just as the one we have observed during 2010…  Ten years 
ago it would have been unimaginable that the Federal Government 
would finance itself, as it is now, at 30 years maturity term with a fixed 
rate, in pesos, of only 7.23%.
961
 
 
 
 
5.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND CLOSING REMARKS 
 
The 2008 GFC was an important test to the modernization process started by Mexico 
25 years ago.  As IDB’s chief economist Santiago Levy said about the 2008 GFC, it 
“may have been the final exam and the graduation party” after Latin America’s 
lengthy education in getting macroeconomic policy right.
962
  
 
Today Mexico is much better equipped to deal with adverse economic shocks 
today than at any point in its recent history.
963
  It has managed to reduce greatly its 
vulnerability to homegrown shocks and to insulate its banking and financial system 
from the 2008 GFC, mainly thanks to the “prudential liberalization” of its economy 
in general and of the financial system in particular.   
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Likewise, financial globalization brought benefits to the Mexican economy, which 
may be summarized as greater systemic stability, banks efficiency and better 
authorization practices as well as higher credit repayment rates. Notwithstanding, 
further structural reforms are urgently needed in areas such as education, tax-
collection, energy, labor, competition, communications and commercial 
diversification.
964
 Therefore Mexico should not only not back-track from the reforms 
already achieved but should apply the same approach of prudential liberalization 
exemplified in financial services to those other areas that need reforms. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSIONS 
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More than 35 years of increasing governmental control over the entire spectrum of 
the economy in Mexico, coupled with fiscal indiscipline and inflationary policies, 
only served to generate severe consecutive and ever- increasing downward-spiraling 
crises. The magnitude of the “tequila crisis” made it inevitable for the Mexican 
government to start a slow and initially hesitant departure from the earlier policies 
that led to the crises, and reluctantly to adopt liberalization and other market based 
economic policies (Chapter 1). 
 
Today, Mexico has not only overcome its systemic crises but has become, even as 
an emerging economy, an important and relevant actor in the global economic and 
financial scene.  The way Mexico weathered the 2008 “Made in the USA” crisis, 
which resulted from its regulatory and institutional framework reforms, attests to 
this. The previous crises have immunized Mexico, so that during this GFC, while 
advanced economies caught pneumonia, Mexico “only got a cold” (Chapter 5). 
 
Another testimony to Mexico’s importance and relevance in today’s globalized 
economy is its participation in the G20, even since the inception of its predecessors.  
Moreover, the positive balance of Mexico’s participation in the G20 has encouraged 
it to take a more active role, thus becoming a leading member based on Mexico took 
the first steps towards economic reform (most notably the accession to GATT), the 
latest GFC showed that Mexico’s country-specific bottom-up approach to legal 
reforms towards the prudential liberalization of the economy generally is bearing 
very palpable fruits, most notably in the financial sector (Chapters 3 and 5).  
 
The reform to the legal framework gave the Mexican financial system the strength 
and stability that has enabled it to avoid the likely disasters that a crisis like the GFC 
could have easily brought about under the previous legal framework.  In and of itself, 
this proves the merits of the Mexican bottom-up approach to prudential liberalization 
in the highly sensitive and specialized realms of markets and finance 
(Chapters 1 and 5).   
 
The current favorable state of affairs of the Mexican economy in general, and 
more specifically the resilience shown by its financial system after the GFC, are not 
fortuitous nor due to isolated causes, rather the aggregate result of the various legal 
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and economic reforms undertaken over the last 25 years. These reforms began with 
the GATT and were followed by the structural reforms of the early 1990s (notably 
the independence of BANXICO in 1994), NAFTA and WTO (1994), the opening of 
the financial sector (1995-1999), and the several FTA´s entered into with various 
nations and regions, including MEFTA in 2000 (Chapters 1, 2, and 5). 
 
An examination of tariff reduction by developing countries found that neither 
regional trade agreements nor multilateral agreements were the driving force in the 
liberalization. Autonomous liberalization or a “bottom up approach” accounted for 
66% of the liberalization, while multilateral agreements and regional agreements 
accounted for 25 and 10% respectively (Chapter 2). Thus, unilateral liberalization 
has become the most successful way to liberalize in many countries.  
 
Interestingly however, Mexico has been applying this approach under two unique 
circumstances: firstly, it has been implemented within a democratic environment 
 (in China, for example, although they also are pursuing  a bottom up approach, the 
communist party continues to decide who will rule the country); and secondly, 
through the adoption of internal structural prudential reforms (e.g. amending several 
internal financial, investment and commercial laws and regulations) undertaken over 
the last 25 years and through step by step in its implementation of international 
financial principles (Chapters 1, 3 and 5). This is not a defect inherent in the 
approach, rather a necessary result of the other political obstacles that Mexico has 
had to overcome and which have been aggravated by popular opinion and objection 
to economic liberalization throughout these years. In other words, both Mexican 
authorities and population in general were finally persuaded that this was the only 
path to follow in order to achieve the goal of economic progress and legal certainty 
and predictability. These are the reasons why this model should be followed by other 
countries of similar financial structure and level of economic progress. 
 
As has been stated, purely top-down legal reform is not viable in the long-term as 
much has to come from the bottom up. Especially regarding prudential financial 
standards, active and fully committed country participation is needed from the very 
beginning (Chapter 1) since has to be analyzed properly its level of implementation 
and commitment in each country, taking into account that every nation represents an 
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unique case. As such each authority may need to adopt solutions that correspond to 
their different needs and levels of development, as has been successful in the case of 
Mexico (Chapters 2, 3 and 5). 
 
In addition to economic modernization and resilience, Mexico has reaped other 
expected benefits from liberalization in financial services.  In general liberalization 
of services increases competition and consequently improves such services.  
Competition is the most effective instrument to lower average costs and increase 
quality and variety of services.  The presence of foreign banks in Mexico has 
provided access to foreign savings, lowered financing costs, and increased 
competitiveness, efficiency and diversity (Chapter 2 and 3). Transfer of knowledge 
was an additional benefit of early stages of its liberalization of the Mexican financial 
system, with the influx of experienced bankers from abroad and the adoption and 
implementation of relevant international standards and regulations (Chapter 3).  
 
On the other hand, the expected level of growth in financial inclusion as a result 
of financial liberalization has, as of yet, not been achieved in Mexico. This is due to 
several factors, the chief of which is the high level of poverty. Financial 
liberalization alone cannot solve the problem of financial exclusion, nor can private 
banks, especially when prudential standards are given priority. With its country-
specific bottom-up approach to financial reform, Mexican law consistently mandates 
the pursuit of financial inclusion to the development banks and other governmental 
programs and institutions. Therefore, private banks have not been forced to 
compromise prudential standards for the sake of financial inclusion (Chapter 3).  
 
A palpable benefit of social significance for the lower classes that has begun to be 
more readily recognized, and that is related to financial inclusion, is the amount of 
money made available by private banks for financing housing. This financing has 
grown steadily over the last four years, albeit moderately. It is true, however, that 
“social interest” (low-income) housing has comprised the smallest proportion of 
these loans and that it has not grown proportionately.  This confirms the underlying 
conflict between adhering to relevant prudential standards and achieving increased 
financial inclusion, since the low-income segment is the one with the highest 
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proportion of payment delays and defaults and generally has a higher risk 
(Chapter 3).
965
 
 
Some have argue that financial liberalization has only benefited developed 
countries while developing countries have been left vulnerable to unnecessary but 
inevitable financial crises. Mexico’s case, however, proves that this is not necessarily 
true, provided that proper sequencing and compliance with relevant prudential 
regulations are observed. On the contrary, financial liberalization has to be credited 
with rescuing the Mexican financial system from its 1994-1995 crisis (Chapters 1 
and 3). This crisis put NAFTA’s Chapter 14 (FFIC’s v Mexico) to the test and passed 
successfully when it confirmed a nation’s right to apply prudential criteria 
(Fireman´s case), further confirming NAFTA’s and MEFTA’s superiority over 
GATS and the WTO (Chapter 1, 3, 4 and 5).  
 
Due to the bottom-up approach to prudential liberalization in Mexico, bank 
management gradually and increasingly adopted the definitions and development of 
international practices, especially after the 1994-1995 crisis (Chapters 1 and 3).  
At the regulatory level, the globalization of the Mexican financial system started in 
1994 with the slow implementation of BCBS recommendations by Mexican 
authorities (CNBV and SHCP), which imposed international standards to measure 
the solvency and performance of Mexican banks (Chapter 3).   
 
Internationally, the creation of new financial instruments and the risk position 
enlargement in the markets throughout the 1990s led to better risk management.   
Management practices and bank risk regulations have been influenced by Basel II, 
which is recognized by more than 130 countries, including Mexico. The Mexican 
financial system had no trouble adopting Basel II, since its regulation has been very 
strict after the “Tequila Crisis.” This, since several Mexican directives (for example 
                                                 
965
 See BANXICO, “Reporte sobre el sistema financiero a junio de 2010” [Report on the Financial 
System as of June 2010] (Nov. 2010), at 46-47; available at: 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/dyn/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/informes-periodicos/reporte-
sf/%7BDC37ABCB-26F0-020D-145B-5CF397D62E68%7D.pdf.  Furthermore, another recent 
BANXICO document indicates that the low dynamism in loans “seems to reflect chiefly problems in 
the demand” not the supply.  See BANXICO, “Crecimiento económico: ¿Pausa o cambio de rumbo?” 
(Nov. 4, 2010), at 18; available at: http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/discursos-y-
presentaciones/presentaciones/%7BF4638876-217B-8699-D92F-9C6498AF3E9F%7D.pdf.  
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on risks, CNBV 2004a and 2004b) are in complete agreement with BCBS’s 
principles (Chapters 3 and 5).  
 
For the particular case of Mexico, the new Basel III will not represent as profound 
changes as those that the banks of other countries will have to face.  This, is because, 
after the 1994-1995 financial crisis in Mexico, a new and very demanding regulatory 
framework was established in the area of capitalization, both for the amounts of 
required capital, as well as for the quality demanded for such capital.  It is for this 
reason that banks in Mexico will not have to make extraordinary efforts to comply 
with the new regulatory parameters (Chapter 3).  
 
This is also why banks will be able to meet the new demands before the end of the 
international transition period, which goes until 2019. It is pertinent to point out that 
the past decisions made in Mexico on bank capitalization were appropriate and 
allowed its credit institutions to avoid being contaminated by the deterioration of the 
foreign banking systems (Chapter 5). This is confirmed by the fact that the new 
global regulatory framework is close to the one applied in Mexico. In fact, Mexico’s 
banks were so well capitalized by the time Basel III was announced, that as of 
August 2010, the Mexican banking sector already had a capital ratio index of 13 
percent, a calculation that used similar methodology to that of the new Basel 
requirements (Chapter 3 and 5). 
 
NAFTA is the most important among Mexico’s FTA network.  When it was first 
implemented, NAFTA created a market of 360 million people, the world’s largest 
market at the time of implementation. This was a promising opportunity for Mexico, 
the weakest party in the agreement. Mexico, as a natural hub for trade and 
investment is situated in a strategic geographical position and today enjoys 
preferential access to one billion consumers in 44 countries (Chapter 3 and 4). As 
seen in the macroeconomics charts (Chapter 4), Mexico has benefited greatly with 
north-south trade, since the concept of “rule of law” has been better understood. 
Since then, Mexican legislation (e. g., the foreign investment and banking laws) has 
been improved, and consequently, the predictability and legal certainty in the 
judiciary system has increased significantly since NAFTA came into force in 1994.  
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Some argued that NAFTA was one of the main causes of the 1994 Mexican crisis.  
Nevertheless, Mexico’s liquidity crisis and consequent currency devaluation at the 
end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 cannot be blamed on NAFTA since, as seen 
in Chapter 1, they were the result of weaknesses in an immature Mexican financial 
system which predated NAFTA. On the contrary, NAFTA integration encouraged 
productivity growth through both trade and foreign investment, and that global and 
regional integration resulted in productivity gains.  
 
A noteworthy legal principle of NAFTA is that financial supervision is reserved 
for the host country; however, regulators are permitted to negotiate bilateral 
agreements leading to regulatory and supervisory harmonization.  
 
Interestingly and due to the broad range of NAFTA’s financial services chapter it 
deals with new types of financial services that may be currently non-existent.  
According to the regulation of that chapter (Art. 1407 (1) of NAFTA) countries 
consent to allow all regulated financial institutions from another NAFTA country to 
enter into their market provided that their services are authorized in the territory of 
the country of origin. Regarding prudential measures NAFTA has proven its maturity 
through the Fireman´s Insurance Company case (Chapter 4). This so called  
‘carve-out’ has guaranteed that each member country has the elasticity to control its 
financial institutions and financial markets. Prudential measures were for the security 
of investors and depositors, to sustain the integrity of financial institutions, or to 
guarantee the security and steadiness of a NAFTA country’s financial system as 
happened regarding Mexico in the Fireman’s Insurance case (Chapter 4). 
 
NAFTA pursued different objectives than those pursued by the EU. NAFTA a 
lower level of economic integration and different financial systems, however, 
NAFTA should take important lessons from the EU. These include the recognition 
that a minimum harmonization of regulatory frameworks and cross-border financial 
activities require public administration reform, especially tax treatment, banking and 
insurance legislation and joint supervision of securities markets in order to make the 
“single passport” system reliable as it is in the EU. Nevertheless, there is still a long 
way to go, because NAFTA lacks the political will to enforce legislative programs 
similar to the EU. MEFTA has had significant implications for NAFTA, since the 
 282 
EU is the largest aggregate trading partner and Mexico is its second largest national 
trading partner. Any agreement that eliminates trade barriers and improves market 
access between these two crucial trading partners potentially has major implications 
for US businesses. Mexico has become an important export bridge for the EU to the 
USA and Canada and vice-versa.  
 
 It is clear that in the services sector, the EU benefits more than Mexico due to its 
net-exporter nature of services and financial services. European banks and insurance 
companies are authorized to operate and establish themselves directly in Mexican 
territory like their US and Canadian counterparts. Mexican banks have similar access 
to EU, however, since Mexico is not a net-exporter in financial services, this 
potential market is not likely to be exploited (at least in the short and medium term), 
as much as the market for industrial products and manufacturing where the Mexican 
competitive advantage lies. Consequently, Mexico offers major benefits for all EU 
investors that desire access to the NAFTA region free of duties. The key lies in the 
clever and correct combination of the rules of origin provided for in MEFTA and 
NAFTA, together with the applicable Mexican domestic trade program, such as the 
Maquiladora program (In bond) and the Sector Promotion Program (Chapter 4).  
 
Although the year 2009 was bad for Mexico, a systemic crisis was prevented.  
As of December 31, 2010, not a single bank in Mexico had failed nor were there any 
troubled Mexican banks.  Meanwhile, 25 banks failed in the USA in 2008, and in 
2010 a total of 322 banks had failed in the USA since the beginning of the crisis. 
This is noteworthy given the high dependence of the Mexican economy on the US 
economy. While early analyses attributed this to the relatively small size of the 
Mexican banking system, the fast recovery of the economy and further research and 
analysis have shown that the explanation is found in the structural prudential reforms 
undertaken over the last 25 years and the bottom-up approach to prudential 
liberalization through the adoption of international financial principles (Chapters 1, 3 
and 5). 
 
The achievements of the legal reform that liberalized the financial sector provide a 
stronger foundation for the several additional economic reforms that Mexico requires 
those already planned, those not yet planned but expected, and those that will 
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eventually become apparent to be required. This will be in addition to the 
adjustments required by the changes already adopted. Among such plans, the 
establishment of a customs union continues to be a major goal of the Mexican 
government, albeit following the failed attempts by the Fox presidential 
administration. The example provided by the EU then continues to be relevant in 
connection with Mexico’s country-specific and bottom-up approach to prudential 
liberalization. 
 
The one arguable disadvantage of Mexico’s approach has been the relatively slow 
pace with which liberalization has been incrementally achieved, which is why it has 
taken 25 years for liberalization to bear any recognizable fruits.  However, this is not 
a defect inherent in the approach, rather a necessary result of the other obstacles that 
the Mexican political situation has created (aggravated idiosyncrasies) including  
objections to market economics in general and economic liberalization in particular 
throughout these years (Chapters 1, 2, and 4). 
 
The practical impossibility of transitioning immediately or more quickly from the 
fully government-controlled and closed economy of the 1980s to a more liberalized 
economy creates the danger of stepping back from the partial reforms already 
achieved, especially during the earlier stages, due to the political opposition faced 
throughout this process. When, for example, the 1994-1995 crisis hit the then 
recently re-privatized banks, opponents of liberalization exploited the occasion to 
specifically blame re-privatization per se,
966
 and to more generally blame the support 
for market economic policies and reforms carried out in the early 1990s.   
 
Although that cross-roads highlighted one of the chief advantages of a bottom-up 
approach (since Mexico spontaneously and unilaterally allowed foreign banks to 
control Mexican banks although the NAFTAs provisions provided that to be 
scheduled much later), it also demonstrates that the reforms achieved were 
vulnerable to partisan national politics and the shifts in voters’ mood (Chapter 1).   
As of 2010, much of the political and academic debate on the political economy in 
                                                 
966
 As mentioned above (see supra Chapter 1, 1.2 The Mexican Pre-NAFTA Financial System), one of 
the factors involved in the 1995 banks’ crisis was the lack of specific banking experience of the new 
bankers.  Nevertheless that is not a defect of re-privatization per se but an inevitable result of lacking 
people with such experience after a decade of government controlled banks.   
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Mexico continued to be filled with voices opposing the current economic model and 
arguing return to the 1980’s model or other versions of Statism. The danger therefore 
continues to exist of Mexico ending the transition toward economic liberalization and 
leaving this proves unfinished and incomplete or even to regress 
(Chapters 1, 3 and 5).   
 
This risk increases as another presidential election approaches in 2012 and with 
the effects of the global financial crisis, which many continue to blame on 
globalization and economic liberalization. These remain strong opinions within large 
portions of the Mexican population.
967
 
   
The danger should not be underestimated especially since the articles of the 
Mexican constitution that were added and modified in 1983 to give almost unlimited 
powers to the government to control the economy (Arts 25, 26 and 28)
968
 are still 
part of the fundamental law. Consequently, there is a legal need to restrain any 
upcoming head of state (and even a majority in the legislative branch) from claiming 
and using (or abusing) such powers to undo 25 years of economic prudential 
liberalization.  In light of the fragile state of the reforms achieved to date, it is urgent 
that they are given permanence by reflecting them in Mexico’s Constitution  
(Chapter 1, Appendix 1 and 2).      
 
One factor that has given some degree of domestic validation to Mexico’s 
economic reforms has been the “indigenous” and unique or original source of several 
of the policies and measures undertaken within a democratic and peaceful 
environment, as opposed to being perceived as having been imposed from abroad or 
by authoritarian dictator or political party. This has gradually (and only recently) 
become a more prevalent feature of Mexico’s approach to prudential liberalization. 
                                                 
967
 On November 18, 2010, UNAM’s rector José Narro Robles “urged the governments to change the 
economic and social models in order to prevent the poverty and inequality that affect humanity from 
continuing to become more acute.”  He even stated that, “México is one of the countries more affected 
throughout the crisis.”  The statements were made in the context of the 2010 “World Summit of Local 
and Regional Leaders,” organized by Marcelo Ebrard, governor of the Federal District of Mexico 
(Mexico City), who has already expressed his desire to contend for the presidency in 2012 as 
candidate of the leftist PRD.  See Narro Urges City Mayors to Change the Social and Economic 
Models, LA JORNADA (Nov. 19, 2010) at 34.  
968
 See supra Chapter 1, 1.1.2 General Political Economy Background and Context of Pre-NAFTA 
Mexico. 
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This is exemplified by the leading role that Mexico, in both policy statements and by 
actual example, has taken among emerging economies, particularly in such contexts 
as the G20.   
 
The next logical step for Mexico is to formally incorporate a political economic 
doctrine into its Constitution that is consistent with the economic liberalization 
reforms already achieved over the last 25 years. Even though many of the ideas 
underlying these reforms date back to decades of global discussion and experience, 
Mexico’s specific approach to economic liberalization has been largely the product 
of indigenous reflection, reception, adaptation and implementation, with close 
attention to Mexico’s manifold particularities and specificities.  
 
Reversing the aforementioned 1983 constitutional amendments would reset 
sensible boundaries to government involvement and interference with the economy, 
and thereby restore the rule of law in this most sensitive area of national identity, as 
well as give its citizens (both individually and collectively) permanent legal certainty 
and predictability over their economic activities and development. Proper prudential 
liberalization requires that a government protect the interests of market users and the 
general public, with necessary adjudication and penalization steps being taken where 
the legal process has been abused or misapplied.   
 
One critical issue that must still be corrected (which goes beyond reversing the 
1983 constitutional amendments) is limiting the government’s power to expropriate 
assets other than land and its accessions (Art. 27).  Currently, Mexico’s government 
can expropriate companies as a whole, or all of their assets, apart from real-estate 
property (land and its accessions), which goes beyond the spirit of the same article in 
the 1857 Mexican Constitution.   
 
This unlimited power of expropriation “for the public benefit” generates another 
vulnerability to the rule of law, legal certainty and predictability which can damage 
productive investment in Mexico, as was demonstrated throughout the 20
th
 century 
and most painfully with the expropriation of the banks in 1982.  
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Achieving the degree of rule of law and legal certainty within Mexico as proposed 
above can only further strengthen its financial system, in particular, and its economy 
in general, and, with this, the quality and maturity of its legal and institutional 
framework.   
 
Finally, the experiences gained with prudential financial sector liberalization can 
be applied to structural reforms in other key sectors that urgently require 
intervention, such as education, fiscal policy, labor, energy, agriculture, 
telecommunications, and scientific and technological research and development, 
among others. An enlightened country-specific and bottom-up approach to prudential 
liberalization and structural reform could still achieve much more. 
 
This specific, and almost uniquely, Mexican approach to financial sector reform 
has been a key factor in securing the reforms achieved to date and, which can, if 
continuously applied and supported, generate further achievements in the future.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: 
 
Comparison of Arts. 27 and 28 of the 1857 and 1917 Mexican Constitution 
 
 
1857 CONSTITUTION
969
 1917 CONSTITUTION 
Art. 27.  The property of the persons 
cannot be occupied without his consent, 
but for cause public utility and prior 
indemnity. The law shall determine the 
authority that ought to make the 
expropriation and the requirements with 
which this must be verified. 
No civil or ecclesiastic corporation, 
whatever its character, denomination or 
object may be, shall have legal capacity 
to acquire in property or to administrate 
by itself real estate, with the sole 
exception of the buildings destined 
immediate and directly to the service or 
object of the institution.
970
  
 
Art. 27.  The property of the lands and waters 
comprehended within the national territory 
corresponds originally
971
 to the Nation, which 
has had and has the right to transmit their 
dominion to the particulars, constituting the 
private property.   
This shall not be expropriated but for cause 
of public utility and by means of an indemnity. 
The Nation shall have in all time the right to 
impose to private property the modalities that 
the public interest dictates as well as to regulate 
the exploitation of the natural resources 
susceptible of appropriation, in order to make 
an equitable distribution of the public wealth 
and to look after its conservation.  With this 
objective measures will be dictates to fraction 
large estates...
972
   
. . . 
V.-The Banks duly authorized, according to 
the law of the institutions of credit, may have 
capitals imposed upon urban and rural 
properties according to the prescriptions of 
such laws, but shall not have in property or 
administration, more real estate than those 
entirely necessary for the direct object.  
. . .  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
969
 Available at: http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/conshist/pdf/1857.pdf.  
970
 Written in the context of the Mexican Reformation War (between Liberals and Conservatives) the 
objective of this Art. was primarily to prevent the Roman-Catholic Church from hoarding (directly or 
through a private corporation) lands that were not put to work and which therefore became 
economically idle. They were called “goods in dead hands”. 
971
 Originariamente in the original text in Spanish.  The term is different from the term “original” as it 
means that the property of the land etc., was originally of “the Nation”, but that it continues to be 
ultimately property of “the Nation”.   
972
 Latifundios in the original text in Spanish. 
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Art. 28.  There shall be no monopolies 
nor embargos or prohibition of the free 
sale of products,
973
 nor prohibitions for 
the protection of the industry.  They are 
exempted solely, those relative to the 
minting of currency, mail, and the 
privileges that, for a limited time, the law 
grants to the inventors or improvers of an 
artifact.       
Art. 28.  In the Mexican United States there 
shall be no monopolies; nor embargos or 
prohibitions of the free sale of products of any 
kind;
974
 nor prohibitions for the protection of 
the industry; except only the ones relative to 
the minting of currency, the mail, telegraphs 
and radiotelegraphy, the issuing of bills by 
means of one single Bank which the Federal 
Government shall control, and the privileges 
that for a certain time are granted to the authors 
and artists for the reproduction of their works, 
and the ones that, for the exclusive use of their 
inventions, are granted to inventors and 
improvers of an artifact. 
. . . 
 
                                                 
973
 Estancos is the one word used in the original text in Spanish translated here as “embargos or 
prohibitions of the free sale of products,” according to the meaning number 3 given by the Spanish 
Royal Academy (http://buscon.rae.es/draeI/SrvltConsulta?TIPO_BUS=3&LEMA=estanco).  
974
 Id. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
 
Excerpts of the 1982 and 1983 Amendments to the Mexican Constitution 
 
Art 25: 
 
It corresponds to the State the governing of the national development to guarantee 
that it be comprehensive, that it strengthens the Sovereignty of the Nation and its 
democratic regime and that, by means of the promotion of the economic growth and 
the employment and a fairer distribution of income and wealth, it may allow the full 
exercise of the liberty and dignity of the individuals, groups and social classes, 
whose security this constitution protects. 
 
The State shall plan, conduct, coordinate and orient the national economic activity, 
and shall carry out the regulation and promotion of the activities that the general 
interest requires in the framework of liberties this Constitution grants.  
… 
The public sector shall be in charge, exclusively, the strategic areas appointed in the 
Art. 28, fourth paragraph of the Constitution, maintaining always the Federal 
Government the property and control over the entities to be established. 
 
Likewise it will be able to participate, by itself or with the social and private sectors, 
according to the law, to boost and organize the priority areas of the development. 
 
Under the criteria of social fairness and productivity the firms of the social and 
private sectors of the economy shall be supported and boosted, subjecting them to the 
modalities that the public interest dictates and to the use, in general benefit, of the 
productive resources, looking after their conservation and the environment.    
. . . 
The law shall encourage and protect the economic activity carried out by particular 
and shall provide the conditions so that the development of the private sector 
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contributes to the national economic development, in the terms that this Constitution 
establishes.975    
 
Art 26: 
 
The Estate shall organize a system of democratic planning of the national 
development that gives solidity, dynamism, permanence and equity to the growth of 
the economy for the independence and the political, social and cultural 
democratization of the Nation.976 
 
Art 28: 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
The laws shall set the basis to fix maximum prices to the articles, materials or 
products that are considered necessary for the national economy or the popular 
consumption, as well as to impose modalities to the organization of the distribution 
of those articles, materials or products, in order to prevent that unnecessary or 
excessive intermediations provoke insufficiency in the supply, as well as the increase 
in the prices. The law shall protect the consumers and shall propitiate their 
organization for the better looking after their interests. 
 
They are not monopolies the functions that the State exercises in an exclusive 
manner in the strategic areas to which this precept refers: minting of currency, mail, 
telegraphs, radiotelegraphy and the communication via satellite; the issuing of bills 
by means of one single bank, decentralized organism of the Federal Government, oil 
and the other hydrocarbons; basic petro-chemistry; radioactive minerals and 
generation of nuclear energy; electricity; railroads, and the activities that would 
expressly mark the laws that the Congress of the Union issues. 
 
                                                 
975
 DOF, Feb. 3, 1983 at 4; available at: 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_102_03feb83_ima.pdf.  
976
 Id. 
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It is also an exception to what is provided in the first part of the first paragraph of 
this article the rendering of the public service of banking and credit. This service 
shall be rendered exclusively by the State through institutions, in the terms that the 
corresponding statute establishes, which shall also determine the guarantees that 
would protect the interests of the public and the functioning of those in support of the 
policies of national development.  The public service of banking and credit will not 
be object of concession to particulars.977 
 
The State shall count with the organism and enterprises that it may required for the 
efficacious handling of the strategic areas of which it is in charge and in the activities 
of priority character where, according to the laws, it would participate by itself or 
with the social and private sectors.  
. . . 
. . . 
The State, submitting itself to the laws, shall be able, in cases of general interest, 
grant concessions for the rendering of public services or the exploitation, use and 
taking advantage of the goods of the Federation’s dominion, but for the exceptions 
that the same prevent.  The laws shall set the modalities and conditions to secure the 
efficiency of the rendering of the services and the social utilization of the goods, and 
shall avoid concentration phenomena that are contrary to the public interest.   
 
The submission to regimes of public service shall stick to what is provided by the 
Constitution and shall only be carried out by means of law. 
 
Subsidizes shall be able to be granted to priority activities, when they were general, 
of temporary character and not affecting.  
 
 
  
                                                 
977
 Except for a change in the capitalization of the word “Art.” in the first sentence, this paragraph 
remained without change from the November 1982 amendment.  
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APPENDIX 3: 
 
G20 and Its Role in the Architecture of the Mexican Financial System 
 
Aiming to achieve financial stability, G20 has played a significant role in the 
construction of the current global financial architecture in general, and in the 
evolution of the Mexican financial system in particular.  As shown in what follows, 
since G20’s inception, Mexico has adopted a proactive role, both domestically and 
externally, in sketching and adopting measures that portray the current global 
financial architecture.   
 
1. Background, History and Development. 
 
During the 1980s, trade liberalization (GATT and, subsequently, WTO), domestic 
capital markets liberalization of and the opening of capital accounts (first in 
industrial economies and later in emerging economies) brought about an exponential 
increase in cross-border capital flow and, in general, an increasingly integrated 
global economy.  “Much of this increase was again due to the growing importance of 
emerging markets, and importantly reflected the unprecedented additional 
momentum provided by the transition of largely closed centrally-planned economies 
to open market economies.”978   
 
Consequently,  
While it had been possible for major industrial countries to address 
most global economic problems among themselves—through the G-5 
or subsequently the G-7—during the 1970’s and even to a large extent 
during the 1980s, this had become increasingly difficult by the late 
1990s, as the weight of the G-7 countries in the global economy 
declined, owing largely to the rapid growth of emerging economies, 
especially those in Asia.
979
 
 
Likewise: 
The increasing interdependence of all countries stemming from the on-
going expansion of cross-border trade and capital flows, and the parallel 
rise in the exposure of countries to economic and financial shocks 
emanating from far beyond their borders, underscored the importance of 
                                                 
978
 See G20, THE GROUP OF TWENTY: A HISTORY (2008), at 9.  Hereinafter, THE GROUP OF TWENTY. 
979
 Id.  
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broadening the scope of international economic and financial co-
operation.
980
 
 
These ‘tectonic’ shifts in the global economy,”981 plus the late 1990s crises in 
emerging economies,
982
 motivated the launching of a new international group.
983
  In 
the wake of the 1997 Asian crisis (at the APEC leaders’ summit, Vancouver, 
November 1997), the idea sprung of organizing “a special meeting of finance 
minister from around the world to examine and debate the problems besetting the 
global economy and, where possible, to seek a consensus on solutions.”984   
 
                                                 
980
 Id., at 11. 
981
 Id. Elsewhere, the same document reiterates that “While the establishment of the G-20 was a direct 
response to the global repercussions of the economic and financial crisis in Asia, it also gave tangible 
recognition to the marked changes to the international economic landscape that had occurred over the 
preceding decades.  Emerging countries had become important economic powers.  Moreover, owing 
to the increasing integration of economies and markets through globalization, domestic developments 
in these countries could have significant repercussions far beyond their borders” (at 16). 
982See “Origins” at http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx. According to THE GROUP OF 
TWENTY, “The main motivation for launching a new international group was the crisis in emerging 
economies that had begun in Thailand in mid 1997, and which widened and intensified through the 
next two years, touching other important Asian economies, before spreading to Russian and Latin 
America” (at 9).  Notwithstanding the above, the same document mentions later that, “At the 1995 
Halifax G-7 Summit, the support of a number of emerging and smaller industrial economies was 
sought to help strengthen the international financial architecture in the wake of the Mexican peso 
crisis. In addition to urging the establishment of a new standing procedure, and encouraging work on 
an IMF quota increase, G-7 leaders looked beyond the traditional G-10 group of industrial countries to 
“other countries with the capacity to support the [international financial] system” to lend funds to the 
IMF in case of emergencies” (at 10). The same document states that among the several factors 
underlying the expanding crisis, a most important one is that, “the development of supervisory and 
regulatory systems in many emerging economies had not kept pace with the challenges posed by the 
opening of capital accounts and with the liberalization of domestic financial sectors” (at 11). 
983
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As a result, a G22 (also known as the Willard Group) met at Washington, DC,’s 
Willard Hotel, in April 1998, “to examine the functioning of the international 
financial system.”985   
The group – which characterized itself as ‘Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors from a number of systematically significant 
economies’ – was originally conceived as a one-time meeting to resolve 
global aspects of financial crisis in emerging-market economies.
986
   
 
The countries invited to attend, in addition to G7 members,
987
 were 15 important 
economies.  Only 11 of those attended.  They met again (as an extension of the first 
meeting) on the margins of the fall 1998 meetings of WB and IMF (5 October 1998), 
with four more countries joining the group (thus completing the 15 countries): 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand.
988
   
 
G22’s work: 
... Helped to provide direction and support to international financial 
institution, such as the IMF, in their efforts to promote reforms aimed at 
strengthening domestic and international financial markets.  These 
included greater disclosure and transparency, adoption of 
internationally-accepted standards and codes, and development of a 
framework for crisis solution.
989
     
 
It “also contributed to the G7 initiative announced by finance minister and governors 
in October 1998 to examine arrangement for co-operation among international 
regulatory and supervisory bodies.”990 
 
After various proposals, discussed among G7 countries through the autumn of 1998, 
on how to carry forward G22’s work, by early 1999, G7 agreed “to hold follow-up 
seminars on international financial architecture, involving a much larger group of 33 
countries.”991  G33 thus succeeded G22, comprised by G22 plus Belgium, Chile, 
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Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden 
Switzerland, and Turkey.
992
   
 
G33 met twice in 1999 for ad hoc seminars, at Bonn, Germany, in March, and at 
Washington, DC, in April.  “Issues covered at these seminars included improving 
prudential oversight of financial markets; strengthening financial systems, especially 
in emerging-market economies; and encouraging the adoption of policies to better 
protect the most vulnerable.”993 “The proposals made by the G22 and G33 to reduce 
the world economy’s susceptibility to crises showed the potential benefits of a 
regular international consultative forum embracing the emerging-market 
countries.”994  Likewise: 
 
It was hoped that an international consensus would coalesce around G-7 
proposals under consideration ahead of the 1999 Cologne Summit that 
were aimed at strengthening and reforming the international financial 
institutions, as well as financial markets in industrial and emerging 
economies.995 
 
In spite of being reckoned successful, both advanced and emerging economies were 
dissatisfied “with the ad hoc nature” of G22 and G33 processes.  “There were also 
concerns about the number of participants at the G-33 seminars, which made it 
difficult to have a meaningful informal dialogue among key countries on important 
economic and financial issues.”996  G7 also realized “the merit in engaging 
systemically important emerging-market economies in a regular informal dialogue,” 
because the growing importance of this countries “in the global economy and their 
vulnerabilities had been exposed by earlier crisis.”997    
 
Therefore, after the second G33 seminar (April 1999) discussion on a replacement of 
the G33 began.  Then Canada’s finance minister Paul Martin championed the idea of 
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broadening the international architecture beyond G7 or G10, arguing that emerging 
economies had to “be at the table and be part of the solution.”998   
  
Proposals were discussed until “a consensus emerged that a distinct ‘G-X’ needed to 
be created as a forum for debate among systemically important advanced and 
emerging economies.”999  In their June report to the 1999 Cologne G8 summit, on 
strengthening the international financial architecture, G7 finance ministers 
recommended the establishment of G20.   
 
During August and early September 1999, G7 solved important issues such as “the 
mandate of the new Group, its membership, and how it would be integrated “within 
the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system” as called for by G-7 
ministers in the June 1999 communiqué.”1000  The establishment of G20 was 
confirmed by the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors in their joint 
communiqué in September 1999.
1001
  That was the official birth of G20.   
 
The main issue discussed in the first Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank 
Governors’ Meeting was crises prevention and resolution.  Among other things, G20 
members agreed back then to: 
…implement the emerging international consensus on policies to reduce 
countries’ vulnerability to financial crises, including through 
appropriate exchange rate arrangements, prudent liability management, 
private sector involvement in crisis prevention and resolution, and 
adoption of codes and standards in key areas including transparency, 
data dissemination, market integrity, and financial sector policy.
1002
 
By 2001, crisis prevention and resolution still remained as a main issue, and G20 
concluded that the adoption of “the best practices embodied in international 
standards and codes also will help support strong, stable growth and reduce the risk 
                                                 
998
 Paul Martin, Interview conducted by Candida Tamar Paltiel, G8 Research Group, (Ottawa 18 
November 2001). Available at www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/interviews/Martin011118.pdf.  Cited in THE 
GROUP OF TWENTY, at 17.   
999
 THE GROUP OF TWENTY, at 18. 
1000
 Id.  
1001
 See HAJNAL, op. cit., at 152. 
1002
 G-20, Communiqué, “G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting,” (Montreal, 
25 October, 2000) at paragraph 7. 
 297 
of future financial crises.”1003 Accordingly, it continued promoting the adoption of 
international standards and codes, and the assessments under one or both of the 
IMF/WB-led FSAPWB and Reports on Observances with ROSCs, which had been 
implemented on a voluntary basis by the majority of G-20 members.  
Upon the attacks to the USA on September 11, 2001, which were perceived as an 
attack to all of its members intended to shake global economic confidence and 
security, G20 incorporated “terrorism” to the issues to be discussed and address by 
the group.  G20 thus affirmed:  
We are committed to combating terrorism by cutting off its financial 
sources. There should be no safe havens for the financing of terrorism. 
To this end, we have agreed on an Action Plan to deny terrorists and 
their associates access to our financial systems. We call on other 
countries to take similar steps.
1004
  
G20 members also agreed on the implementation of UN conventions, and supporting 
surveillance and voluntary self-assessments through the IMF, the FATF, and other 
international organisms. 
On 2003, under Mexico’s leadership, G20 followed up discussion on such issues as 
crises prevention and resolution, globalization, and the interdiction of terrorist 
financing.  Additionally, a major step was taken to reach a consensus to solve 
financial crises: Mexico announced that it had included collective action clauses in 
an international bond with the purpose of restructuring debts in case the debtor is 
unable to carry out its commitments. Eventually other G-20 countries and smaller 
developing countries such as Brazil, Korea, and South Africa followed this 
example.
1005
  Endeavouring to achieve UN’s “Millennium Development Goals” was 
another resolution of 2003, at the “Monterrey Consensus,” which concerns and 
involves Mexico.
1006
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In 2004, G20 members Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey, together with private 
sector creditor groups, including IFF and IPMA, issued the “Principles for Stable 
Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.” 
  
We reaffirmed the importance of an international financial architecture 
that sets incentives for pursuing sustainable policies and prudent risk-
taking. In this regard, we welcomed the results achieved between 
issuing countries and private-sector participants on “Principles for 
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging 
Markets.” Such principles, which we generally support, provide a good 
basis for strengthening crisis prevention and enhancing predictability of 
crisis management now, and as they further develop in future.
1007
 
 
On 2004, two mid-term issues were also discussed in 2004, regional economic 
integration and demography and growth.  On regional integration, a subject matter in 
which Mexico has played and continues to play a key role, G20 concluded: 
 
We agreed that regional cooperation and integration can be important 
steps for national economies in opening up to global trade and financial 
flows and in achieving gradual improvements in competitiveness. We 
agreed that G20 countries, as systemically important economies, have a 
special responsibility in their regions. We undertake to play a leading 
role in advancing regional and global integration.
1008
 
 
...policy challenges differ greatly among countries in the short-term. 
Countries that will encounter aging problems first need to integrate to 
the labour force a larger part of their working-age population, expand 
individual working life, and implement life-long learning. Countries 
that will experience a rise in the working age population before the 
problematic impact of aging becomes apparent should increase 
investment in human-capital and infrastructure while pursuing prudent 
fiscal policies.
1009
 
  
By 2005, another issue concerning Mexico became the focus of G20, namely, the 
importance migrant remittances have for developing countries to reduce poverty and 
promote economic development.  Therefore, G20 urged the international community 
to improve remittance services. 
 
                                                 
1007
 G-20, Communiqué, G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, (Berlin, 
Germany, 20-21 November 2004) at paragraph 3. 
1008
 Id., at paragraph 6. 
1009
 Id., at paragraph 7.  
 299 
By 2006, G20’s the subject matter of the Annual Meeting was “Building and 
Sustaining Prosperity.” The aim being to promote global development and growth, 
based upon open trade.
1010
  It was recognized that “maintaining a strong world 
growth and containing inflation will require ongoing adjustments to monetary and 
fiscal policies while ensuring appropriate exchange rate flexibility and structural 
reform.”1011   
 
President Calderón’s administration (inaugurated on December 1, 2006) has follow 
suit promoting fiscal discipline and giving continuity, in coordination with 
BANXICO, to the fight inflation, and to maintaining sound and prudential monetary 
and exchange policies, even in spite of the strong antagonism of the opposition 
political parties.  This ongoing antagonism has been the reason why structural 
reforms have not been achieved, as the Legislative branch is controlled by the leftist 
opposition parties, chiefly PRI and PRD.
1012
   
 
On 2007, under the leadership of South Africa, G20 followed up on the 2005-2006 
Bretton Woods Reform discussion.  The statement “Reforming the Bretton Woods 
Institution” was intended to strengthen the “credibility, effectiveness and legitimacy 
of IMF and WB.”1013  Consequently, G20 insisted that the reform should enhance the 
representation of dynamic economies, many of which were emerging market 
economies, whose importance in the global economy had increased.  
 
On November 14-15, 2008,  
 
...the leaders of the world’s 20 systemically significant countries held 
their first summit in Washington DC in response to the great made-in-
America financial crisis that had erupted in full force two months 
before. Within six months of their Washington gathering they met 
again, on April 1-2, 2009, in London. A mere six months later, they met 
for a third time, on September 24-25, 2009, in Pittsburgh.  There they 
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proclaimed that their summit would become a permanent institution, to 
serve as the primary centre of global economic governance for the 
indefinite future, long after the crisis that had created it had passed.
1014
 
 
Thus, “although a creation of the G7, the G20... developed as an autonomous, 
informal group,”1015 firstly, then to become (due to the September 2008 USA 
financial crisis) a permanent summit, “quickly repeated to become a permanent 
feature of international political life.”1016  As a result, G20 meetings are no longer 
forums merely for finance ministers and central bank governors, but a summit of its 
member’s leaders.  “G20 leaders still meet with their finance ministers by their side, 
and thus far only ministers of tourism (from all members but America) and ministers 
of labour seem ready to join the G20 governance game.”1017  
 
2. Mandate and Objectives. 
 
As stated at its inaugural meeting by the ministers and central bank governors, G20: 
 
…was established to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in 
the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden 
the discussion on key economic and financial policy issues among 
systemically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve 
stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all.
1018
 
 
As a result of the September 2009 Pittsburgh summit (the third meeting in a row 
within a year after the 2008 “Made in USA” crisis) and G20’s decision to become a 
permanent institution, it proclaimed its mission was “to serve as the world’s premier, 
permanent forum for international economic cooperation”1019 From the Pittsburgh 
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Summit, G20 Finance Ministers were tasked “to take forward work in the following 
areas:”1020 
 
 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth  
 Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory System 
 Modernizing our Global Institutions to Reflect Today's Global Economy 
 Reforming the Mandate Mission, and Governance of the IMF 
 Reforming the Mission, Mandate, and Governance of Our Development 
banks 
 Energy Security and Climate Change  
 Strengthening Support for the Most Vulnerable 
 Putting Quality Jobs at the Heart of the Recovery 
 An Open global economy 
 
3. Members and Structure. 
 
G20 country members are G8 country members plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, 
and the Council Presidency and the President of the European Central Bank, who 
together represent the 20
th
 member, namely, the EU.  There are also ex-officio 
participants: the managing director of the IMF, the President of WB, and the 
chairpersons of the IMF, and Financial Committee and Development Committee of 
the IMF and WB.
1021
 
       
The G20 represents all the regions of the world. Together, its members 
comprise two-thirds of the world’s population and generate 
approximately 90% of global gross domestic product.  Their combined 
economic clout and broadly representative membership give the G20 
greater legitimacy and potential greater influence than the G8 
commands.
1022
   
 
Members interact as equals without legal binding decisions; speeches are intended to 
be spontaneous; and the staff is not permanent but provided by the chairing country.   
 
At the Sherpa Meeting 1, in Mexico City (January 12, 2010), the consensus on 
membership and participation was that: 
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G20 should have 20 country member participants, the 19 with the chair 
each year being allowed to invite 1-2-3- guests as its choice, but only 
for that year.  The European Union (EU) was seen in a special category 
as far as regional organizations were concerned.
1023
   
 
4. Mexico and G20 
 
Mexico’s participation in the Bretton Woods institutional system, through G8 (from 
which G20 sprung), dates back to 1989:   
Mexico started participating in G8 summit governance at the leaders’ 
level in 1989, did so again in 2003 and has done so continuously since 
2005. It has participated as an equal at the ministerial level, starting 
with the Global Health Security Initiative since 2001, and at the official 
level in the Heiligendamm Process since 2007.
1024
 
 
Mexico has been a full member of the G20 at all levels from the start, but “with the 
very recent emergence of an inner, replacing the troika, as the steering group for the 
G20 summits and thus system, Mexico is not a member of this inner grouping.”1025 A 
2003 G20 assessment of Mexico’s Institution1026 building in its financial sector, 
deemed Mexico’s case a positive example regarding liberalization on institution 
building.
 1027
 
 
As already mentioned above, in 2003 and under its leadership, Mexico announced 
that it had included collective action clauses in an international bond with the 
purpose of restructuring debts in case the debtor is unable to carry out its 
commitments, an example that other G20 countries and smaller developing countries 
followed later.
1028
 In 2004, Mexico was one of the G20 members that, together with 
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private sector creditor groups, issued the “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and 
Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.” 
 
In November 2006, G20 recognized that, “maintaining a strong world growth and 
containing inflation will require ongoing adjustments to monetary and fiscal policies 
while ensuring appropriate exchange rate flexibility and structural reform.”1029 
President Calderón’s administration (inaugurated on December 1, 2006) has follow 
suit promoting fiscal discipline and giving continuity, in coordination with 
BANXICO, to the fight inflation, and to maintaining sound and prudential monetary 
and exchange policies, even in spite of the strong antagonism of the opposition 
political parties and pundits.  
 
The great “Made in USA” financial crisis that erupted in September 2008, inevitably 
affected the Mexican economy especially, because of its strong dependence on the 
USA’s economy.  Income was affected because of the crisis effect on Mexico’s 
exports of manufacture and oil, USA tourism to Mexico, remittances of migrant 
workers.
1030
  As a result, the Calderón administration (2006-2012) has participated 
actively in G20’s pursuit of durable solutions to the global crisis.  As of 2010, 
Mexican efforts are focused on following up fiscal and monetary measures aimed at 
restraining global crisis consequences.
1031
  
 
At the London 2009 G20 meeting, Mexico supported, among other measure, the 
enforcement of international coordination to make information available on a timely 
basis, in order to be able to design global strategies that allow for the prevention and 
resolution of financial institutions’ bankruptcies.1032  Mexico implemented this 
measure by creating the Council of the Financial System Stability.
1033
  It was the first 
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emerging economy to adopt this measure, which most developed countries had 
already implemented.
1034
  
 
In the speech to introduce this act, President Calderón said: 
With this council we are generating a privileged forum to strengthen 
the coordination and exchange of information between the country’s 
financial authorities which will allow us to act in a faster and more 
accurately manner, when risks for financial systems are detected, and 
also will allow us to comply with commitments proposed to reinforce 
national finances and also contribute to the international effort in 
accordance with commitments acquired at G20. 
1035
   
 
The concern for finding and applying durable solutions to the global crisis is not 
restricted to Mexico but constitutes one of the most frequent discussions in 
international forums such as G20.
1036
  In this regard, anti-cyclical policies,
1037
 reform 
of financial institution and market liberalization were measures implemented by 
Mexico, in some cases, even before they were proposed by G20 as a reaction to 
global crisis
1038
. 
 
Mexico has adopted a proactive role in proposing issues to be discussed by G20, 
such as: 1) Coordinating developed and emerging economies and IMF, WB and, in 
general, international financial organisms; 2) Rebuilding the international financial 
structure; 3) Implementing a “Green Fund” to address climate change; and 4) 
Committing to achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.
1039
 
 
Along with Germany, Mexico coordinates G20’s Working Group, which is in charge 
of the “Reinforcement of international cooperation and promotion of financial 
markets integrity,” the following purposes: follow up and develop proposals to 
strengthen regulatory cooperation  of institutions and financial markets, strengthen 
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negotiation and resolution of international effects of financial crisis, elaboration of 
proposals to protect global financial system from illicit activities and strengthen 
cooperation between international agencies. 
1040
 
 
Mexico has also endeavoured to increase the involvement of the emerging economies 
in the decision making and the implementation of international economic and 
financial guidelines.  Together with Argentina and Brazil, Mexico has promoted the 
voice and vote reform of IMF and WB moving the deadline from 2013 to 2011. 
1041
 
   
On January 13-14, and upon Mexico’s invitation, G20’s Sherpas met at the Mexican 
Foreign Ministry to discuss the group’s rules of operation. “Among other issues, they 
discussed their positions on the group’s rotating presidency; the scope, frequency and 
timing of the summits, support structures and the relationship with the meetings of 
the finance ministers and Central Bank governors.”1042 
 
On March 12, in the context of the delivery of his paper Why the World Needs G8 
and G20 Summitry: Prospects for 2010 and Beyond,
1043
  Prof. John Kirton 
(University of Toronto) said that “Mexico is called to occupy a very important role in 
G20, above all as a communication bridge between developed and developing 
nations.”1044  Likewise, Kirton highlighted the interest demonstrated by Mexico in 
updating the so-called ‘international architecture.”1045 
 
On May 15, 2010, under “Global Issues” in the V EU-Mexico Joint Statement: 
 
On global economic and financial issues, both sides stressed the 
importance of the multilateral trading system of the WTO and an 
ambitious and balanced outcome of the Doha Development Round as 
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soon as possible. Both sides agreed on the need for the G20 to deliver 
on existing commitments and to set ambitious goals for the future to get 
a stronger, more balanced and more sustainable growth. They shared 
similar views about the priorities to pursue in this context, notably on 
supporting global recovery; ensuring a consistent implementation of 
financial market reforms and strengthening international financial 
institutions, among others. From its side, the EU welcomes and 
supports hosting the G-20 Summit in 2012. The EU is committed to 
make a strong contribution to this Summit.
1046
 
  
In advance of G20’s IV Summit (June 26-27, 2010), a June 25, 2010, communiqué 
by the Presidential office, announced: 
 
President Felipe Calderón shall ratify Mexico’s role as key performer in 
the multilateral consensus mechanisms at global level and the 
commitment of his Government to contribute to international economic 
stability.  He shall also address the overdue need of achieving 
sustainable and balanced world growth, as well as moving forward in 
the agenda of reforming international institutions in favour of 
developing countries.  He shall reiterate the need to promote an open 
commercial system, free of protectionist measures, as key factors for 
economic recovery and the recovery of Mexico’s exporting activity.1047      
 
At the summit, President Calderón said that although the strategy of recovering 
growth (at the expense of  fiscal stability) generally work for those countries that 
adopted it, “there are certain consequences that are starting to be paid which, 
paradoxically, are becoming one of the main inhibitors of growth.”1048 He said that it 
is fundamental that those G20’s developed countries that have decided to keep their 
expansive fiscal policies and have not yet a solid recovery, “start to make credible 
and real fiscal adjustments that would generate in the markets certainty and trust.”1049   
 
                                                 
1046
 Council of the EU, “V EU-Mexico Summit Comillas (Cantabria, Spain) 16 May 2010, Joint 
Statement;” available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114464.pdf . 
1047
 “President Calderón Will Participate in the IV Summit of Leaders of the G20” (communiqué, June 
25, 2010); available at: http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/?DNA=85&Contenido=58035.  
1048
 “Urge Calderón al G-20 a aprobar nuevas reglas para mercados financieros,” [Calderón Urges 
G20 to Approve New Rules for Financial Markets] in El Financiero en Línea [The Financial Online] 
(June 27, 2010); available at: 
http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/ElFinanciero/Portal/cfpages/contentmgr.cfm?docId=270387&docTip
o=1&orderby=docid&sortby=ASC.    
1049
 “Mexico advierte ajustes en naciones G20” [Mexico advises adjustments in G20 nations] (June 28, 
2010); available at  http://www.cnnexpansion.com/economia/2010/06/28/brasil-y-mexico-advierten-
por-recortes.  
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Along the same lines, President Calderón also warned at the summit that “economies 
with growing deficit and public debt are in the process of becoming one of the larger 
obstacles for the development of the world economy.”1050  He also alerted: 
..about the dangers, for future growth, of the permanence of expansive 
policies and its high deficits, as public debt in industrialized countries is 
at levels never seen before –of 83 per cent of the GDP of the USA, 68 
per cent in the UK, and 73 percent in Germany,– the implications of 
which must be analyzed.
1051
      
 
President Calderón also urged the drafting of new clear rules for the financial 
markets to eliminate uncertainty and provide a rout map toward recovery.  He called 
for an agreement for the regulation of markets, in order to reduce “systemic risks for 
the global financial system and, at the same time, to promote world economic 
recovery.”1052  He called for higher capital requirements for activities that generate 
systemic risks, for the strengthening of international cooperation among supervisors, 
as well as designing joint measures to identify non-cooperating jurisdictions.
1053
   
 
He expressed that Mexico “backs the proposal accumulated at the G20 Summit to 
face the problems associated to financial institutions of systemic importance.”1054  
Following suit, he announced he would be sending the Legislative branch “a bill that 
includes a resolution framework for the bankruptcy of banks, based on the best 
international practices.”1055   
 
After South Korean President Lee Myung-bak state visit to Mexico, on July 2, 2010, 
a joint communiqué was issues by Mexico and the Republic of Korea stating, among 
other things: 
 
The Mexican leader reiterated his disposition to work closely with 
Korea and support his work as G20’s President in turn, looking forward 
to the upcoming Summit of Leaders to be held next November in Seoul.  
Both leaders reckoned that G20 must continue adding efforts to ensure 
the economic recovery, the fulfilment of its commitments in financial 
regulation and supervision, to promote a comprehensive reform of the 
                                                 
1050
 “Urge Calderón…,” op. cit. 
1051
 Id.  
1052
 Id.    
1053
 Id.  
1054
 Id.  
1055
 Id.  
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international financial institutions, and to adopt the measure needed to 
promote a vigorous, sustainable and balanced growth.  Likewise, they 
fully concurred on the need for the G20 to push the development 
agenda in order to share the benefits of economic development and to 
contribute to the fulfilment of the Development Millennium Objectivs.  
President Lee expressed his satisfaction for the decision that Mexico 
leads and be host of the G20’s Leaders Summit in 2012.1056 
 
Although G8 agenda item, it is worth mentioning this group’s concern for what 
became the top priority early in President Calderón’s administration, namely, “the 
drug trafficking and transnational crime that is proliferating in Mexico and infecting 
the Caribbean, North America, Africa and even distant Europe itself.”  G8 has 
appropriately listed the above as its “fourth security priority... the new multi-faceted, 
non-state security challenge coming from vulnerable states:”1057  This is consistent 
with the frequent appeals President Calderón has made to the international 
community to cooperate with the Mexican government in its war against drug cartels 
whose criminal activity is carried out across borders.       
 
5. G20’s Assessment of Mexico’s Institution Building in Its Financial Sector. 1058 
 
Mexico’s case has been considered as a positive example regarding liberalization on 
institution building. For purposes of presenting a complete landscape of the 
institution building process in Mexico, it is deemed convenient a brief reference to 
the diverse periods of Mexican financial system for a correct analysis of the 
immediate perspective and steps to be followed in order to adjust such system to 
prudential financial standards that lead Mexico to an economic growth and 
sustainable financial stability in accordance with consensus reached by G-20.
1059
  
 
Significant reforms were approved from the early seventies to 1988, where financial 
liberalization finds its grounds. One of the most innovative reforms was the 
                                                 
1056
 “Comunicado Conjunto México-República de Corea en ocasión de la Visita de Estado a México 
del Presidente Lee Myung-bak [Mexico-Republic of Korea Joint Communiqué on Occassion of the 
state Visit to Mexico of President Lee Myung-bak] (July 2, 2010); available at: 
 http://www.sre.gob.mx/csocial/contenido/comunicados/2010/jul/cp_202.html  
1057
 Kirton, Progress through Partnership…, op. cit., at 6. 
1058
 Institution refers here to the rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations that shape the 
functioning of markets.  
1059
 See “G-20 Case Study: The Case of Mexico”, Globalization: The Role of Institution Building in 
the Financial Sector, at 1, available at http://www.banxico.org.mx 
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amendment to Credit Institutions Law in 1974; by virtue of which specialized 
banking was transformed into universal banking allowing new multi-service banks to 
provide different kind of services increasing flexibility and risk diversification.
1060
  
 
In 1975 a Security Markets Act regulated the legal framework for expansion of 
securities operations, and strengthened the regulatory role of the National Securities 
Commission.
1061
 Also, introduction of Treasury Certificates (CETES) in 1978 
reinforced the measures adopted during this period.  Other financial instruments were 
created in the late seventies, such as the non-bank paper and convertible securities. 
This liberalization process was interrupted in September 1982 with banks 
nationalization as a measure against critical Mexico’s debt crisis. Such “financial 
repression” affected in diverse aspects of the Mexican economy, externally and 
domestically.
 1062
  
 
During late eighties, Mexico started a process of radical transformation of the 
economy from high trade rates, foreign trade restrictions and high levels of 
regulation to a deregulation and opening to international trade system. As a result, 
the main steps followed were deregulation of the financial sector, internationalization 
of the financial sector and privatization of commercial banks. Deregulation was 
mainly focused on reducing limits to banks maintaining the supervision and 
regulation of their activities in order to make more efficient their services and 
operation but yet subjecting them to strictly necessary regulations.
 1063
  
 
In June 27, 1990, a Constitutional reform abolished government’s exclusive right to 
provide banking and credit services. The major reasons that urged the Congress to 
approve such reform were the modification of Mexican society in its complexity, 
plural expression and culture diversity; in other words, economic crisis aggravated 
social backwardness making necessary a modification in accordance with the current 
                                                 
1060
 See id., at 2. 
1061
 See id. 
1062
 See id., at 3. 
1063
 See id., at 4. 
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social situation in Mexico in order to make the country competitive in an 
increasingly globalized context.
1064
  
 
In this scenario, in August 1993, Congress approved a Constitutional reform granting 
autonomy to the BANXICO. The main purpose of this reform was to establish the 
basis for price stability and as a consequence reinforce purchasing power of the 
national currency, as well as controlling inflation levels.
1065
  
 
One of the most important institutional paradigm changes derived from the signing 
of NAFTA in 1993. The ratio of this agreement was creating an environment that 
promotes the opening of the financial sector to foreign investment. In accordance 
with the terms and obligations assumed under NAFTA, Mexican Congress modified 
financial regulations in order to allow foreign financial institutions the establishment 
of fully-owned subsidiaries in Mexican territory.
1066
  
 
The opening of the Mexican economy derived from NAFTA intended to balance 
competition and financial stability through gradual modifications in the countries’ 
applicable regulations in order to adjust them to the guidelines provided by NAFTA. 
Nevertheless, Mexico drafted certain conditions to NAFTA to guarantee the gradual 
transition to foreign access; such provisions mainly limit the amount of capital and 
assets that foreign investors are allowed to hold from the total capital of all financial 
institutions in Mexico
1067
.  
 
“After the effective date of NAFTA, large numbers of foreign banks applied for 
permission to enter the Mexican financial services market. (…) Although Mexico 
was one of the most underbanked economies in the world and ‘desperately in need of 
more financial services’ the individual and aggregate capital limits imposed by 
                                                 
1064
 See FERNANDO HEGEWISCH DÍAZ INFANTE, DERECHO FINANCIERO MEXICANO [Mexican Financial 
Law], Porrúa, México, 3
rd
 ed. (2004) at 9. 
1065
 See “G-20 Case Study: The Case of Mexico”, Globalization: The Role of Institution Building in 
the Financial Sector, at 6, available at http://www.banxico.org.mx 
1066
 See id., at 7. 
1067
 See Christopher R Rowley, “Searching for Stability: Mexico’s 1995 Banking System Reforms” in 
NAFTA: LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS, Vol IV, No. 3 (Summer 1998), at 34, 35. 
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NAFTA limited what might have been greater foreign investment by preventing most 
foreign banks from pursuing retail banking in Mexico”.1068  
 
Although origins of economic crisis in Mexico in 1994 are extremely complex; it is 
worth to overview a brief landscape as context of later financial development in 
Mexico issues. “Such situation forced Mexico to implement unanticipated measures 
in an attempt to stabilize the country’s banking system”.1069 In 1994 Mexico had an 
important amount of foreign investment considerably conformed by liquid and short 
term equity and debt portfolio investments that may be quickly withdrawn that 
allowed Mexico to support the large deficit of its current accounts.
1070
  
 
On this kind of scenario, countries normally reduce their deficit adjusting its 
monetary and fiscal policy or its exchange rate. Though, Mexico permitted a 
significant inconsistency between its monetary and fiscal policy and its exchange rate 
system forcing Mexico to either, raise interest rates or devalue peso; however making 
a decision was complicated due to upcoming presidential election. Also, a lot of 
political and national events generated an increasing withdraw of large amounts of 
foreign investment from Mexico and, as a reaction, several actions were taken in 
order to stop the outflow of capital, such as depreciating peso, securing short-term 
credit agreement with the USA and Canada, and increasing rates on short-term 
CETES.
1071
  
 
Another measure adopted by Mexico was to increase the issuance of debt 
instruments denominated “tesobonos” instead of increasing interest rates, reducing 
government expenses or devaluating peso. “Tesobonos guaranteed an investor’s 
repayment in pesos sufficient to cover the dollar value of its investment, thus 
protecting the investor in the event of devaluation.”1072 The issuance of tesobonos 
left Mexico’s foreign currency reserves vulnerable in case of an outflow of foreign 
capital.
1073
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 See id.   
1070
 See id., at 37. 
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 See id.  
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 See id., at 38. 
1073
 See id. 
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Finally Mexico was forced to completely devalue its currency on December 22, 1994 
leading Mexican economy to recession
1074
. As we may notice, the fundamental 
problem was not liberalization per se, crisis was a result of a combination of diverse 
factors, external, domestical, economic and political; specially the fact that ideal 
liberalization conditions did not exist at that time (i.e. stable macroeconomic 
environment, adequate timing and sequencing of domestic and capital account 
liberalization, a financially sound banking system).
1075
 Notwithstanding the 
abovementioned crisis, Mexico continued with its financial liberalization process 
presumably due to Mexico acknowledged the benefits of liberalization and because 
the process of institutions building was difficult to revert since international efforts 
were involved in this process
1076
.  
 
Since 1995, BANXICO adopted a gradual disinflation process and finally in 2001 
introduced a formal specific inflation framework including the following: (i) 
consolidation of the autonomous monetary; (ii) authority; (ii) reiteration of price 
stability as the fundamental objective of the monetary policy; (iii) announcement of 
short and medium term inflation targets; (iv) a permanent analysis of all potential 
sources of inflationary pressures; (v) an emphasis on transparency and 
communication with society; and (vi) and improved framework for central bank 
accountability. 
1077
 
 
Also, Mexican efforts after the crisis focused on two aspects: maintaining the 
integrity of the financial system and establishing adequate policies to ensure correct 
operation of the financial system in an increasingly liberalized environment. 
Consequently, the Congress approved a financial reform in December 1998 
following those aspects. 
1078
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From such reform, three items are particularly relevant: (i) deposit coverage was 
limited to an amount equivalent to 400,000 UDI’s1079 per person and per financial 
institution; (ii) Institute for Bank Deposit Insurance (“IPAB” per its acronym in 
Spanish) was created for managing the new deposit insurance scheme, restructuring 
programs for banks that receive its support and to administrate and sale assets 
acquired through several banking-support programs; and (iii) limits to foreign 
ownership in financial system allowing foreign investment up to 100% in Mexican 
financial holdings
1080
.  
 
Another measures were taken during this period, being especially relevant the 
amendment of the pension system based on an individual capitalization system in 
1997 and the Congress approval of the bankruptcy and secured lending legislation in 
2000. In addition, supervisory and regulatory frameworks were strengthened to 
accomplish with applicable best international practices
1081
.  
 
Reforms approved from 1995 to 2000 strengthened the financial sector in Mexico 
and improved operation of financial markets achieving strength in banks’ financial 
conditions, higher efficiency in banking system and foreign participation in the 
domestic banking system that promoted competition capitalizing banking system.
1082
  
In 2000, for the first time in 70 years the elected President did not represented PRI 
and no political party held a majority in Congress. These circumstances derived into 
a political equilibrium that became a new institutional arrangement reflected in the 
reforms approved since then to the present. As a result, significant reforms were 
approved to strengthen institutional framework and combat remaining problems in 
the financial system, such as:
 1083
 
 
 Credit Institutions Law and the Financial Groups Law 
 
                                                 
1079
 UDIS are units of account with constant real value; its daily value depends on fluctuations in 
Mexican Consumer Price Index. 
1080
 “G-20 Case Study: The Case of Mexico”, Globalization: The Role of Institution Building in the 
Financial Sector, at 13, available at http://www.banxico.org.mx.  
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1083
 See id., at 17, 18.  
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Main objectives of these laws is to strengthen credit institutions’ corporate 
governance and broaden the offered services by introducing timely risk identification 
mechanisms and creating an audit committee.  
 
 Amendment to the Rules of Capitalization Requirements for Multiple 
Banking Institutions 
 
Purposes of this reform are to accelerate the process of homologation between 
banking regulation and international standards by simplifying processes and 
establishing a uniform criteria with the CNBV, as well as eliminating certain 
discretional faculties of financial authorities.  
 
 Amendments to the Miscellany on Credit Collateral  
 
This reform intends the promotion of bank lending by reducing transaction costs and 
interest rates, which will reduce risks related with credit operations and decrease 
interest rates.  
 
 Credit Information Institutions Law 
 
It regulates the establishment and operation of credit information companies by 
establishing transparency regulations for the proper operation of such companies and 
providing secrecy in financial matters.
1084
  
 
Also, for purposes of increasing access of the population to financial services and 
promote creation of small and medium companies it was proposed to increase these 
institutions autonomy, and an improved accountability process. In this regard, 
Congress passed the following laws: Organic Law of the Federal Mortgage 
Association, Popular Saving and Credit Law, Organic Law of the Bank of National 
Savings and Financial Services, and the Organic Law of Financiera Rural.
1085
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With respect to Mexican Stock Exchange, it has been affected by diverse problems, 
such as low firms controlled by a small group of investors and the fact that the 
domestic debt is dominated by public sector instruments. As a result, Congress 
approved important reforms to the Securities Market Law and to the Mutual Funds 
Law with the intention of promoting development of the securities market by 
establishing provisions under transparency and efficiency principles. In general, 
these laws establish the new basis for corporate governance in this regard.
1086
  
 
6. Some observations and Conclusions 
 
Mexico’s importance and relevance in the global economic and financial scene, even 
as emerging economy, is attested by its participation in G20, even since the inception 
of its predecessors.  Although such importance and relevance was first made 
apparent in the painful way (on occasion of its 1994 crisis), the 2008 “Made in USA” 
crisis proved that Mexico learned its lessons from its crisis and has been dutiful, 
ever-since, in reforming its regulatory and institutional framework, in order to be 
protected against the risks inherent in liberalization and a growing involvement in the 
globalized economy.   
 
The above also shows, on the other hand, the benefits that membership in G20 
has given Mexico, especially when sound free market economics approaches are still 
harshly repudiated by a significant portion of Mexico’s political players, as well as 
other regional leaders.   
 
Moreover, the positive balance of Mexico’s participation in G20 has 
encouraged a more active role on the part of Mexico, who has become a leading 
member, both by voice (proposals) and by example (compliance).  This has been 
increasingly the case over the second half of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, 
which makes noteworthy the impetus that President Calderón and his economic 
cabinet has brought to the Mexico-G20 relationship and the positive fruits it has 
borne.  
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APPENDIX 4:  
A Comparison with EU as an Example of Proper Sequencing  
in Financial Liberalization. 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The foundation of the European Community was the Coal and Steel Community 
Treaty of Paris, which dates back to 1952. The EU is the response to the two wars 
that affected Europe in the 20
th
 century, and the preservation of the peace as a 
supreme value. The Treaty of Rome was signed establishing the European Economic 
Community and at the same time the European Atomic Energy Community.
1087
  
 
The Treaty of Rome tried to achieve an ambitious economic integration that 
included the area of services,
1088
 free movement of capital, right of establishment, 
                                                 
1087
 See The Rt Hon The Lord Cockfield PC, The European Union, Creating the Single Market, 
(Wiley Chancery Law 1994) at 5. The Preamble of the Treaty of Paris is as follows: “CONSIDERING 
that world peace can be safeguard only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that 
threaten it” and therefore: 
“RESOLVED to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create by 
establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples 
long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction 
to a henceforth shared.”  
1088
 See GEORGE A. WALKER, EUROPEAN BANKING LAW: POLICY AND PROGRAMME CONSTRUCTION 
(2007) at 9:  
“The Treaty of Rome which tried to regulate he operations of banks and banking itself 
faced obstacles in the light of lack of any particular regulations resulting from a course of 
action void related with monitoring and ensuring provisions for the financial market. The 
treaty included many development provisions comprising areas such as competition law, 
agricultural policy, improvement and implementation of atomic energy resources, 
however, the financial field was deprived of similar legislation. In fact, there existed a 
number of general principles that could be derived from chief aims and regulations of the 
pact but they present minor aid in establishing a thorough scheme for financial market 
supervision and regulation.  
Closer superintendence over and complex legislation concerning banking and national 
markets in Europe have been worked on and created over decades of the European 
Community functioning. The superintendence in question aims at thorough monitoring of 
financial markets conduct by means of financial instruments or regulative rules while the 
legislation is a set of provisions having as an objective managing and constraining the 
risks undertaken by banks and other financial organizations. By the way of addition, 
brought to life under Maastricht Treaty, the European Union is a successor of numerous 
European communities operating over years in Europe among them being the European 
Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. Supplementary powers were granted to it in reference to Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and Home Affairs and Justice Policy as well. 
Constituting one of the largest regional areas for trade, industry and commerce, the 
institution had to come up with regulations to establish a firm financial system within it. 
As the underlying principle of the institution functioning is an immediate or obligatory 
right to access the internal market for all the interested parties which would ensure no 
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and free movement of persons. In 1992, the treaty established the European Union to 
encompass the European Community.
1089
  
 
The targets of the EU are described in the Art. 2 of the Treaty of Rome:
1090
the 
establishment of the common market and an economic and monetary union and, in 
                                                                                                                                          
inside borders with the guarantee of free goods, persons, services and capital movement, 
equilibrium of ensuring the complete cross-border entry and at the same time applying 
essential scope of the market control should be carefully maintained. The internal market, 
although being more limited than the common market which on its part was supposed to 
be founded on the ground of Art 2, was intended to be gradually introduced by the end of 
December 1992 as an embodiment of Arts. 15, 26, 47(2)s, 49, 80, 93 and 95, however 
with the avoidance of dismissing  other regulations of the pact – Art 14(1) (ex 7a).1088 The 
European Union comprises of a free trade area (FTA) and customs union (CU) which are 
founded on the common market (CM) ensuring free flow of labour, capital, goods and 
services. It also aspires to form an economic and monetary union (EMU) and intends to 
reach complete political union with time as well. Considering the existence of the EU, 
one has to notice that it actually started as interaction and joint operation between 
partakers at a specific time. Though it was initially constrained to dealing with the 
common coal and steel industries management, it soon expanded its operation to atomic 
energy, general goods and services, economic monetary issues handling ending with 
shared regulations on justice, home affairs and defence.”  
1089
 Treaty of Rome Complete text, See http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc053.htm 
[Hereinafter Treaty of Rome] 
1090
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 68:  
“To implement the new order the treaty initiators created a number of legislative and 
executive institutions to  help the whole process go on, the main ones being the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. 
The European Parliament is composed of the representatives of the member states chosen 
in direct elections in the respective country for five-year terms. The representatives then 
hold the executive power of implementing the new regulations. The President and officers 
of the Parliament are selected from amidst its members. The members of the Commission 
are allowed to witness the Parliament’s meetings and take an active part in them. The 
Commission is obliged to answer any member’s or Parliament’s questions orally or in a 
written manner. Voting procedure depends on the absolute majority and the quorum is 
included in the Rules of Procedure and agreed on by the Parliament. Every year, the 
Parliament is bound to discuss the Commission’s general report in open session. The 
Commission may be asked to step down on an essential motion by two-thirds majority 
votes after a three-day discussion. 
The Council acts as the coordinator of the member states general economic policies and 
may attribute to the Commission executive powers to impose accepted regulations. The 
council comprises representatives of each member states on ministerial level with 
competences of acting on behalf of their governments. The Presidency is passed on at six-
month intervals. The council meets at the entreaty of its president, a member state or the 
Commission. Voting is based on a majority, although in the cases listed by the treaty a 
qualified majority may me employed. In terms of voting, an interesting concept is that 
Council members may act on behalf of others. The Council may as well ask the 
Commission to prepare studies and make research on the rules governing committees 
under the Treaty, fix salaries, allowances and pensions for the Commission and the Court. 
As far as the Commission is concerned, it is a body responsible for guaranteeing new 
regulations implementation, providing recommendations and stating opinions plus 
supporting the adoption of provisions by the Council and the European Parliament. 
Within a month from the opening of the European Parliament, it presents an annual report 
which includes the Community activities. The entity consists of 20 members chosen on 
the basis of their knowledge and competence as well as independence and capability of 
acting for the good of the entire Community for five-year renewable terms. Members are 
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general, the elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers.
1091
 Also, Art. 23(1)
1092
 
states that the EU is based in part on a Customs Union where custom duties are 
prohibited between member states. Also the EC prohibited the non-tariff barriers 
(quantitative restrictions).  
 
One of the activities of the EU is the creation of an internal market characterized 
by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of the four freedoms mentioned 
above. In the case Gaston Schul the Court stated that “the aim of the treaty is to 
eliminate all obstacles to intra community trade in order to merge the national 
markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those 
of a genuine domestic market.”1093 
 
While laying the foundations for the EU, its creators skilfully used then existing 
international agreements such as the GATT, however they moved a few steps 
forward. It is a fact the main ideas and operational procedures of the GATT initially 
inspired the “founding fathers” of the EU but their vision extended the scope of the 
GATT with regard to integration market security. As said before, the GATT was the 
result of the Conference held from 1
st
 to 22
nd
 July 1944 at Breton Woods in New 
Hampshire with an aim to establish new trade and monetary pact to be due to after 
the WWII.
1094
 
                                                                                                                                          
required to step down from any other position for the time of working for the Commission 
and the President is chosen by common concurrence and accepted by the Parliament. The 
body proceeds on the majority of votes. 
The creation of the bodies mentioned above is one of the distinguishing features of the 
European regional agreement and outstands among others. This line of thinking is 
followed to include the common financial market, specifically in terms of banking, 
insurance and investment funds. On 5
th
 November 2003, as a consequence of the 
recommendations made by the Lamfalussy Committee, each of the areas of the financial 
integration obtained two new specialist committees to improve the overseeing and 
monitoring cooperation. The committees in the financial services sector are the following: 
the European Banking Committee, Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee, committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the European securities Committee 
and Committee of European Securities Regulators. Lamfalussy Committee’s advice was 
for the committees to deal with policy matters and technical side of application in order to 
approximate or assimilate all financial correlated mechanisms.” 
1091
 CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS, Oxford 
University Press 2004, at 11. 
1092
 Treaty of Rome. 
1093
 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteurder Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 
Roosendaal (1982) ECR 1409, paragraph. 33.  
1094
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 50: Initially another organisation was to be called into 
being at Breton Woods which was an International Trade Organisation (ITO) whose objective was to 
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Trade in services as such was not included in the GATT – it was contained in the 
GATS in 1994. Its target was to set up a multinational scheme for trade and services 
within the GATT. The core agreement banned its signatories on discriminating 
against trading partners or most favoured nation, provided for full disclosure of 
information and required commitment to partake, according to a fixed agenda, in 
works ensuring gradual liberalization. The plans or schedules of obligations were 
prepared by members individually and reflected the country’s willingness to open the 
market access and national treatment in terms of specific services sectors.
1095
 
 
However, the GATS weakness is the fact that the member countries can liberalize 
their market only to the extent they agreed on while taking upon specific obligations. 
                                                                                                                                          
dispose of trade tariffs and import controls. Unfortunately, because of the US objections the entity was 
actually not set up, yet what was agreed on was the introduction of trade reforms under the GATT. 
The agreement was open for ratification on 30
th
 October 1947 and is now superintended by the World 
trade Organization (WTO) which eventually came into existence on 1
st
 January 1995. 
1095
 See id. at 60:  
“The European Union being one of the most complex trade systems is not a monolith with 
one set of fixed instruments and provisions to regulate the whole scheme. It is rather a 
collection of various parallel structures and procedures to ensure the entire body goes on 
well. Shared aims are to be obtained through a sequence of coordinated modules via 
specific defined activities. The goals, which the Union wishes to reach, are specifically 
fostering congruent, equitable and maintained improvement of economic activities, a high 
degree of jobs and social security, equality of the sexes, sustainable and no inflation 
inducing growth, a high level of competitiveness and evening the economic 
performances, focus on perseverance development of the environment, elevating the 
living standards and ensuring the solidarity among its members. 
The free movement of all the production factors is expected to bring numerous positive 
outcomes. Removing quotas and tariffs should encourage the consumers’ choice and 
improve the market competition while production and supply of goods should be 
optimised through free flow of workers, enterprises and money, which can through 
optimum apportionment of resources increase the economic effectiveness as well as 
provide the general affluence.  
It does not mean, however, that a member state is not allowed to protect its own domestic 
products by employing discriminatory tax procedures. Additionally, private entities may 
also negatively influence the market by forming syndicates or maintaining a privileged 
position as oligopoly. To avoid that, the pact introduced a number of anti-competitive 
provisions to minimise the likelihood of corrupt practices. 
Together with the application of negative market protection, through bans and 
prohibitions, the Treaty includes a collection of regulations which have a profound 
positive impact on harmonization via imposing accurate internal criteria in numerous 
fields. 
Considering the above, one can notice that the legislators of the primary pact established 
an entirely new economic practice founded on a set of coordinated legal rights and 
undertaken responsibilities. To that degree, the European Community can be perceived as 
a body that has been granted a legal personality and validity under the international law.  
Having in mind ensuring the process of integration, the agreement functions through 
independent, yet corresponding, new legal order placed on a set of interconnected trading 
relations. 
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The obligations in questions can be avoided on the basis of general and specific 
exceptions. What is more, GATS does not provide any hints for the future 
liberalization talks which the countries are not bound to take part in. Their 
participation is founded merely on their uttered intentions to liberalize, yet it does not 
have to move the process forward.  
 
On its part, transparency means solely the publication of measures that will be 
applied to limit trade and services. The information disclosure can have only local 
range and does not need to be presented in the WTO Secretariat either.
1096
 
 
As described above, the Treaty of Rome provided the platform for the integration 
in services (Art. 59), the right of establishment (Art. 52), free movement of capital 
(Art. 67) and free movement of workers (Art. 48).
1097
 In 1992 the Treaty on 
European Union changed the name from the European Community to European 
Union and its scope covers as well Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
provisions on justice and home affairs.
1098
 
 
There is a right of establishment (Art 52 and 59) in Services, and they are subject 
to non-discrimination regulation. The ECJ passing a verdict on the Van Binsbergen 
case announced that "specific requirements imposed on the person providing the 
service cannot be considered incompatible with the treaty where they have as their 
purpose the application of professional rules justified by the general good - in 
particular rules relating to organization, qualifications, professional ethics, 
supervision and liability which are binding on any person established in the state in 
which the service is provided.”1099 Thus, non-discrimination regulation may be 
protected under certain circumstances, even though the regulation differs from that 
imposed by other member states and even though it imposes differential burdens on 
persons than other member states. The ECJ invalidated here the Dutch residence 
requirement.  
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In the German Insurance case, (Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany, 1986 
E.C.R. 3755, 3803) the ECJ held that requirements of local establishment could only 
be imposed if there are "imperative reasons relating to the public interest which 
justify restrictions on the freedom to provide services" and if these imperative 
reasons are neither satisfied by home state rules nor capable of being achieved by 
less restrictive rules.
1100
 
 
The goal of the EU in financial services was to create a legislative framework that 
would allow greater integration of financial markets without sacrificing public policy 
interests of each member states regarding prudential rules, market stability and 
consumer protection.  
 
The new way of looking on the goods and services in general led to reconsidering 
the idea’s implementation into the financial services area which applied a parallel 
principle of home country control. In its history, in spite of initial economic obstacles 
which the institution encountered in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the further 
advancement followed gradually to end up with establishing the internal market by 
the year 1992 founded on the judgement of the European Court of Justice in Cassis 
de Dijon of 1979.
1101
 
 
In this sense, as Walker has pointed out the EU has come up with one of the most 
intricate and complex regulatory and supervisory schemes in the world, namely 
Financial Services Action Plan, and it includes all main domains of domestic and 
cross-border financial services. The programme itself results from different 
approaches to multinational cooperation in the institution’s history and gradual 
development from ideas of full harmonization, which was supposed to impose entire 
collections of fixed standards on all of the fields listed in General Programmes 
falling under the original EEC Treaty, to notions of the mutual recognition of agreed 
standards, which stressed the importance of outlining common minimum standards 
for all the members in important areas.
1102
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1102
 Id. at 11:  
“In this sense, the European Union being one of the most complex trade systems is not a 
monolith with one set of fixed instruments and provisions to regulate the whole scheme. 
 322 
 
The EU experience is important because in some countries financial sectors were 
competitive prior to the single market while others had heavily regulated financial 
sectors with a major part in the hands of the government.
1103
  
 
To sum up, the European Union is a good example of the liberalization in the 
financial services as a single market.
1104
 Nevertheless, still some that believe that the 
European Union is “still a fragmented market,”1105 and in practice, it had brought a 
heterogeneous integration across both sectors and countries.
1106
  
                                                                                                                                          
It is rather a collection of various parallel structures and procedures to ensure the entire 
body goes on well. Shared aims are to be obtained through a sequence of coordinated 
modules via specific defined activities. The goals, which the Union wishes to reach, are 
specifically fostering congruent, equitable and maintained improvement of economic 
activities, a high degree of jobs and social security, equality of the sexes, sustainable 
and no inflation inducing growth, a high level of competitiveness and evening the 
economic performances, focus on perseverance development of the environment, 
elevating the living standards and ensuring the solidarity among its members. 
The free movement of all the production factors is expected to bring numerous positive 
outcomes. Removing quotas and tariffs should encourage the consumers’ choice and 
improve the market competition while production and supply of goods should be 
optimised through free flow of workers, enterprises and money, which can through 
optimum apportionment of resources increase the economic effectiveness as well as 
provide the general affluence.  
It does not mean, however, that a member state is not allowed to protect its own 
domestic products by employing discriminatory tax procedures. Additionally, private 
entities may also negatively influence the market by forming syndicates or maintaining 
a privileged position as oligopoly. To avoid that, the pact introduced a number of anti-
competitive provisions to minimise the likelihood of corrupt practices. 
Together with the application of negative market protection, through bans and 
prohibitions, the Treaty includes a collection of regulations which have a profound 
positive impact on harmonization via imposing accurate internal criteria in numerous 
fields. 
Considering the above, one can notice that the legislators of the primary pact established 
an entirely new economic practice founded on a set of coordinated legal rights and 
undertaken responsibilities. To that degree, the European Community can be perceived 
as a body that has been granted a legal personality and validity under the international 
law.  Having in mind ensuring the process of integration, the agreement functions 
through independent, yet corresponding, new legal order placed on a set of 
interconnected trading relations. 
1103
 See STIJN CLAESSENS & MARION JANSEN, edt. THE INTERNATLIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000) at. 5, for example, Italy, Portugal, Greece 
Spain were heavily regulated.  
1104
 See Trachtman Id. at 59.  The European Union’s single passport idea has become greatly exported 
to other regions, such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR. This objective has been achieved since the 
Second Banking Directive (SBD) in 1989.  
1105
 See K.N. SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (2000) at 261. Schefer and 
Rogers consider that despite the liberalization in the provision of banking services the integration of 
the banking market in the EU is far from complete. Also Wijsenbeek a European Parliament deputy 
from Netherlands said:   
“Possibly in response to the advent of the monetary union, there was a mergers of 
financial institutions…however the banking sector is still a highly fragmented 
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Nevertheless the foregoing mentioned by Schefer, it is evident that one of the 
most outstanding achievements of the EU was to call into being one single market 
for banking and financial services, on which the whole community economic and 
financial is based. One particular difficulty here is to stabilize the market both at a 
local and regional level trying to foster the market access within the internal system 
at the same time. Appropriate supervision and monitoring are necessary to lessen the 
vulnerability of the financial sector which is subject to instability due to the 
interdependence with other members’ economies. The organization has been 
gradually working on the issues of ensuring both the access and the control over it. 
While doing so, it evolved its approach from the full harmonization to the mutual 
recognition and minimum harmonization.
1107
 
 
2. Banking and Financial Markets in Europe. 
 
The essentiality of the banking and financial ingredient in the single European 
market cannot be refuted as it assists the financial markets and bears high economic 
value to the European economy estimated in total consumer surplus increase as much 
as between £7.7 and £23.1 billion of which the banking industry earned between £5.6 
and £15.4 billion. It meant that financial services constituted about 6% of EU GDP 
and created 2.45% of overall employment posts. What is more, it demonstrated one 
of the biggest dynamics for employment expansion as noted by the Commission’s 
Employment Rates Report.
1108
  
                                                                                                                                          
market…even the largest European banks do not account for more than one or two per 
cent of the total volume of banking services at Union level.”  
See also Rogers, Arthur. “EU Parliamentarians Weigh Changes to Allow Freer Cross-Border Banking 
Activity” 70.20 BNA Banking Rep 826 (18 may 1998).  
1106
  See Inter-American Development Bank, Financial Integration, in BEYOND BORDERS: THE NEW 
REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 106 (2002). [hereinafter Inter-American Development Bank, 
Financial Integration].  While the banking sector deepened its integration process, retail banking 
remained fragmented and strongly localized. Securities market led to deeper integration but insurance 
faced obstacles due to legal barriers.  
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 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 12. 
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 Id. at 6:  
“In addition, the financial integration was calculated to bring approximately 
supplementary 5 to 7% per annum to EU GDP. Nevertheless, the financial and banking 
system can be intrinsically unsteady leading in some cases to general regional instability 
and downfall by way of chain reaction. Individual institution problems can cause the 
spread of crisis onto the entire intra-sector which will be passed on to the system 
nationally. The national sector collapse can infect the regional organism and 
contaminate a greater general financial area resulting in a large crisis. The factors 
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As mentioned earlier, the EU has come up with one of the most complex 
regulatory and supervisory schemes in the world, namely Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP), and it includes all main domains of domestic and cross-border financial 
services. Yet, while evaluating the programme and appreciating its achievements one 
cannot forget that some issues concerning further development, present frame and 
substance together with its successful termination may demonstrate a few problems. 
To be fully recognized as the efficient financial scheme it has to address some 
general integration issues as well as specific financial ones to avoid partial 
evaluation, diminishing its importance or pertinence.
1109
 
 
3. Financial Integration in Europe 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Rome, which tried to regulate he operations of 
banks and banking itself, faced obstacles in the light of lack of any particular 
regulations resulting from a course of action void related with monitoring and 
ensuring provisions for the financial market.  
 
The treaty included many development provisos comprising areas such as 
competition law, agricultural policy, improvement and implementation of atomic 
energy resources, however, the financial field was deprived of similar legislation. In 
fact, there existed a number of general principles that could be derived from chief 
aims and regulations of the pact but they present minor aid in establishing a thorough 
scheme for financial market supervision and regulation. The European Community, 
being one of the most complex regional structure in the world, has been treated as an 
example while creating other regional schemes in Latin America, South Africa or 
Asia, though one has to admit that none of them has ever reached its range or 
complexity. Enjoying free trade ensuring completely unrestrained flow of all factors 
of production plus joint control framework of outside the internal market products 
together with the implementation of a common policy in numerous fields including 
                                                                                                                                          
seemingly contributing to the threat are ‘individual bank failure, contagion and systemic 
collapse; information asymmetries and natural monopolies’. That is why it is so 
important to create an efficient monitoring scheme to assure all the participants about 
the steadiness and ensure secure system operation.”  
1109
 Id.,11. 
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legal and institutional structures, the European Union established new regulations 
within one regional agreement.
1110
  
 
The new way of looking on the goods and services in general led to reconsidering 
the idea’s implementation into the financial services area which applied a parallel 
principle of home country control.
1111
 In its history, in spite of initial economic 
obstacles which the institution encountered in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
further advancement followed gradually to end up with establishing the internal 
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 Id. at 11-37: 
“One of its most outstanding achievements was to call into being one single market for 
banking and financial services, on which the whole community economic and financial on 
is based. One particular difficulty here is to stabilize the market both at a local and 
regional level trying to foster the market access within the internal system at the same 
time. Appropriate supervision and monitoring are necessary to lessen the vulnerability of 
the financial sector which is subject to instability due to the interdependence with other 
members’ economies. The organization has been gradually working on the issues of 
ensuring both the access and the control over it. While doing so, it evolved its approach 
from the full harmonization to the mutual recognition and minimum harmonization. 
Financial integration is only a part of a broader economic integration but the same rules 
apply in both. The underlying principle is the optimum apportionment of resources 
together with stability and effectiveness of the system functioning. Capital and 
investments should be allocated in such a way to maximise the efficacious operation, 
transaction costs should be reduced for the investors and merchants and their profits 
increased. 
In spite of the banking and financial market functioning policy being one part of the 
larger economic system, it plays an essential role in terms of savings, credits and 
payments in making the entire system function properly. They simply act according to the 
current level of integration being on one hand independent areas within a new economy, 
and on the other hand providing important mechanisms and crucial support channels for 
each of the created markets. 
Throughout the European community history, there have been some substantial measures 
employed to ensure deeper and deeper financial integration. On of them was The Bretton 
Woods system, which fixed the values of all foreign currencies to dollar whose value on 
its part was fixed to gold. Due to later speculative dollar fluctuations and implementation 
of protectionist measures in Europe, the system collapsed in 1971 accompanied by the 
floating currency rates and 1973 oil crisis. 
The 1980s brought the attempts of gradual liberalisation through the adoption of Euro for 
the transfers and transactions, increasing the freedom of capital movement across the 
continent together with the decision to finalise the free movement application under the 
Treaty with the 1985 Internal Market programme. A significant progress was noted under 
new Commission President Jacques Delors, although the idea of the completion had been 
undertaken by ECOFIN as early as in 1982. The aim was to oversee if all the means to 
ensure complete free movement of goods and services together with factors of production 
were employed properly and accurately. Decision taking provisions of the Treaty were 
updated and institutional reforms introduced under the Single Act of 1986. Jacques Delors 
took over the initiative and supervised the capital liberalisation while Lord Cockfield, the 
US Commissioner, and Margaret Thatcher oversaw the complete realisation of the 
potential increase of benefits. 
1111
 Id., at 40. 
 326 
market by the year 1992 founded on the judgement of the European Court of Justice 
in Cassis de Dijon of 1979.
1112
  
 
1979 was also the year of exchange rate fluctuations stability and encouragement 
of inflation rate evening with calling into being the European Monetary System. This 
evolution of European fusing can be viewed from point of view of various general 
approaches to it, functionalism, neo-functionalism and neo-realism among others. 
Functionalism emphasises the fostering of joint operation through particular 
economic activity, neo-functionalism accepts the presence of competitive economic 
and political high class to ensure the integration process, while neo-realism on its 
part stresses the promotion of national interests instead of regarding national 
governments as the initiators of the entire blending process. The two latter have been 
replaced since the late 1980s by a thorough research on the political and 
organizational units and the way they are managed and interconnected.
1113
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“Economic fusion entails numerous strata of interwoven ties, links or operations. The 
general division here can be made into free trade area – which by definition is free of 
customs, duties and quotas on an interstate trade, though some rules in connection with 
the goods from third countries may be applied, a customs union – in which members 
unanimously agree on tariffs and quotas imposed on internal and external goods, a 
common market – which comprises the previous regulations plus the freedom of all 
trade factors including unrestricted flow of labour, capital, goods and services, 
economic union – meaning agreeing on common economic policy dealing with many 
aspects such as market regulation, competition or industrial framework, monetary union 
– based on the common currency or settling the exchange rates and full political union – 
understood as acting according to common regulations and competences shared by all 
the member states. The first three deal generally with particular market aims while the 
three latter are associated with general policy goals. 
The history of Europe demonstrates that economic integration has not until recently 
been a target as such. It has rather been a side effect of overall high-tech and industrial 
transformations. Deliberate economic integration was considered no sooner than after 
WWII and it was exactly when it began to aim at mutual economic dependence and 
profit with tightening of political alliance. 
Regional agreements concerning trade have in mind creating an internal market in 
which the transaction costs would be maximally lowered and profits made from free 
movement maximised. The early internal market of the European Community was with 
this respect different from the full common market represented by the United States of 
America. The core dissimilarity would lie rather in the social outlook on the transactions 
than the open market itself.”  
The EU has been trying to regulate the issues of technology, public purchasing, state 
support policy or taxation demonstrating a new view on technological harmonisation 
based on the minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition principle under the 1985 
White Paper.  
While the United States forms a single market, still the discrepancies in legal, tax and 
regulatory systems exist. Various states apply different laws considering goods and 
services and even the fiscal policy shows diversity across the country. And although 
federal regulations forbid discernment on the basis of the state of origin and anti-
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4. Assessment. 
 
The gains of forming of a single market within the European area have been regarded 
with respect by many experts in the topic. One of the most thorough ones was the 
1988 report by Paulo Ceccini on the “Benefits of a Single Market” which included a 
few interesting points. According to Ceccini, disposing of the obstacles such as 
tariffs, quotas, cost-increasing barriers, market entry restrictions and government 
market distorting activities would result in competition stimulation and costs 
lowering, which would lead to price reduction and investment facilitation.
1114
 
  
What is more, the internal market would foster capabilities of supplies thus 
enlarging total demand. Another assessment from a world wide known consulting 
group Price Waterhouse appeared a bit earlier than Ceccini’s report, namely in 1986. 
However, the approach was completely different. It looked at costs of European 
financial services union non-existence. It carefully provided an analysis for present 
framework of financial services, macro-economy, regulatory barriers as well as 
control restrictions on trade in financial services and their economic impact on 
integration itself. 
 
5. Regional Integration. 
 
While laying the foundations for the European Union, its creators skilfully used then 
existing international agreements such as the GATT, however, they moved a few 
steps forward. It is a fact that the main ideas and operational procedures of the GATT 
initially inspired the “founding fathers” of the EU but their vision extended the scope 
of the GATT with regard to integration market security. As it has been mentioned 
earlier trade in services as such was not included in the GATT, as it was contained in 
the GATS in 1994. Its target was to set up a multinational scheme for trade and 
services within the GATT. The GATS generally relies on lack of discrimination 
                                                                                                                                          
competitive means, yet they lack the monitoring and control over public purchase or 
state support. 
Europe has to be careful not to introduce sophisticated and inconsistent regulations to 
avoid augmentation of transactional costs and diminishing of the profits resulting from 
the integration. Appliance diversities among its members or no regulation 
implementation at all assisted by cultural dissimilarities and institutional controversies 
will divide Europe and contribute to legislative irresolution.” 
1114
 Id at 54. 
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embodied in the national treatment and most favoured nation principles assisted by 
transparency tenet all of which are referred to in a core agreement, which outlines 
prevailing obligations and regulations germane to all sectors, and the register of 
commitment plans. The financial specifications comprising insurance and associated 
services, banking and securities are listed in the Annex on Financial Services. The 
core agreement banned its signatories on discriminating against trading partners or 
most favoured nation, provided for full disclosure of information and required 
commitment to partake, according to a fixed agenda, in works ensuring gradual 
liberalization. The plans or schedules of obligations were prepared by members 
individually and reflected the country’s willingness to open the market access and 
national treatment in terms of specific services sectors.
1115
 
 
However, as it has been pointed out the GATS weakness is the fact that the 
member countries can liberalize their market only to the extent they agreed on while 
taking upon specific obligations. The obligations in questions can be avoided on the 
basis of general and specific exceptions. What is more, the agreement does not 
provide any hints for the future liberalization talks which the countries are not bound 
to take part in. Their participation is founded merely on their uttered intentions to 
liberalize, yet it does not have to move the process forward.  On its part, transparency 
means solely the publication of measures that will be applied to limit trade and 
services. The information disclosure can have only local range and does not need to 
be presented in the WTO Secretariat either.
1116
 
 
The main differences between the EU and NAFTA are as follows: NAFTA is 
open to any new members. Within the range of the agreement there are no tariffs on 
trade, although individual external tariffs are sustained. What it means is that in 
NAFTA the three countries form a free trade union but not a customs union. Chapter 
14 of the pact and its Annexes deal with the financial services and ordain unqualified 
national treatment but they do not require any harmonization or impose mutual 
recognition. What they allow is the autonomy of the member countries as far as 
regulation is concerned.
1117
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Mercosur on its part was started by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 
1991 and now constitutes the third biggest trade market in the world. The 
assumptions of the treaty were to establish an internal market by the year 1994 with 
the incorporation of common external tariff and free movements of labour, goods, 
services and capital which were supposed to liberalise the market gradually. 
Similarly to the GATS and NAFTA, Mercosur fosters both the intercontinental and 
local trade. 
 
6. European Court of Justice. 
 
The European Court of Justice has played an important role in developing a coherent 
policy of EU in terms of banking and financial area, however nothing was actually 
done before the transitional period ended on 31
st
 December 1969. Since that time the 
Court has recognised its cruciality in participating in creation of the regulations of 
the pact, notably when it comes to the free movement provisions. Still, though 
numerous, both universal and particular, regulating acts have been acknowledged by 
the Court in the evolution of free movement, there exist some doubts about the range 
of some main issues. One of them is whether the extent of limitations provided in the 
text of the Treaty in the field of free movement should be decided on by the means of 
discrimination, both direct and indirect, or effects based test. Other dilemmas appear 
in associating these juridical rules to make them compatible with provisions designed 
by the Commission and Council while devising legislative sub-programmes.
1118
 
 
In 1996 the Court addressed the case of Reiseburo Broede, which dealt with the 
licensing requirements. The managing director of INC Consulting SARL was 
hindered from executing her right obtaining debt payment from Mr. Sandker in 
Germany on the foundation that applicable provisions made it impossible for the 
representative of the creditor clients to act on their behalf in legal proceedings as 
debt collectors. However, the German Government and Commission’s objections as 
to the case dealing with no cross-border matter were rejected. The Court stood on a 
position that Reiseburo Broede had granted the power of attorney to INC Consulting 
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residing in France which, on its part, gave the power of attorney to its managing 
director in Germany. Therefore, it was indeed the case of a cross-border issue. 
Additionally, the Court decided that applicable Treaty regulations were the ones 
which handled services, not residence. As a result, the debt collection interdiction 
within Germany without the participation of a lawyer would limit services as they 
could not be provided on German territory by unqualified personnel.
1119
 
 
In 1997 the Court addressed the local licensing requirement again in Parodi. The 
Dutch de Barry Bank granted a mortgage loan to a French real property company – 
Parodi – in November 1984, which case was dismissed by the Regional Court and 
Appeal Court. After that the Cour de Cassation required from the Court a 
confirmation if national provisions demanding authorization to assist banking 
services in the local area was in contradiction to Arts. 59 (4) and 61 (2) (51) of the 
Treaty. The Court stated that the need to obtain additional authorization put the credit 
company in a less favourable position as to providing cross-border banking services 
and in consequence limited its freedom of supplying services. It also noticed that the 
banking area is specifically sensitive if it comes to consumer rights.
1120
 
 
Art. 52 (1) (ex 63) includes the guidelines in order to ensure the freedom of 
establishment and services as it was outlines in earlier General Programmes. As a 
result, the Second Bank Directive imposed a complete mutual recognition of national 
licenses among all Member States on the foundation of the adopted rule of minimum 
harmonization agreed on in the First and Second Directive.
 1121
  
 
5. The Financial Services Action Plan. 
 
Following the implementation of Action Plan for the Single Market of 1997 
Amsterdam European Council Summit, the Commission presented its first 
framework for action in the banking and financial sectors a year later. One of the 
main purposes of the plan was to get rid of accumulation of issues connected with 
applicable Single Market regulations complete introduction. Consequently, the 
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number of non-implemented measures in Member States fell down dramatically. Yet, 
there was a lot to be done to meet the deadline outlined for 1
st
 January 1999. To 
ensure the success of the undertaking, the Action Plan included four “Strategic 
Targets” whose roles were to ensure the effectiveness of market regulations, 
eliminating market obstacles and contortions and fostering individual profits. The 
Plan comprised as well measures for three stages of varied application (Annex 1) and 
enumeration of priority actions (Annex 2). Eventually, the document was adopted in 
the financial sector in 1998 this was a huge step forward, yet there were many things 
to be done on the way to ensure a real Single Market.
1122
 
 
6. The Process towards Mutual Recognition. 
 
7.1. Mutual Recognition. 
 
The mutual recognition is not as simple as it may seem. It may adopt various 
meanings depending on what context it is used in. When it comes to judiciary 
understanding, mutual recognition is associated with the examination of its 
correspondence or analogousness of national restriction measures. This will be taken 
into consideration by the Court while researching mandatory requirements and 
passing judgement if there exists any national interest which should be put before the 
basic provision of free movement. 
 
In Cassis de Dijon that examination of correspondence and analogousness was 
reverted into a separate law provision. This move leads to understanding that 
Member States are obliged to revise other members’ laws and adopt their own to 
adjust to international regulations. That, together with minimum harmonization, 
contributed to creating the “White Paper” which ensured a new market approach. 
Mutual recognition is often referred to as far as mutual identification and 
acknowledgement of national powers execution is concerned in terms of European 
directives, including financial ones. It is connected, for instance, with confirming the 
legitimacy of the broadened range of each of individual licenses (passports as well) 
issued according to applicable directives that allow banks and other financial entities 
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accredited in one Member State to provide services in all others.
1123
Finally, mutual 
recognition can be used as referring to the Commission’s new approach to European 
integration or more generally to any instance of mutual analogy or approbation. In 
judicial terms it can also mean an individual act of validation or acceptance done 
under European legislative measure. Acceptance function of mutual recognition 
correlates with the need for easy access market within a regional treaty and 
comprises numerous regulatory provisions.
1124
 
 
7.2. Minimum Harmonization. 
 
It is not easy to provide a definition for minimum harmonization, either, although it 
does not seem to be as problematic as mentioned earlier mutual recognition. It can 
pertain to the choice of main sectors for legislative actions or agreed minimum level 
of protection under any specific provision. The 1985 White Paper noted that creation 
of the Single Market entails both mutual recognition and minimum harmonization in 
legislation considered generally and as a part of home control, particularly in the 
financial area.
1125
 With reference to minimum harmonization, the White Paper 
emphasizes the importance of legislative harmonization in sectors like health and 
safety which would be mandatory in all Member States. This would ensure the free 
movement of a product. In cases in which there must be some kind of restrictions to 
assure citizens’ safety and health, the minimum harmonization principle would not 
outline requirements but rather prerequisites. In other cases, companies would need 
to comply with an individual set of rules to exercise free movement within the 
Community. Therefore, minimum harmonization may deal with particular areas for 
future legislation as well as creation of common European regulations together with 
fixed minimum levels of protection.
1126
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7.3. Home Country Control. 
 
Home Country Control was a new point in the new approach to Commission’s 
integration strategy. The treatment of banking and financial services under the White 
Paper was analogous to the one given to industrial and agricultural products under 
Cassis. This harmonization of specific fundamental principles was in reality making 
financial institutions subjected to supervision of home country control through 
competent authorities of a country of origin. Soon it started being treated as an 
independent law and together with mutual recognition and minimum harmonization 
became fundamentals of banking and financial programmes. The fact is that the three 
principles were only enounced in the late 1980s; however they evolved from 
previous commencements.
1127
 In July 1972 the Committee of Experts presented an 
original directive project which was founded on the full harmonization idea. In 1974 
it was proposed that credit institutions should be absolved from national license 
while establishing branches in other Member States. It surely preceded the 
introduction of a single passport as a result of the Second Banking Directive in 1989 
functioning on the foundation of mutual recognition considering authorization and 
supervision of a Member State as sufficient by all other states.
1128
 
 
The home country control has been regarded as a crucial component in the area of 
finances from the very beginning. It is one of the outstanding characteristics of this 
field to instantly reassess and supervise the surveillance operations functioning 
within this domain. All of the mentioned above constituents (apart from minimum 
harmonization), which found themselves in the eventual European strategy, were 
forethought by 1972. The case is with post-entry validation system based on original 
lawful production and first market placement of 1979 Cassis, mutual recognition 
being substituted by ‘license validation’ while home country control would connote 
mutual recognition as well as minimum harmonization.
1129
 The utilization of home 
country control principle was thought of as early as 1974-1975, which could be 
perceived in the works of 1975 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The initial 
idea was of mutual responsibility which soon was converted into partition of liability 
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 Id. at 308. 
1128
 Id. at 309. 
1129
 Id. at 310. 
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between the country of origin and the host country authorities in reference to specific 
functions comprising bank solvency and liquidity. The result was issued in 1975 First 
Concordat by the Committee complemented by a requisite of general collaboration 
and data interchange. Later documents together with 1983 Revised Concordat led to 
the requirement of home country control with reference to capital sufficiency and 
joint supervision. What differentiates the European and Basel requirements is that the 
first one comprised a market access right or entitlement added to basic allocation of 
responsibility. This component was proposed in 1974 First Bank Directive, though it 
was anticipated in the initial version of the first directive outlined by the Committee 
of Experts in 1972.
1130
 
 
Taking into account that all banking and financial programmes are founded on the 
three core principles mentioned earlier, there is one more regulation worth 
mentioning here - general good. Originally there was no intention to place this rule in 
the Second Banking Directive, yet eventually it was done thanks to persistence of 
Italian and French representatives working on that. The present functioning of this 
regulation is fully explained in the Court’s verdict in Gebhard and Gouda where it 
was agreed that the measure taken must be ‘non-discriminatory, non-harmonized, 
recognized, not duplicatory, necessary and proportionate.
1131
 
 
7.4. Host Country Control. 
 
Similarly to general good, host country control rule has not been included in the main 
constituents. The Banking Consolidated Directive 2000/12/EC functions by 
designating  the ‘prudential supervision’ of credit entities to the potent authorities of 
the home Member State, though it should be done without compromising any other 
regulation of the Directive. The Directive does not mandate the home country control 
itself, yet broadens the range of home country power to include prudential 
supervision. Regrettably, the definition of ‘prudential supervision’ is not provided, 
though it is generally referred to capital and liquidity and systems and control 
requisites demanded from the bank.
1132
 
                                                 
1130
 Id. at 311. 
1131
 Id at 312. 
1132
 Id. at 313. 
 335 
 
7.5. Assessment. 
 
As Cranston correctly points out the aim in the EU is to create a single market in 
financial services through establishing branches in other parts of the Union or 
providing services cross border, thus through mutual recognition a bank established 
in one member State has a “single passport” to establish branches or to provide 
services in other member State.
1133
 Consequently, a single license is required for all 
the EU instead of licensing in each Member State.  
 
As exposed earlier this directive gave the idea of home country control and 
minimum harmonization as opposed to full harmonization of regulatory rules. Home 
country control means that the primary responsibility for regulatory oversight of 
banking institutions resides with the institutions’ home country supervisors.1134The 
same is with the principle of “freedom of establishment,” which flows from EU 
Treaty Rights and provides any financial institution in the EC with conducting 
permitted services in another EC member country. This has become known as the 
single banking license.   
 
Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition entails recognition for all member-
states of other banking laws and regulations.
1135
 This was designed to encourage free 
                                                 
1133
 See ROSS CRASNTON. PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW, 2 ed. (2002), at 433. The passport does not 
apply to a bank based outside the EU the third country bank must incorporate a “subsidiary” in the 
Community and be licensed in at least one jurisdiction.  
1134
 See Inter-American Development Bank, Financial Integration, at 112.  
1135
 See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 199: “In 1985 the Commission issued a White Paper, in 
which it described its new approach in the banking and financial sectors, which adopted principles of 
mutual recognition and minimum harmonization. To understand the importance of mutual recognition 
notion, one needs to look at famous 1979 Cassis de Dijon which explains its origin and validity. 
Although the European Court did not address the issue of mutual recognition directly, it referred to it 
in its verdict discussing ‘lawful production and first placement of goods’. It remarked that the 
products could be labelled in such a way to notify the consumer about the place of origin and the 
content of the product. The Court’s judgement was founded on three basic elements of authority, 
mandatory requirements and assessment. The Court agreed with the right of a country to regulate 
issues that were not embraced by any general provision at the European level. It also confirmed that a 
country could sustain restrictive measure implementation if a vital public interest was satisfied, even if 
it had trade-restrictive consequences. Yet, in the light of evidence presented by the German 
Government, the Court decided the measure maintenance as unlawful on the basis of proportionality.” 
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trade in financial services without the requirement to harmonize banking laws among 
all the member states and its impact has been remarkable.
1136
     
 
In this sense, participants’ national laws do not have to be fully harmonized and 
home rules are accepted to govern cross border provisions.  The adoption of 
minimum harmonization and mutual recognition outside the EU is problematic 
because its implementation is premised upon a transfer of sovereign authority from 
member states to the EU Commission and such compromise of national sovereignty 
is impossible to achieve in other contexts.
1137
  
 
In this context, the EU Single Passport idea has become attractive for other 
foreign banks, such as the U.S. banks, which having a subsidiary in Europe allow 
them to use the single passport within the 25 countries.
1138
 However, if the U.S. bank 
sets up just a branch, this single passport benefit would not apply.
1139
 
 
The integration of the EU brought the following benefits: a) greater exposure to 
international competition, b) improved efficiency in financial intermediation, c) more 
efficient capital utilization, d) development of the financial industry itself and e) 
better fiscal discipline.
1140
 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that when establishing any regional trading 
scheme or treaty a conflict between easy market access and control inevitably 
emerges. Together with disappearing current national market levels and diminishing 
technical and consumer protection to ensure market entry to new incumbents, 
applicable control mechanisms may be remarkably diminished or completely 
withdrawn from. In the light of lack of central body exercising its surveillance within 
the regional integration system, the European Community Treaty faces a strategy 
                                                 
1136
 The OECD Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services Industry, Volume I, Sectoral Studies, 
1997 at 79. 
1137
 See J. Ane Kaufman Winn. “National Treatment v. Reciprocity in International Banking: United 
States and European Community at 9. In J.J. NORTON et al (eds.). INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS  (Graham & Trotman / Martinus Nijhoff 
1994). 
1138
 The single passport idea is better understood now with the new enlargement. 
1139
 Because the branch is just an office of the parent bank without legal entity and thus it would not 
be liable, while the subsidiary held a separate legal entity.  
1140
  Inter-American Development Bank, Financial Integration, at 106.  
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void in the matter of supervision. As financial market is extremely susceptible to 
insecurity, the market regulation is influenced at national or host levels.
1141
 
 
While creating programmes for this field only a small step forward was made to 
insure the minimum of regulatory framework operation. Minimum harmonization 
and obligatory mutual recognition face tremendous obstacles due to unbalanced 
adoption, interpretation and application in various Member States. What it means is 
that mutual recognition based strategy to ensure regulatory ‘equivalence or 
convergence’ has not been implemented in many countries yet.1142 What is more, the 
countries lack the willingness to establish efficient collaboration to ensure the 
surveillance of financial entities through competent authorities. There is a debate 
going as to whether create a central agency responsible for supervision but many 
issues have to be addressed there including costs, bureaucracy and financing pattern. 
In the absence of such institution, a need to cooperate more efficiently visibly 
arises.
1143
 With regard to free movement, there exists an urge to straighten all the 
discrepancies and uncertainties appearing within the law. This could be done through 
the implementation of GATT or GATS free trade strategy introducing among others 
a discrimination test to future internal market provisions.  
 
Another issue is the parallel home country control and concurrence. Based on the 
Cassis Court verdict, it implies that where a sufficient level of protection has been 
maintained under the home regulations, the host country will not be capable of 
implementing similar provisions. The assessment will be done on the basis of 
examination of regulations implementation and the scope of their security they 
provided, and finally, a competent entity dealing with free movement’s scope of 
jurisdiction needs to be established as quickly as possible to allow better legal 
certainty which on its turn can only foster operational access, stability and 
implementation and resulting market integration. 
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  See WALKER, EUROPEAN…, op. cit., at 345. 
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 Id. at 346. 
1143
 Id. at 347. 
 338 
 
8. Conclusion. 
 
The EU has come up with one of the most intricate and complex regulatory and 
supervisory schemes in the world, namely Financial Services Action Plan, and it 
includes all main domains of domestic and cross-border financial services. The 
programme itself results from different approaches to multinational cooperation in 
the institution’s history and gradual development from ideas of full harmonization, 
which was supposed to impose entire collections of fixed standards on all of the 
fields listed in General Programmes falling under the original EEC Treaty, to notions 
of the mutual recognition of agreed standards, which stressed the importance of 
outlining common minimum standards for all the members in important areas. 
Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition entails recognition for all member-
states of other banking laws and regulations. This was designed to encourage free 
trade in financial services without the requirement to harmonize banking laws among 
all the member states and its impact has been remarkable.  
 
The integration of the EU brought the following benefits: a) greater exposure 
to international competition, b) improved efficiency in financial intermediation, c) 
more efficient capital utilization, d) development of the financial industry itself and 
e) better fiscal discipline.  
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APPENDIX 5: 
 
 
Gambling with Derivatives Burned Mexican Companies 
 
 
In the autumn of 2008, BANXICO’s International reserves decreased in double digits 
and only traders were profiting, while financial institutions were going through a 
really tough financial distress.
1144
 
 
For years, Mexican companies were betting, literally, on certain stability in the 
foreign exchange market, specifically, in the USD/MXN in hedge contracts. The 
USD rate was at MXN$10.50. A lot of investors made “easy” money with this 
situation; due to the kind of derivatives contracts, some of them even multiplied their 
profits, the same size of the losses in other companies. Little by little, as of 
September 15, the level of virtual debt of several companies started growing in the 
banks’ assets above US$50 million.1145 
 
The tragic week of Mexican companies finished with a total loss of more than 
US$2,500 million. CEMEX, Alfa, Bachoco and some others were in dire straits, but 
the worst part was taken by Controladora Comercial Mexicana (COMERCI), a 
company that had to face a loss of US$1,080 million and started restructuring 
negotiations in order to avoid bankruptcy. At the same time, Grupo Maseca 
suspended its quotation in the stock market and was facing a virtual loss of more than 
US$1,200 million. Lawyers, bankers, auditors and economists describe a scenario 
with several factors at stake. They talk about extremely high exposure to risk and no 
control at all; lack of reports to financial Committees, ignorance, bad luck and even 
lies. Such complex financial instruments as the derivatives were a “time bomb”, as 
Warren Buffet described them 5 years ago. However, it all shows that it was caused 
by wrong decisions by some executives, scared of failure and allured by greed.
1146
 
 
                                                 
1144
 See Zacarias Ramirez, Gisela Vázquez and Gilberto Bello, Double or Nothing. Casino of 
Derivatives, in EXPANSION (Nov 23, 2008) at 129. 
1145
 Id. at 129. See also “The CNBV investigates Mexican companies” Wednesday 15th October 2008. 
El Universal. 
1146
 Id., at 130. 
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Derivatives are instruments that reduce risk to companies when applied correctly, 
but when they are used for mere speculation, they can be extremely risky. A 
derivative needs a low initial investment, which can lead to an extremely high 
leverage, even above the capacity of payment of the company. When the USD 
reached MXN$11.00, bankers started calling people who had the most sophisticated 
derivatives contracts: TARNs (Target Accrual Redemption Notes), which punish 
severely an investor who placed a wrong bet. It’s something similar to Casino 
chips.
1147
 
 
The TARNs are a kind of derivative that makes cheaper the cost of getting such 
instrument in exchange of a “bet” on a foreign exchange rate or a product. If the 
client makes a wrong bet (in most cases it’s unlikely), his loss is larger than his 
possible pay-off. The reason why a company takes the risk is the possible profit and 
savings in the costs of these contracts. The most aggressive Mexican companies in 
the derivatives markets made a huge profit in the last couple of years with this kind 
of operations. Comercial Mexicana reported a profit of MXN$360 million in 2007 
with derivatives, 7.4% of its EBITDA. Financial derivatives were invented in order 
to protect companies against shocks in their raw materials, foreign exchange rates or 
energy prices, but were used instead as casino chips for irresponsible bets, a situation 
that was pointed out by the Mexican Central Bank.
1148
 
 
Comercial Mexicana (Comerci) reported that their derivatives used for hedging 
imports or debt had a “fair value” of MXN$125 million by the end of 2007. The rest, 
up to MXN$367 million, were “negotiations”, or better said, speculation. It seems 
that the company was using its Treasury in order to obtain extra profits in foreign 
exchange markets betting on the Mexican Peso and the euro vs. the USD. At that 
time, nobody questioned its operations. COMERCI accepts that these operations took 
place only in September that year, when its treasurer doubled the bets, but a bad end 
came along. Nobody was expecting a banking crisis in the global economy or in the 
foreign exchange markets.
1149
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By the end of the second quarter of 2009, the game stopped being fun. GRUMA 
reported a loss of US$70 million as of May 30 of 2008. Comercial Mexicana 
watched its comprehensive financial cost grow up to MXN$400 million due to 
“derivatives operations”. The National Banking and Securities Commission in 
Mexico, or CNBV, (similar to the SEC in the U.S.) is currently analyzing thoroughly 
if the companies and banks acted clearly and ethically in their derivatives operations. 
In addition, it will check if rules of conduct need to be strengthened. In its view, the 
crisis in these Mexican companies was due to lack of control within the decision-
making process; some basic considerations were overlooked within their corporate 
government. Specially, when a great deal of the derivatives contracts were made by 
the treasurer without telling the Board of the company. All the moves and 
“strategies” inside COMERCI went wrong: they bet on the appreciation of the Euro 
and a stable MXN/USD, exactly the opposite of the actual facts.
1150
 
 
Are Derivatives Safe? 
 
The depreciation of the Mexican Peso and low energy prices made companies 
acknowledge important losses when assessing its derivatives operations: 
Company Loss 
(US$ millions) 
% of its 
Assets 
Comercial Mexicana 1,080 25.0 
Gruma 684 18.2 
Vitro 227 7.5 
Alfa 191 2.0 
Bachoco 50 2.6 
Grupo Industrial 
Saltillo 
49 4.5 
Autlán 40 9.2 
Grupo Posadas 38 3.0 
Source: Mexican Stock Exchange, Banamex Accival, Fitch Ratings.
1151
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COMERCI states that some of the derivatives operations made from July-September 
that year, which caused the actual default, were carried out by the treasurer without 
telling the Board of Directors. On Monday October 3
rd, the company’s treasurer told 
its General Director about the whole situation; with an exposition of US$1,080 
million (the banks say it was US$2,000 million) Credit Suisse was brought to the 
picture to start a restructuring process.
1152
 
 
The Minister of Finance, Dr. Agustín Carstens, said that the speculation of some 
companies added an important pressure to the exchange rate in Mexico. Afterwards, 
the Mexican Central Bank criticized the company (COMERCI and some others) by 
saying that they were negotiating unusual financial operations totally different to 
their business  line. All of the sudden, the third largest retail sale company in 
Mexico, with annual sales of US$5,000 million, had to inform the Mexican Stock 
Exchange that its debt had quadrupled to US$2,000 million, that it had defaulted a 
corporate bond and hence, it was facing restructuring negotiations. As soon as some 
of its suppliers knew about this situation, they took immediate action: MABE 
cancelled the delivery of 10,000 home appliances.
1153
 
 
Some of the solutions arrived soon and outside the court room in an effort to 
avoid a decline in the company’s market value. In order to guarantee payments to 
suppliers, the company announced on October 29 that it got access to two credit lines 
of MXN$3,327 million for COMERCI, COSTCO or the California restaurants. One 
credit from a private entity of 327 TARNs and a contribution made by the Mexican 
Development bank called NAFIN (Nacional Financiera S.N.C.) of MXN$3,000 
million for a trust fund for suppliers´ payments. The company was asked to leave 
collateral such as real estate assets of the company’s group.1154  
 
A weak regulatory scenario definitely helped the creation of this memorable disaster. 
It must be kept in mind that derivatives contracts are not public. The sellers couldn’t 
know the level of risk taken by companies with other banks. In this case, most of the 
operations were made in New York, even the Ministry of Finance (Secretaría de 
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Hacienda y Crédito Público) was not aware of the market value of these contracts. 
Some of the new proposals or suggestions in the market are that companies will have 
to inform more specifically about the potential risks in their derivatives contracts, 
and the Ministry of Finance will have to supervise and keep tight control of 
information in national companies regarding these kind of financial operations.
1155
 
 
The C-10 bulletin of the Financial Information Regulations in Mexico establishes 
that all companies must reveal their positions in financial derivatives when used in 
order to change their risk profile associated with variations in interest rates and 
exchange rates in which the debt is denominated. 
  
For each operation, they must inform if the derivative was used for hedging (mark to 
market) or for cash flow. Lame explanations about the derivatives crisis arrived later 
on. Some traders claimed that a strong Mexican peso was supported by high liquidity 
in the global economy. An important factor to be pointed out is that the crisis in 
Mexico could bring legal and serious consequences if an investor, being a 
shareholder or a bond holder, files a lawsuit or a formal complaint claiming that he 
was deceived by him who was, in theory, responsible for informing about the 
company’s situation he was investing in.1156 
 
It is most likely that the story of Comercial Mexicana will bring new rules of 
conduct and regulations in the Mexican financial law. One of the lessons learned is 
that Corporate Government attends Committees more than four times a year; it 
implies identifying potential and sensitive risks, assessing them and deciding whether 
to report them in detail or not to its investors. In the meantime, consensus suggests 
that it is mandatory to find new formulas that will prevent, if possible, financial crisis 
in the Mexican market.
1157
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APPENDIX 6: 
  
The BCCI Affair and  
the Three Rivers District v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England case 
 
The litigation known as Three Rivers District v. Governor and Company of the Bank 
of England (the Three Rivers case for short), was originated by a law suit filed by ex-
depositors of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) accusing the 
Bank of England of insufficient surveillance over BCCI, which resulted in losses of 
about 10 billion Sterling Pounds for around 6,000 depositors in Britain (including the 
Three Rivers District Council, Hertfordshire, the Western Isles Council and other 
authorities in Scotland), after the Bank of England closed down BCCI in July 5, 
1991.   
 
The initiator of the BCCI enterprise and president of the bank for almost all of its 
19 years life was the India-born Pakistani Agha Hasan Abedi (also known as Agha 
Sahab), whose Shiite Muslim ancestors “had been courtiers and advisers to feudal 
princes for generations” in India.1158   
 
According to BCCI’s official history (still available at its official website as of 
early 2011),
1159
 Agha Hasan Abedi’s plan for BCCI was spelled out in Beirut to “a 
group of people who had worked with him over many years” (including childhood 
friends who fled with him in 1947 from India to the newly independent Islamic 
nation of Pakistan.
1160
   
 
The bank was nevertheless incorporated in Luxemburg as BCCI SA, where it was 
licensed to conduct business in 1972.  A post-BBCI-scandal document by the United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention reports Belgium’s criticism of 
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Luxembourg’s secrecy laws “on the grounds that [they] attract dirty money from 
African dictators.”1161  This document suggests that such state of affairs has been true 
long time ago and was a factor in Abedi’s choice of jurisdiction to incorporate BCCI.  
This is supported by the fact that from the beginning BCCI was actually run from 
headquarters in London (Leadenhall Street, in the City).   
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANK 
OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL prepared by Lord Justice Bingham 
(hereinafter THE BINGHAM REPORT),
1162
 records Abedi’s claim that “before ever 
incorporating BCCI in Luxembourg, he sought to incorporate it in the UK, but was 
rebuffed when the Bank [of England] called for capitalization of a new UK bank in a 
sum he could not then raise.”1163  
 
According to BCCI’s own literature (posted at its website), Abedi’s plan for BCCI 
was to be “a truly international Bank, a bank that would have its early roots in the 
Middle East, and over a period of time would grow into a multinational organization 
with close connections with the Third World…”  This statement hinted subtly key 
BCCI features.  The largest portion of its original capital (USD$2.5 million Dollars) 
was invested by the Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, who 
remained the largest shareholder until its liquidation with 77% of the shares.
1164
  The 
remaining part of the capital was invested by Bank of America.   
 
BCCI “internationality” did not stop there.  “The BCC Group was originally 
conceived as an international organization to provide commercial banking services 
world-wide” (BCCI’s official website).  Therefore, in addition to the London 
branches, Abedi opened branches in more than 70 countries.  Another key insight to 
BCCI’s international growth, hinted in its official website, was BCCI’s openness to 
do things differently in order to achieve world-wide effects: 
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 346 
In BCC we are building an institution that will bring about a new 
balance in the world economy. We are doing something new and so we 
have to find new ways of working. The institutions that dominate 
today’s world have their own style. The institutions of tomorrow need a 
different style – less rigidly structured, more adaptable and more and 
more in harmony with the flow of change.   
 
The truth is that, as “A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations” of the 
USA Senate says: 
 
Unlike any ordinary bank, BCCI was from its earliest days made up of 
multiplying layers of entities, related to one another through an 
impenetrable series of holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, banks-
within-banks, insider dealings and nominee relationships. By fracturing 
corporate structure, record keeping, regulatory review, and audits, the 
complex BCCI family of entities created by Abedi was able to evade 
ordinary legal restrictions on the movement of capital and goods as a 
matter of daily practice and routine. In creating BCCI as a vehicle 
fundamentally free of government control, Abedi developed in BCCI an 
ideal mechanism for facilitating illicit activity by others, including such 
activity by officials of many of the governments whose laws BCCI was 
breaking.
1165
    
 
 
Along the same lines, Mr. Anthony Nelson, former Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury of the UK, said: 
 
The narrative of the events that make up a large part of Sir Thomas 
Bingham’s report has two main themes.  The first is of a bank that was 
structured in such a way as to maximise its potential for concealing 
information from both its auditors and the supervisory board around the 
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world that sought to regulate its activities.  The bank’s guiding principle 
was divide and deceive.
1166
 
 
As a result, BCCI attracted not only wealthy people but also various criminal and 
terrorists organizations, as well as from the cabal of anti-Soviet intelligence agencies 
(the “Safari Club”, which included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, France and Morocco, 
lead by the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency) that were behinds its founding and 
founders, and which used the bank for their unauthorized or even independent 
operations.
1167
  
 
According to the Bingham Report, BCCI’s speed of growth first elicited concern 
in the summer of 1974, but reports from the Luxembourg Bank Commission (LBC) 
and the Bank of America were favorable.  Then by 1975, the first criticisms of 
BCCI’s business practices came to the notice of the Bank of England, but THE 
BINGHAM REPORT reckons them “at that stage isolated and insubstantial.”1168   
 
In March 1976 the Bank of England learned about Abedi’s decision to restructure 
the BCCI group “by forming a non-bank holding company in Luxembourg (BCCI 
Holdings Luxembourg SA) to become the parent of [BCCI] SA and a second 
banking subsidiary in the Caymans, BCCI Overseas,” as a likely response –according 
to THE BINGHAM REPORT– to LBC’s pressure “to restrict the speed BCCI SA’s 
expansion.  One of the expressly mentioned purposes of the Cayman subsidiary 
(BCCI Overseas) was the opening of branches in the UK, although branches of BCCI 
SA were already operating in the UK.
1169
 
 
In June 1976, BCCI Overseas opened its first UK branch, which finally concerned 
the Bank of England, “primarily because of the confusion which branches of SA and 
Overseas, operating together were liable to cause”.  At the time BCCI SA already 
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enjoyed some interim exchange control permissions, with “the hope of full exchange 
control authorization within the foreseeable future.”1170   
 
THE BINGHAM REPORT acknowledges there were rumors about BCCI’s business 
integrity already that 1976 (and implies that the support of Bank of America’s and its 
presence at board level out-weighted such rumors), and that the Bank of England’s 
and LBC’s concern about the speed of BCCI’s growth was shared by some other 
bankers, although –THE BINGHAM REPORT notes— the market opinion in the UK was 
not “strongly hostile” at that point in time.1171 
 
Also in 1976 and 1977, the New York Superintendent of Banks rebuffed BCCI 
attempts to acquire New York banks due to the lack of a single regulator responsible 
for overseeing BCCI’s worldwide operations.  THE BINGHAM REPORT explains (and 
almost dismisses) the contrast in the New York and the UK’s attitudes and responses 
to BCCI as due to the Superintendent’s “personal experience of problems caused by 
lack of a singular regulator,” which the Bank of England had not had “up to then,” 
and reckoning the Superintendent’s decision, “particularly by the standards of the 
day,” as “wise and farsighted decisions.”  The Bank [of England] –continues 
commenting the report—was aware of his thinking, but when the licensing stage in 
the UK came it did not (perhaps because it felt it could not) apply it.
1172
     
 
By 1977 it became evident that BCCI’s expansion was being carried out through 
BCCI Overseas, “which was subject to little or no supervision,” which elicited 
concern.  There was also “a concern that in the drive for expansion such mundane 
prudential matters as ratios and bad debt provisions were somewhat neglected.”  
Likewise, it was thought that the UK branches were over-trading and trading at a 
loss, over-lending in certain areas and to certain borrowers, and doing little business 
with other banks.  It was also realized “for the first time… that BCCI did no sizeable 
banking business in Luxembourg or the Caymans, whereas the bank had more 
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branches in the UK than in any other country, and that the London office appeared to 
play a central role in the group.”1173 
  
Reckoning the above as “nebulous concerns”, THE BINGHAM REPORT says that the 
Bank of England “had more solid material telling in BCCI’s favour.”  Such evidence 
was that: Bank of America, “represented in the London office and on the board, 
reported nothing amiss,” “The LBC continued to inspect the UK branches and 
continued to give [BCCI] SA a clean bill of health;” and that “There was no evidence 
of malpractice.”1174  The report records, nevertheless, the acknowledgement that it 
was not clear how closely Bank of America touch with BCCI business, as well as the 
acknowledgement of LBC’s representatives about the impossibility of supervising 
BCCI SA effectively from Luxembourg, and the desirability of having the Bank of 
England supervise BCCI’s UK branches.1175  
 
Even as early as 1977, no supervisor supposed that incorporating a single 
subsidiary for UK operations “could wholly insulate the local company against the 
effects of disaster afflicting the rest of the group,” and there were those “who felt that 
the responsibility of supervising a local subsidiary was one which the Bank [of 
England] could not adequately discharge and should therefore not undertake.”1176 
 
In spite of the above the Bank of England encouraged the scheme described above 
and BCCI applied to the Department of Trade for its approval.  The proposal 
eventually failed mainly because: 1) It was not possible to obtain the accustomed 
letters of comfort from BCCI’s ultimate owners;1177 2) LBC expressed reservations, 
particularly its Director-Manager; and 3) According to the proposed legislation that 
would become the Banking Act 1979, “unless a UK subsidiary of BCCI were 
recognized as a bank in the UK, it could not use a banking name under the proposed 
legislation, and recognition was (at best) uncertain,” all of which made it potentially 
disadvantageous for BCCI “to encourage a UK subsidiary, which might then be 
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denied use of the name under which SA’s business in the UK was already being 
done.”1178 
 
What becomes clear at that point in the report is that, already at this stage in the 
BCCI story (13 years before its closure), there is a paradox: a dubious (at the very 
least) bank operating in the UK that cannot be brought under full supervision of the 
UK authorities (the  Bank of England at that time) precisely for the same reasons it 
needs to be brought under full supervision, which are the same reasons why it is 
dubious should not be operating in the first place.  This anomaly is explained by THE 
BINGHAM REPORT as due to the fact that the Bank of England lacked formal powers 
(the 1979 Act being not yet in force); “internationally accepted principles of 
supervision were only beginning to take shape;” and BCCI was still a little-known 
entity.
1179
  Lord Bingham reckoned that moving forward with the proposal that 
would have put BCCI under British authorities’ supervision (in spite of its lack of 
qualifications) would have been an advance, which is of course said in light of what 
happened over a decade later.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, the Bank of England still came up with a scheme 
(supposed) “to curb BCCI’s over-rapid growth in the UK and end the confusing 
dichotomy between SA and Overseas.”  The scheme could not be imposed Abedi, 
“but he did accept it (if reluctantly) and he did what was asked of him.”  Likewise, 
the LBC “was content that all the UK branches, as part of SA, would be its 
responsibility.  The scheme was to freeze the overall number of BCCI branches in 
the UK; put all the UK branches owned by BCCI Overseas (Cayman) into BCCI SA 
(Luxembourg); and let the Bank of England “receive information on the UK 
branches as if they were part of a UK bank” and have routine prudential meetings.1180   
 
Once the Banking Act 1979 came into effect (for the most part in October 1979) 
BCCI SA applied for the required recognition to carry on deposit-taking business in 
the UK.  But, upon “a careful and well-devised consultation exercise”, the Bank of 
England concluded that BCCI did not meet the requirement of enjoying and having 
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enjoyed for a reasonable time “a high reputation and standing in the financial 
community.”  Yet the bank had more concerns about the BCCI group, all which were 
related in one way or another to the opacity of its structure and operation and the lack 
of proper supervision of the overall group.
1181
    
 
In spite of such concerns, the Bank of England decided to license SA as a deposit-
taking institution.
1182
  Lord Bingham reckons that: “Refusal of a license would, in all 
probability, have caused loss to depositors and other creditors and exposed the Bank 
to accusations of racial prejudice, xenophobia and so on.”1183  He then goes on to 
speculate briefly on the alternative possibility of having indicated to Abedi that the 
Bank of England was not satisfied that the prudence criterion was fulfilled, in order 
to push Abedi to do “all he could (to the length of making structural changes) to 
alleviate the Bank’s concern.”1184  Yet, Lord Bingham himself realizes that, “in the 
light of what is now known, that the group’s exposure to Gulf and the Gokals was 
already such by 1980,” Abedi could not afford to let the truth appear without 
jeopardizing the future of the group.
1185
 
 
Lord Bingham asserts that BCCI’s principal place of business was in the UK, not 
Luxembourg, and therefore was not entitled to a license as a deposit-taking 
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institution and to use a banking name.  The report says that the Bank of England 
recognized this point shortly after the grant of the license but did not act on it.
 1186
   
 
The Bank of England requested BCCI SA to commission Ernst & Whinney 
(BCCI SA’s auditors) to review the the loan book and report back to the Bank of 
England.  Such exercise was carried out three consecutive times (1980, 1981 and 
1982).  In spite of improvements, a June 1982 paper by Mr Brian Gent (a deputy 
head of Banking Supervision at the Bank of England) found the following usual 
concerns about BCCI: “the persisting caution of the market, the issue of the risks 
inherent in the structure of the group, the crying need for a single overall supervisor, 
the fiction of the group’s Luxembourg assurances when the group’s principal place 
of business was in the UK.”   
 
The paper’s argument was that “no supervisory authority other than the Bank [of 
England] could reasonably be expected to take on the supervision of BCCI and that 
the Bank [of England] should do so, rather than let a large international group 
continue in business on a largely unsupervised basis.”  Yet, not action followed the 
paper.
1187
 
 
A few months after Gent’s paper, a by officials of the Bank of England to 100 
Leadenhall Street left them “in no doubt that London was the head office of the 
[BCCI] group.”  Around the same time Luxembourg indicated that a recent attempt 
to conduct consolidated supervision had been thwarted by lack of information from 
BCCI and the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois’s1188 own lack of resources.  These 
two factors strengthened Mr Gent’s argument that, “Either BCCI’s UK licence 
should be revoked or it should be properly supervised” by the Bank of England.1189    
 
A revised version of Gent’s paper was finally forwarded to the Governor in 
January 1984.  The paper suggested that consolidate supervision of BCCI group’s 
                                                 
1186
 THE BINGHAM REPORT, op. cit., at 38. 
1187
 Id., at 39. 
1188
 The IML replaced the LBC. 
1189
 Id., at 40.  Yet another paper was written in October 1983, reiterating the illegality of BCCI SA’s 
operation with a banking name in the UK since it had not been recognized under section 36 of the Act, 
assuming that the principal place of business was the UK not Luxembourg.  The paper went further to 
argue that BCCI Overseas was not entitled to conduct any deposit-taking business in the UK, 
including the Central Treasury operation, since it held not UK license at all (see id.). 
 353 
worldwide activity could be conducted by the Bank of England by moving the 
incorporation of the holding company to the UK.  The paper also suggested that prior 
to taking that step, “a comprehensive review of BCCI’s worldwide business should 
be undertaken at BCCI’s expense.”1190  The Governor of the Bank of England 
approved of this overall strategy. 
 
But Abedi was resistant to the plan, presented to him in April 1984, even 
“truculent and angry.”  The plan was “quickly snuffed out.” According to Lord 
Bingham, Abedi saw “no need to fall in with the Bank’s wishes;” and the Bank of 
England “had no immediate ground for taking action against [BCCI] SA under the 
Banking Act and thus lacked formal means of exerting leverage on it.”1191   
 
Yet Lord Bingham finds it “surprising that no effort was made to bring the Bank’s 
traditional authority to bear on Abedi to seek to secure his compliance;” and 
speculates that possible “the introduction of formal legal powers led officials to lose 
sight of the Bank’s informal authority, which had proved efficacious in the past.”  In 
Lord Bingham’s assessment, the Bank of England was “rather easily deterred.”1192 
 
Between September 1983 and January 1985, the Bank of England “received eight 
reports on BCCI’s activities in the financial and commodity markets…  the scale of 
BCCI’s activity had attracted the attention of seasoned market professionals, some of 
whom were sufficiently puzzled or concerned to feel that the Bank should know…”  
One of such professionals –THE BINGHAM REPORT says—had ceased “doing options 
business for BCCI because it felt BCCI was taking too many risks.”1193   
 
For all response, the Bank of England merely passed on the said information to 
the IML.  According to THE BINGHAM REPORT, the Bank of England “adopted this 
passive role because it regarded the IML as the primary supervisor of SA and the 
group and did not regard itself as being responsible for the supervision of Overseas.”  
In Lord Bingham’s assessment, “this was a highly unsatisfactory supervisory 
situation, as should have been obvious at the time,” especially since “the Central 
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Treasury was based and operated from 100 Leadenhall Street (although a part of 
[BCCI] Overseas, with transactions booked in the Caymans).”1194 
 
The Bank of England’s concern about lending by BCCI continued over 1985, and 
even Luxembourg’s IML “was becoming restive.”  That year, Abedi presented to the 
Bank of England two alternative schemes, both of which depended on the approval 
of USA authorities.  Abedi, nevertheless, never consulted such authorities, although 
he was advised to do so by the Bank of England.
1195
 
  
In October of 1985, the IML caused BCCI to commission Price Waterhouse 
(BCCI Overseas’ auditors at that time) to review the Central Treasury’s investment 
activities.  The exercise revelead that BCCI Overseas “had made and were making 
substantial losses on option contracts, the extent of which had not been revealed by 
the accounting method used.”  The losses were quantified at the time at USD$ 285 
million Dollars and, attributed by PW, “to incompetence, errors made by 
unsophisticated amateurs;” and “the accounting treatment of these transactions to 
lack of expertise.”1196  
 
The Bank of England was not told about the above, despite Price Waterhouse 
advice to do so and IML’s belief that it had done so.  It was until May 1986 that the 
Bank of England first heard about the said losses, and addressed the issues at a 
meeting later that month.  As a result the Bank of England reviewed the position of 
and its relationship with BCCI SA.  The Bank of England concluded that: 1) BCCI’s 
Central Treasury should not be part of a UK subsidiary; 2) “since there was no basis 
of trust for the Bank’s supervision and the management had shown itself to be 
reckless,” it was “difficult to contemplate BCCI incorporating in the UK at all;” 3) 
“BCCI’s continuing presence in the UK called for consideration.”1197 
 
Subsequently the Bank of England assessed the viability of BCCI SA getting a 
license to incorporate in the UK (although no application had been submitted by 
BCCI).  The result of the exercise reflects the lukewarm and ambiguous, if not 
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contradictory, position of the Bank of England regarding BCCI.  In spite of 
conclusions mentioned in the previous paragraph, it concluded that “there appeared 
to be no immediate danger to depositors,” especially since “the financial loss had 
been made good and the group’s controls were under review” by Price 
Waterhouse.
1198
    
 
Yet, THE BINGHAM REPORT also records what seems more likely to be the real and 
most weighty factor for the Bank of England’s attitude described above, namely, that 
“the closure of 45 UK branches would cause substantial political and diplomatic 
problems.”  Why should the closure of a private bank cause substantial political and 
even diplomatic problems is a question not answered in the main body of the report.   
 
Yet, THE BINGHAM REPORT included a “top secret” Appendix 8 (to remain 
unpublished until October 2042) about the involvement of British and foreign 
intelligence agencies in the BCCI affair.  The “substantial political and diplomatic 
problems” alluded above as a reason not to close BCCI in the UK may refer to 
BCCI’s dealings and involvement with a cabal of international intelligence agencies 
(including, notably, Saudi Arabia’s and the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency), as 
well as the use that, eventually, British intelligence and made of BCCI as source of 
information on the activities of terrorist groups that held accounts at London 
branches.    
 
  According to Conal Walsh, Roger Barnes of the Bank of England’s supervisory 
division met with MI6 officers, in the spring of 1989, to talk about BCCI.  Barnes 
told them that BCCI had: 
 
…‘no natural or established customer base [and] there was no obvious, 
respectable explanation as to how it came to grow so quickly and 
became so profitable…  it was widely assumed that the BCCI 
management were less than meticulous as to what funds they handled.’ 
 
Other Bank of England officials were more forthright, telling MI6 of 
allegations linking BCCI to drug gangs in Colombia and to the military 
regime of General Manuel Noriega in Panama.
 1199
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According to Walsh, the “Appendix 8” makes it clear that the Bank of England 
“received a host of additional warning from intelligence agencies about alleged 
misconduct at BCCI.”1200  Walsh wonders, if the Bank of England “knew of alleged 
unsavoury dealing at BCCI, why didn’t it investigate them?”  And appropriately 
points out “That is the question at the heart of the block buster legal case that began 
at the High Court in London,” alluding precisely to the Three Rivers litigation.   
 
Walsh seems to be providing an answer to his own questions when, reporting the 
contents of the “Appendix 8”, he says that around the same time, 1987, “spy chiefs” 
(as Walsh refers to British MI5 and MI6 intelligence agencies) discovered that the 
terrorist organization lead by the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal 
(responsible of kidnapping and murdering several British citizens) held several 
accounts at BCCI London branches, “worth at least $50m… but decided to discreetly 
monitor the accounts rather than freeze them.”1201   
 
This may be at least one of the “substantial political and diplomatic problems” 
alluded by THE BINGHAM REPORT; a diplomatic problem, as well as political because, 
according to Adams & Frantz, between 1987 and 1991, British intelligence and CIA 
just monitored the terrorists’ and arm dealers’ transactions without further action 
against them or BCCI.
1202
   
 
Another possible “substantial” diplomatic problem may have come from the 
significant involvement of the Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi in 
BCCI.  In addition to owning the majority of BCCI’s stock, it was an Abud Dhabi oil 
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account which bailed out BCCI in 1989 when, intelligence communicated to the 
Bank of England, suggested “that BCCI was in serious financial difficulty.”  Walsh 
writes that “Officials at Threadneedle Street appear to have done nothing to 
investigate BCCI’s solvency.”1203 
 
But the involvement of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency was itself dubious.  
An October 1988 USA Customs’ operation arrested several bankers lured to Tampa, 
Florida, from other jurisdictions.  “Within 72 hours after the Tampa trap was sprung, 
American and British customs agents arrested 40 bankers and narcotics traffickers in 
London and several U.S. cities on money laundering and other charges.”1204  TIME 
goes on to explain: 
 
The investigation, the largest and most complex yet into money 
laundering, was called Operation C-Chase for the $100 bills (C-notes) 
that are the denomination of choice in major drug deals. While previous 
probes had netted mostly low-level operatives, C-Chase bagged far 
bigger suspects. The arrests were based on indictments handed up by 
federal grand juries in Tampa and other cities. The indictments named 
some 80 defendants and the first banking company ever charged in the 
U.S. with money laundering: the Luxembourg-based Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, the seventh largest privately held financial 
institution in the world (assets: $20 billion).
1205
 
 
 
At the time of the aforesaid operation, TIME reported that BCCI operated 400 
branches in 73 countries and was owned by 51 shareholders “including members of 
the Saudi Royal Family.”1206  In 1990, BCCI (Luxembourg) pleaded guilty “to 
laundering millions in drug money” and “agreed last week to close its U.S. offices 
and give up its previously hidden interest in First American, a Washington-based 
bank holding company.” 
 
In spite of all the above, it still took another year for the Bank of England to close 
BCCI in the UK.  The Bank of England “maintained that it could not close BCCI 
Down until clear evidence of malpractice and impropriety in the UK had been 
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uncovered.”  The evidence came in the form of a report under section 41 of the 
Banking Act 1987, by Price Waterhouse, which confirmed that fraud had taken 
place.  “After the report was produced the bank was immediately closed down.” 1207 
 
Yet, the hesitation and delay manifested by the Bank of England to take timely 
and appropriate actions toward protecting the British depositors of BCCI was 
regarded by their defense counsel and BCCI liquidators (Deloitte & Touche) as 
misfeasance in public office.
1208
  The action of tort for misfeasance commenced 
originally in May 1993.
1209
  Yet among other preliminary issues to be considered was 
whether the Bank of England and the other defendants “were capable of being liable 
for the tort of misfeasance in public office, whether alleged losses were caused in law 
by the acts or omissions of the defendant and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover for the tort as existing or potential depositors.”1210 
 
Judge at first instance Clarke, ordered a trial on preliminary questions on Jul 19, 
1995.  A re-amended statement of claim was lodged on 21 August 1995.  First 
instance judgments were delivered on Apr 1 and May 10, 1996.  “A series of further 
amendments were the proposed to the statement of claim and an eighth draft 
produced on January 1997.”  Yet “Clarke J concluded that the claim was bound to 
fail on the basis of the evidence available.”  The action was struck after further 
hearing (Apr 1997) on Jul 30, 1997.  The Court of Appeal upheld but granting leave 
to appeal to the House of Lords (Jan 21, 1999).
1211
   
 
In 2000, the House considered the components of the tort of misfeasance in public 
office and issued its judgment on May 2001, which held that a public power “had to 
be exercised for an improper purpose with the specific intention of injuring a person, 
or persons, or a public officer had to act in the knowledge that he had no power to do 
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the act complained of and that it would probably injure the claimant.”1212  BCCI ex-
depositors based their claim on the second ground above described.  In this case, 
Walker explains, “an act performed in indifference to the outcome was 
sufficient.”1213 
 
After almost 8 years of litigation, on March 2001, the House of Lords held: 
 
…that the claim against the Bank [of England] for misfeasance in public 
office in failing properly to supervise BCCI, or close it down, had been 
adequately pleaded and that the claim could not be said to have no real 
prospect of success and therefore should not be struck out as an abuse of 
the court process.
1214
 
 
Therefore, the House of Lords allowed liquidators Deloitte & Touche to sue the 
Bank of England over 1 billion pound on behalf of BCCI’s ex-depositors.1215  The 
issues, positions and conclusions discussed and held at the House of Lords can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
For Lord Steyn, according to earlier authorities, an action for compensation for 
losses suffered as a result of breach of statutory duty could not be maintained (citing 
Yuen Kun-Yeu v. A-G of Hong Kong).  Consequently, depositors could not sue the 
Bank of England for losses resulting from the negligent licensing, supervision or 
failure to withdraw a license.  If tort was to be pursued.      
 
The House of Lords considered whether individual depositors had any rights, 
regarding which Lord Millet concluded that an authority’s failure to provide 
continuous and effective supervision (in violation of Arts 6 and 7 of the First 
European Banking Directive) did not conferred rights on individuals.  Therefore the 
appeal to community law was dismissed.   
 
     The tort for misfeasance in public office dates from the 1671 case Turner v. 
Sterling
1216
 and is generally based on Ashby v. White (1703).  Walker explains that: 
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This established that an elector who was willfully denied a right to vote 
by a returning officer would have a cause of action.  Although the tort 
was recognized in a number of cases during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries
1217
 
 
 
It was nevertheless until the Three Rivers case that the House of lords was able to 
identify the components of the tort action for misfeasance in public office, which 
according to Lord Steyn are six:
1218
 
 
i) The defendant must be a public officer; 
ii) The conduct must be in exercise of a public function; 
iii) There had to be targeted malice or abuse and probable injury: 
iv) There had to be a duty to the plaintiff; 
v) There had to be causation; and 
vi) There had to be foreseeable damage. 
 
In March 2001, Lord Hope reckoned that THE BINGHAM REPORT was inadequate and 
insufficient as evidence or ever as a fair source of information for a trial on the issues 
relating to the tort of misfeasance in public office in the BCCI affair. 
1219
  
Consequently, he reckoned that it was necessary to hear oral evidence since the 
assessment of the state of mind of the Bank of England’s officials at each of the 
various stages throughout the collapse process could not be determined only by the 
documents.
1220
 
 
Lord Hope also admitted that the trial would be lengthy and expensive, but that 
justice required that the claimants be given an opportunity to present their case at 
trial so that its merits may be assessed in light of the evidence.  Connected with this, 
Walker records that Lord Hope attempted to act with neutrality and without 
                                                 
1217
 Id., at 3. 
1218
 Id., at 3. 
1219
 Id., at 4. 
1220
 Id., at 5. 
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assumptions about the competence or integrity of the Bank of England or its 
officials, before examining the available evidence.
1221
 
 
Along similar lines, for Lord Steyn, the House of Lords had to reckon the matter for 
itself and not rely merely on THE BINGHAM REPORT.  To him it was indisputable that 
the Bank of England knew from April 1990 onward that BCCI was in imminent 
danger of collapse with inevitable loss to depositors; and concluded that the case 
should be examined and tested with the procedural advantages of a fair and public 
trial. Lord Hutton accepted Lord Hope’s account of the factual and statutory 
background to the appeal and with his general conclusion and reasons behind it.
1222
 
 
The minority votes of Lord Hobhouse and Lord Millet were against allowing the trial 
to proceed.  Lord Hobhouse concluded that the appeal should be dismissed because 
the tort used by the plaintiffs required proof of actual bad faith or dishonesty on the 
part of the officials concerned, and to him alleging that without prima facie evidence 
in support was an abuse of process.   
 
The trial began on 13 January 2004, but was later abandoned formally on November 
2, 2005.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1221
 Id. 
1222
 Id., at 5-6. 
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